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FOREWORD
In November 2008, three weeks before Diane Kriger passed away, I 
visited her in Ottawa. I believe we both knew that it was our last face-
to-face visit, but it was filled with family news, updates on students and 
colleagues, discussion of her book, my research projects, conferences, the 
academic scene in Israel, the new feminist commentary to the Talmud 
project, and laughter—much laughter. It was only then, that close to the 
end, that she was willing to let go of her book. That night she signed 
the contract for this book, something I had been urging her to do for 
several months. It was essentially complete—she needed to finish her 
conclusion, which she sent to me a few days later. We over-optimistically 
set a date for submission early in 200⒐ But books take longer to get 
all the details right. She quoted several languages, including Hebrew, 
Aramaic, Greek, Latin, Akkadian (thankfully in transliteration) as well as 
German and French.  Unfortunately, all foreign alphabets and diacritical 
marks disappeared in the transfer of material to me. Even with the help 
of computer technicians we were unable to recover the original languages. 
With the help of a scanner, nearly all lost material was keyed in very 
accurately by Yael Richardson, to whom I am most grateful. Nevertheless, 
everything needed to be checked, the notes renumbered, the bibliography 
finalized, and many other details with which only editors and publishers 
are concerned needed to be addressed.  Diane had been the person who 
helped me with this work in my books and articles. She was an expert 
and I am a novice.  I have tried very hard to fulfill my promise to her that 
we would “do her proud” in getting her book out, but I am responsible 
for the many delays. I had no Diane with whom to consult with my 
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questions, only the loss of Diane with which I had to come to terms while 
immersed in her thoughts and ideas.  Readers will see the density with 
which she writes, both in the difficulty of concepts and in the terseness 
of presentation. I have made some modifications for the sake of clarity, 
remaining as faithful as possible to her ideas as I understood them.  I have 
streamlined her presentation of variant readings of rabbinic texts, divided 
one chapter into two, and filled in her conclusions. This was for the sake 
of clarity only; I changed nothing of the content of her thoughts. I have 
also prepared the indices which depended on pagination and added a few 
notes marked [TM].
 I am grateful to Harry Fox (leBeit Yoreh) with whom I regularly 
consulted, to Paul Heger for his support, to Yael Richardson for her help in 
restoring the lost texts, to Matt Iannucci for his help with the bibliography 
and to my colleagues P.A. Beaulieu and Doug Frayne for their help with the 
Akkadian references. I feel Diane’s absence every day and the loss of her 
talents for the academic world, for those seeking justice, and for her family 
and iends.  I hope the final outcome of my efforts would be acceptable to 
Diane. May her memory be blessed.
Tirzah Meacham (leBeit Yoreh)
ל“ג בעומר תשס“ע
----------  NOTES ON SOURCES, TRANSLITERATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS           ----------
— xvii —
NOTES ON SOURCES, 
TRANSLITERATIONS AND TRANSLATIONS
⒈  Citations of Mishnah, Talmud and aggadic works are om standard 
printed editions, most of which have been downloaded om the Bar 
Ilan Responsa Project Data Base. If there are significant variants, the 
text may be presented according to a particular manuscript as noted 
and variants om other witnesses may be presented in an apparatus 
or in a note. Occasionally line numbers and punctuation are added. 
Tosea citations are om Lieberman where available and otherwise 
om Zuckermandel.
⒉  Citations om Targum Onkelos and the Targumim to the Prophets 
and the Hagiographa are om the Yemenite Tag’ (תאג׳). Citations om 
Targum Pseudo-Jonathan are om E. G. Clarke, 198⒋ Citations om 
Targum Neofiti are om A. Diez Macho, 1970. Citations om the 
Samaritan Targum are om A. Tal, 198⒏
⒊  Hebrew transliteration is based on the “non-technical” system cited 
in Encyclopedia Judaica, 1972, Vol. ⒈ Exceptions are made for some 
commonly used words, particularly names (e.g. Moses, Akiva, etc.). 
When a vowel combination is not a diphthong but two separate 
syllables, I have indicated such by use of an apostrophe. I have also 
included a dot under the “h” (ḥ) to indicate the letter ח.
⒋  Transliterations of the Mesopotamian law collections are taken om 
M. Roth, 199⒌ Akkadian transliteration uses the Thames font 
developed by Dr. J. Hoch of the Department of Near and Middle 
Eastern Civilizations at the University of Toronto. Cunieform texts 
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om Babylonian tablets are cited using the abbreviations in W. von 
Soden (cited as AHW) and the Chicago Assyrian Dictionary (cited as 
CAD).
⒌  Unless otherwise indicated, English translations of Hebrew, Aramaic, 
and Akkadian texts are my own.
⒍  Citations om the Septuagint are taken om the Göttingen edition 
where available. English translations of the Septuagint passages are 
taken om L. Brenton, 198⒍ Quotations om the work of Philo and 
Josephus and translations thereof are taken om the Loeb Classical 
Library editions.
D.K.
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INTRODUCTION
The Construction of Status
Several years ago, an article in the Journal of Halakhah and Contemporary 
Society proposed the following argument:1 Since neither the State of Israel 
nor its political predecessors have ever passed any legislation banning 
slavery, it would still be possible to acquire in Israel a shifḥah kena’anit 
(a non-Jewish female slave) for use under the provisions of mQidd. 3:⒔ 
The purpose of such a transaction would be to “cure” the descendants of 
a mamzer (a male outcast2), who would have limited marrying capacity 
within the Jewish community, by having the mamzer produce offspring 
with the slave woman.3 The children would be slaves, like their mother,4 
and could then be eed, untainted by any outcast status. The slave would 
presumably be someone willing to accept her assignment in return for a 
monetary reward, and she could be “eed” aer she had produced the 
child or children. Manumission constitutes conversion, so that the slave 
who became obligated in the negative commandments when acquired 
becomes a full Jew at manumission. 
 Should we question such transactions in legally marginal statuses, even 
1 David Katz, “The Mamzer and the Shifcha,” JHCS 28 (1994): 73-10⒋
2 In mYev. 4:13 there are various definitions of a mamzer; in general it may be said that it 
is the offspring of a woman with whom one is forbidden to have a sexual union. A point 
to note is that the term is narrower in meaning than English “bastard,” which generally 
connotes any offspring of unmarried parents.
3 MQidd. 3:13 states in part: “R. Tarfon says: mamzerim can clear themselves [of 
disqualification om marrying Israelites]. How? A mamzer who married a shifḥah —  the 
offspring is a slave. If he [his father] eed him, the son is thereby a ee man.”
4 A dissenting opinion of R. Eliezer in mQidd. 3:13 holds that the offspring would be both 
a slave and a mamzer.
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if the proposed transactions are (at least to some extent) symbolic? In my 
opinion, the answer is yes, because such transactions bring us too near 
the “slippery slope” between word and deed.5 Where, in fact, would the 
women in such transactions be found? We may be lulled into a belief that 
female slaves who are associated with the widespread violence, kidnapping, 
and abuse associated with plantation slavery are a phenomenon limited to 
particular areas of the third world. Marginalization of humans, however, 
particularly the physical trafficking in and economic exploitation of females, 
is a worldwide phenomenon, though its victims may be hidden behind such 
labels as “prostitute” and “illegal immigrant.”6 It is far too easy to assume 
that such marginalized statuses are what mishnaic law had in mind by 
“female non-Jewish slave.” 
 Further, the uncritical maintenance of such vague terms allows us to 
forget that such categories are not “natural or inevitable.”7 “Slavery” and 
“slaves” are constructs, supported by particular legal, political, economic, 
and social definitions. 
 In this case, we may question why marginal statuses arise in the first place 
in legal systems, and why they remain. Are they simply enforcing an existing 
social hierarchy? Can their development be explained by theories of evolution 
(some variation of the status-contract progression, for instance, or overactive 
analogy, i.e., the logical extension of a limited term to wider categories), or by 
theories of diffusion (borrowing om foreign sources, for instance), by political 
or economic changes (such as the development of Diaspora Judaism or the 
waning of an agricultural society), or by some dynamic, multivariate model?8 
5 Martin J. Burke, The Conundrum of Class (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 
xvi: words both register ideas and give effect to them.
6 For three among many summaries that show the variety of transactions that may be 
included under the term “slavery,” see Bryan Welch, “Putting a Stop to Slave Labor: 
A Moral Solution to Illegal Immigration,” UTNE Reader, March-April 2007, 42-44; 
Thomas S. Axworthy, “Sexual Slavery Seen as World’s Greatest Crime,” The Toronto Star, 
25 September, 2005, A-17; Barry Came, “Freeing the Slaves of Sudan,” Maclean’s, 10 
April, 2000, 20-2⒎
7 Barry Came, “Freeing the Slaves of Sudan,” 2⒉ Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: 
Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), also 
notes that such categories can become “reified,” leading to “levels of abstraction remote 
om actual experience” (114).
8 For a summary of and comments on various evolutionary and diffusionist models, see, 
e.g., Bernard S. Jackson, “On the Problem of Roman Influence on the Halakhah and 
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 I wish to contribute to this discussion by examining the status of “female 
slave” in early Jewish law. I conclude that there is a “leap” between biblical 
and postbiblical meanings of this term. The “female slave” envisioned in the 
Bible, though clearly dependent, was valued for her reproductive capability, 
and the Bible’s concern was to place her within a family continuum. In 
the Mishnah, she is already a marginalized entity, sex with whom is either 
forbidden or made legally insignificant.
What is a “Slave”?
Before beginning a discussion of the changes in female slave status, it is well 
to note that the concepts of “slave” and “ee” in biblical and postbiblical 
documents differ om our modern understanding of these terms. Modern 
notions of “slave” as a specific status distinct om “ee” probably did not 
apply in the Bible. Certain scholars have argued that the ancient Near 
East was in fact unfamiliar with the modern notion of “eedom,” and the 
overall ideology was one of a hierarchy of dependence.9 The ideal, in other 
words, was a notion of belonging. One theory in fact proposes that slaves 
in Mesopotamia were simply household members who were acquired by 
means other than birth or marriage, but who otherwise simply took their 
place as part of an overall dependence continuum.10 
 Certainly, dependence is also presented as an ideal in the Bible; as one 
of many examples, see Lev. 25:55: “For to me the children of Israel are 
slaves; they are my slaves whom I have taken out of the land of Egypt; I am 
Normative Self-Definition in Judaism,” in Aspects of Judaism in the Graeco-Roman Period, 
vol. 2 of Jewish and Christian Self-Definition (ed. E. P. Sanders et al.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 
1981), 158-5⒐ In “History, Dogmatics and Halakhah,” in Jewish Law in Legal History and 
the Modern World, (Leiden: Brill,1980), 17-22, Jackson proposes a multivariate approach 
to legal development that takes into account both innate and external factors (including 
foreign influence). He proposes that the relative importance of each factor will vary 
according to the type of legal phenomenon studied — that is, whether it relates to form 
(e.g., classificatory divisions) or content (e.g., rules or notarial practice). This model 
will be discussed further below. Alan Watson has argued in contrast that, at least in the 
Western world, borrowing has been the usual process of development: Alan Watson, 
Legal Transplants: An Approach to Comparative Law (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 
1974), ⒎
9 See Orlando Patterson, Freedom (New York: Basic Books, 1991), 1:33-4⒈
10 Patterson, Freedom, 34-3⒎
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the Lord your God.” (One might argue that Eden itself represents the ideal 
biblical hierarchy, conditional upon each element of creation maintaining 
its assigned place.) Further, the biblical term ḥofshi, usually translated as 
“ee,” seems to have more the sense of “apart,” and is not necessarily an 
ideal state.11 And there are certainly hints throughout the Bible that slaves 
would be on the lower end of any such hierarchy; “world-upside-down” 
depictions such as that found in Prov. 30:21-23 (the eved who reigns and 
the shifḥah who inherits) suggest that the opposite was the ideal. It is in 
the Mishnah, with its introduction of a new term for “ee” in ben ḥorin, 
as well as the introduction of the status of a eedman, meshuḥrar, that we 
seem to come closer to the notions of slavery found in Greek and Roman 
law. In the Bible, the slave is a dependent creature. In postbiblical works, 
the slave is a truly marginalized creature.
Sex Right as a Status Marker
If the notions of dependence versus marginalization are sufficient in general 
to differentiate biblical om postbiblical slaves, why study female slaves 
in particular? Female slaves have not yet been the subject of particular 
study, as I will discuss in more detail below. Prior studies have tended to 
subsume females within the more general principles derived with respect 
to male slaves. This scholarly marginalization, however, has also obscured 
the important fact that female slaves have reproductive capacity; as such, 
I argue that the female slave is better compared to the ishah, “wife,” 
than to the male slave. Certainly, some scholars have attempted to rank 
various biblical females, particularly the amah, shifḥah, and pilegesh (the 
word usually translated “concubine”) in relation to the ishah. One of the 
most detailed hierarchies was proposed by Epstein, who suggested that 
the “oriental” type of extended family structure might have included the 
chief wife, the concubine (assumed to be a wife of lower rank with the 
same legal strictures regarding inheritance, adultery, and incest), the 
eedwoman (though this term is not mentioned in the Bible), the captive 
wife, the slave wife, and the female slave; these were associated legal 
11 One must therefore question whether Exod. 21:26-27, which purports to give the iǌured 
slave his or her “eedom,” was actually beneficial to the slave.
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statuses of descending rank.12 In these studies we find perfect examples of 
the tendency to rank females first and foremost according to “sex right” — 
that is, in terms of the degree of sexual access permitted to a female and 
the consequences of such access. As Pateman has suggested, sex is divided 
into separate areas of significance— compartmentalized — according to 
the woman involved.13 
 In this concept of sex right separating women into categories, I believe 
we have an appropriate status “marker” that may be used to trace the way 
in which female slaves were differentiated om wives and other women as 
Jewish law developed. Using the notion of sex right, I trace the meaning 
of the Hebrew terms amah and shifḥah (the usual terms used for female 
slave)14 as it is represented in texts within the Jewish legal canon, primarily 
the Hebrew Bible, Mishnah, midreshei halakhah, and baraitot within the 
Talmudim. The method of study will include both philological analysis of 
specific terms relating to slavery and a functional comparison to rules and 
attitudes found in certain documents contemporary with or antecedent 
to the primary texts.15 The study also addresses issues regarding the 
12 Louis Epstein, “The Institution of Concubinage Among the Jews,” PAAJS 6 (1934-1935): 
154, 15⒍ 
13 Carol Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 22⒋ 
Pateman’s own study also focused on the idea that “wives,” “slaves,” and “serfs,” among 
others, may all be seen as part of a continuum of dependence. Thus in fact they share 
certain disabilities in law. In her review of the implications of coverture in English common 
law, she notes the loss of identity that has been common to both “slave” and “wife”: 
 To be a slave or wife was, so to speak, to be in a perpetual nonage that
 wives have not yet entirely cast off. Adult male slaves were called “boys”
 and adult married women were — and still are — called “girls.” As befitted
 civilly dead beings, the slave was brought to life by being given a name by his
 master…. When a woman becomes a wife, her status was/is singled out by
 the title “Mrs.” A wife was included under her husband’s name and, still
 today, can be called “Mrs. John Smith.” (p. 21)
 It is thus not surprising to find similar mishnaic terminology regarding the acquisition 
of wives and slaves (the language of qinyan, in mQidd. chapter 1), and the use of a get 
(either a writ of divorce or a writ of manumission) to sever both the marriage and the slave 
relationship.
14 It is the biblical terms eved for a male and amah and shifḥah for a female that are generally 
taken to refer to slaves.
15 These include the Mesopotamian law collections, Mesopotamian contractual evidence, 
Qumran documents, apocryphal and pseudepigraphic texts, the Tosea, and midreshei 
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relative priority of different slave laws in Mishnah, Tosea, and talmudic 
baraitot.
 How is sex right manifested in a legal system? I focus on two types of 
provisions that I believe are significant for explicating this topic: the use 
of legal marriage and correlative ideas about the legitimacy of children as a 
means of differentiating class; and the extent to which adultery provisions 
are used to protect a man’s sex right to a particular woman. 
 I thus use certain repercussions of sexual activity as a “marker” of legal 
status. “Status” here is used in the modern legal sense of an abnormality 
or difference in legal condition om some presumed norm, which cannot 
be acquired, changed, or divested at will.16 This definition is intended to 
emphasize the idea that status in a legal system is not an inherent condition, 
but one assigned by the system according to characteristics it deems relevant 
at particular times. By the use of differentials in the legal provisions on sexual 
activity, formal legal recognition thus tends toward status inequality. 
 I shall explain these two facets of sex right in more detail. 
Sex Rewarded: Marriage and the Matrilineal Principle
Various studies of social stratification have noted the way that prohibitions 
against intermarriage between different groups serve as a means of 
delineating class structure.17 The stratification is further maintained by 
making a child’s status — its “legitimacy” for community membership, 
domicile, inheritance, or other purposes — dependent upon whether its 
mother has entered into a “valid” marriage. That is, where the woman’s 
options and roles are limited and feature as a major element the bearing 
of children, such conditions on her offspring’s legitimacy act as a strong 
incentive to enter into a “valid” marriage.” 
aggadah. Certain mediaeval Jewish texts will also be examined.
16 This definition is based on R. H. Graveson, Status in the Common Law (London: Athlone, 
1953), chap. ⒈ Though this is an older work, it is useful in setting out the nature of 
the modern Western idea of status, as opposed to other concepts of status. In particular, 
Graveson notes the distinction between this idea and the concept of status in Roman law, 
which connoted the legal condition of the “normal” person, or Sir Henry Maine’s concept 
of status as deriving om one’s position in the family (4, 34).
17 See, e.g., Joseph Schumpeter, “The Problem of Classes,” in Class, Status and Power (2nd 
ed.; ed. R. Bendix and S. M. Lipset; New York: Free Press, 1966), 42-46, at 4⒊ 
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 Not surprisingly, a common feature of many slave systems is to deny 
slaves, particularly female slaves, the ability to engage in such legally 
valid marriages, and as a corollary to make the slave status of a child 
interdependent with its mother’s marital status.18 These two elements, a 
restriction on legal marriage and the interdependence of a child’s status with 
that of its mother, are termed in this work the “matrilineal principle.”19 
 The economic benefits to the slave master of such a principle are 
obvious: slave women, unlike other women, do not have their status 
changed by intercourse, whether with their master or other males; their 
offspring, in turn, add to the master’s supply of slaves.20 These benefits to 
the master were expressed succinctly by Frederick Douglass, describing his 
own experience as a slave in the United States:
The whisper that my master was my father, may or may not be true; and, 
true or false, it is of but little consequence to my purpose whilst the fact 
remains, in all its glaring odiousness, that slaveholders have ordained, and by 
law established, that the children of slave women shall in all cases follow the 
condition of their mothers; and this is done too obviously to administer to 
their own lusts, and make a gratification of their wicked desires profitable as 
well as pleasurable; for by this cunning arrangement, the slaveholder, in cases 
not a few, sustains to his slaves the double relation of master and father.21 
18 The interdependence of the child’s status and the mother’s marital status is also a common 
feature of modern legal systems. We may note, for instance, that Canadian law, like many 
common law jurisdictions, held (until 1968) that a child’s domicile followed that of its 
mother, unless the mother was validly married.
19 The term “matrilineal” is used in this work in its general meaning of “deriving om the 
mother,” rather than in any technical, anthropological sense.
20 It is still seems to be a matter of debate, however, whether “breeding” was ever an 
economically viable way of increasing the supply of slaves, and whether the matrilineal 
principle may be related to such use of breeding. Claude Meillassoux’s classic study 
of certain Aican societies posited circumstances in which it was more economical to 
have all slaves engage in production of goods that could be exchanged for more slaves: 
Claude Meillassoux, Anthropologie de l’esclavage. Le ventre de fer et d’argent (Paris: Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1986), 292-9⒊ Meillassoux argued (302) that the greater the 
trend toward this kind of production, the greater the déféminisation of female slaves (and 
the less price differential between them and male slaves).
21 Frederick Douglass, “Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglass, an American Slave,” in 
Autobiographies (New York: Library Classics of the United States, 1994), 1:16-⒘ Douglass 
goes on to remark that in his experience such children, being a “constant offence” to the 
master’s (white) wife, suffered greater hardships, and were more likely to be sold away.
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 A legal rule connecting the status of the child to that of its mother is 
also deemed by some to be simply a matter of common sense; as Watson 
notes, a rule that made a child’s status dependent on that of its father 
would give rise to “endless problems of proof.”22 
 Given the economic and other benefits of a matrilineal principle, it is 
not at first glance surprising to find such a principle in mishnaic law. The 
Mishnah in fact uses it to define the status of children in two types of 
“intermarriage”: Jewish-gentile and ee-slave. The principle finds expression 
in the Mishnah in two apparently asymmetrical parts. MQidd. 3:12 deals 
with a case in which the mother is a gentile or slave woman: the child of 
the gentile mother is a gentile; the child of a slave mother is a slave.23 Both 
results are based on the idea that neither the slave woman nor the gentile 
woman is capable of entering a legal marriage (qiddushin). MYev. 7:5 deals 
with a case in which the mother is an Israelite and it is the father who is a 
gentile or slave;24 the offspring in both cases is a mamzer.25 
22 Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987), ⒑
23 This Mishnah reads:
וכל מי שאין לה לא עליו ולא על אחרים קדושין הולד כמותה ואיזה זה ולד שפחה ונכרית   
 And whoever does not have qiddushin with him or with others — the offspring 
is like her. And which is this? The offspring of a slave or a gentile.
24 This Mishnah reads:
העבד פוסל משום ביאה ואינו פוסל משום זרע כיצד בת ישראל לכהן בת כהן לישראל וילדה   
הימנו בן והלך הבן ונכבש על השפחה וילדה הימנו בן הרי זה עבד היתה אם אביו בת ישראל 
לכהן לא תאכל בתרומה בת כהן לישראל תאכל בתרומה ממזר פוסל ומאכיל כיצד בת ישראל 
לכהן ובת כהן לישראל וילדה הימנו בת והלכה הבת ונישאת לעבד או לגוי וילדה הימנו בן הרי 
זה ממזר היתה אם אמו בת ישראל לכהן תאכל בתרומה בת כהן לישראל לא תאכל בתרומה.
 The slave disqualifies because of intercourse but he does not disquali because of 
offspring. How? The daughter of an Israelite [married] to a priest, [or] the daughter of 
a priest [married] to an Israelite, and she bore to him a son, and the son went and had 
intercourse with a slave woman and she bore him a son — he is a slave. [If ] his father’s 
mother were the daughter of an Israelite [married] to a priest — she may not eat terumah; 
[if his father’s mother were] the daughter of a priest [married] to an Israelite — she may 
eat terumah. A mamzer disqualifies and gives the privilege to eat. How? The daughter of 
an Israelite [married] to a priest or the daughter of a priest [married] to an Israelite who 
bore to him a daughter and the daughter was married to a slave or to a gentile and she 
bore to him a son — he is a mamzer. [If ] his mother’s mother were the daughter of an 
Israelite [married] to a priest — she may eat terumah; [if his mother’s mother were the] 
daughter of a priest [married] to an Israelite — she may not eat terumah.
25 In later law there was a trend to declare the offspring of a gentile or slave father kasher (valid) 
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 The role of this principle with respect to children who have one gentile 
parent has recently been debated quite extensively, particularly regarding 
the idea that the principle is of postbiblical, possibly Roman, origin.26 The 
question of slaves’ children is, however, mentioned only incidentally. 
 At a second glance, the presence of a matrilineal rule for slaves in the 
Mishnah rule is puzzling. 
 First, there is the great “leap” between the biblical status of slaves’ 
children and the mishnaic rules. Despite the use of Exod. 21:4 in legal 
midrash as the basis for arguing the existence of a matrilineal principle in 
the Bible, I demonstrate that there is in the Bible no conclusive evidence 
of a prohibition of legal marriage for female slaves or of an automatic 
inheritance of slave status om a parent. Second, if the purpose of the 
mishnaic principle were simply to prevent ethnic intermarriage, gentile 
slaves would be covered by the general rule regarding the status of gentile 
children; why add them separately? Put another way, we may ask: What 
is the commonality between slavery and religious status that would justi 
rather than a mamzer: see, e.g., the statement of Ravina in bYev. 23a and Maimonides, 
MishTor Hil. Issure Biyah 15:⒋ 
26 An extensive discussion of the issue took place following the proposal by American 
Reform Judaism to also recognize as Jewish the child of a Jewish father, even if its mother 
was gentile. A collection of such arguments appears in Judaism 34/1 (1985). Much of 
the argument that took place at the time of the Reform proposal was concerned with 
tracing the origin of the precise rule that the child of a gentile woman should follow the 
status of its mother. Such arguments about origin followed two main trends. One line of 
thought suggested that the rule connecting the gentile mother and her child was an innate 
development in Jewish law, a logical outgrowth of such biblical passages as Ezra 10:2-3 
(attesting to the covenant made by the returning exiles to put aside the wives taken om 
“the peoples of the land” as well as their children) and Neḥ. 13:23-24 (noting that the 
children born of wives om Ashdod, Ammon, and Moav could speak only the mother’s 
language). For an example of this viewpoint see Lawrence Schiffman, “Jewish Identity and 
Jewish Descent,” Judaism 34/1 (1985): 78-84, esp. 8⒈ Another line of thought, exemplified 
in particular by Shaye Cohen, suggested that this rule actually originated in the postbiblical 
period. Noting that biblical attitudes favored a patrilineal principle, Cohen argued that 
the development of a matrilineal principle might have been actuated by external factors 
(particularly Roman law), but might also have been an organic development om the 
biblical concern with forbidden mixtures; see his extended article: Shaye D. Cohen, “The 
Origins of the Matrilineal Principle in Rabbinic Law,” AJS Review 10/1 (1985): 19-5⒊ For 
a recent critique of Cohen’s position, see Ranon Katzoff, “The Children of Intermarriage: 
Roman and Jewish Conceptions,” in Rabbinic Law in its Roman and Near Eastern Context 
(ed. Catherine Hezser; Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 276-8⒍
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their association under the same matrilineal principle? Further, there is 
an asymmetry in the rule: the fate of children of these “mixed” unions 
differs depending on whether the male or female parent was the slave. S. 
Cohen has suggested that this asymmetry is evidence that the Mishnah 
did not know of a unified matrilineal principle.27 I demonstrate that there 
were a variety of ideas regarding the inheritance of slave status even in 
postbiblical literature, so that there is no ground for arguing for a linear 
development of the matrilineal principle in early Jewish law. The evidence 
in my opinion is consistent with the overall difference between dependence 
and marginalization in biblical and postbiblical texts. 
 
Sex Punished: Adultery as Property Crime or Sex Crime?
Given that wives and female slaves existed on the same sexual continuum, 
what separated one om the other? Certainly different expectations as to 
work obligations, dowries, and inheritance came into play. There is also, 
however, the question of the degree to which the husband’s or master’s 
sexual access to a woman was protected, and here the concept of adultery 
is pivotal. Leviticus 19:20-21 addresses the question of a female slave who 
is bound sexually in some way to a male (the shifḥah neḥerefet) and seems 
to state that such a woman is incapable of adultery due to her unee 
condition. Does this section reflect a conflict between sex right and some 
sort of property right, with the resolution in favor of the latter?
 Certainly the conceptualization of slaves, both male and female, as 
“property” as opposed to “person” is oen treated as a given in the study 
of slave systems. This distinction is far om straightforward, however;28 
27 Shaye J.D. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness: Boundaries, Varieties, Uncertainties 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999), 27⒏
28 For a brief idea of the range of opinion on this complex topic, we may note the view 
of Guillaume Cardascia, “Le concept babylonien de la propriété,” RIDA (3e serie) 6 
(1959): 19-32, at 25, who argued that Babylonian sources reflect only an undifferentiated 
concept of ownership, a direct relationship between person and object, without the 
type of constitutive elements that were recognized in the Roman system, and without 
a clear differentiation between ownership of an item and possession of it; and the view 
of Paul Koschaker who argued that the Laws of Hammurapi [=LH] consist of various 
layers, some layers reflecting more “primitive” ideas of ownership. See Paul Koschaker, 
Rechtsvergleichende Studien zur Geseztgebung Hammurapis, Königs von Babylon (Leipzig: 
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further, concepts of property and person oen collide, resulting in widely 
inconsistent treatment of slaves within the same legal system.29
 One such juncture of property and person is the prominent pattern 
in certain ancient legal systems of assigning different punishments for an 
offense, depending on the status of the perpetrator, and different remedies, 
depending on the status of the victim. In Athenian law, for instance, 
offenders who were slaves were oen subjected to corporal punishment, 
while ee citizens who committed the same offense might receive only a 
fine; the apparent physical inviolability of the latter possibly emphasized the 
degradation of the former.30 
 And so it is that one of the most explicit of such differential 
remedies in both biblical and Mesopotamian law is the use of the lex 
talionis in the case of iǌury or death.31 As has been noted long ago by 
Von Veit, 1917). Koschaker argued specifically that the slave warranty in s. 279 seems to 
presuppose that a claim to the slave might be asserted by some third party, without it 
being alleged that the vendor or buyer was a thief; this stands in contrast to LH ss. 9-13, 
where the mere presence of a third party claim seems to put the onus on buyer and seller 
to prove their contractual right to the item (p. 51). He also argued (p. 46) that while the 
warranty in s. 279 assumes that a third party could trace an item into the hands of the 
current possessor, LH 125, the case of goods stolen while on deposit, appears to assume 
that an owner who has parted with possession of an item, in this case the “depositor,” 
must look for satisfaction only to the person to whom he has ceded possession, the 
“depositee,” if the goods are stolen; he may not, therefore, follow the goods into the 
hands of the thief or the current possessor. In the latter situation Koschaker found a 
parallel to the concept of Hand wahre Hand in early Germanic law, by which someone 
who voluntarily gave up possession of an item, without actually conveying it (such as in 
a deposit), retained only the right to claim it back om the depositee. 
29 Paul Virgil McCracken Flesher, Oxen, Women or Citizens? Slaves in the System of the 
Mishnah (Brown Judaic Studies 143; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988), makes this point about 
mishnaic law. Flesher’s arguments will be discussed in more detail below.
30 Virginia Hunter, “Status Distinctions in Athenian Law” (paper presented at “Law and 
Social Status in Classical Athens” conference, University of Toronto, April 1997).
31 This vast topic is the subject of much scholarly discussion, particularly regarding the 
conceptual development of the law and whether it was ever actually carried out in practice. 
I shall simply suggest here certain topics related to status differentials that I think should 
be investigated further. There are various theories that talion is “primitive” and is eventually 
replaced by a system of compensation as the concept of “like penalty” is extended to a 
concept of “equivalent penalty” (e.g., G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles, Babylonian Laws 
[Oxford: Clarendon, 1952], vol. 1). In my opinion, however, this is contradicted (at least 
in Mesopotamia) by the fact that talion appears in the LH but not in any of the earlier 
law collections, where compensation is the main remedy for iǌury or death. One must 
also note that the scheme of payments and talion in the LH is not complete or necessarily 
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Driver and Miles,32 talion in the Law of Hammurapi [= LH] is restricted 
to iǌury or death of an awīlu (full citizen); compensation for iǌury or 
death to a muškēnu (commoner) or a slave is monetary. There are very 
close parallels between LH and the talionic rules in Exodus 2⒈33 The 
Bible, however, introduces a particular facet of the slave as victim of death 
or physical iǌury: the case in which the slave is killed or iǌured by his or 
logically consistent; in my opinion this suggests an attempt to impose a talionic concept 
(perhaps western Semitic?) on an existing (eastern Semitic) compensation scheme. Cf. 
E. Grace, “Status Distinctions in the Draconian Law,” Eirene (Studia Graeca et Latina) 
11 (1973): 5-30, who argues (p. 8) that the gaps in status specifications with respect to 
either perpetrator or victim in the Draconian law reflects the fact that status inequalities 
at this time were still largely internal to the individual household. For a summary of talion 
theories regarding the ancient Near East, see Raymond Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and 
Cuneiform Law (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1988). Westbrook himself argues that both talion and 
compensation always coexisted as alternatives. See also J. J. Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored 
(Transactions of the American Philosophical Society 71/2; Philadelphia: The American 
Philosophical Society, 1981), who argues that talion is a later development, marking the 
“elevation” of iǌuries and death to public crimes, as opposed to private wrongs remedied 
only through self-help. 
32 Driver and Miles, Babylonian Laws, 1:4⒛
33 To briefly summarize the relevant texts: 
 Exod. 21:12, 20-21, 23-27:
 v. 12: If a man strikes a man and he dies, he shall surely die.
 v. 20: If a man strikes his eved or his amah with a rod and he/she dies under his hand, 
he shall surely be avenged.
 v. 21: But if he lingers a day or two, he will not be avenged, as it is his money.
 v. 23: …you will give life for life,
 v. 24: eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot,
 v. 25: burning for burning, wound for wound, bruise for bruise.
 v. 26: If a man strikes the eye of his eved or the eye of his amah and puts it out, he 
shall send him/her ee for his/her eye.
 v. 27: And if he knocks out the tooth of his eved or the tooth of his amah, he shall 
send him/her ee for his/her tooth.
 Laws of Hammurapi (trans. M.Roth), sections 196-201:
 s. 196: If an awīlu should blind the eye of another awīlu they shall blind his eye.
 s. 197: If he should break the bone of another awīlu, they shall break his bone.
 s. 198: If he should blind the eye of a commoner or break the bone of a commoner, 
he shall weigh and deliver 60 shekels of silver.
 s. 199: If he should blind the eye of an awīlu’s slave or break the bone of an awīlu’s 
slave, he shall weigh and deliver one-half his value (in silver).
 s. 200: If an awīlu should knock out the tooth of another awīlu of his own rank, they 
shall knock out his tooth.
 s. 201: If he should knock out the tooth of a commoner, he shall weigh and deliver 
20 shekels of silver.
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her own master. Remarkable here is the fact that slave is provided with a 
remedy that seems to be meant as equivalent to but not the same as talion: 
the ambiguous “he shall surely be avenged” in Exod. 21:20 and the eeing 
of the slave in verses 26-27, which in effect give the slave back his own 
body. 
 Such provisions raise questions as to whether the Bible did view slaves 
as solely property, so that iǌury to them was simply an economic loss 
to the master.34 I propose that the stylistically difficult text of the shifḥah 
neḥerefet law in Lev. 19:20-21 is to be resolved not by assuming that the 
female slave as property could not commit adultery, but by viewing adultery 
in the biblical scheme as an upset of the dependence hierarchy, punishable 
here as elsewhere by death.35 This model is also consistent with the various 
prophetic portrayals of Israel’s betrayal of God metaphorically as a wife’s 
sexual betrayal of her husband.36 And just as Israel’s betrayal of God is a 
type of “treason,” I would argue that a wife’s betrayal of a husband is also a 
type of “treason, in this case warranting the death penalty.”37 (Interestingly, 
we may also note that LH 129 seems to juxtapose a wife’s adultery with 
treason against the king; if the husband, here called the “master,” allows 
his wife to live, the king may allow the male transgressor to live.) 
 Leviticus 19:20-21 argues, however, that a female slave is incapable 
of treason given the conditions of coercion under which she exists; this, I 
will argue, is the meaning of the hapax neḥerefet in Lev. 19:⒛ Either the 
sexual line created between master and slave is not strong enough, given 
the coercion, to create a marriage bond protected by the laws of adultery,38 
or the lack of eedom prevents the slave woman om “crying out” against 
34 A related question, which I also will not discuss here, is whether different concepts of 
slaves as “property” is behind the apparent distinction, in the matter of physical treatment, 
between different types of slaves: for the slave called aḥ (brother) in Lev. 25:39, the master 
is admonished לא תרדה בו בפרך (You shall not rule over him harshly, Lev. 25:43).
35 See, e.g., J. J. Finkelstein’s discussion of the death penalty with respect to the goring ox 
of Exod. 21 as punishment for a breach in the hierarchy (The Ox That Gored, 19).
36 See, e.g., Ezek. 16 and 2⒊
37 One is put in mind of the English law of “petit treason,” which would apply to the murder 
of a husband by a wife or of a master by a slave. Such murder of a superior was considered 
more serious than “ordinary” murder and punished accordingly. 
38 In postbiblical law, we may note that a female slave, unlike a wife, cannot be acquired 
simply by sexual relations (mQidd. 1:2-3).
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her adulterer. There has been no breach of the hierarchy warranting the 
death penalty, but there is still some form of relationship that would 
warrant a claim of trespass, with its vaguely proprietary sense, against 
the third party; this is the meaning of the hapax biqqoret in Lev. 19:⒛ 
Again, the question of the slave as property in the Bible is only vaguely 
suggested.
 In the postbiblical period, as has been argued by B. Cohen, Flesher, and 
Hezser, among others, Jewish law came into contact with Greco-Roman 
law and its more precise distinctions between persons and property. In the 
movement toward emphasis on the individual, the notion of a dependence 
hierarchy becomes irrelevant. How is Lev. 19:20-21 to be interpreted 
against this background? The sages’ reaction was to compartmentalize this 
biblical provision through exegesis into a completely novel crime whose 
conditions were likely too tenuous to be put into practice, including the 
unusual notion of “half slave, half ee.” The female slave was no longer 
within a dependence hierarchy and was taken outside any suggestion 
of kinship or other relationship. Again we see a movement away om 
dependence and toward marginalization.
 Before outlining each chapter in detail, I would like to focus on certain 
methodological issues and assumptions that inform this study.
Methodological Issues
I. A Word on “Representativity”:39 Are We Dealing With Legal Texts? 
Since this study focuses on concepts I have termed “legal,” I believe it is 
appropriate to make the case that the biblical and postbiblical sources to 
be used in this study may be studied in this way. These materials, like the 
Mesopotamian law collections, can be considered “internormative,” that 
is, containing rules that share variable ontiers among moral, ethical, and 
religious norms, civil and economic regulations, or political goals. Given 
39 This term is used by Josine Blok, “Sexual Asymmetry: A Historiographical Essay,” in 
Sexual Asymmetry: Studies in Ancient Society (ed. J. Blok and P. Mason; Amsterdam: J. C. 
Gieben, 1987), 1-57 at 43, to describe the extent to which source material represents a 
specific historical condition.
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this “aming” or context, scholars have questioned whether these texts 
can be approached with methodology appropriate to civil or secular legal 
material.40 I accept an anthropological definition of “law” as a complex 
phenomenon rather than a discrete set of rules, a function of the discourse, 
practices, and beliefs of a particular society that are deemed essential to 
that society’s existence, and which are protected through “juridicization,” 
or codification, in some form.41 That is, one need not view “law” in the 
modern, Western sense of a self-contained sector of society, parallel to 
but separate om “economics” or “politics” or “religion.”42 Thus while B. 
Levinson and others are correct to point out that these internormative 
texts are not “statute” law in the modern sense,43 the texts are still capable 
of reflecting legal phenomena. 
II. Philology and Functional Equivalence
I propose to use both diachronic philological examinations and comparisons 
to terms and provisions of other legal systems. 
 By a philological approach, I mean a study of particular words and phrases 
in their contexts in a variety of texts, so as to ascertain the development of 
the concepts reflected in these terms. It may be noted that scholars differ 
on just how closely such concepts mirror actual events or social reality. An 
aggressive view of this connection is expressed by Burke: 
[T]he investigation of changes in semantic meaning requires the examination 
of a broad sample of formal texts and other sources over extended periods of 
time. The concepts located in these sources are more than simple reflections 
40 Various scholars question the use of such an approach to such texts. See, e.g., Bernard 
Levinson, “The Case for Revision and Interpolation within the Biblical Legal Corpora,” in 
Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development 
(JSOT Supplement Series 181; Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 37-59, esp. 49, 53-54, 
who raises this point with respect to the Bible.
41 N. Rouland, Legal Anthropology (trans. P. Planel; London: Athlone, 1994), 12⒐
42 Rouland, Legal Anthropology, 9⒈
43 Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 
esp. 2, 16, does in fact argue that while the Bible and the Mishnah were not necessarily 
draed as statute law, they came to be regarded as such aer being written down. The 
correctness or incorrectness of this opinion does not affect my point that in any event such 
texts can be the subject of a legal study.
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of other, more basic transformations. These concepts both registered 
historical change and gave shape to its outcomes.44 
 Watson, commenting on the relationship between a society and 
the legal rules that operate within it, suggests that while legal rules are 
ultimately rooted in social values, such rules may take on a life of their 
own.45 We may assume that if we find such terms as amah, shifḥah, and eved 
in the texts, some distinction was imputed to such persons. Beyond this 
assumption, however, I shall make no attempt to describe the connection 
between the legal texts and the social or historical “reality” they may reflect, 
and I propose this study as a history of concepts only. 
 I shall also make use in some cases of comparisons between Hebrew and 
Akkadian terms. While such a comparison makes no assumption regarding 
the specific historical relationship between these languages or the extent of 
borrowing between them, it is reasonable to assume that where terms in 
these languages seem to be cognate, nuances of meaning in one language 
may suggest similar nuances in the other.
 In certain cases I shall attempt to explain particular slave laws by a 
comparison with “functionally equivalent” acts and remedies om other 
legal systems. This technique, a basic method of comparative law,46 involves 
in essence a comparison of how different legal systems seem to have solved 
a particular problem. The use of this type of comparison is not without 
difficulty. First, the assessment of “functional equivalence” is largely 
subjective. However, given the uitfulness of this method in generating 
hypotheses regarding explanations for particular rules, this subjectivity 
seems to be justified.47 A second difficulty is the scholarly tendency to 
confuse issues of comparison with issues of linkage — the assumption, for 
instance, that one must show an actual connection between particular legal 
systems before comparisons can be made between them, or, conversely, the 
44 Burke, Conundrum of Class, xvi.
45 Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 
68-70. Watson notes in particular a tendency for lawmaking to become concentrated in 
the hands of elites, who treat law as existing for its own sake (p. 72).
46 See, e.g., K. Zweigert, “Methodological Problems in Comparative Law,” Israel Law Review 
7 (1972): 465-74, at 46⒍
47 This point was noted by Jackson, Essays, ⒓
------------------------------------------------  INTRODUCTION  ------------------------------------------------
— 17 —
assumption that such connection exists when the legal systems seem to 
contain close parallels. I do not think that it is necessary to demonstrate 
linkage before arguing for functional equivalence.48 
III. The Use of a Pluralistic Model
As summarized above, my analysis will show that the halakhic construction 
of “female slave” status was neither consistent nor linear, and that historical 
causes offer at least a partial explanation of why particular principles became 
dominant. I accept, therefore, a multi-factor model of halakhic development, 
of the type that is proposed by B. Jackson,49 which allows for roles for both 
historical causes and inherent logical development in the analysis of any 
decision. I offer no opinion here, however, on whether my findings support 
Jackson’s use of a structuralist model of legal development, particularly the 
idea that there is “a [universal] sequential development in the cognitive 
capacity” of a legal system.50 In particular, while it is plausible that the 
appearance of particular types of logical reasoning (such as the use of 
propositional logic) may appear in a regular diachronic sequence in the 
development of any legal system, I wish to focus instead on the use of 
different reasoning methods by sages operating within the same general time 
ame. This would include, for instance, the question of whether a particular 
48 This point has been amply demonstrated by many scholars. G. R. Driver and J. C. Miles 
used comparisons to English common law to explain aspects of Babylonian and Assyrian 
law (see, e.g., Babylonian Laws, 1:48, 56). Koschaker compared aspects of the Laws of 
Hammurapi to early Germanic law (see, e.g., Koschaker, Rechstvergleichende Studien, 46, 
and the discussion in chap. 5 n. 87); Asher Gulak, The Documents in the Talmud in Light 
of the Greek Papyri from Egypt and in Light of Greek and Roman Law [in Hebrew] (rev. 
and trans. om German [1935]; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1994), compared talmudic law with 
Greco-Egyptian papyri; Boaz Cohen used comparisons between tannaitic and Roman law 
(see, e.g., Boaz Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law: A Comparative Study [New York: JTSA, 
1966], 1:xii); and Reuven Yaron compared terms and concepts om the Aramaic papyri 
om Elephantine with demotic sources (see, e.g., Reuven Yaron, Introduction to the Law 
of the Aramaic Papyri [Oxford: Clarendon, 1961], 126).
49 As Jackson summarizes in “History, Dogmatics and Halakhah,” 15: “Neither the innate 
[capacity for logical consistency] nor the environmental can be viewed as sufficient 
causes.”
50 Bernard S. Jackson, “History, Dogmatics and Halakhah,” 24-2⒌ See also idem, “Towards 
a Structuralist Theory of Law,” Liverpool L. Rev. 2 (1980): 5-30, esp. 17, 29-30. 
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halakhic midrash was the source of a sage’s halakhic decision51 or an ex-post-
facto rationalization of it, and the question of whether different referents were 
used by different sages in their construction of analogies.52 In my opinion, 
the pluralistic model of P. Heger provides a more nuanced view of halakhic 
development, in that it imputes to each decision maker a combination of 
individual influences, both logical and environmental, in tension with a deep 
belief in the immutability of the Torah.53 Such an approach acknowledges 
the productive use of “legal fiction” in allowing a legal system to adapt to 
changing circumstances while still maintaining a sense of continuity;54 it 
allows for a role for such historical factors as custom, foreign influence, and 
personal motives in assessing each halakhic decision, side-by-side with an 
analysis of the “logical” factors inherent in the decision.
 I thus disagree with any positivist model of halakhah that demands or 
assumes logical consistency throughout the Jewish legal canon. D. Novak, 
for instance, uses such a monolithic approach in claiming that there are 
“deep differences of gender that permeate the Jewish tradition om its 
very beginnings in Scripture and forever aer,” and that this is the reason 
why women are religiously unequal and must stay that way.55 Aside om 
the faulty assumption that “difference” necessarily implies “inequality” in 
the legal sense, such a view fails to recognize the many disparate opinions 
regarding women’s status that are found throughout the Jewish sources as 
well as the explicit rejection of earlier opinions.56 
51 For summaries of the various opinions regarding the relative priority of Mishnah and 
midrash, see, e.g., D. Weiss Halivni, Midrash, Mishnah and Gemara: The Jewish Predilection 
for Justified Law (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 1986), 18-21 and M. Halbertal, 
Interpretive Revolutions in the Making [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1997), 13-⒖ 
52 See, e.g., Cees W. Maris, “Milking the Meter,” in Legal Knowledge and Analogy: Fragments 
of Legal Epistemology, Hermeneutics, and Linguistics (ed. P. Nerhot; Dordrecht: Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, 1991), 74-102, esp. 97, who argues that the process of determining 
what is similar and different in the process of analogy-creation is culturally conditioned; 
Bernard S. Jackson, “Analogy in Legal Science: Some Comparative Observations,” in Legal 
Knowledge and Analogy, 148-64, esp. 164, who suggests that such determination may be 
based on “social-experiential narrative grounds” rather than abstract legal concepts.
53 Paul Heger, The Pluralistic Halakhah: Legal Innovation in the Late Second Commonwealth 
and Rabbinic Periods (Studia Judaica 22; Berlin: De Gruyter, 2003). See, e.g., his description 
of this tension at 19-2⒍
54 Heger,The Pluralistic Halakhah, 10⒉
55 D. Novak, Natural Law in Judaism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 20⒉
56 An example of such non-linearity of opinion follows. Novak (Natural Law in Judaism, 202 n. 
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 One may also question attempts to render traditional halakhah immune 
om historical criticism. I. Englard, for instance, argues: “The dogmatic 
exclusion of historical inquiry is achieved by the notion of authority … 
the authority of a scholar as accepted as absolutely binding by tradition.”57 
But what exactly is binding? If, as I am arguing, the meaning of legal 
concepts changes over time, it seems that historical inquiry must be linked 
to any dogmatic inquiry into a particular trend of reasoning.58 Further, 
if one acknowledges the crucial role played by authority, does this not 
necessitate as well an inquiry into the motives of and influences on that 
authority? J. Roth, though he too would restrict the relevance of history in 
halakhic decision making,59 does seem to acknowledge, at least implicitly, 
the importance of individual motives in decision making, given the broad 
role he assigns to judicial discretion within the halakhic process.60 
69) argues that the locus classicus for gender inequality lies in the principle in mQidd. 1:7 that 
women are exempt om time-bound mitzvot. Though studying Torah is not time-bound, 
one view in a mishnaic dispute in mSotah 3:4 claims that women are not only exempt om 
such study but are actually prohibited om being taught Torah: “Ben Azai says: A man is 
obligated to teach his daughter Torah…. R. Eliezer says: Anyone who teaches his daughter 
Torah, it is as if he teaches her ivolity/obscenity [tiflut]…” Though bSotah 21b acknowledges 
that this issue is a matter of dispute, Maimonides claims that the prohibition is commanded, 
based on some rather specious reasoning (MishTor, Hil. Talmud Torah 1:13):
 A woman who studies Torah has merit, but not like the merit of a man, because 
she is not commanded [to do so] … Even though she has merit, the Sages 
commanded that a man not teach his daughter Torah, because the minds of most 
women are not directed toward being taught, and they find the words of Torah 
like words of indifference because of the poverty of their intellect. 
 Menachem Elon, Jewish Law: History, Sources and Principles (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1994), 4:1799-1802, quotes more modern sources which are quite willing to view 
such an attitude as belonging firmly in the past.
57 I. Englard, “Research in Jewish Law,” in Modern Research in Jewish Law (ed. B. Jackson; 
Leiden: Brill, 1980), 21-65, at 3⒍
58 Jackson, “History, Dogmatics and Halakhah,” 10 n. 27, argues that the traditional division 
of approaches to the study of law into dogmatic, historical, comparative, and ethical is 
“conceptually incoherent.” E. E. Urbach has demonstrated that legal terms/concepts in 
the tannaitic period have undergone changes by the late amoraic period, a matter of a 
few generations. See one of several examples in The Halakha: Its Sources and Development 
(Givatayim, Israel: Yad Le-talmud, 1984), 124-2⒍
59 Roth argues that the historical origin of a halakhic norm becomes irrelevant to decision-
making once the norm becomes “established” or ceases to be the raison d’être of the norm: 
Joel Roth, The Halakhic Process: A Systemic Analysis (New York: JTSA, 1986), 11, 24⒊
60 Roth, The Halakhic Process, 84, 160. This discretion includes the ability to abrogate Torah 
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 Based on such evidence of pluralism, I also disagree with approaches 
that preclude comparison between texts on the ground that each text is a 
logical entity unto itself. While I agree with both H. Fox and J. Neusner61 
that any provision in a text needs first to be instantiated within the 
overall context of that text, I disagree with Neusner’s assertion that this 
precludes any detailed comparison of provisions within a text or between 
texts. Neusner’s “macro” approach takes place at a high level of abstraction 
(perhaps so abstract as to exist only in the redactor’s unconscious62) and 
does not preclude analysis at a more “micro” level.63 This allows, in my 
opinion, for the attribution of significance to inconsistencies — whether 
logical inconsistencies or differences in wording in texts that are supposedly 
parallel to each other. One need not conclude, in other words, that because 
a text is fixed it is also internally consistent.
 As these approaches run directly counter to other techniques that have 
been used by scholars in elucidating slavery in biblical and postbiblical 
texts, I shall briefly review some of these approaches and explain how my 
assumptions differ.
Slave Status in Biblical Law: A “Common Law”?
The three best-known, or at least most studied, biblical provisions on 
slavery have to do with manumission of slaves, and each provision is 
different.64 Not surprisingly, the differences in the Hebrew terms for 
law. Roth suggests that the rishonim in fact favored the retention of broad judicial discretion 
(103).
61 Harry Fox, “Textual, Intratextual and Intertextual Studies,” in Introducing Tosefta: Textual, 
Intratextual and Intertextual Studies (ed. H. Fox [leBeit Yoreh] and T. Meacham [leBeit Yoreh]; 
Ktav Publishing House, 1999), 27-28; Jacob Neusner, Wrong Ways and Right Ways in the Study 
of Formative Judaism (Brown Judaic Studies 145; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988) 59 n. 2⒐
62 For a discussion of implied and implicit levels in writing, see Jackson, “History, Dogmatics, 
and Halakhah,” ⒓
63 For the same reason I believe one may question the approach of Haym Soloveitchik, who 
argues that one may not attribute “extraneous influence” to a particular literary work (in 
his case, Tosafot) unless the thinking involved is “atypical” of this literature. See Haym 
Soloveitchik, “Halakhah, Hermeneutics, and Martyrdom in Medieval Ashkenaz (Pt I of 
II),” JQR 94/1 (2004): 77-108, esp. 7⒎ Yet Tosafot is a multi-authored work; can it be 
perceived as a single literary work with a “typical” mode of thought?
64 To summarize: Exod. 21:2-6 speaks of Hebrew slave (eved ivri), whose term of service is 
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slaves, the period of service, and the treatment of females, among many 
other issues, have led to many scholarly coǌectures, particularly as to the 
possible historical contexts within which each provision was promulgated. 
These provisions have been particularly uitful as bases for source criticism 
and for determining the relative priority of the E, P, and D strata. Many 
of these coǌectures take an evolutionary model as a starting point and 
assume a close connection between some of the biblical material and 
Mesopotamian documents.
 Thus I. Mendelsohn proposed a legal and economic history of slavery 
in biblical Israel based on both comparative philology and explicit “gap-
filling” — supplementing apparent gaps in the biblical records of slavery 
with evidence om Mesopotamian documents on the assumption of the 
existence of a “common law” within these societies.65 He concluded that 
while slaves were legally chattel, the boundaries between slave and “ee” 
were quite fluid. 
 Mendelsohn suggested that large-scale slavery existed only in the 
“public” (state and temple) sectors;66 in the “private” sector, however, 
despite occasional references to war captives, foreign or native (e.g., 2 
Chr 28:8-10), he concluded that the major source of slaves in ancient 
Israel was native-born debtors.67 Mendelsohn emphasized particularly the 
apparent lack of recognition of a slave’s family bonds as evidence of the 
slave’s treatment as chattel.68 This was especially true, in his opinion, with 
limited to six years, and who may become a “permanent” slave (eved olam) if he wishes to 
remain with a woman given to him as a wife by his master; in contrast, an amah sold by 
her father must be espoused or set ee (Exod. 21:7-11). Lev. 25:39-46 speaks of an aḥ 
(brother), presumably a fellow Israelite, who has sold himself under economic coercion. 
His term is limited to fi years or to the next Jubilee, whichever comes first. In contrast, 
the slave acquired om the surrounding peoples may be kept forever and passed on as 
heritable property. Deut. 15:12-18 again speaks of an eved and amah; in this case the 
term of both is limited to six years unless each chooses to remain as an eved olam with the 
master.
65 Isaac Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1949), v.
66 Permanent slaves were taken om foreign prisoners or subject nations, to whom reference 
is found in such biblical terms as mas eved and avde shlomoh, and would presumably have 
been part of corvées used for large public works undertaken by the kings (Mendelsohn, 
Slavery, 96-98).
67 Mendelsohn, Slavery, 2⒊
68 Mendelsohn, Slavery, 64, 12⒉
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respect to women: he interpreted Exod. 21:7-11, based on a presumed 
parallel with Nuzi contracts providing for the “conditional sale” of women, 
as allowing female slaves to be mated successively with different people, and 
he took Lev. 19:20 as referring to a betrothed woman who was le as a debt 
pledge in the creditor’s household and then leased out as a prostitute.69 He 
characterized such women, as well as the slave women in Genesis married to 
the patriarchs, as half slave, half ee — part “maid” and part slave-bearing 
mother. Based on such imprecise categories, Mendelsohn concluded that 
despite chattel-like treatment there was no sharp boundary between slave 
and “ee”; slavery was thus not a caste (other than the hereditary netinim 
class), but rather an economically dependent class based on wealth.70
 To arrive at his conclusions, Mendelsohn assumed a common law 
prevalent throughout the ancient Near East, on the basis of which one 
may interpret “gaps” in the biblical record by looking to Mesopotamian 
law collections. This assumption has also been used by other scholars, 
based on the strong parallels between certain biblical and cuneiform rules. 
R. Westbrook, for instance,71 argues for the existence of a common, and 
fairly static, customary law throughout the entire Near East for a period 
of at least 1500 years. On this basis he proposes that the individual cases 
in both the biblical and cuneiform law collections may be interpreted by 
reference to cases in the other collections. Thus the specific cases within 
each document do not represent more abstract principles and are not “code 
specific.” 
 One primary objection to this approach is the assumption of a static 
law over some 3000 years or more of Near Eastern civilization. Reason 
alone would preclude a legal system remaining static over this amount of 
time. In fact, Koschaker argues convincingly for different theories even 
within Hammurapi’s laws, showing a development in legal concepts.72 E. 
E. Urbach has demonstrated that legal terms/concepts in the tannaitic 
period have undergone changes by the late amoraic period, a matter of 
69 Mendelsohn, Slavery, 10-14, 5⒌
70 Mendelsohn, Slavery, 119-20; cf. ibid., 76-7⒎
71 Raymond Westbrook, “What is the Covenant Code?” in Theory and Method in Biblical and 
Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development (JSOT Supplement Series 181; ed. 
B. Levinson; Sheffield Academic Press, 1994), 15-36, esp. 31, 3⒊
72 See, e.g., Koschaker, Rechtsvergleichende Studien.
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a few generations.73 Another difficulty of this synchronous approach is 
the failure to posit the mechanisms by which this “common law” became 
so widespread. In other words, what were the channels of transmission 
by which these parallel rules entered each culture? J. J. Finkelstein, in 
his analysis of the goring ox provisions in Exodus 21 and the Eshnuna 
and Hammurapi law collections, rejects any a priori assumptions of a 
common law or custom, yet he acknowledges the quandary here: given 
the closeness of this and other parallels, both in the choice of a particular 
case out of all possible areas of human behavior and in the wording and 
style, any explanation other than an “organic linkage” between the two 
groups of sources is precluded; yet such linkage, in his opinion, cannot be 
independently established.74 It must be noted that Finkelstein specifically 
rejects any notion of oral transmission, though he proposes a gap of only 
several hundred years between the cessation of cuneiform use in Palestine 
(13th century B.C.E.) and the earliest redaction of the Covenant Code 
(10th century B.C.E.).75 A solution to this quandary is the assumption 
of a common “school tradition” and the existence of a scribal connection 
between eastern and western Semites. I adopt this assumption but do 
not suggest that it must lead inevitably to assuming the existence of a 
common law throughout the ancient Near East. Finkelstein and Heger, 
among others, have argued that biblical law, though likely facing the same 
problems as other legal systems, contains particular solutions to such 
problems that are consistent with its own theology.76 
 Further, this type of “synchronous” interpretation becomes even more 
tenuous when the parallels are less clear, which I suggest is the case 
with respect to Mendelsohn’s interpretation of Exod. 21:7-11 and Lev. 
19:20 based on comparisons with Nuzi.77 I think there is “functional 
73 See Urbach, Halakhah, 123-3⒏ 
74 Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored, ⒚
75 Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored, 19-⒛  
76 Finkelstein, The Ox That Gored, 25-31, 36-39, 42-41; Heger, The Pluralistic Halakhah, 
37-3⒏
77 The issue of channels of transmission raises a particular stumbling block in questions of 
comparison between the masoretic and Nuzi texts; the usual channel, moving om east 
to west, is considered to be the people known as hapiru. For a recent summary of the 
controversy regarding this term, see Gregory C. Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery in Israel and 
the Ancient Near East (JSOT Supplement Series 141; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 205-18; 
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equivalence” between the Nuzi examples and the biblical law in these 
cases; as I shall discuss in Part I, both attempt to address the question of 
conflicting claims of ownership of a female slave. This does not, however, 
warrant the assumption of successive mating in Exodus 21 or prostitution 
in Lev. 19:⒛78 
 G. Chirichigno has made use of both the assumption of a common 
scribal tradition and the technique of comparison with Mesopotamian 
law in his examination of the biblical manumission laws. 79 While some 
scholarly opinions suggest that the differences between these laws reflect 
chronological development, Chirichigno proposes that all were part of a 
comprehensive social welfare scheme designed to deal with debt slavery and 
its consequences. Based on Old Babylonian [=OB] parallels and extensive 
structural and philological analysis of the biblical rules, he concludes that 
the three manumission laws (like their OB counterparts) were part of a 
single scheme. This provided for the periodic release of debt slaves (Exod. 
and Deut.); remission of debts (Deut. 15:1-3, similar to the function of OB 
mīšarum edicts); and the provision of interest-ee loans and endowments 
(Exod. and Deut) that would be of assistance to poor farmers.80 Like 
Mendelsohn, he argues that Leviticus attempts to ameliorate the more 
serious case of someone forced to sell himself (and his family) into slavery 
in order to survive by preventing permanent slavery and alienation of 
patrimonial land; further, this type of person was to be treated like a day 
laborer, since he was not paying off a debt. Consequently, Chirichigno 
posits that the biblical manumission laws could all have been operative at 
the same period. Deuteronomy thus does not repeal Exodus, but simply 
Chirichigno rejects any connection between ivri and hapiru.
78 I would also question Mendelsohn’s assumption that the presence of subject populations 
or a large labor force for public works projects necessarily implies that these people were 
“slaves.” For instance, Mendelsohn assumes that slave labor was used for large mining 
projects in the Aravah, citing Nelson Glueck’s evidence in this regard. Glueck, however, 
does not offer precise evidence of the use of slave labor. In his discussion of the site of a 
copper mine at Khirbet Nahas in the Negev (Rivers in the Desert: A History of the Negev 
[Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1959], 155-56), he describes the 
exploitative conditions presumed to have prevailed at this site; he then assumes that the 
mine must consequently have been worked by an expendable labor force and that this must 
necessarily have consisted of slaves.
79 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 2⒏ 
80 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 142-4⒋
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addresses a different aspect of debt slavery; in particular, Exodus is said to 
address the marital rights of debt slaves, while Deuteronomy discusses the 
case of a woman sold for non-sexual labor. 
 Chirichigno’s case is based in part on a particular model of economic 
evolution. It may be noted that other scholars, using different models of 
linguistic or social evolution, analyze the relationship among the three 
manumission passages differently. Weinfeld, for instance, sees a progressive 
social development om E to P to D,81 while Van Seters, in contrast, 
has posited that E is the latest stratum and argues that the manumission 
rules of Exodus 21 support this conclusion.82 It may also be noted that 
those scholars who have used economic models in their analyses of ancient 
Near Eastern slavery have differed in their evolutionary assumptions. In 
his portrayal of the rise of the landholding class, Diakonoff relies on a 
specifically Marxist theory of the development of slaveholding societies; 
Gelb similarly relies on an anthropological assumption regarding the 
formation of centralized states.83 M. Dandamaev, in his study of slave 
documents in the Neo- and Late-Babylonian periods, is critical of this 
tendency of early researchers to use the cuneiform sources and the biblical 
text to support such a priori theories. From his own research, he concludes 
that slaves need not all have possessed a similar distance om the means 
of production. The documents he reviews appear to show slaves owning 
other slaves and possessing rights in a peculium-like pension; thus he 
concludes that slaves, at least in these later periods, did not constitute a 
single economic class but rather what he termed “an hereditary estate.”84 
 Aside om the lack of agreement on the appropriate model, one major 
difficulty with such evolutionary approaches is that they tend in their 
broad outlines to obscure the specific differences that relate to females. I 
81 Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 
28⒉
82 J. Van Seters, “The Law of the Hebrew Slave,” ZAW 108 (1996): 534-46, esp. 540-4⒈
83 See, e.g., I. M. Diakonoff, “Slaves, Helots and Serfs in Early Antiquity,” in Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft im alten Vorderasien (ed. J. Harmatta and G. Komoróczy; Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1976), 45-78, esp. 46; I. Gelb, “From Slavery to Freedom,” RAI 18 
(1972): 81-92, esp. 8⒈
84 M. Dandamaev, Slavery in Babylonia: From Nabopolassar to Alexander the Great (626-331 
BC), (ed. and rev. M. Powell; trans. V. Powell; DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 
1984), 656, 65⒏
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believe an examination of functional equivalence may serve as a corrective 
in this respect, allowing a focus on the problem that a specific rule was 
intended to address and enabling modern scholars to compare how such 
problems were addressed in different sources. 
Slave Status in Postbiblical Law: A Unified Tradition?
There is an evident “leap” om the biblical provisions to those found in 
the Mishnah. The terms eved, amah, and shifḥah remain in the Mishnah; 
however, there is a distinction in some provisions between “Hebrew” (ivri) 
and “Canaanite” slaves (the latter term appears nowhere in the Bible). 
The term for “ee person” is not ḥofshi, but ben ḥorin; and there now 
appears a separate status of “eedman,” the meshuḥrar. Further, there 
are many mishnaic rules regarding slavery that have no explicit biblical 
source, and there are a number of biblical rules that have been modified 
or are altogether absent om the Mishnah. One example, as noted above, 
is mQidd. 1:2, which speaks of a Hebrew female slave being released once 
she shows signs puberty. 
 This “leap” has also led to various proposals regarding the connection 
between the Bible and postbiblical canonical documents, particularly the 
Mishnah. Traditionally, the midreshei halakhah attempt to explain (oen 
not clearly) the biblical hooks upon which the mishnaic provisions depend. 
Modern scholars take radically different approaches. At one end of the 
continuum there are scholars who accept the traditional assumption of a 
linear connection between Bible and Mishnah. 85 At the other extreme are 
scholars such as J. Neusner who argue that the Bible and rabbinic works 
are to be treated as self-contained, mono-thematic works and cannot be 
compared except at this “macro” level; in particular, Neusner argues that 
the Mishnah reflects a type of utopian or “imaginary” system and is not 
reflective of actual historical conditions.86 
85 E.g., David Halivni, Peshat and Derash: Plain and Applied Meaning in Rabbinic Exegesis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 7-⒐ 
86 See, e.g., Jacob Neusner, “The Mishnah in Historical and Religious Context,” in The 
Mishnah in Contemporary Perspective, Part Two (ed. A. J. Avery-Peck and J. Neusner; 
Leiden: Brill, 2002), 81-109, and “The Synoptic Problem in Rabbinic Literature: The Cases 
of the Mishna, Tosepta, Sipra and Leviticus Rabba,” JBL 105 (1986): 499-500, 50⒊
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 Between these two extremes lie the arguments of E. E. Urbach.87 
Surveying the slave rules in Mishnah and the Talmudim, his approach is 
to delineate the differences and logical contradictions among the various 
slave rules, to posit that these reflected different historical layers, and 
then to hypothesize the conditions which gave rise to each layer. He thus 
develops an outline of Jewish slavery om the Second Temple period to 
the 4th century C.E., concluding that Hebrew slaves would have been 
most prevalent in the period following Neḥemiah, while non-Hebrews 
became the major source of slaves following the Maccabean wars and 
Hasmonean conquests. Though useful in noting the contradictions and 
distinctions in rabbinic slave law, no consistent methodology is proposed 
to accurately date the various layers, nor is proof in many cases offered for 
the hypothesized context.88
87 E. E. Urbach, “The Laws Regarding Slavery as a Source for Social History of the Period of 
the Second Temple, the Mishnah and Talmud,” in Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies, 
London (ed. J. G. Weiss; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964), 1:1-9⒋
88 As one example of the difficulties in this method, we may note Urbach’s comments on 
the following baraita in bQidd. 14b, which discusses mQidd. 1:2 on the acquisition and 
manumission of the Hebrew slave. The issue is the apparent differences in the manumission 
laws of Exod. and Deut. regarding the term of slavery, the creation of a permanent slave, 
the maintenance given to the slave who is set ee, and whether a woman is provided to 
a male slave. In one tanna’s opinion, the difference is between one who has sold himself 
into slavery and one sold by a Beit Din, presumably for the: 
 [1] This [regarding the author of a preceding opinion] is the tanna who teaches: 
If one sells himself, he is sold for six years or more than six years; if the Beit 
Din sells him, he is sold for only six years. If one sells himself, [his ear] is not 
pierced [as a permanent slave]; if the Beit Din sells him, [his ear] is pierced. If 
one sells himself, he is not given maintenance [on his release]; if the Beit Din 
sells him, he is given maintenance. If one sells himself, his master does not 
give him a Canaanite shifḥah; if the Bet Din sells him, his master gives him a 
Canaanite shifḥah.
 [2] R. Elazar says: Both are sold only for six years; both have the ear pierced; 
and both are given maintenance; and the master gives both a Canaanite shifḥah.
 This distinction between the slave who has sold himself and one sold by a Beit Din is 
found neither in mQidd. 1:2 nor, as Urbach notes, in any of the biblical manumission 
provisions. Urbach concludes: 
 Now it happens that there is extant a piece of exegesis that fits R. Eleazar’s 
view exactly… [citing Mekhilta deR. Shimon Bar Yoḥai, Epstein-Melamed, 59]. 
As against this, it is difficult to find any exegetical point corresponding to the 
line first taken in the baraita, and it would seem that the halakhah which limits 
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 P. Flesher is a follower of the Neusner method of systemic analysis and 
objects specifically to the use of the “philological” approach practiced by 
Urbach.89 He focuses on slave rules in the Mishnah, and in particular on 
two of the anomalies found therein:
1)  Slaves seem to be classed with property in some cases and with 
humans in others.
 2)  An “ethnic” distinction is in some cases made between Hebrew 
and Canaanite slaves.90 
 In using Neusner’s systemic approach, Flesher compares the Mishnah’s 
system (or systems) of slavery to the Bible’s system of slavery, deriving the 
latter by also treating the Bible’s “legal” provisions as a systemic whole 
(as it is assumed the postbiblical sages would have done). Any differences 
between the biblical and mishnaic systems are then assumed to have been 
initiated by the sages.91 He concludes that the Bible’s system of slavery 
is ordered upon a genealogical criterion, a distinction between Israelites 
and non-Israelites. The former are really indentured servants serving for a 
limited period and then returning to their former place in Israelite society. 
The latter are chattel slaves who lose their former identity and find a (lowly) 
place in Israelite society solely through their dependence on the master.92 
This conclusion would seem to be based primarily on the provisions of 
Leviticus 25, which do make a clear distinction between the treatment of 
aḥim (brethren) and the treatment of the “surrounding nations”; but it 
is assumed in Flesher’s analysis that the slavery provisions in Exodus and 
the laws of a Hebrew enslaved to fellow Jews represents the halakhah as it was 
actually applied. 
 In other words, Urbach has detected two different traditions here, only one of which can 
be traced explicitly to the biblical sources. To conclude, however, that the other tradition 
must therefore represent halakhah in practice is too far a leap without further evidence. 
89 See Flesher, Oxen, Women or Citizens? x-xiv.
90 As noted above, though the term ivri is applied to slaves in the biblical text (e.g., Exod. 
21: 2), the “Canaanite slave” (shifḥah kena’anit or eved kena’ani) is nowhere found in the 
biblical text. Further, this distinction is made in the Mishnah in less than 10% of its slave 
provisions. Flesher (Oxen, Women or Citizens? Appendix) notes some 129 mishnaic passages 
that refer to the eved or shifḥah, of which six have this ethnic distinction: mArakh. 8:4-5; 
mB.Metz.. 1:5; mB.Qam. 8:3 and 8:5; mEruv. 7:6; mMa’as.Sh. 4:4; mQidd. 1:2-⒊
91 Flesher, Oxen, Women or Citizens? 11-⒖ 
92 Ibid., 26, 54-5⒐
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Deuteronomy also make this distinction, presumably since the word ivri 
(Hebrew) is found in these provisions.
 The Mishnah carries through the Bible’s genealogical distinction 
between Hebrew slaves and non-Hebrew slaves (in the Mishnah called 
“Canaanite” slaves), but in only six of its provisions. The Mishnah’s primary 
system of slavery, Flesher argues, instead defines slavery in terms of the 
control exercised by the male Israelite householder over the slave, regardless 
of the latter’s ethnic background.93 The slave is located on the boundary 
between inanimate objects (called “property”) and human beings; he can 
be classed in some cases with property such as oxen, in some cases with 
other dependent household members such as women, and in some cases 
with householder-citizens, depending on the nature of the householder’s 
control.94 In this system the slave’s ethnic background is irrelevant; the slave 
is contrasted instead with the eedman. The term “slave” in this system is 
also assumed to be gender-neutral. Flesher attributes this change in systemic 
outlook completely to the Sages, whose system of classification, in his 
view, was intended to reflect their understanding of the proper hierarchical 
relationship to the Deity; humans are both objects to be classified and 
classiing agents, with the householder able to prevent others om fully 
exercising their power of classification.95 Flesher explains the existence of a 
separate “ethnic system” simply by positing that certain matters cannot be 
explained without a distinction between Hebrew and Canaanite slaves.96 
 Flesher has identified an interesting pattern in these rules based on the 
nature of the householder’s control. Yet in his concern to place all slave 
provisions within this one “system,” many nuances and contradictions are 
overlooked which cannot be described or explained by means of the concept 
of householder control. I would particularly note that he makes no special 
case for female slaves. Flesher argues that the amah and shifḥah of Exod. 
21:7-11 and Lev. 19:20 are to be le out of the biblical system of slavery 
because they are “concubines” rather than merely slaves; this is shown by 
their use as sex objects in these verses. The amah of Deuteronomy, on the 
93 Ibid., 43-45, 62-6⒊
94 Ibid., 7-8, 171-7⒉
95 Ibid., 30-32, 61-62, 67-7⒈
96 Ibid., 54-5⒐
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other hand, is simply the female counterpart of the eved. For the Mishnah’s 
primary system of slavery, however, he argues that females likely belonged 
more to the category of “slaves” than to the category of “women.”97 They 
merely possessed the added “attribute” of sexual use. 
 Yet this distinction is not trivial or without legal significance; we need 
merely look to the different “halves” of the matrilineal principle for male 
and female slaves in mYev. 7:5 and mQidd. 3:⒓ This distinction is not 
easily explained by differences in householder control. Further, despite 
Flesher’s suggestion that the proposed primary and ethnic slavery systems 
are complementary, this is not so with respect to female slaves: the subject 
matter in this case not only overlaps, but is treated differently. In the “non-
ethnic” system (which would presumably cover both Hebrew and non-
Hebrew slaves), there are several provisions referring to the shifḥah who 
gives birth (e.g., mQidd. 3:12). In the ethnic system, on the other hand, 
mQidd. 1:2 provides that the Hebrew female slave is to be manumitted 
when she shows signs of puberty; in other words, she would be manumitted 
before she could ever give birth.98 Again, it is difficult to explain these 
differences in terms of householder control; other principles seem to be at 
work, as I shall explain in the course of this work.99
97 See Flesher, Oxen, Women or Citizens? 17 n. ⒘ J. R. Wegner, in her comprehensive study 
of women in the Mishnah, also excluded female slaves, referring the reader to Flesher’s 
study. See Judith Romney Wegner, Chattel or Person? The Status of Women in the Mishnah 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 220, n. ⒚
98 It is also difficult to reconcile mQidd. 1:2 with such passages as mB.Metz. 7:6, which 
speaks of adult female slaves in general.
99 We may note briefly here two other nuances in the mishnaic slavery rules that are not 
explained by the notion of householder control. First, it is necessary to account for the fact 
that slaves in the Mishnah are not simply classed as “property”; in some cases they appear 
to be classed with so-called “personal” property (i.e., movable goods and chattels, as in 
mB.Qam. 9:2 with respect to depreciation and mB.Bat. 3:1 with respect to conditions of 
sale); and in other cases with “real” property (immovables such as land and buildings, as in 
mQidd. 1:3, in which the modes of acquisition for Canaanite slaves parallel those for land 
in mQidd. 1:5; mB.Metz.. 4:9 with respect to overreaching; mB.Bat. 3:1 with respect to 
adverse possession; mSheb. 6:5 with respect to oaths). This distinction was in fact already 
noted by the Sages in yQidd. 1:3 60a.
 Second, Flesher posits that the concept of the “eedman” (meshuḥrar) was developed by 
the sages as a contrast to the idea of the slave; that is, someone who, unlike the slave, is no 
longer under a householder’s control, but who, like the slave lacks a legitimate genealogy. 
There are several instances, however, in which one would expect the lack of genealogy to 
be relevant, but which have no mention of the eedman (e.g., mBikk. 1:5). Connected 
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 This failure to address these nuances stems, in my opinion, om 
certain assumptions underlying Flesher’s systemic approach. This 
approach emphasizes that the relevant context against which to measure 
the Mishnah’s rules (or those of any document) is first and foremost the 
document itself; the document reflects the worldview (or partial view) of a 
“clearly defined social group.”100 Thus an analysis of such matters as what 
was included and excluded and the methods of ordering is said to reveal 
the principles underlying the document. 
 This argument, however, tends to assume that the Mishnah in particular 
is a homogeneous “code,” a complete description of the utopian society 
proposed by its redactors. It may be argued that the Mishnah is rather a 
collection of specific rules, ordered in some pattern, but not intended as a 
complete codification in the modern sense. Further, as shown by Urbach 
and others, the Mishnah and other documents are layered, which makes it 
doubtful that such documents represent a consistent worldview. Thus, to 
describe such a set of rules as a system does not inevitably mean that there 
are a limited number of fundamental principles underlying it.101 There is 
arguably a difficulty in attempting to derive such principles at the macro 
level. I think it is reasonable, however, to assume that the documents do 
have “micro-contexts” (as perhaps legal systems have “local unities”102). As 
one example, the positioning of several rules next to each other may be 
based on some common theme underlying the rules that can be derived 
through contextual analysis. Such “positional analogy,” as Jackson notes, 
was not only utilized by the sages in their hermeneutical methods, but was 
with this issue is the meaning of the term ḥetzyo eved veḥetzyo ben ḥorin. Though Flesher 
interprets this expression (as used in mPesaḥ. 8:1) as “half bondman, half eedman,” it is 
not clear that ben ḥorin equals meshuḥrar; further, ben ḥorin is itself a postbiblical term of 
uncertain meaning, possibly but not certainly equivalent to the biblical ḥofshi.
100 Jacob Neusner, First Principles of Systemic Analysis (Lanham: University Press of America, 
1987), 5⒎
101 This type of question has been posed for “law” in general: is positive law as a whole to 
be conceived as a unified, rational system based on certain fundamental principles (Maris, 
“Milking the Meter,” 79)? Jackson poses the question om another angle: Does “law” as 
a semiotic system derive om an innate system of fundamental norms or duties, similar 
to the universal grammar of Chomsky’s language theory (“Can One Speak of the ‘Deep 
Structure’ of Law?” in Theory and Systems of Legal Philosophy [ARSP Supplement 3; ed. S. 
Panow et al.; Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1988], 250-61, esp. 250ff.)?
102 Maris, “Milking the Meter,” 7⒐
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actually used in practice even in the biblical codes.103 There may in fact be 
a disjunction between a principle derived at the “macro” level and those 
reflected at the “micro” levels.
 Thus while Flesher is right to approach the Mishnah first as a whole, the 
results of this approach reveal not unified patterns but many inconsistencies. 
I make the assumption that these differences do not necessarily reflect 
different editorial viewpoints, but can reflect different school traditions, 
and thus can be profitably compared to and contrasted with provisions 
in other canonical texts. I will argue in particular that the differences 
in the construction of female slave status between Mishnah provisions 
and supposed parallels in other tannaitic works, particularly the Tosea,104 
actually reflect a multiplicity of halakhic viewpoints. I thus accept Urbach’s 
appreciation for the layers implied by these various inconsistencies, while 
rejecting the Sitz im Leben he proposes for them. 
 Finally, Hezser compares rabbinic and Roman laws regarding slavery as 
an extended functional analysis between the two systems.105 This presents 
an in-depth synchronic analysis of postbiblical slavery. Although the 
current study differs in that it focuses on an individual diachronic analysis 
of a particular aspect of slavery, sex right, to analyze its evolution om its 
ancient Near Eastern to its Greco-Roman context, I believe that in fact the 
two approaches complement each other.
Chapter Summary
Based on assumptions that:
1)  biblical provisions need not be explained by a Near Eastern common 
law, and that there is a gap in the case at hand between biblical and 
postbiblical law; and
103 Jackson, “Analogy in Legal Science,” 162-6⒊ Jackson also notes, however, that it is difficult 
to tell in ancient texts whether the underlying themes are based on “social-experiential 
narrative ames” rather than abstract legal concepts.
104 For a compilation of recent scholarly studies on the relationship between the Mishnah and 
Tosea, see Fox and Meacham, eds., Introducing Tosefta. 
105 See Catherine Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
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2)  postbiblical law reflects a variety of principles and influences, justiing 
a pluralistic method of study,
this work proceeds as follows: 
 Chapters 1-4 examine biblical provisions relating to the female 
slave, the matrilineal principle, and adultery, to establish the biblical 
understanding of the status of female slave as measured by these notions. 
Chapter 1 examines: i) the biblical female slave terms amah and shifḥah; ii) 
the biblical terms ben amah, ben bayit, and yelid bayit, suggestive of the type 
of description that would be used for a second-generation slave. I argue 
that the terms ben amah, ben bayit, and yelid bayit were not restricted to 
slaves, but were intended to emphasize the inclusion of these individuals, 
as dependents or otherwise, within the family unit. 
Chapter 2 examines the biblical term pilegesh, usually translated as 
“concubine.” I conclude that while the sexual utility of the female slave, 
including for breeding purposes, was recognized, this sexual role was placed 
within some sort of family structure. In contrast to the sexuality of slaves 
as part of the dependency continuum, the sexuality of the concubine was 
that of a dangerous outsider to the family. 
 Chapter 3 examines Exod. 21:2-11 within its ancient Near Eastern 
context, concluding that this passage was concerned with the question 
of ownership of a slave woman as between father, husband, and master, 
and that some of the provisions can be seen as functional equivalents of 
the Akkadian “fitting out” contracts.106 Again, there is confirmation of a 
desire to ensure that the female slave, and particularly her children, are 
placed within some sort of familial context. Contrary to the traditional 
rabbinic interpretation, Exod. 21:4 does not serve as support for a biblical 
matrilineal principle based on a prohibition of slave-ee intermarriage.
 Chapter 4 focuses on Lev. 19:20-21 and its various hapaxes. Using 
philological and functional comparison, it is argued that the key to the 
provision is the meaning of the hapax neḥerefet as “sexually coerced.” The 
hapax biqqoret is taken to mean “a claim for trespass,” based in part on a 
comparison to Akkadian BQR/PQR terms in slave warranties. I shall add 
106 That is, contracts under which a father with limited means sold his daughter to a third 
party, who was to “fit her out” for marriage and receive the bride-price.
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to this much-discussed argument by exploring the trespass idea in relation 
to these warranties, as providing some general insight into the development 
of property law. 
 Having confirmed in chapters 1-4 that female slave status in the 
Bible must be seen as attempting to fit the slave’s reproductive capacity 
within a dependence hierarchy, chapters 5 and 6 examine the development 
of female slave status in postbiblical texts. Chapter 5 argues that there 
were principles other than matriliny that were debated with regard to 
the inheritance of slave status and suggests that the mishnaic matrilineal 
principle became prominent in response to Greco-Roman administrative 
rules, particularly the need to define “slaves” for tax purposes. Chapter 6 
illustrates the exegetical development of Lev. 19:20-21 into an exoteric and 
vague ruling, likely not related to realia. This exegesis is seen particularly 
in several superficially parallel baraitot in the Mishnah, Tosea, and Sifra, 
which, it will be argued, actually contain some significant differences. 
This allows us to study the relationship between these three sources with 
respect this case and to speculate on the forces of development influencing 
their particular differences.
 In Chapter 7 I also examine some non-legal sources discussing the case 
of Bilhah and Zilpah, the slave-wives of Jacob. By the mishnaic matrilineal 
principle, their offspring, Dan, Naali, Gad, and Asher, would have been 
slaves. Tracing the attitudes toward Bilhah and Zilpah in the various sources 
gives further evidence that the development of the matrilineal idea was not 
straightforward. In particular, there are two “genealogical” traditions that 
can be followed through Targumim, Qumran, and mediaeval sources that 
argue against Bilhah and Zilpah’s slave origins; further, certain midrashim 
appear to have ignored their origins and considered them “matriarchs.” 
 Conclusions contains a summary of the conclusions in the first seven 
chapters and poses the question of why the construct “female slave” 
changed om biblical to postbiblical law, at least with regard to sex right, 
and concludes that this was due to a combination of adaptation to external 
forces and internal halakhic development. Finally, it is argued that it should 
be legitimate within common halakhic principles to “vacate” this halakhic 
category based on evidence that some of its major underlying defining 
points are no longer morally relevant or applicable.
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“Slavery,” as M. I. Finley noted, is an institution aught with ambiguity 
and contradiction.1 How does one define a female slave, as opposed, for 
instance, to a wife, a servant (indentured or otherwise), an employee, 
a dependent relative or hanger-on, a nursemaid, a lady-in-waiting, a 
concubine, a mistress? In fact, a female slave may have partaken of all 
these roles. 
 There is much literature on the origins and definitions of slavery 
in both ancient and modern slave systems. As we have noted in the 
introductory chapter: 1) in the case of the ancient Near East, such 
theories oen depend on the particular economic or political ideology 
assumed by the scholar; 2) definitions of slavery in Mesopotamia are 
also complicated by the theory that dependence, versus “eedom”, was 
the ideal state; and 3) finally, female slaves tend to be either simply 
assimilated with male slaves, or assumed to have been only concubines 
or breeders. 
 I shall argue that a contextual and etymological analysis of the terms 
for female slaves assign them to the same continuum of dependence which 
wives inhabited. Their reproductive capabilities were certainly valued, 
but with a role sought for them within a family or kinship structure. 
There is nothing biblically to indicate that marriage with female slaves 
was prohibited, or that the children of female slaves were automatically 
slaves. Finally it will be argued that it was actually the concubine, the 
pilegesh, who was the “other” - who, outside the dependence continuum, 
constituted danger. 
1 See, e.g., Moses I. Finley, “A Peculiar Institution?” Times Literary Supplement, July 2, 
1976, 82⒈
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1.1 THE AMAH AND THE SHIFḤAH: 
BREEDER, DRUDGE, CONCUBINE OR WIFE?
The terms אמה amah and שפחה shifḥah, found throughout the biblical 
text (as well as extra-biblical and post-biblical Hebrew texts), are 
conventionally taken to denote a female slave, bondswoman or the like.2 
With respect to pentateuchal usage, neither term is found in Numbers; 
shifḥah is well represented in Gen., and comparatively rare (one instance 
each) in Exod., Lev. and Deut; amah, conversely, is more widely found 
in the latter books, and is the term most commonly found in “legal” 
provisions. The three patriarchal “surrogate wives” in the Pentateuch 
(Hagar, Bilhah and Zilpah) are called by both terms;3 of particular 
note is the fact that these women are also called ishah, wife.4 In certain 
instances, both pentateuchal and non-pentateuchal, the terms amah or 
shifḥah are paired with the term eved.5 In many of the non-pentateuchal 
instances, both terms are used in a self-effacing way, as terms of 
“courtesy”, by women addressing God, or addressing men of apparently 
2 E.J. Revell, The Designation of the Individual. Expressive Usage in Biblical Narrative. 
Contributions to Biblical Exegesis and Theology 14 (Kampen: Kok Pharos, 1996) 34, 
among others, notes that the term נערה can refer to someone who might be a debt-slave (as 
in 2Kings 5:2, 4); as he acknowledges, however, this term is not used biblically to indicate a 
precise legal status or relationship. For the purposes of this study, I concentrate on shifḥah 
and amah as being the primary terms in biblical and post-biblical texts for female slaves.
3 For Hagar, see e.g. Gen. 16:1 and 21:10, 12; and for Bilhah, see e.g. Gen. 29:29 and 30:⒊ 
Zilpah alone is never called an amah. Both she and Bilhah together, however, are called 
shefaḥot and amahot; see e.g. Gen. 31:33 and 32:2⒊
4 For Hagar, see Gen. 16:3; for Bilhah, Gen. 30:4; for Zilpah, Gen. 30:⒐ 
5 The amah and the eved are paired in various pentateuchal laws: Exod. 20:10 and Deut. 5:14, 
the inclusion within the Decalogue Sabbath requirement; Exod. 20:14 and Deut. 5:18, 
inclusion within the Decalogue prohibition on coveting; Exod. 21:20, 26-7, regarding 
assaults; Exod. 21:32, regarding an attack by a goring ox; Lev. 25:6, partaking of Sabbatical 
year provisions; Lev. 25:44, regarding the taking of non-Israelites as slaves; Deut. 12:12, 
18 and 16:11, 14, regarding inclusion in certain religious festivals; and the anomalous 
Deut. 15:17, regarding manumission (this provision will be discussed in chapter five). The 
shifḥah and the eved are paired in the Pentateuch primarily in lists of patriarchal property: 
Gen. 12:16, 20:14, 24:35, 30:43, 32:6, as well as the divine threat of enslavement in Deut. 
26:6⒏ Outside the Pentateuch it is shifḥah that is more oen paired with eved (1Sam. 8:16, 
2Kings 5:26; Isa. 14:2, 24:2; Jer. 34:9, 10, 11, 16; Joel 3:2; Ps. 123:2; Esth. 7:4; Eccl. 
2:7; 2Chr. 28:10). The terms amah and eved are paired in Job 31:13, Ezra 2:65 and Neḥ. 
7:6⒎ 
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higher rank or status.6 These uses suggest an attempt to create a mock 
servile relationship between the speaker and addressee, much as one sees 
in other languages (consider, for instance, the English “at your service,” 
or the use of “slave” to indicate someone in thrall or dependence). There 
is a similar use of the male slave term eved. 
 Finally, there are various rules that suggest that a sexual use was 
assumed for both the shifḥah and the amah: 1) Exod. 21:7-11, concerning 
a father who sells his daughter as an amah; the pericope specifically 
provides that she is not to “go out as the avadim do” (v. 7), but must 
be redeemed only if she is “not assigned”7 to someone, including her 
master’s son; 2) the apparently contradictory Deut. 15:17, providing 
for the automatic release of an amah aer six years; 3) Lev. 19:20-22, 
concerning an apparently adulterous shifḥah. We may also note the case 
of Exod. 21:4-5, which refers to an ishah who is mated to an eved in his 
master’s household; it is not clear, however, whether such woman/wife is 
an amah or shifḥah.8 
 All but the Deut. passage, it may be seen, presume that these women 
will be involved in sexual relationships, and further, that these relationships 
will be regulated. 
The existence of both terms raises two sets of issues: 
⒜ Are the terms amah and shifḥah simply the female counterpart⒮ of 
6 Hannah, for instance, refers to herself as אמתך before God and to the priest Eli (1Sam. 
1:11, 16), and again as שפחתך to the priest Eli (1Sam. 1:18); Ruth calls herself both שפחתך 
and אמתך when addressing her prosperous kinsman Boaz, in Ruth 2:13, 3:⒐ This self-
effacing use is more common with amah, and most prevalent in the books of Samuel and 
Kings. Other instances of the self-effacing use of these terms occur with respect to Avigail 
(1Sam. 25:24, 25, 28, 31, 41 for amah, and 1Sam. 24:27, 41 for shifḥah); Saul’s necromancer 
(1Sam. 28: 21, 22 for shifḥah); the woman of Tekoah (2Sam. 14:15, 16 for amah, and 2Sam. 
14:7, 12, 15, 17, 19 for shifḥah); the woman with Yoav (2Sam. 20:17 for amah); Batsheva 
(1Kings 1: 13, 17 for amah); the two nashim zonot addressing Solomon (1Kings 3:20 for 
amah); the widow to Elisha (2Kings 4:2, 16 for shifḥah). Non-self-effacement instances in 
these sources are: for amah - 2Sam. 6:20, 22; Judges 19:19; Job 19:15, 31:13; Naḥum 2:8; 
Ezra 2:65; Neḥ. 7:67, and for shifḥah - 1Sam. 8:16; 2Kings 5:26; Isa. 14:2, 24:2; Jer. 34:9, 
10, 11, 16; Joel 3:2; Ps. 123:2; Prov. 30:23; Esth. 7:4; Eccl. 2:7; 2Chr. 28:⒑
7 The meaning of the MT לא יעדה (Exod. 21:8) and the effect of its qere variant לו יעדה will 
be discussed further in chapter three.
8 This issue will be discussed further in chapter three.
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the eved (עבד), the primary term taken to refer to a male slave in 
biblical and post-biblical texts, given that they do not appear to share 
a common etymology with the latter (or with each other)? There has 
been a gradual recognition in slave studies that the situation of female 
slaves must not automatically be assumed to correspond to that of male 
slaves. Female slaves, in other words, may be treated (legally, socially and 
politically) more like “females” than like “slaves,”9 and this difference 
may result om the fact that their primary (if not exclusive) role is 
sexual. This is not to ignore that male slaves were also put to sexual 
use;10 the issue with female slaves, however, is whether their primary 
use was sexual, and particularly whether they were used to “breed” 
more slaves.11 This issue in turn raises further questions. Is it inevitable 
that female slaves will be put to sexual use? Meillassoux’s classic study 
of certain Aican societies, for instance, proposed circumstances in 
which it was not economically feasible to have female slaves breed.”12 
Does sexual use, however, inevitably mean breeding of new slaves, or 
does it more generally take the form of “concubinage” to the master or 
other “ee” male in the household?13 
9 Contra, e.g., Flesher, Oxen, Women or Citizens? 17 n. 17, who states with respect to slave 
rules in the Mishnah: “The Mishnah treats the female slave like a male slave, with the 
added attribute of sexual use.” As will be argued throughout this paper, however, it is that 
sexual use that in fact results in non-symmetrical treatment of male and female slaves in 
rabbinic law. The sexual use, in other words, is significant. Yam shel Shelomo Kiddushin ch. 
1, siman 22 d.h. 22 also discusses whether a Hebrew slave would be obligated to have sexual 
relations with a Canaanite slave woman given to him by his master during his tenure and 
concludes that he can be given such a wife even against his will and even if it constitutes 
“night work”.
10 One might, for instance, treat the situation of Joseph and Potifar’s wife as an example 
of the sexual coercion of a male slave (see contra Theodore Weinberger, “And Joseph 
Slept with Potiphar’s Wife’: A Re-Reading,” Literature and Theology 11 (1997) 145-151, 
esp. 148-9, who argues that Joseph is actually being criticized for failing to engage in a 
legitimate act of sexual “subversion” against Potifar the slave-owner). 
11 See, e.g., Marcia Wright, Strategies of Slaves & Women. Life-Stories from East/Central 
Africa (New York: Lilian Barber Press, 1993) 2, who suggests that in general female slaves 
are more easily absorbed into their new community as, among other roles, concubines and 
mothers.
12 Meillassoux, Anthropologie de l’esclavage 301-⒉ The “breeding” of slaves will be discussed 
further in chapter ⒉ 
13 Scholars such as B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law 329 and Raphael Patai, Sex and Family 
in the Bible and the Middle East (New York: Doubleday, 1959) 42, have suggested that this 
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⒝ The existence of two words for female slaves makes it relevant to ask 
whether the two terms are actually synonymous. As will be discussed 
below, they are generally treated as such in the various biblical 
Targumim.14 Certain scholarly opinions, in contrast, suggest the terms 
reflect actual differences, particularly in legal status or in function, and 
that the amah might have been higher in “rank” than the shifḥah.
 A review of the biblical evidence suggests, on the one hand, that a 
sexual role for the women was assumed. On the other hand, there is little 
indication that their fate would have inevitably have been either concubinage 
or the breeding of a new generation of slaves. 
 To substantiate these observations, I shall summarize the biblical 
instances of shifḥah and amah, review prior opinions on the meaning of 
these terms as well as early translations, and comment on certain epigraphic 
evidence of the use of amah and the way this evidence relates to the biblical 
terms. I shall examine in detail the key biblical texts relating to female 
slaves and concubines.
 In general, we have two major characteristics that are supposedly 
indicative of female slaves: sexual use and dependence. But is there 
significance to the fact that there are two terms for female slaves? In 
particular, is this an indication of a difference in rank? Is the amah a type 
of secondary wife or concubine, as opposed to the shifḥah, who was simply 
sexually abused as hefqer or ownerless property? Or are both terms indicative 
of a quasi-wife status, maintained with the same rules against adultery and 
incest as are found biblically with respect to wives? Or, again, does the 
Bible seem to prohibit marriage, and particularly slave-ee intermarriage, 
for female slaves? 
 I shall argue, first, that the two terms as used biblically are synonyms. 
The most likely reason, in my opinion, for the presence of two terms 
is that each has a different ethnic origin, and there is some, admittedly 
scanty, evidence for this. Sexual use of these women is assumed, though 
type of concubinage was the inevitable fate of the female slave.
14 This type of overlap in meaning is not an unexpected phenomenon. As a modern example, 
one may note that Canadian English recognizes, as terms for child-minders, not only 
“nursemaid” and “nanny”, but also (coincidentally) “amah”, a term used in the Far East 
and ultimately derived om the Portuguese ama, “nurse” (CED, s.v. “amah”).
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based on the regulations in Exod. 21 and Lev. 19, to be discussed more 
fully in the following chapters, it cannot be assumed that the primary 
function of either was as a concubine or breeder or mistress to a male 
master. Nor is there evidence of any prohibition on marriage for slave 
women; on the contrary, I shall argue that both etymology and context 
have as their point the assimilation of these women within a family or 
kinship structure. 
1.1.1 The Terms are Biblical Synonyms Indicating a Servile Status
This conclusion is based on essentially negative evidence: the complete 
absence of any discernable differences in their pattern of use.
1) There have been various contextual studies proposing a difference in 
meaning according to the use or status of the woman in question. 
Jepsen concluded that though there was some interchange in the use of 
the two terms, there were still basic differences between them: though 
both types of women were “unee”, the shifḥah was “unbehrührte,” and 
would usually serve a woman, while the amah was either a “Nebenau” 
to the master or an “unee” wife to a male slave. This distinction 
carried through to the use of the words as terms of courtesy: the use 
of shifḥah suggested a greater degree of subservience, while the amah 
was a woman seeking protection.15 Riesener accepted the idea that 
there was an essential distinction in meaning between the two terms; 
she also made the reasonable point, however, that they need not be 
mutually exclusive, pointing in particular to their simultaneous use 
with the same person (e.g. Hagar, Bilhah and Zilpah, as noted above), 
to the fact that a shifḥah could serve a man (e.g. Gen. 29:24 and 29, 
in which Zilpah and Bilhah are referred to as שפחתו of Lavan), and 
to various instances contradicting the “unbehrührte” nature of the 
shifḥah, notably Lev. 19:⒛ Rather than a legal difference, Riesener 
suggested the terms emphasized different aspects of slavery: the use 
of shifḥah emphasized the slave as a possession (as in lists of one’s 
patrimony, such as Gen. 12:16), while the use of amah emphasized 
15 A. Jepsen, “Amah and Schiphchah,” VT 8 (1958) 293-297, esp. 293, 29⒌ 
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the sexual role of the female slave.16 Yet this proposed distinction 
also fails to take account of the sexual nature of the offence regarding 
the shifḥah neḥerefet of Lev. 19:20; the significance of this passage is 
highlighted by the fact that the term shifḥah here is a type of hapax, 
since it is amah that is used in the other pentetuechal laws involving 
female slaves. 
  Finally, Mandelkern (s.v. 17(אמה suggested that the amah must 
have had a higher status than the shifḥah, since Hagar is only called 
by this term once she becomes the “wife” of Abraham.18 This pattern, 
however, does not hold true of the similar situations of Bilhah and 
Zilphah. Zilpah is never called an amah when mentioned alone.19 
Bilhah is called Rachel’s amah before she is presented to Jacob (Gen. 
30:3). Both are also called the shefaḥot of Jacob (Gen. 32:23), even aer 
their mating with him.
2) As noted earlier in this chapter, in many of the non-pentateuchal 
instances, both terms are used self-effacingly or as terms of “courtesy,” 
by women addressing God, or addressing men of apparently higher 
rank or status.
3) Source-Critical analysis suggests some distinctions of use in the 
Pentateuch, but nothing that points to a pattern. Shifḥah is used more 
oen than amah in J and P sources, while amah is used more oen 
than shifḥah in E and D sources.20 As Jepson noted, however, the fact 
16 Ingrid Riesener, ”Der Stamm עבד im Alten Testament,” BZAW 149 (Berlin: Walter de 
Gruyter, 1978) 78, 8⒊
[Mandelkern=] שלמה מאנדעלקערן, קונקורדנציא לתנ“ך. ירושלים: שוקן, 1955. 17
18 A similar distinction has been postulated among Ugaritic terms by L.M. Muntingh, “The 
Social and Legal Status of a Free Ugaritic Female,” JNES 26 (1967) 102-13, esp. 10⒊ It is 
also interesting to note that under Islamic law the amah would have been of higher rank 
than the surriyya, “concubine”; though both were slaves, the former was married, perhaps 
to another slave, and thus off limits to her master. As a wife, she would have at least a right 
to demand sexual fulfillment om her husband. See Donna Lee Bowen, “Muslim Juridical 
Opinions Concerning the Status of Women as Demonstrated by the Case of ‘AZL [coitus 
interruptus],” JNES 40 (1981) 32⒍ 
19 She is called both an amah and shifḥah when mentioned with Bilhah; see supra note ⒏
20 This point was suggested to me in a personal communication with Dr. Tzemaḥ Yoreh. 
 The number of instances for each is summarized in the following table:
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that both terms are used in all sources makes it difficult to assess the 
significance of these numerical statistics;21 this overlap in fact supports 
his conclusion that the two terms came to be seen as synonyms. 
 The question of whether the “courtesy” nuance represents a development 
in these terms is addressed by Leshem, who makes the interesting 
observation that these self-effacement uses of the terms are found primarily 
in the books of Samuel and Kings. From this fact he concluded that the 
rise of the monarchy brought about an increasing emphasis on status 
distinctions, and thus resulted in the wider use of these “slave” terms.22 
Against this, however, one may argue that the redaction chronology of 
these books is not necessarily coincident with the early monarchy,23 and 
the use of the terms may reflect the cultural attitudes of a later editor. 
Further, as Leshem himself notes, the male term eved is already used in 
“pre-monarchy” references as a term of subservience24 - as, for instance, 
in reference to Moses as the eved of God (e.g. Num. 12:7-8; Deut. 34:5) 
or Jacob’s calling himself the eved of Esau (Gen. 32:5).
  amah     shifḥah
 E 14 (Gen. 20:17; 21:10, 12, 13; 31:33*;   2 (Gen. 20:14; 30:18)
  Exod. 2:5; 20:10, 14; 21:7, 20, 26, 27;
  21:32; 23:12).      
 J 2 (Gen. 30:3; 31:33)   19 (Gen. 12:16; 16:1, 2, 5, 6, 8;
       24:35; 30:4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 43; 32:6,
       23; 33:1, 2, 6; Exod. 11:5)
 P 2 (Lev. 25:6, 44)    7 (Gen. 16:3; 25:12; 29:24, 29;  
      35:25, 26; Lev. 19:20)
 D 7 (Deut. 5:14, 18; 12:12, 18;   1 (Deut. 28:68)
  15:17; 16:11, 14)
   * Gen. 31:33 is not divided between J and E
21 Jepsen, “Amah and Schiphchah” 296-7; Jepsen thus argued against the use of these terms 
as a criterion for distinguishing between the different sources. 
22 Yosi Leshem, ,אמה ושפחה בסיפורי המלוכה שבמקרא,“ אסופת זיכרון לשושנה בהט, מ. בר אשר” 
[”Amah and Shifḥah”=] עורך (ירושלים: האקדמיה ללשון העברית, תשנ“ד) 48-49.
23 See, e.g., P. Kyle McCarter, Jr., I Samuel. The Anchor Bible 8 (Garden City: Doubleday 
& Co., 1980) 22, who suggests a redaction date for the books of Samuel around the time 
of the destruction of the northern kingdom; and Mordechai Cogan and Hayim Tadmor, 
2Kings, The Anchor Bible 11 (Garden City: Doubleday & Co., 1988) 4, who suggest that 
the Kings chronologies may have been composed in the 7th century, then partially revised 
aer the destruction of the Temple.
24 Leshem, “Amah and Shifḥah” 4⒐
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4) Early biblical translations generally treat the two terms as 
synonymous.
  The Jewish Targumim, with one exception regarding Bilhah and 
Zilpah that will be discussed in chapter seven, appear to make no 
distinction between the two terms, translating both as אמהא or 25.אמתא 
The Peshitta (Gen. and Exod.) also uses forms of אמתא throughout. 
The Samaritan Targumim show considerable variation, though not 
with any discernible pattern. The Sj uses primarily forms of שמשה,
26 
though this alternates with forms of אמתא. The Sa uses סולה or אסולה 
most equently, but also other forms such as שמשה and 27.אמאתא
  The Septuagint [=LXX] is consistent in its translation in using 
either παιδίσκη or δούλη for both amah and shifḥah, with three notable 
exceptions: the amah of Exod. 21:7 and the shifḥah of Lev. 19:20 
are both translated as οἰκέτιν or οἰκέτις , as is the shifḥah who is heir 
to her mistress in Prov. 30:23, while the amah of Exod. 21:26-7 is 
translated as θεραπαίνης. Whether any of these terms necessarily imply 
“slaves” is unclear, as it seems they could describe both slaves and 
25 Marcus Jastrow, Dictionary of the Targumim, Talmud Babli, Yerushalmi and Midrashic 
Literature. New York:Pardes Publishing House, Inc., 1950, s.v. אמהתא ,אמתא ,אמהא 
considers them equivalent. 
26 Michael Sokoloff, A Dictionary of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic. Ramat-Gan: Bar Ilan 
University Press, 1992, s.v. שמש has a masculine form שמש “attendant” or “servant,” but 
notes that the verb שמש also has a sexual sense. 
27 See Abraham Tal, 1988 ,התרגום השומרוני לתורה. 3 כרכים. אוניברסיטת תל אביב [=Samaritan 
Targum]. The terms סולה and אסולה do not appear in the common dictionaries. 
Perhaps there is a connection with “goad” or “switch” (Gustaf Dalman, Aramaisch-
neuhebraisches Handworterbuch zu Targum, Talmud und Midrasch. Hildesheim: Georg Olms 
erlagsbuchhandlung, 1967, s.v. סול), suggesting a whipped drudge, or with“fine flour” 
(Sokoloff, s.v. סולת) or possibly “rubbish” (Dalman, s.v. ס[ּו]לתא), suggesting the tasks 
associated with such women. We may also note that in Babylonian Jewish Aramaic סול 
can mean “wooden pick” (Jastrow, s.v. סול); perhaps there is a connection with the slave 
whose ear is bored, as the following talmudic passage (yQidd. 1:2 59d) suggests: 
אין לי אלא במרצע מניין אפילו בסול אפילו בקוץ אפילו בזכוכית תלמוד לומר ורצע 
I know only [that a permanent slave’s ear is to be bored] with a borer; how do 
I know it is also with a splinter, a thorn, a piece of glass? It is thus stated: “and 
he shall bore [the ‘and’ implying inclusivity].”
 Tal, A Dictionary of Samaritan Aramaic. Leiden, Boston and Cologne: E.J. Brill, 2000, s.v. 
.simply defines the word as maidservant without attempting a derivation סולה
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non-slaves.28 In analyzing the masculine term οἰκέτης, Spicq29 notes 
a range of associations; it is used for eved in the LXX, apparently 
thus suggesting a “slave,” but it is also used for people who do not 
seem “servile,” and is oen a synonym of ύπηρέτης, the meanings of 
which include “assistant” and “aide-de-camp”30 (Liddell/Scott). Gibbs 
and Feldman discuss the use of οἰκέτης in the later books of the LXX, 
Josephus and contemporary papyri, concluding that in all these sources 
this and other “slave” terms were increasingly regarded as synonyms; 
31 they view this absence of systematization as simply a lack of interest 
in distinguishing “half-statuses,” an attitude characteristic of Greek 
scholars generally.32 
5) Traditional commentators suggested that the two terms connote 
differences in ethnicity, amah referring to the “Hebrew” slave, and 
shifḥah to the Canaanite. Against this conclusion we may note, first, 
that the term “Canaanite” in reference to shifḥah or amah is purely 
post-biblical;33 further, there are instances of the term shifḥah ivriah, 
28 See, e.g., Iza Biezunska-Malowist, L’esclavage dans l’Égypte Gréco-Romaine. Part 1: Periode 
ptolémaïque. Translated by J. Wolf and J. Kasinska (Wroclaw, 1974) 14-16, who analyzes 
occurrences of παῖς in Egyptian papyri; while she agrees with earlier scholars that the term 
can refer to a slave, rather than to a type of worker permanently attached to an estate, she 
notes that this assessment is not unequivocal, and must be assessed case by case. She cites 
(p. 17) Amusin’s study of slave terms in the LXX, in which he seems to have accepted παῖς, 
οἰκέτης, θεράπων and their feminine equivalents as referring to slaves. Amusin’s argument, 
however, may be circular, in that it assumes the meaning of the Greek terms om the 
biblical Hebrew terms they are translating. John Gibbs and Louis Feldman, “Josephus’ 
Vocabulary for Slavery,” JQR 76 (1986) 281-310, discussing the various “slave terms” used 
by Josephus, note παιδισκη is used as both “young woman of marriageable age” and “slave 
girl’ (p. 295); the male terms θεράπων and οἰκέτης oen connote a person in a trusted or 
non-submissive position (pp. 293-294). The authors conclude that Josephus, like earlier 
Greek writers, did not use these words as precise technical terms (p. 297).
29 C. Spicq, “Le vocabulaire de l’esclavage dans le nouveau testament,” Revue Biblique 85 
(1978) 218-⒐
30 H. G.Liddell and R. Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon. 9th edition with revised supplement. 
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 199⒍ 
31 Gibbs and Feldman, “Josephus’” 290, 294, 29⒌ They also note that the differing patterns 
of use of “slave” terms throughout the LXX raises the possibility of separate authorships 
(p. 300).
32 Gibbs and Feldman, “Josephus’” 292, 30⒈
33 As Flesher has noted (Flesher, Oxen, Women or Citizens? 203), six of the some 129 
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both biblically and post-biblically.34 One might also question in this 
case why there is no similar division in terms for male slaves. 
 In summary: The evidence is consistent with the probability that the 
terms amah and shifḥah were a) considered synonyms, and that differences 
in use among the various pentateuchal books may be accounted for by 
editorial preference; b) were considered terms of servility.
1.1.2 North-East Semitic Versus North-West Semitic? 
At least one scholar has attempted to relate the terms shifḥah and amah to 
apparent cognates in other Semitic languages. Morgenstern suggested a 
relationship between amah and אם, “mother,” proposing that the clan of 
the amah-wife was called אום; he then proposed a derivation of shifḥah om 
a pre-biblical root שפח “to pour,”35 noting an Arabic cognate, suggesting 
that this would indicate a woman into whom semen was “poured”, and 
whose clan was called a 36.משפחה His assessment of the meaning of amah 
and shifḥah took place within the context of his thesis that the biblical text 
reveals signs of a historical change om beena (matrilocal, matriarchat)-
style marriage, in which the husband stays with the wife’s clan, to ba’al 
(virilocal)-style marriage, in which the wife leaves with the husband. 
He thus concluded that both terms originally indicated a wife in a beena 
marriage. The later development of these words into slave terms was in his 
view a parallel of the change om beena to ba’al marriage, itself conditioned 
by increased access to foreign captive women and a consequent increase 
in the institutions of slavery and clientage.37 The changeover involved 
in tracing one’s lineage through one’s father rather than through one’s 
mother would, as Morgenstern notes, explain many of the differences in 
genealogy oen noted between Genesis and Chronicles.38 His conclusions 
mishnaic sections relating to slaves refer to this distinction.
34 e.g. Jer. 34: 9; mB.Metz. 1:⒌
35 One must note that the verb “to pour” in biblical and post-biblical Hebrew is spelled שפך.
36 Julian Morgenstern, “Beena Marriage (Matriarchat) in Ancient Israel and its Historical 
Implications,” ZAW 47 (=n.s. 6) (1929) 99-101, 101-⒉ 
37 Morgenstern, “Beena Marriage,” 10⒊
38 Morgenstern, “Beena Marriage,” 103ff.
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were accepted by Bal, in forming her argument that the violence toward 
women reflected in the book of Judges was the result of this shi om 
what she calls patrilocal marriage to virilocal marriage, and the consequent 
tensions between father and husband.39 
 Morgenstern’s observations do seem to suggest the quasi-kinship nature 
of both terms. Nonetheless, I believe his conclusions should be viewed 
with caution. Morgenstern offers other evidence in support of an original 
matrilocal clan organization: Jacob, for instance, stays with the clan of his 
wives; members of David’s clan are referred to by the mothers’ names; in 
non-P texts women “give birth” to children (ילדה, ילדה ל-), whereas in the 
later P texts it is men who “sire” them (the Hifil הוליד is used exclusively). 
While this evidence may hint at different types of social organization, it 
cannot conclusively support a linear, chronological change om matrilocal 
to virilocal organization, particularly as Morgenstern’s theory seems to be 
predicated on a Bachofen-type assumption of an historical “advancement” 
om matriachal to patriarchal societies.40 
 Further, the etymological evidence that Morgenstern offers is not without 
difficulties. The term amah seems to be cognate with terms in other Semitic 
languages, including Akkadian amtum and Jewish Aramaic ,אמהא  אמתא, 
 Logically then, before one can argue for a connection between the 41.אמהתא
Hebrew terms אם, אמה and אום, one would also be required to show that this 
slave woman/mother/clan relationship holds true in related languages. 
 With respect to the term shifḥah, certain of the dictionaries, like 
Morgenstern, have also suggested a connection between shifḥah and 
 has noted a similar type of relationship 42(שפחה .Even-Shoshan (s.v .משפחה
between the Latin famula, “maid servant”, and familia, “family.” There is 
no agreement, however, as to the root of either of these Hebrew terms. 
39 I shall discuss Bal’s conclusions later on in chapter two.
40 Julian Morgenstern, “Additional Notes on Beena Marriage in Ancient Israel.” ZAW 49 
(=n.s. 8) (1931) 5⒊ Blok, “Sexual Asymmentry” 29-31, has documented this tendency in 
19th-20th century scholarship to find a “suppressed level of matriarchal culture” in ancient 
societies (p. 30), especially when scholars came across facts that appeared to contradict 
their assumption of a “norm” of male dominance.
41 There are also west Semitic cognates noted by J. Hoĳzer and K. Jongeling, Dictionary of 
the North-West Semitic Inscriptions. 2 parts. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995, s.v. אמה II.
[Even-Shoshan=] אברהם אבן-שושן, המלון העברי המרכז. ירושלים: קרית ספר, תשמ“ח. 42
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Morgenstern’s idea of “pouring” would seem to be more closely related to 
the biblical term שפך than to his proposed root 43.שפח Another suggested 
derivation is the biblical ספח-שפח “to join,” perhaps implying someone 
who is joined to the family; here too, however, there is no agreement as to 
the meaning of this root.44 
 The root ŠPḤ is also attested in other Semitic sources, specifically in 
Phoenician/Punic inscriptions. Some scholars argue for the meaning “clan, 
family” (Hoĳzer and Jongeling, s.v. špḥ1), though other opinions are cited 
giving the meaning “servant” or “slave,” particularly with respect to Corpus 
Inscriptionum Semiticarum [=CIS] i 16⒌ This document is described as a 
tariff of payments for sacrifices at the Temple of Baal, probably deriving 
om Carthage and dating to the 4th century BCE.45 Aer setting out the 
priestly tariff for various kinds of sacrifices, and exempting om payment 
those who are “poor in cattle or birds”, lines 16-17 set out a further group 
of people (or sacrifices) who are to pay according to some fixed schedule; 
these lines are transliterated as follows:46
כל מזרח וכל שפח וכל מרזח אלם וכל אדמם אש יזבח [ ]
 האדמם המת משאת על זבח כמדת שת בכתב[ת]
 Cooke takes ŠPḤ here as related to Hebrew משפחה, and suggests the 
meaning “family”; Donner/Rollig similarly suggest a comparison with 
biblical Hebrew משפחה  ,as in 1Sam. 20:6, 2⒐47 Van den Branden ,זבח 
43 There appears to be an Akkadian cognate in sapāḫu ”to spill,” though W. von Soden, 
Akkadisches Handwörterbuch. 3 vols. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1965 [=AWH] relates 
this to a south Semitic root ŠPḤ. 
44 Mandelkern assigns the meaning adiungere (“to connect”) to the biblical ספח-שפח. There 
again appears to be an Akkadian cognate in sapāḫu, but with the opposite meaning of “to 
scatter” or “to disperse” particularly with respect to a household (AHW and Martha Roth, 
(current editor in charge) The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University 
of Chicago. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956-2006 [=CAD]), based on which 
one might interpret the Hebrew shifḥah as referring to someone separated om her family. 
Adding to the confusion, Kohut (ed.) in , Vindobona, 1926 ,הערוך השלם [=Arukh] derives 
shifḥah om a root shafaḥ (translated simply as unterjochen knechten), which it deems related 
to biblical ספחת “leprosy,” A. Kohut (ed.), הערוך השלם Vindobona, 1926 s.v משפחה..
45 See Herbert Donner and Wolfgang Rollig, Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften 
(Wiesbaden Harrassowitz, 1962-1964) 2:8⒋
46 Donner and Rollig, Kanaanäische und aramäische Inschriften.
47 G.A. Cooke, A Text-book of North-Semitic Inscriptions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1903) 
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on the other hand, relates ŠPḤ to Hebrew shifḥah, assuming the latter to 
mean “esclave qui répand l’eau sur les mains du maître,” and translates the 
provision as referring to various types of temple functionaries:
Tout allumeur et tout laveur at tout serviteur du banquet sacré, bref, tous les 
hommes (de cette categorie) qui offrirent un sacrifice...48 
Liǳbarski similarly gives the meaning “Diener.”49 
 This evidence gives a slight hint that amah is more closely associated 
with East-Semitic sources such as Akkadian and Jewish Aramaic, and 
shifḥah with West-Semitic sources, such as Phoenician and Punic. In the 
former case, amah’s cognates suggest quasi-kinship terminology, while 
the shifḥah’s possible cognates may be more associated with the idea of a 
stranger or outsider taken within the family.50 In biblical usage, as argued 
above, the terms became synonymous; it is interesting to consider, however, 
the kinship or quasi-kinship roles suggested by their cognate term.
1.1.2.A The amah as a Secondary Wife
We may note that the word amah has been found on a limited number of 
material remains, both pre- and post-exilic. Despite the assumption that 
amah refers to a slave, the context of these finds leads to the conclusion 
that the amah in each case was not a woman of low standing. The following 
summarizes the finds, based on scholarly articles:
121; Donner and Rollig, Kanaanäische 2:8⒍ An attempt to get the sense of this word 
by comparison to the other terms is difficult, as these too are unclear. Both these works 
suggest מזרח may be related to Hebrew אזרח, perhaps implying “natives,” or “a class of 
eemen,” or “clan.” For מרזח both note biblical Hebrew instances of this term (Jer. 16:5, 
Amos 6:7), which seem to indicate a type of celebration or “wake” (Cooke, Text-book 
121-2; Donner and Rollig, Kanaanäische 186). מרזח is also attested in rabbinic Hebrew; 
ישראל, -1954 ממשלת  של  והתרבות  החינוך  משרד  (ירושלים:  התלמוד  לשון  אוצר  קסובסקי,  חיים 
1982) [=Kosovsky, Concordance to Talmud], s.v. רזח takes it as a combination of מרר and 
.הרמת קול בין לבכי ובין לשמחה and meaning similarly ,זחה (מרר / זח/זחה/זוח)
48 A. van den Branden, “Notes phéniciennes,” Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth 13 (1956) 94, 9⒌ 
49 M. Liǳbarski, Handbuch der nordsemitischen Epigraphik nebst ausgewählten Inschriften. 
Weimar: Felber 1898, 381, s.v. שפח.
50 See n. 65 of this chapter.
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i)  A Hebrew inscription associated with a tomb found in Siloam, 
identified as pre-exilic (approximately 700 B.C.E.), and reconstructed 
as follows:51 
1. זאת [קברת...]יהו אשר על הבית אין פה כסף וזהב
2. [כי] אם עצמתו ועצמת אמתה אתה ארור האדם אשר
3. יפתח את זאת
1.  This is [the grave of ...]yahu who was over[seer] of the house. Here 
there is no gold and silver,
2.  [but] his bones and the bones of his amah52 with him. Cursed is the 
person
3. who opens this. 
ii)  A seal om Amman, date pre-exilic, possibly 7th century B.C.E., with 
an Ammonite inscription:53 
לעליה אמת חננאל
[belonging] to Aliyah, the amah of Ḥananel
iii) A 7th century seal with an Ammonite inscription transliterated as 
follows:54 
‘nmat amah dblbs
iv) A seal om the Jerusalem region, dated to the Persian province of 
Judah approximately 6th century B.C.E., with a Hebrew inscription, 
reconstructed as follows:55
51 Naḥman Avigad, “The Epitaph of a Royal Steward om Siloam Village.” IEJ 3 (1953) 143, 
150. The reconstruction and transliteration are those of Avigad.
52 Avigad (“Epitaph,” 142-143) identifies אמתה אתה as an older form of possessive, using ה 
instead of ו; as a biblical instance of this construction he cites אהלה in Gen. 9:2⒈
53 Naḥhman Avigad, “A Seal of a Slave Wife,” Palestine Exploration Quarterly (1946) 130; Walter 
Auecht, A Corpus of Ammonite Inscriptions, Ancient Near Eastern Texts and Studies 4 (Lewiston: 
Edwin Mellen Press, 1989) 8⒎ Transliteration and translation are those of Avigad.
54 Adolf Reifenberg, Ancient Hebrew Seals. London: East and West Library. MCML (1950) 
#36; Naḥman Avigad, Bullae and Seals from a Post-Exilic Judean Archive Qedem ⒋ Transl. R. 
Grafman (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1976) 11, ⒚ The transliteration is that of Avigad.
55 Avigad, Bullae and Seals 11, 13, 17, 19 (English section); Ephraim Stern, Material Culture 








 The presumed meaning of amah as “slave woman” causes a certain scholarly 
dilemma. Auecht56 notes the scholarly puzzlement at a “slave” being associated 
with a seal or tomb inscription, with some scholars suggesting57 that amah in 
these cases refers to a royal title or an official functionary. Avigad, in his earlier 
articles discussing the Siloam description and the Aliyah seal, had maintained 
that the amah in each case must have been a “slave-wife”; he related this amah 
to the woman referred to in Exod. 21:7 given to an eved by his master. He 
assumed that she was not “legally” married, but possessing sufficient status 
to be buried with her “master,” or to possess her own seal; alternatively, this 
might have been a widow, originally a slave, who, following the parallel of 
Code of Hammurapi [=CH] 171, became a eedwoman aer her husband’s 
death.58 The Persian era seal, in contrast, caused him some doubt. 
 Though he still maintained the possible meaning of “concubine,” that 
is, a slave woman with higher status by virtue of her relationship with her 
master, he also conceded that Albright’s meaning of “functionary” could be 
appropriate.59 
of the Land of the Bible in the Persian Period 538-332 BC (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 
1982) 200, 207, figure 32⒐ The reconstruction and transliteration are those of Avigad.
56 Auecht, Ammonite Inscriptions 87-8⒏
57 See, e.g., Stern, Material Culture 200. Stern notes the prior opinion of Cross that Persian 
custom prescribed that only officials holding high rank possessed inscribed seals. He also 
refers to a seal of עשניהו עבד המלך (Ashnayahu eved of the king,) found at Tel Qasile, which 
he dates to the 4th century B.C.E. (p. 207). He cites the opinion of B. Mazar that the 
title עבד המלך was common in the First Temple period in Israel and Judah, and continued 
into the Persian period; the “king” in this case is taken to be the king of Persia. Cf. the 
opinion of Leshem, n. 22, who connects the self-deprecating use of amah with the rise of 
the monarchy.
58 Avigad, “Seal of a Slave Wife” 130-1; Avigad, “Epitaph of a Royal Steward” 145-⒍ 
59 Avigad, Bullae and Seals 12-⒔ In support of the meaning of “concubine,” Avigad cites 
the terse discussion in yKet. 5:2 29d of the legal status of the pilegesh, as indicating the 
potentially high standing of such a woman. The precise meaning of this passage, is however, 
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 Avigad in his arguments notes an opinion (expressed by Y. Yadin) that 
the amah could be a “legal wife”. This was supported by a Neo-Assyrian 
document in the name of Zaqûtum, consort of Sennacherib and mother of 
Esarhaddon; in it she describes herself with the sign GÉME.60 This sign 
was read by certain scholars61 as amtu (or the NA equivalent antu). This 
apparent association of an Akkadian slave term, cognate with the Hebrew 
amah, with a royal consort led Yadin to suppose that the Hebrew amah 
could also refer to someone of “wifely” rank.62 Later opinion, however, 
reads the sign GÉME here as SAL.KUR; it is to be read as equivalent to 
SAL.É.GAL, and is to be Akkadianized as ša ekalli rather than amtu.63 As 
such, it is understood as “the wife of a king” or “a woman of the highest 
rank.”64 Yet SAL.KUR is also associated with slaves; it has been read as 
“woman of the mountain”, and, as such, an indication of the source of 
many slaves as “foreigners”.65 Again, this opinion seems circular, positing 
the alternate reading due to the apparent incompatibility between a king’s 
consort and the presumed meaning of amtu as “slave.” It would seem, 
therefore, that it is not necessary to interpret amtu as indicating a slave in 
this case. 
 I propose that om the context of these instances we may accept these 
women were sexual partners; perhaps we may call them quasi-wives.
a matter of issue; this will be discussed later on in this chapter.
60 Assyrian and Babylonian Letters [=ABL] XII 1239, line 2, titled by Leroy Waterman, 
Royal Correspondence of the Assyrian Empire (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1930) [=RCAE] 1239, as “Oath of Fealty to Ashurbanipal.” Line 1 has GÉME ša Sin-aḫḫe-
eriba; GÉME is repeated in line ⒑ 
61 For example, Waterman, RCAE 1239 and 327; Hildegard Lewy, “Nitokris Naqi’a,” JNES 
11 (1952) 28⒉
62 Yadin’s opinion is noted by Avigad, “Epitaph of a Royal Steward” 146, n. 2⒈
63 See, e.g., AHW, s.v. ekallu(m), B2, and the opinion of H. Tadmor, cited by Avigad in Bullae 
and Seals 12-13, n. ⒛ 
64 CAD s.v. ekallu, in ša ekalli. 
65 See, e.g., Guillaume Cardascia, “Le statut de l’etranger dans la Mesopotamie ancienne,” 
Recueils de la Société Jean Bodin 9 (1958) 10⒍ Certain scholars have argued, based in 
particular on LH 280-281, that a distinction was made for “inland” slaves that protected 
them om being sold “abroad” (see, e.g., Koschaker, Rechtsvergleichende 106; contra Driver 
and Miles, The Babylonian Laws 1:224). Bernard J. Siegel, “Slavery During the Third 
Dynasty of Ur,” American Anthropologist ns. 49, No. 1 pt. 2 (1947) 42-43 argues that a 
similar protection existed during the Ur III period. We may also note that mGitt. 4:6 
provides that a slave sold outside the land of Israel ceases to be a slave.
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1.1.3 Conclusion: On the Slave-Wife Continuum
The evidence above points to a presumption that female slaves and wives 
existed along the same continuum:
a) shifḥah and amah were used biblically as synonyms, their difference 
probably reflecting differences in ethnic origin;
b) these female slaves were dependants (whose dependence could be 
mimicked in the use of slave terms for non-slaves);
 - the same woman could be both wife and slave; and there is material 
evidence of a wife-like status for some amahot;
c) consistent with the overarching notion of hierarchy as the ideal, the 
Bible displays great concern to place these women in some kind of 
family or kinship structure; conversely, there is no hint that marriage 
was prohibited to these women, or that their primary use was to be 
exploited as concubines or breeders.
 Point ⒞ in particular will be brought out more fully in the next two 
chapters, specifically on the issues of the matrilineal principle and the slave as 
property. In the meantime, this exercise in philology will focus on two other 
sets of terms that shed light on the hierarchical structure that is envisioned 
biblically. 
1.1.4 Conclusion
We may conclude that while the amah and shifḥah were dependants - this 
would account for the self-effacing use, and their use in lists with the term 
eved - their sexual use was carefully regulated. The biblical evidence suggests 
that the terms shifḥah and amah, if not completely synonymous, at least 
implied no difference in legal rank; yet the epigraphic evidence of amah 
does suggest the term was used, in pre- and post-exilic Israel, to describe 
someone of high social status. Further, we note that “wife” terminology, 
 is applied to women also described as shifḥah and amah. Do these facts ,אשה
suggest that the biblical amah was a “concubine” or some other “close-to-
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wife” status? In chapter three we shall examine the provisions of Exod. 21:2-
11, the most extensive pentateuchal regulation concerning the amah. We 
shall focus in particular on the supposed connection of v. 4 of this pericope 
with the matrilineal inheritance of slavery, and the effect of vv. 7-11, which 
seem to suggest that the amah was fated to be a “concubine” to the master.
1.2 ARE THERE BIBLICAL TERMS 
FOR SECOND GENERATION SLAVES?
Our next study of biblical terms should question whether there are definite 
biblical terms denoting second-generation slaves. Specifically, do the 
biblical phrases ben amah, ben bayit and yelid bayit suggest the existence of 
a specific status applied to second generation slaves, and thus the existence 
of a “hereditary” slave class? This possibility seems strengthened by the 
fact that in some cases the terms seem to be used in parallel with the 
male slave term eved. Further examination of the terms in their various 
contexts, however, suggests instead that they imply some inferior attribute 
or characteristic rather than a specific status, and in some cases might be 
applied to non-slaves.
1.2.1 ben amah
The question with respect to the ben amah, as Fensham notes, is whether 
ben in this case means literally “the son of ”, so that the term simply means 
“son of an amah” with no further implications as to status, or whether 
it implies “a member of the group of,” and thus partaking of the social 
or legal position of the amah.66 If it is the latter case, one might argue 
that the term implies the existence of a slave status inherited through 
the mother, and, in fact, three of the six biblical instances of ben amah 
appear to use this term as a synonym for the male slave term eved. Yet the 
various nuances of meaning connected with all the biblical occurrences, 
as well as the disappearance of this term (except in biblical references) in 
post-biblical sources, argue against its being incontrovertible evidence of a 
hereditary status. Furthermore, several instances point to the amah in this 
phrase as describing a type of secondary wife, rather than a slave.
66 F. Charles Fensham, “The Son of a Handmaid in Northwest Semitic,” VT 19 (1969) 3⒖
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1.2.1.A Ishmael
Three of the biblical instances of this term refer to specific individuals, 
thus offering the possibility of assessing their status contextually. Two 
describe Ishmael (the son of Hagar, the amah/shifḥah of Sarah and the ishah 
of Abraham), and specifically his standing in relation to his “half-brother” 
Isaac:
 -  Gen. 21:10 (E stratum), in which Sarah insists that Ishmael, “the son 
of that amah,” not inherit with her own son Isaac.
 -  Gen. 21:13 (E stratum), the promise to Abraham that this son of an 
amah Ishmael, as his descendant, will, like Isaac, also lead a nation.
 I would argue that there is nothing within the biblical context to 
indicate that Ishmael was addressed as or treated as an eved. There is 
evidently an issue, at least in the view of the wife Sarah, with respect to 
Ishmael’s position vis-à-vis her biological son Isaac. The terminology in 
Gen. chapter 21 emphasizes this issue: vv. 9-10 highlight Sarah’s view of 
Hagar and her son as rivals and outsiders: “the son of Hagar the Mitzrit, 
whom she had born to Abraham…”, “cast out this amah and her son”, 
while v. 11, which describes Abraham’s view, calls Ishmael “his son”. 
Underlying this rivalry may have been questions of the right to inherit the 
father’s property, or position, yet there is nothing in the biblical narratives 
regarding Ishmael that suggests chattel slavery or other legal subordination 
to Isaac or Sarah. 
 The treatment of Ishmael in earlier post-biblical sources confirms that 
in these texts he was not associated with the term eved;67 the concern is 
rather to emphasize his inferior standing in various respects in relation to 
Isaac, or to justi his harsh treatment at the hands of the matriarch Sarah. 
 Commenting on Gen. 25:9, which describes Isaac and Ishmael burying 
their father, Gen. Rabbah (Rom) at 62:3 states that the order of the names 
in this verse is deliberate:
67 The Targumim and Septuagint [=LXX] translate all the biblical instances of ben amah 
literally (בר אמתא, ‘o νιος παιδισκης), and thus offer no hint as to its meaning.
---------   1.2 ARE THERE BIBLICAL TERMS FOR SECOND GENERATION SLAVES?   ---------
— 55 —
בן אמה חולק כבוד לבן הגבירה
The ben amah [Ishmael] defers to the son of the main wife [Isaac].
The midrash at 47:5 on Gen. 17:21 uses an a fortiori argument, to suggest 
that Isaac was the only one to benefit om the covenant: 
רבי יוחנן בשם רבי יהושע בר חנינא בן הגבירה למד מבן האמה 
הנה ברכתי אותו כבר שמעתי אותו זה יצחק וחפרתי אותו זה יצחק והרבתי אותו זה יצחק 
ולישמעאל כבר שמעתי אותו ע“י מלאך רבי אבא בר כהנא בשם רבי בירי כאן בן האמה 
למד מבן הגבירה הנה ברכתי אותו זה ישמעאל והפרתי אותו זה ישמעאל והרבתי אותו זה 
ישמעאל ק“ו וזאת בריתי אקים את יצחק
R. Yoḥanan in the name of R. Joshua b. Ḥaninah: The son of the main wife 
learned [his status] from the ben amah: “I have blessed him” - this is Isaac; 
“I will make him fruitful” - this is Isaac; “I will make him multiply”- this 
is Isaac; while I have already informed Ishmael through an angel. R. Abba 
bar Kahana in the name of R. Biryai: the ben amah learned [his status] from 
the son of the main wife: “I will bless him” - this is Ishmael; “I will make 
him fruitful”- this is Ishmael; “I will make him multiply” -this is Ishmael; a 
fortiori “I will establish My covenant with Isaac [Gen. 17:21].”
 Yet the same midrash, addressing the wording in Gen. 17:20, also 
confirms the promise to Abraham that Ishmael will receive a leader status 
equal to that of Isaac: 
ולישמעאל שמעתיך הנה ברכתי אתו והפריתי אתו והרביתי אתו במאד מאד
שנים עשר נשיאם יוליד ונתתיו לגוי גדול
With respect to [your concerns for] Ishmael, I have heard you. I have blessed 
him, and will make him fruitful and cause him to multiply exceedingly; he 
will sire twelve princes, and I will make him into a great nation. 
 Concern thus seems to be to render Ishmael as inferior (because he is 
addressed only by an angel), but not servile, to Isaac as the preferred heir 
(because of the covenant). 
 The later biblical commentator Naḥmanides meticulously examined the 
subtle differences in terminology used in Gen. with respect to Isaac and 
Ishmael. The significance of these distinctions, in his opinion, lies in their 
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different relationships to, and recognition by, their father Abraham. He 
notes, for instance, that in Gen. 25:19 Abraham’s relationship to Isaac is 
described with אברהם הוליד את יצחק “Abraham sired Isaac”;68 this stands in 
contrast to Ishmael, described in 25:12 as ישמעאל בן אברהם אשר ילדה הגר 
 Ishmael the son of Abraham whom Hagar the“ …המצרית שפחת שרה לאברהם
Egyptian, Sarah’s shifḥah, bore to Abraham.” This contrast, which lies in 
the reference to the siring by the father in the case of Isaac, emphasizes the 
difference in Abraham’s relationships to his two descendants. Naḥmanides 
further notes (commentary to Gen. 30:5) the interesting point that though 
the sons of Bilhah and Zilpah are technically, like Ishmael, sons of amahot 
they are never described as such. This difference in his view again depended 
on the father’s acknowledgment:69 
ותלד [בלהה] ליעקב בן: הזכיר בכל השפחות ליעקב להגיד כי הוא חפץ ומודה בהם ואיננו 
נקרא לו בן האמה רק בן ליעקב  כבני הגבירות המתיחסים אליו...
And [Bilhah] gave birth to a son to Jacob: [The particular wording a son to 
Jacob] is mentioned with respect to all Jacob’s shefaḥot, to indicate that he 
wanted and acknowledged [these sons], and we do not refer to [such a son] 
as ben ha-amah but as a son to Jacob, like the sons of the main wives who 
were [automatically] his relations.70 
 What Naḥmanides’ nuanced reading of the Genesis narratives again 
suggests is that the legal and financial situation of an “unacknowledged” 
ben amah was precarious, but not that of a slave. 
68 [There was also significant concern about Abraham’s paternity of Isaac given that Sarah 
had just been released by Avimelekh and the pregnancy is announced. Targum Yonatan 
[= TY] (Gen. 21:2) and other midrashim (e.g. Bereishit Rabbah (Theodor-Albeck) 52:1-2) 
emphasize Isaac’s likeness to Abraham as proof of his paternity. The biblical text itself 
reemphasizes Abraham’s paternity a number of times. TM.]
69 As will be noted below, Naḥmanides’ emphasis on acknowledgment by the father happens 
to mirror the situation of a mār amtim in the Hammurapi laws.
70 This idea of legal precariousness and perhaps social inferiority with respect to the four sons 
of Bilhah and Zilpah is suggested also in Chap. 24 of the apocryphal document entitled 
“Joseph and Aseneth” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, 1985, pp. 177 -247, edited by 
J.H. Charlesworth. New York: Doubleday (trans. C. Burchard); perhaps reading between 
the lines of Gen. 37:2, it ascribes to the four sons feelings of envy, and has Pharaoh’s son 
later inciting them to hatred of Joseph by claiming that the latter intended to have them 
disinherited as being only the “children of maidservants” (v. 9).
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 (Interestingly, Naḥmanides echoes here an argument found in the 
Laws of Hammurapi [=LH]. The semantic equivalent of ben amah, the 
mār amtim, is found rarely in Akkadian.71 Significantly however, it is 
mentioned in LH 170-171, which speaks of the fate of children of an 
awīlum who have been borne to him by an amtum. In one instance they are 
referred to as mārū amtim, the literal equivalent of Hebrew בני אמה “sons 
of an amah.” If acknowledged by the father,72 they share the father’s estate 
equally with children of the first-ranking wife (mārū ḫīrtim); if not, they 
are released om any claim of slavery (wardūtum) at the father’s death. 
The children’s existence also appears to affect the status of the mother in 
ss. 146-7: an amtum who has borne children to an awīlum may not be sold 
by a prior-ranking nadītum (a temple dedicatee who, if married, brought 
in other women to bear children for her husband). The legal effect of such 
provisions is to negate any possibility of “hereditary” slave status, at least 
for children of an amtum who were sired by the master.)
1.2.1.B Avimelekh
The third biblical instance of ben amah, in Judges 9:18, refers to Avimelekh, 
who is described as the son of Gideon by the latter’s pilegesh (Judges 8:31) - 
again, there is the suggestion that this phrase applies to sons of secondary 
of inferior wives. Here Avimelekh’s “half-brother” Yotam - again there 
is an issue of aternal hierarchy - castigates the people of Shekhem for 
assisting Avimelekh in the slaughter of Gideon’s other sons, and then 
appointing this בן אמתו as king. Again, the status of Avimelekh is nowhere 
explicitly stated or implied to be that of an eved; at most, the half-brother 
Yotam questions his right to kingship, perhaps by imputing to him an 
71 There is also the phrase mār amat ekalli, found in Neo-Assyrian [=NA] documents. 
Radner considers this expression as the palace equivalent of a “houseborn slave”, and it 
will be discussed below with reference to the yelid bayit.
 We may also note the documents (primarily temple ration lists) om the Ur III period 
and earlier, that I. Gelb has called GÉME.DUMU texts (see, e.g. I.J. Gelb, “The Arua 
Institution.” RA 66 1972] 1). In his opinion, however, the women referred to in these lists 
were not primarily slave women (and their children), but marginalized persons (including 
the elderly, female prisoners and ex voto women and children “donated” by families who 
could not support them), collected and maintained by the temple (ibid. 3, 9, 12).
72 Cf. the commentary of Naḥmanides, above at n. ⒊
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inferior and treacherous “stock,” as suggested in his use of the parable of 
the thorn (Judges 9:15-20):
ויאמר האטד אל העצים אם באמת משחים אתי למלך עליכם באו חסו בצלי ואם אין תצא 
אש מן האטד ותאכל את ארזי הלבנון...
ואם באמת ובתמים עשיתם עם ירבעל ועם ביתו היום שמחו באבימלך וישמח גם הוא 
בכם. ואם אין תצא אש מאבימלך ותאכל את בעלי שכם
The thorn said to the trees: If you are truly anointing me as king over you, 
come and have refuge in my shade; but if you are not, a fire will issue from 
the thorn and consume the cedars of Lebanon...
[Similarly] If today you have acted truthfully and honestly with Yeruba’al and 
his house, rejoice in Avimelekh, and let him also rejoice in you. But if not, a 
fire will issue from Avimelekh and consume the Shekhemites...73 
 Morgenstern analyzed the Avimelekh story as a clear example of beena 
marriage, suggested in part by the fact that Avimelekh remained with 
his mother, and claimed the kingship perhaps because his mother’s clan 
were natives of Shekhem (Judges 9:2), and the crown had previously been 
offered to his father Gideon.74 His designation by Yotam as a ben amah 
may thus indicate a pejorative use, a reflection of Avimelekh’s status as a 
usurper.
73 Thorn parables are found elsewhere in Near Eastern literature; see, e.g. 2Kings 14:9, 
and the Aḥiqar document (trans. J.M. Lindenberger, “Ahiqar,” in The Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha, ed. J.H. Charlesworth [New York: Doubleday, 1985] 2:479-507, at 506 
ll. 165-166), both of which seem to associate the thorn with the idea of a rebuke against 
those accepting improper authority. The author known as Pseudo-Philo also made 
this connection explicit in his comment on Yotam’s parable in Judges 9: “And now 
the bramblebush will be for you in this hour like Abimelech, who killed his brothers 
uǌustly and wishes to rule among you. If Abimelech be worthy of them whom he 
wishes to rule for himself, let him be like the bramblebush that was made to rebuke the 
foolish among the people” (trans. D. J. Harrington, “Pseudo-Philo,” in ibid. 2:297-377, 
esp. 350-351).
74 J. Morgenstern, “Beena Marriage” 93, 109 n. ⒋ As discussed earlier in this chapter (⒈⒈2), 
Morgenstern proposed that amah was the usual term to designate a woman in a beena 
marriage (ibid. 101-102); he also argued in Julian Morgenstern, “Additional Notes on 
Beena Marriage in Ancient Israel,” ZAW 49 (=n.s. 8) (1931) 57-58, that the Judges editor 
called Avimelekh the son of a pilegesh because his readers, living in a time when beena 
marriage had been supplanted by the ba’al form, would not have understood the word 
amah. As I will argue later, pilegesh has a specific meaning not equivalent to amah. 
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1.2.1.C As Parallel to eved in Psalms and Sabbath Law
The three remaining biblical instances of ben amah, as noted, appear to treat 
the term as a parallel to eved. In two instances the parallel is explicit:
- Psalm 86, a plea by one who calls himself עבדך (v. 3), and then goes 
on to describe himself as a ben amah (v. 16): תנה עזך לעבדך והושיעה לבן 
.”Give your strength to your eved, and save the son of your amah“ אמתך
- Psalm 116:16, in which the supplicant describes himself as: אני עבדך בן 
 ”…I am your eved, the son of your amah“ .אמתך
 Fensham has summarized the scholarly treatment of the term ben amah 
in the two psalms,75 noting that the phrase is either taken as indicating 
a “houseborn slave” or read as if the second noun were emet, not amah, 
as ben amittekha, “the son of your fidelity.”76 Fensham rejects, I believe 
correctly, both suppositions: a definite parallel between eved and amah 
(not emet) seems intended, but this is merely figurative, an expression 
of humility.77 A similar difference in viewpoint may be seen among the 
traditional commentators to these Psalms.78 Rashi and Metzudat David 
both equate the ben amah in Psalm 86:16 with a yelid bayit, “a houseborn 
person,” and assumed this indicated a slave with a greater connection with, 
and thus greater feelings of humility toward, the master:
בן האמה משפיל את עצמו לפני אדוניו יותר ממקנת כסף 
שבן האמה יליד בית הוא וגדל בחיק אדוניו
75 Fensham, “Son of a Handmaid” 320-32⒈
76 The latter is the position of M. Dahood, who suggests this phrase echoes the idea of 
faithfulness expressed in v. 11 of Psalm 86 (אהלך באמתך) and v. 10 of Psalm 116 (האמנתי). 
He suggests also a parallel with the Akkadian arad kittīšu, “his true servant”, found in the 
El-Amarna letters, as a type of address form used by a vassal to one’s suzerain: in Mitchell 
Dahood, Psalms II, 51-100. Anchor Bible (Garden City: Doubleday, 1968) 296; Mitchell 
Dahood, Psalms III, 101-150. Anchor Bible (Garden City: Doubleday, 1981) 150. Dahood 
suggests on literary grounds that Ps. 116 is earlier than post-exilic (ibid. 145).
77 Fensham, “Son of a Handmaid” 3⒛
78 Each position also affects modern translations. Most of the English translations (e.g. KJV, 
JPS, Schocken) use the literal “son of a handmaid/slave girl” for the translation of the 
biblical ben amah; the Jerusalem Bible, which similarly translates “son of a slave girl” in the 
other four instances of ben amah, uses “son of a pious woman” for Pss. 86:16 and 116:⒗
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The son of an amah supplicates more to his master than one bought with 
money, because the ben amah is a yelid bayit, and grew up in his master’s 
household.
Radak (Psalm 86:16), on the other hand, assumed simply a figurative use of ben 
amah as indicating deference to the Deity, suggesting that one’s attitudes in 
this regard are more closely influenced by the example set by one’s mother:
טבע האם נקשר בבן יותר מטבע האב...אני עבדך משני פנים 
שהרגלתי עצמי בעבודתך ועוד כי היה בטבעי ג“כ כי אמי היה* אמתך 
*likely an error for היתה
The mother’s nature is more closely connected to the son than the father’s 
nature... “I am your servant” has two facets: I have become accustomed to 
serve You, and also it was in my nature because my mother was Your amah.
 The sixth instance of ben amah occurs in Exod. 23:12 (E stratum), in 
which the Sabbath is explicitly extended to all “members” of the household: 
 so that your ox and your donkey…“ למען ינוח שורך וחמרך וינפש בן אמתך והגר
may rest, and your ben amah and the stranger may be reeshed.”79 It is this 
occurrence of ben amah, in Fensham’s opinion, that definitely refers to a 
slave, given its apparent parallel with the Sabbath observance provision in 
the two versions of the Decalogue, in which the terms eved and amah are 
used: Exod. 20:10 states אתה ובנך ובתך עבדך ואמתך ובהמתך וגרך “you and your 
son and your daughter and your slave (eved) and your maid servant (amah) 
and your cattle and your stranger,” while the version in Deut. 5:14 states 
 you and your son“ אתה ובנך ובתך ועבדך ואמתך ושורך וחמרך וכל בהמתך וגרך
and your daughter and your slave (eved) and your maid servant (amah) and 
your ox and your ass and all your cattle and your stranger.” The Samaritan 
Pentateuch does in fact make this parallel explicit, as its Exod. 23:12b 
matches more closely the decalogue wording and order: עבדך ינוח   למען 
 in order that your slave (eved) and your maid“ ואמתך כמוך וכל בהמתך והגר
servant (amah) shall rest like you and all your cattle and the stranger.”80 
79 It is of interest to note that the verb וינפש is also used in Exod. 31:17 to describe God’s 
ceasing work on the Sabbath.
80 The Samaritan Targumim correspond with the literal ואמתך  שמשך ואמתך Sj) or) עבדך 
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 Given, however, both the change in wording and the change in order 
in MT Exod. 23:12, it is not clear that the אמתך  here is intended as בן 
a deliberate parallel to the עבדך of the Decalogue verses. As the phrase 
is used pentateuchally only by E, it may be interpreted with reference to 
its uses in Gen., as indicating in this case too simply a dependant family 
member, whether descended of the main wife or not. 
 The Mekhilta deR. Ishmael, Dibaḥodesh, on Exod. 20:10 (Lauterbach) 
also noted, but could not easily explain, the change in wording in Exod. 
23:⒓ An assumption was made that the Decalogue verses referred to 
circumcised avadim, while Exod. 23 referred to uncircumcised avadim:
עבדך ואמתך – אלו בני ברית. אתה אומר אלו בני ברית או אינו אלא עבד ערל.
כשהוא אומר וינפש בן אמתך והגר הרי עבד ערל אמור, הא מה ת“ל ועבדך 
ואמתך אלו בני ברית.
Your eved and amah [Exod. 20:10] - these are members of the covenant. 
You say these are members of the covenant, but perhaps this means an 
uncircumcised eved. When it says so that the son of your amah... and the stranger 
may be refreshed [Exod. 23:12], this is the uncircumcised eved, thus when 
Scripture says your eved and amah, these are members of the covenant.81
 Further in the work, however, this attempted harmonization among the 
three Sabbath provisions leads to difficulty. It is noted that R. Eliezar actually 
prohibited the ownership of an uncircumcised eved; the Mekhilta (Pisḥa) 
then attempts, anonymously, to reconcile this prohibition with its comments 
on Exod. 23:12, restricting the latter to a somewhat farfetched case:
אם כן מה תלמוד לומר וינפש בן אמתך והגר אלא הרי שלקחו רבו ערב שבת 
עם חשיכה ולא הספיק למולו עד שהחשיך, לכך נאמר וינפש בן אמתך
[Given the prohibition against owning uncircumcised avadim, and the 
Mekhilta’s assumption that Exod. 23:12 refers to uncircumcised avadim] 
What does Scripture mean by so that the son of your amah and the stranger may 
be refreshed [in that verse]? If the master bought [a male slave] on Sabbath 
eve and it was getting dark and the master was not able to circumcise him 
(Sa).
81 This passage goes on with a parallel distinction in the use of the term ger: in Exod. 20:10 
it means ger tzedeq, a convert, while in Exod. 23:12 it refers to a ger toshav.
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before it got dark, it is for this [particular case] that it says so that the son of 
your amah... may rest.82
 This tradition of interpreting the ben amah in Exod. 23:12 as referring 
to an issue of circumcision is also found in some of the Targumim, but 
not consistently. Pseudo-Jonathan for Exod. 23:12 translates בר אמתך ערל 
(the uncircumcised son of your amah), thus following the first quote in 
the Mekhilta. Neofiti,83 however, has ברא דאמתך יהודייתה (the son of your 
Jewish amah), a position which would contradict not only the Mekhilta 
but also the rule in mQidd. 1:2 that a Hebrew amah is to be released upon 
reaching puberty (i.e. before she can give birth). One may argue, therefore, 
that it is only through somewhat convoluted analysis that the ben amah of 
Exod. 23:12 is made equivalent to the eved of the Decalogue verses.
1.2.1.D Conclusion
We may argue that neither Ishmael nor Avimelekh is slave-like, though they 
are perhaps socially and legally in a precarious position, especially with respect 
to their “half-brothers.” The other biblical instances of this term might be 
referring to slaves, but are not unequivocally indicative of an inherited slave 
status. If we take the biblical ben amah as the functional equivalent of the 
mār amtim in the LH, this would imply that the second generation (at least 
if they are also children of the master) does not remain enslaved.
1.2.2 yelid bayit - Houseborn Slave?
Though the literal meaning of this term (discussed further below) seems to 
be “child of the house”, the term is oen taken by traditional and modern 
translators to mean specifically a “houseborn slave.”84 The use of a specific 
82 R. Eliezer’s prohibition against ownership of uncircumcised slaves was not held 
unanimously, as illustrated in the following baraita in bYev. 48b:
ת“ר: מקיימין עבדים שאינם מלין דברי רבי ישמעאל רבי עקיבא אומר אין מקיימין…
 Our sages taught: We retain slaves who are not circumcised: these are the words 
of R. Yishmael. R. Akiva says: We do not retain [uncircumcised slaves]. 
83 A.D.Macho, Neophyti 1, Targum Palestinense ms. de la Biblioteca Vaticana, Madrid: Consejo 
Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 6 vol. 1968-79 [=Neofiti]. 
84 See, for instance, the JPS translation to Gen. 17:12, 23, 27 and Jer. 2:14, and the Schocken 
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term to refer to slaves born in the master’s house is also noted in other 
legal systems. Wiedemann, for instance, notes that “houseborn slaves” 
were prized among the Greeks and Romans; such οικογενεις or vernae 
were, he suggests, more likely to be loyal and closer to “real” members of 
the family.85 Further, the practice of referring generally to slaves, or even 
employees, as “children” is also widespread;86 this terminology suggests 
a pejorative appellation, though it has been suggested that kin-based 
societies might deliberately create fictive kinship terms for slaves, to give 
them the appearance of being incorporated into the master’s family.87 It 
may also be argued that “houseborn” slave carries the connotation of 
“native-born,” as opposed to “foreign”; there are equent attestations in 
Near Eastern legal sources of a partiality toward “native” slaves, particularly 
evident in prohibitions or penalties with respect to the sale of such slaves 
outside their lands.88
 Despite such precedents, however, I shall argue that the phrase yelid 
bayit in both biblical and post-biblical use is simply a general term for a 
household member, which may include, but is not restricted to, individuals 
who are also slaves. This argument is based first on an examination of the 
biblical contexts surrounding this term; second, on an assessment of the 
anomalous features of both the biblical term and the Akkadian wilid bītim; 
and third, on post-biblical use. This evidence suggests that the term is in 
the nature of a trope, connoting in some cases a loyal or trusted individual, 
translation to Gen. 14:⒕
85 Thomas Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery (London: Croom Helm, 1981) 7, 112, 
18⒌
86 We may note the use of Greek παις for a male slave, or the use of the pejorative “boy” for 
an adult male slave in the United States. S.D. Goitein, A Mediterranean Society (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1967) 1:93, notes that “employees” in the Geniza documents 
were referred to as “boys”, whether they were ee persons or slaves, even if such persons 
were “long past the stage of apprenticeship.” In modern business practice adult female 
employees are still oen referred to as “girls”. 
87 See, e.g., Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1982) 62-63; Igor Kopytoff and Suzanne Miers, “Aican 
‘Slavery’ as an Institution of Marginality,” in Slavery in Africa. Historical and Anthropological 
Perspectives, Eds. S. Miers and I. Kopytoff (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1977) 
2⒊ The latter note that slavery and kinship relationships may both be redefined in terms 
of each other.
88 See the opinions cited in note 60 of this chapter, section ⒈⒈⒉ 
----------   Chapter 1. WHAT IS A “FEMALE SLAVE”? CONTEXT AND COMPARISON  ----------
— 64 —
rather than speciing a particular hereditary status.
 Most significant with respect to the association of the yelid bayit with 
slavery is Jer. 2:14, in which the prophet refers to Israel’s decline:
 העבד ישראל האם יליד בית הוא מדוע היה לבז
Is Israel an eved? Is he a yelid bayit? Why has he become prey?
The parallelism here certainly suggests that yelid bayit is synonymous with 
the male slave term eved, and this verse generally suggests a reference to 
someone of subservient status. This is in fact the interpretation of Jer. 
2:4 given in Midrash Pesiqta Rabbati (parshah 27, 3), which contrasts the 
position of a son with that of a purchased eved:
שמעו דבר ה‘ בית יעקב לאמר וכל משפחות בית ישראל...כשאתה עושה רצונו אביך ואתה 
בנו ואם לאו על כרחך שלא בטובתך קונך ואתה עבדו שנאמר 
העבד ישראל אם יליד בית הוא
Hear the word of the Lord, House of Jacob, and all the families of the House of Israel 
[Jer. 2: 4]...when you do as He desires He [is] your father and you are His son; 
if not, [you are] His purchase, against your will and not for your benefit, and 
you are His eved, as it says [ibid. v. 14]: Is Israel an eved, a yelid bayit....
 Despite the strong parallelism in the verse om Jeremiah, the 
association with slavery is not explicit or even suggested in the remaining 
six occurrences of yelid bayit, which are all pentateuchal:
 Gen. 14:14 (possibly E stratum) refers to the mustering of Abraham’s 
household to ee Lot:
וירק את חניכיו ילידי ביתו שמנה עשר ושלש מאות
...he mustered his retainers, his yelidei bayit, numbering 318...
The meaning of the word חניכיו, which seems to be used here as a parallel 
to yelidei bayit, is admittedly unclear.89 Yet the number 318 is large for 
89 Thomas Lambdin, “Egyptian Loan Words in the Old Testament,” JAOS 73 (1953) 150 
suggests the term has an early Egyptian cognate, and translates “armed retainers.” Jubilees 
13:25 (at least the English translation by Wintermute based on the Ethiopic) refers to 
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slaves, and we may posit that the verse is referring to all those with a blood 
relationship (real or even putative) to Abraham’s household.90 
 There are five instances of the term in sections attributed to the P 
stratum. Gen. 17, regarding all the males in Abraham’s house who were to 
be circumcised, contains four of these:
כל זכר לדרתיכם יליד בית ומקנת כסף מכל בן נכר אשר לא מזרעך הוא
המול ימול יליד ביתך ומקנת כספך
And throughout the generations, every male among you [shall be 
circumcised....] As for the yelid bayit and the one bought from an outsider 
who is not of your offspring, they must be circumcised, [both the] yelid bayit 
and one who has been bought by you (vv. 12-13)
ויקח אברהם את ישמעאל בנו ואת כל ילידי ביתו ואת כל מקנת כספו
כל זכר באנשי בית אברהם
Then Abraham took his son Ishmael, and all his yelidei bayit and all those he 
had bought, every male in Abraham’s household... (v. 23)
וכל אנשי ביתו יליד בית ומקנת כסף מאת בני נכר
...and all his household, the yelid bayit and the one that was bought from an 
outsider... (v. 27)
Finally, Lev. 22:11 refers to the occupants of a priest’s household who may 
eat קדש (that is, the priestly tithes):
וכהן כי יקנה נפש קנין כספו הוא יאכל בו ויליד ביתו
A priest who purchases someone - the one purchased may eat of them [the 
tithes], as well as his yelid bayit...
“servants,” as does Josephus in Ant. 1:78 (οικεταις).
90 One tradition (cited below under ben bayit) mentions this difficulty and assumes the 
number refers only to Abraham’s ben bayit Eliezer, as the letters of the name אליעזר add 
up under the rules of gematria to 3⒙
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 Most significant in these five instances is the fact that the term yelid 
bayit is paired with כסף כסף or מקנת   that is, “one acquired with ,קנין 
silver.” One could argue that these pairs are intended as parallels, both 
referring to slaves, and suggesting the two methods, acquisition and birth, 
by which such slaves might be attached to a household, and emphasizing 
that both groups are to be treated equally with respect to these aspects of 
the cult. Yet it is not unequivocally clear that “one acquired for silver,” i.e. 
purchased, necessarily refers to a slave. Certainly there are biblical instances 
in which slavery seems to be associated with subjection to purchase and 
sale: Lev. 25:42 provides, with respect to Hebrews, עבד ממכרת  ימכרו   לא 
“they shall not be sold in the [manner of ] selling an eved”; there are also 
prohibitions against “resale” of the minor girl sold by her father as an amah 
(Exod. 21:8) and of the captive woman (Deut. 21:14).91
 Yet as Kopytoff and Miers note, property-like transactions (whether 
sales, pawns, or other forms) are not necessarily restricted to, or characteristic 
of, slaves alone.92 In the biblical text there are references to the pawning 
of children, and the acquisition of wives.93 We may note, for example, the 
91 I exclude the reference to כי כספו הוא in Exod. 21:21; this issue will be discussed further 
below. 
92 Kopytoff and Miers, “Aican Slavery” 7, 11-12, note that, particularly in societies in which 
“rights-in-persons” form an integral part of kinship and marriage systems, such rights (for 
instance, in a wife, or her children) may be acquired through property-like transactions 
involving transfers of material goods.
93 Such examples also abound in Mesopotamian legal sources. See, e.g. the discussion of 
Siegel “Third Dynasty of Ur” 12-23 with respect to the sale of children in the Ur III 
period; LH ss. 114-116 with respect to the taking of a household member as a nipûtum 
(“distraint”), and ss. 117-119 with respect to the surrender of both family members and 
slaves to a creditor ana kaspim or ana kiššātim (sale or distraint); MAL A44, C+G2, 3 
and 7 with respect to a non-slave used as a šapartum (pledge); and the discussion of M. 
Dandamaev, Slavery in Babylonia, From Nabopolassar to Alexander the Great (626-331 
BC), Transl. Victoria Powell, Ed. Marvin Powell (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University 
Press, 1984) 157-180, with respect to the pledging of ee persons in the NB period. The 
precise details of these human surety transactions are matters of debate, especially with 
respect to whether a family member could be permanently enslaved by such a transaction. 
A summary of many of these issues may be found in Chirichigno’s discussion of the LH 
and MAL provisions, Chirichigno, Debt Slavery 61-8⒌ It should also be noted that the 
precise functions of “distraints”, “pledges” and other types of surety are not necessarily 
equivalent in different legal systems; a useful overview of the issues involved may be found 
in John H. Wigmore, “I. The Pledge-Idea; A Study in Comparative Legal Ideas,” Harvard 
Law Review 10 (1897) 321-350.
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phrasing in Gen. 31:15 of the complaint by Rachel and Leah against their 
father: הלוא נכריות נחשבנו לו כי מכרנו; “Were we not considered strangers 
to him, as he has sold us [to Jacob].” We may further note the specific 
wording of Exod. 12:43-5, which sets out who is allowed to eat of the 
Passover sacrifice:
...כל בן נכר לא יאכל בו. וכל עבד איש מקנת כסף ומלתה אתו אז יאכל בו
תושב ושכיר לא יאכל בו.
...No stranger shall eat of it. Any eved of a man, acquired by silver - if he has 
circumcised him he may then eat of it. A sojourner and a hired worker may 
not eat of it.
The fact that eved ish needs to be specified here in addition to miqnat kesef 
suggests that the two are not synonymous.
 I exclude here Exod. 21:21, regarding the eved who dies several days 
aer a beating by his master; the master is exempted om the punishment 
that would be due if the eved died immediately, with the phrase כספו  כי 
 This would seem at first glance to be directly equating the eved with .הוא
money, suggesting that the loss of this “money” is punishment enough. This 
interpretation would require כספו to be taken as a metaphor for “property” 
or “chattel,” whereas the general biblical use of כסף seems to be in the literal 
meaning of “money” or “silver.” I thus agree with Westbrook that the הוא in 
this phrase does not refer to the eved, but rather to the penalty assessed to 
the master,94 and may be interpreted as “it is a matter of his [the master’s] 
silver” - that is, as in v. 19 in connection with a non-slave, the perpetrator 
(here the master) must pay the relevant costs of the victim.95 
94 Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law 100. We may note that Gen. 42:27, וירא את כספו 
 .כסף in the sense of “it is” in reference to הוא also contains the word , והנה הוא
95 Rashi to Exod. 21:21 seems to be suggesting something similar: אף על פי ששהה מעת לעת 
 [even though he lingers for a [specific] time before he dies, he [the master“) קודם שמת חייב
is liable”). I agree, however, with Chirichigno, Debt Slavery 176, 179, that this verse, like 
21:19, refers to a victim who recovers; contra Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law 100, 
who argues that the slave has died, and the master’s “money” is a forfeiture of his debt. It 
is interesting to note on the latter point that Chirichigno and Westbrook have different 
views as to whether Exod. 21:20-21 refer to “debt slaves” or “chattel slaves.” Chirichigno 
(ibid.) argues that the verses refer to chattel slaves. Westbrook (ibid.) argues that the 
verses concern debt slaves, and are to be seen as parallel to LH 1⒗ The latter provides for 
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 One may conclude that the term yelid bayit has less to do with the 
difference between a born slave and a bought slave and more to do with the 
distinction between an insider and an outsider and their relative degrees of 
assimilation into the household. The latter idea is explicitly suggested in 
Gen. 17, in which the מקנת כסף is described as מכל בן נכר אשר לא מזרעך הוא 
(v. 12), and as מאת בני נכר (v. 27). The same association between the sold 
person and the stranger is also suggested in several of the other passages 
noted above: Gen. 31:15 (Were we not considered strangers to him); Exod. 
12:44 (while v. 43 prohibits any בן נכר om eating the Passover sacrifice, 
v. 44 seems to specifically exempt the stranger acquired as an eved, if he 
is circumcised); and Exod. 21:8 regarding the girl sold as an amah by her 
father, who may not be sold “outside”: לעם נכרי לא ימשל למכרה. Gen. 14:14, 
in contrast, suggests that the yelidei bayit for Abraham were likely persons 
particularly loyal to his household, whether slaves or otherwise.
1.2.2.A The Form and Meaning of yelid and the Akkadian wilid bītim
The form yelid is unusual in biblical Hebrew. Mandelkern (s.v. יליד) 
treats it as the construct of a hypothetical noun yalid, meaning “child” or 
“offspring” (similar to the absolute and construct forms for נשיא and נתיב). 
The remaining instances of yelid not connected with bayit seem to refer 
to people who are natives of particular geographical areas.96 One could 
argue that yelid is a participle form of the verb ילד so that the phrase does 
mean literally “houseborn”; yet the biblical passive participle form is 97.ילוד 
One might thus posit that the form is an Aramaism, a form of the Pe’al 
passive participle; such a form, ילידא, is in fact used by Onkelos to translate 
 in Lev. 18:9, part of the incest מולדת as well as the feminine noun) יליד
provisions). 
monetary compensation to be paid to a debtor who has provided a slave as a debt pledge, if 
the creditor has killed the pledge by striking or abuse. The biblical verses in his view also 
refer to a case of debt slavery, a Hebrew debtor in straitened circumstances having sold or 
pledged a family member or slave to his creditor, who has killed the pledge. I shall not 
debate this point here, but I do not think the asymmetry in the talionic remedies in Exod. 
necessarily points to a difference between debt and chattel slavery. 
96 Num. 13:22, 28 and Josh. 15:14, referring to 2 ;ילידי הענקSam. 21:16, 18 with בילידי הרפה; 
and similarly 1Chr. 20:4 with מילידי הרפאים.
97 See, e.g., 1Kings 3:26, 27; Job 14:1, 15:14, 25:4; 1Chr. 14:4 (in plural).
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 It must also be asked whether the biblical phrase bears any relationship 
to the Akkadian phrase wilid bītim. The word wilid, the construct of the 
noun (w)ildu(m), “offspring, progeny” is found in most dialects;98 the 
specific phrase wilid bītim, however, is attested according to the dictionaries 
only in Old Babylonian sources. If there is a semantic relationship between 
the Old Babylonian and biblical terms, an interesting question of influence 
is thus raised, as the Old Babylonian sources would predate the conventional 
redaction period for the P stratum, to which most of the pentateuchal 
instances of yelid bayit are attributed, by at least 1000 years.
 Many of the OB occurrences of wilid bītim do happen to be applied 
to individuals otherwise identified as slaves; the dictionaries, as well as 
Mendelsohn,99 thus accept the meaning of “houseborn slave.” Nonetheless, 
it may be argued that the term is in the nature of a trope, rather than a 
description, as the same singular masculine form is used also with respect 
to females, and with respect to more than one person; further, there is the 
apparently anomalous (i.e. non-OB) use of the spelling i-i-lid in at least 
two cases. The following examples illustrate this range of use: 
1) Cunieform Texts [=CT] VIII 28b = Urkunden des Altbabylonischen Zivil- 
und Prozessrechts [=UAZP] #288 (Sippar, Sumula-ilum) appears to be 
an inheritance dispute; lines 8-9 list among the disputed persons and 
items belonging to the “defendant” a male slave described as a wilid 
bītim, who is contrasted with a purchased slave: 
 1  wardum PN1 wilid bītīša 1 amtum PN2 ša ina ramānīša 
  PN3 išāmuši
   one male slave PN1, a wilid of her house, one female
  slave PN2, whom PN3 [the defendant] purchased for herself 
 (The distinction appears to have been of no significance regarding the 
outcome of the claim against the defendant, which was rejected).
2) In Vorderasiatische Schriftdenkmäler [=VAS] 16 4:25 (a letter cited in 
98 CAD, s.v. ildu; AHW, s.v. wildum.
99 Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East 5⒎
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CAD, s.v. “ildu”) the term is used to refer to a female slave. The context 
also suggests the idea of the wilid bītim possessing a specific training 
or skill: 
 aššum amtum ša tašpuram šumma wilid bītim u išparat šāmši
 As to the female slave of whom you wrote me, if she is a wilid bītim 
and a weaver, buy her
3)  In Textes Cunéiforms du Louvre [=CTL] 1 29 = Vorderasiatische 
Bibliothek [=VAB] 6 143 (Samsu-iluna), a letter appears to refer to two 
individuals as ilid bītim (lines 13-15): 
 PN1 u PN2 ilid bītim ardūya ša ilki illakū
 PN1 and PN2, ilid bitim, are my slaves who perform my ilku service.
4)  A “pedigree” statement was noted by J.J. Finkelstein in several slave 
sale documents of the late Old Babylonian period.100 Certain slaves are 
described in these documents as wilid bītim ša Bābilim (the wīlid bītim 
of Babylon); in contrast, slaves in other of these sales are described 
simply as Subarians of various cities. In Finkelstein’s opinion, the terms 
refer to two contrasting classes of slaves, foreigners and houseborn of 
Babylon (though the latter would have been ultimately of foreign 
descent). 
5)  Kraus came to a similar opinion regarding the use of the term wilid 
bītimin a provision of the Edict of Ammiṣaduqa (1646-1626 BCE). 
The provision is found in a section of the Edict that releases certain 
debt slaves, and contrasts the situation of the wilid bītim with other 
people who have been placed as pledges. Should a citizen of certain 
named cities have had a debt foreclosed against him, and so placed 
himself, his wife or his children into servitude as a pledge against 
the debt, they are now released as a result of the Edict. If, however, 
certain slaves of these cities were placed as pledges, their release is not 
100 J.J. Finkelstein, “Ammiṣaduqa‘s Edict and the Babylonian Law Codes,“ JCS 15 
(1961) 9⒐
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effected; these slaves are described (section 19’) as [šumma] GÉME.
ARAD ui-li-[i]d É [ša] mār Numḫia mār Emut-balum… which Kraus 
took as referring to three separate groups, including “houseborn 
slaves,” belonging to ee persons of certain cities: “Wenn eine Sklavin 
(oder) ein Sklave (oder) ein im Hause geborener (Sklave) eines freien 
Mannes von Numhia, eines freien Mannes von Emut-balum…”101 He 
argued that the essential characteristic of such houseborn slaves was 
that they were permanent; unlike those acquired by capture, sale or 
pledge, who might become ee without any act of the owner (by 
ransom, redemption or proof of citizenship status). That is, with a 
houseborn slave, the owner ran no risk of loss.102 
6) There is at least one instance, however, in which there is no explicit 
connection between wilid bītim and slavery. TCL 133 = UAZP #82 
(Dilbat, 11 Samsu-iluna) is a slave sale contract in which a female slave 
is purchased (line 3) ana wilid bītim ša Dilbat (for the wilid bītim of 
Dilbat). The context suggests that perhaps the male, like the female, 
is also a slave, yet there is no indication (such as the determinative IR 
or SAG) that this individual is a slave. Based on this contract Schorr 
argued that wilid bītim was probably an official title, like mār bītim 
and mār ekallim.103 
 The instances above suggest the term is used most oen with respect 
to slaves. It is arguable, however, that the term itself does not specifically 
connote a second generation slave, but is being used to give a “pedigree”, 
to a slave or other dependant of a household, whose ancestry may not be 
known or considered relevant. One might hypothesize at this stage, given 
the apparent use of wilid bītim as a trope, the similarity to the biblical yelid 
bayit, and the possible Aramaic form of the latter, that both the Akkadian 
and Hebrew terms are borrowed.104 
101 F.R. Kraus, Ein Edikt des Königs Ammi-Șaduqa von Babylon (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1958) 4⒈
102 Kraus, Ein Edikt des Königs 173-17⒋
103 M. Schorr, Urkunden des Altbabylonischen Zivil- und Prozessrechts (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs’sche 
Buchhandlung, 1913) 12⒎
104 A further study might be undertaken to assess whether the term in OB documents is used 
in connection with West-Semitic names.
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1.2.2.B Other Akkadian Equivalents
The phrase in the Old Babylonian texts reviewed always has (w)ilid spelled 
syllabically, while bītim may be syllabic or in the form É. Certain scholars 
argue that semantic equivalents to wilid bītim may be found in other 
dialects, sometimes spelled logographically. This is more tenuous, however, 
as it is not clear that these suggested terms actually refer to slaves.
umzarḫu/unzarḫu
This term is found in OB texts om Mari as well as later texts, including 
Neo-Assyrian [=NA] and Neo-Babylonian [=NB]. Radner argues (following 
K. Deller105) that when used in reference to slaves the term means “im 
Haushalt geborener Sklave,” and is to be contrasted with the ša šīme, “gekaufter 
Sklave.”106 The NA texts she cites in support, however, are equivocal; they 
do not clearly refer to slaves, as the following examples indicate: 
1)  Assyrian Documents and Deeds [=ADD] 1041 = Kouyuǌik Collections 
of the British Museum [=K] 958 = State Archives of Assyria [=SAA] 
XI 29
 This is identified in SAA XI as a “List of Audience Gis and a 
Memorandum.” Lines 6’-9’ read:




 Concerning the 3 year old unzarḫī of the kalzu, the sinnutu is not 
established.
 While SAA XI takes unzarḫī as “domestic slaves”, the CAD (s.v. 
sinnutu) takes it as “eedmen.” Adding to the difficulty in this case are 
the precise meanings of kalzu and sinnutu. The former term is taken 
105 K. Deller, “Assyrisch um/nzarḫu und Hebraisch ‘azraḥ,” ZA 74 (1984) 235-9, discusses the 
use of the Akkadian term as a loanword in Hebrew, in the form of אזרח.
106 Karen Radner, Die neuassyrischen Privatrechtsurkunden als Quelle für Mensch and Umwelt 
SAAS VI. (Helsinki: The Neo-Assyrian Text Corpus Project, 1997) 20⒌
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as an area around or connected with the palace (SAA XI and CAD, s.v. 
kalzu); the CAD notes, however, that the word might be read ribzu. 
The latter term is taken by SAA XI as “brand marked,” while the CAD 
tentatively assigns the meaning “assessed.”
2) CT 53 21 = K 1097 + King’s Excavations Collection at British Museum 
[= Ki] 1902-5, 10, 13 = SAA X 316
 This is identified by SAA X as a letter om the physician Urad-Nanaya 
to Essarhaddon. Lines 7-14 relate a speech of the king regarding 
the loyalty of certain servants (LU*ARAD.MEŠ-šu). Lines 14-18 
provide:
...dabābu
ša Ṣābī[šu] šarri bēlī
idubub unz[arḫī ḫard]ūte [gap]
ammar ṭēnšu hassūni
ina tirik libbi mētū
the king my lord made a speech about [his] men, and the [ale]rt unz[arḫī] 
...as many as are remembering their orders are dying of a throbbing heart
 In addition to the gap, the context is completely unclear.
mār amat ekalli = DUMU.GÉME.É.GAL (NA)
Radner considers this expression in NA documents as the palace equivalent 
of a houseborn slave; she suggests, however, that it could also refer to a 
high-ranking member of the court, given instances in which such persons 
own property.107 One of the texts cited apposes such persons with “bought 
people,” but it is not clear that either term refers to slaves; it may simply 
appose paid (outside) workers to those who are members of the court 
household:
1) Assyrian and Babylonian Letters (Harper) [=ABL] 99 (SAA I, 99) 
 This document is identified by SAA I as a letter to Sargon concerning 
107 Radner, Die neuassyrischen 206-20⒎ In addition, such persons according to the texts cited 
act as witnesses, and one is a debtor.
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the manpower available for repairs to the Ekallate. Lines 10’-16’ read:
mārē šīme (DUMU.MEŠ ŠÁM.MEŠ-e) iqabbūnišunu
ulâ zakkûte ša rab ekalli annurig
lē’u ša amēlūti108 šāmūti
ša mārē amat ekalli (DUMU.MEŠ GÉME É.GAL) asaṭṭar ina pān šarri
bēlīya usebbila 370 šunu Ṣābe
90 Ṣābe šarri šunu 90 ša kutal
190 dullu ša šarri lêpušū
[Are they] sons of bought persons, as they call them, 
or exempt persons of the palace manager?
I am now inscribing a writing board with the bought personnel
[and] the “sons of the palace maidservant,” and to the king
my lord I am sending it. They are 370 men.
90 are king’s men, 90 are reserves,
let 190 do the king’s work.
 The context, according to Garelli, concerns the number of people 
available to Tab-Ṣil-Ešarra to perform work on the palace in Ekallate; 
the question seems to concern the status of some as exempt (zakkûte); he 
considers the DUMU.MEŠ ŠAM.MEŠ-e to refer not to slaves but to hired 
workers.109 One might argue with respect to the DUMU.MEŠ GÉME 
É.GAL that this means simply those permanently attached to the palace, 
with GÉME meaning simply “woman”. 
1.2.2.C Post-Biblical Occurrences
The term yelid bayit does not appear in either Mishnah or Tosea, despite 
the former work’s clear establishment of hereditary slavery. One might 
have expected such a reference, for instance, in mQidd. 1:3, to speci the 
method by which a yelid bayit acquires his eedom. There are sporadic 
occurrences of the term in the Talmudim and aggadic works; these, 
however, give no consistent association of the term with slaves, and in fact 
show some controversy over the precise meaning of yelid. 
108 SAA I reads DUMU.MEŠ, but the sign appears to be LÚ*.MEŠ.
109 Paul Garelli, “Problèmes de stratification sociale dans l’empire assyrien,” RAI 18 (1972) 7⒍
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 Certain of the talmudic instances are primarily in the nature of quotes 
om Lev. 22:11 used to support rulings as to who is eligible to partake 
of priestly terumah, and here the phrase is clearly not restricted to slaves. 
yYev. 7:4 8b gives an interpretation of yelid bayit that seems to takes yelid 
as emphasizing the idea of an actual birth: 
ומה טעמון דרבנין הם יאכלו והם יאכילו הראוי לוכל מאכיל ושאינו ראוי לוכל אינו מאכיל 
התיבון הרי ממזר הרי אינו ראוי לאכול ומאכיל שנייא היא דכתיב יליד בית מעתה הילוד 
מאכיל ושאינו ילוד אינו מאכיל
...What is the reason of the sages? They [the bought person and the yelid 
bayit of Lev. 22:11] shall eat [terumah]; they shall eat - one who is fit to eat 
[terumah] can render [his mother] capable of eating [terumah]; one who is 
not fit to eat [terumah] cannot render [another] capable... as it is written 
yelid bayit - thus one who is born [yalud] causes another to be capable of 
eating [termuah] and one who is not born does not render [another] capable 
of eating.
 The effect of this passage is to interpret the yelid bayit of Lev. 22:11 
as referring to someone actually born; such a person can also render his 
mother fit to eat terumah. One who is a fetus at the relevant time is not, 
in contrast, a yelid bayit, and thus cannot render its mother eligible to 
eat terumah. An example of the latter situation is given in yYev. 9:5 10b. 
This passage comments on the related mYev. 9:5, which debars various 
women om eating the priestly terumah; among such women is the bat 
yisrael married to and le pregnant by a priest, who then dies. The Gemara 
explains why such a case does not fit within Lev. 22:11:
מכהן ליליד בית אין כאן יליד בית...
(According to the wording proposed by Qorban HaEdah): [Pregnant] by a 
priest - [Lev. 22:11 includes] a yelid bayit - there is no yelid bayit in this 
case [i.e. since the fetus does not qualify to eat terumah, neither does its 
mother].
 Sia Emor parshah 5:4-5 (Weiss, 97b) questions why Lev. 22:11 needs 
to refer to both the yelid bayit and the qinyan kesef (acquired), appearing 
to assume, on the basis of an a minore ad majorem argument, that the 
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yelid would be more closely related to the household, at least in cultic 
matters, than a miqnat kesef. It then questions whether the analogy should 
be based instead on the presumed monetary value of each; it concludes, 
however, that both are entitled to partake of terumah whether they have 
a monetary worth or not. In this case it is not clear whether either term 
refers specifically to a slave:
יליד בית מה תלמוד לומר אם הקנוי קנין כסף אוכל ויליד בית לא יאכל.
אילו כן היית אומר מה קנין כסף שיש בו כסף אף יליד בית שיש בו כסף
ומנין שאע“פ שאין שוה כלום תלמוד לומר ויליד בית מכל מקום.
עדין אני אומר יליד בית בין שיש בו כסף בין שאין בו כסף אוכל.
אבל קנין כסף אם יש בו כסף אוכל, אם אין בו כסף לא יאכל.
תלמוד לומר קנין כספו ויליד ביתו מה יליד ביתו 
אף על פי שאינו שוה כלום אף קנין כספו שאינו שוה כלום.
yelid bayit [Lev. 22:11] - why is this stated? If the one who is purchased – a 
qinyan kesef - partakes, would a yelid bayit not partake? But in that case you 
might have said just as a qinyan kesef has a monetary [value] so [it must also be] 
a yelid bayit who has a monetary [value]. How [would we justify a yelid bayit] 
worth nothing? Thus it says “veyelid bayit” - of any kind. I could still say that 
a yelid bayit, whether with or without money [value] partakes; a qinyan kesef, 
though, if he has money [value] partakes, but if has no money [value] he does 
not partake. Thus it says [both] qinyan kaspo veyelid beito - as [it includes] a 
yelid bayit worth nothing, so [it includes] a qinyan kesef worth nothing.110 
 The following discussion in bShabb. 135b does refer specifically to the 
child of a female slave. The passage discusses the necessity of circumcising a 
male convert or a male slave, and the particular interaction of this rule with 
the terminology in Gen. chap. 17; the question is posed as to when the child 
of one’s female slave would be considered a miqnat kesef or a yelid bayit:
הא בהא תליא כתנאי יש יליד בית שנימול לאחד ויש יליד בית שנימול לשמנה 
יש מקנת כסף שנימול לאחד ויש מקנת כסף שנימול לשמנה 
110 The question of how there can be a miqnat kesef with no monetary value is discussed in 
bGitt. 42b-43a. The question arises within a general discussion of whether a slave with a 
tenuous connection to a priest’s household (such as one whose value is contingent on the 
compensation the master might receive if the slave is gored by an ox, or a miqnat kesef 
without value) may eat terumah.
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יש מקנת כסף שנימול לא‘ ויש מקנת כסף שנימול לשמנה, כיצד? 
לקח שפחה מעוברת ואח“כ ילדה זהו מקנת כסף הנימול לשמונה 
לקח שפחה וולדה עמה זו היא מקנת כסף שנימול לאחד 
ויש יליד בית שנימול לשמנה כיצד? 
לקח שפחה ונתעברה אצלו וילדה זהו יליד בית הנימול לשמנה 
רב חמא אומר ילדה ואח“כ הטבילה זהו יליד בית הנימול לאחד 
הטבילה ואחר כך ילדה זהו יליד בית הנימול לשמנה
This is dependent on a dispute between Tannaim. There is a yelid bayit 
who is circumcised on the first [day], and a yelid bayit who is circumcised 
on the eighth [day]; there is a purchased person who is circumcised on the 
first [day], and a purchased person who is circumcised on the eighth [day]. 
There is a purchased person who is circumcised on the first [day], and a 
purchased person who is circumcised on the eighth [day]: How [does this 
arise]? If one bought a pregnant shifḥah and she then gave birth, [the child] 
is a purchased person who is circumcised on the eighth day. If one bought 
a shifḥah and her [newborn] infant, [the child] is a purchased person who 
is circumcised on the first day. There is a yelid bayit who is circumcised on 
the eighth [day]: How [does this case arise]? If one bought a shifḥah and 
she became pregnant in his [house] and gave birth, this is a yelid bayit who 
is circumcised on the eighth day. Rav Ḥama says: If she gave birth and 
then had a ritual bath, this is a yelid bayit who is circumcised on the first 
day. If she had a ritual bath and then gave birth this is a yelid bayit who is 
circumcised on the eighth day.
 Based on this passage, the tannaitic criterion for a slave who is a yelid 
bayit appears to be the place where the child was conceived. Thus no case is 
put forth for a yelid bayit circumcised on the first day. Any child conceived 
elsewhere, though born in the master’s house, is still a purchased person. 
Rav Ḥama appears to address this lacuna by offering a further refinement, 
if not contradiction: a yelid bayit is someone born in the house, but his 
circumcision status depends on whether his mother was converted before 
she gave birth. If so, the child is an Israelite, and the usual eight-day rule 
applies. If not, the child is a foreigner, and must be converted immediately. 
There are, however, conflicting principles evidenced with respect to such 
cases. Eccl. Rabbah 7:3-4, part of a series of traditions about the sage 
Yaaqov of Kfar Gevuryah, seems to contradict bShabb. 135b:
הורה יעקב איש כפר גבוריא בצור על בנה של נכרית שהוא נימול בשבת. 
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שמע רבי חגי שלח ואייתינה. א“ל מן הן הוריתה. א“ל מן הן דכתיב ויתילדו על משפחותם 
וכתיב יליד בית ומקנת כסף. אמר ארבעיניה דילקי. א“ל ובר נש דאמר מילתא דאורייתא 
ילקי. אמר לא הורית טבאות. א“ל מן הן...דאמר לא תתחתן בם. למה כי יסיר את בנך, בנך 
הבא מישראלית קרוי בנך ואין בנך הבא מן הגויה ומן השפחה קרוי בנך אלא בנה.
Yaaqov of Kfar Gevurayah taught at Tyre regarding the son of a gentile woman, 
that he could be circumcised on the Sabbath. R. Ḥaggai heard [this] and 
sent for him to come. He said to him: Based on what did you teach [this]? 
He replied: From that which is written [Num. 1:18]: they gave the pedigrees of 
their families and it is written [Gen. 17:12] a yelid bayit and one purchased with 
money. [R. Ḥaggai] replied: Lie him down to be flogged. [Yaaqov] replied: 
Is a person who stated the substance of the Torah to be flogged? [R. Ḥaggai] 
said: You have not taught properly. [Yaaqov] replied: From what [should this 
be deduced]? [R. Ḥaggai replied]... As it says: Do not marry them [Deut. 
7:3]. Why? Because they will lead your son astray [Deut. 7:4] - your son by an 
Israelite woman is called your son, your son by a gentile or slave woman is not 
called your son, but her son.
1.2.2.D Conclusion
The term yelid bayit, like the term miqnat/qinyan kesef, does not necessarily 
refer to slaves. It seems to particularly emphasize the aspect of houseborn, 
but for reasons other than to distinguish slaves om non-slaves. This is 
especially evident in the presumed earliest (E stratum)111 occurrence of 
this term in Gen. 14:⒕ If there is a relationship between the biblical 
yelid bayit and the OB wilid bītim, one might posit a common Aramaic 
influence. Post-biblical sources confirm that yelid bayit could be used to 
describe non-slaves. 
1.2.3 ben bayit 
Though usually translated straightforwardly as “son of the house,” this 
term is of interest because of its occasional translation as “houseborn slave.” 
From the relevant biblical citations, however, it is not absolutely clear that 
it refers to slaves, as opposed to simply a general household member, or 
111 See Tzemah Yoreh’s website: www.biblecriticism.com and his book, The First Book of God, 
Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 20⒑ 
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perhaps even a household administrator. 
 In Gen. 15:3 (J stratum), which states: 112והנה בן ביתי יורש אותי - “my 
ben bayit will inherit [om] me,” the term ben bayit apparently describes 
Abraham’s potential heir Eliezer - ”apparently” because he is not named 
in this verse, only in the immediately preceding one, though by tradition 
he is also the object of this verse. The Fragment Targum, for instance, has 
for the בן ביתי of Gen. 15:3 [ואלי[עזר] בר בי[תי Eliezer’s status is, however, 
unclear, as he is described in the preceding v. 2 (possibly E) only with the 
exceedingly unclear ובן משק ביתי הוא דמשק אליעזר (and the one in charge 
of my household is Dameshek Eliezer). Mandelkern (s.v. משק) translates 
mesheq as possessio “possession”, apparently suggesting that ben mesheq 
implies an “owned” person or chattel. Both the LXX and Jubilees, however, 
seem to have assumed that mesheq in v. 2 was a slave’s name: the LXX at 
Gen. 15:2 has ὁ δὲ υἱὸς μασεκ τῆς οἰκογενοῦς μου οὗτος δαμασκὸς ελιεζερ (the 
son of Masek my home-born female slave, this Eliezer of Damascus), and 
follows through by translating the ben bayit of v. 3 as οικογενης (“house 
born” - Liddel and Scott), while Jubilees (14:2) has “And the son of Maseq 
the son of my handmaid is Eliezer of Damascus.”113 Gen. Rabbah (Rom) 
44:11 equates the ben mesheq of Gen. 15:2 with a ben bayit,114 and with the 
yelidei bayit of Gen. 14:14, through the person of Eliezer, though never 
explicitly calling him a slave:
ר“ל בשם בר קפרא אמר בן משק ביתי בר ביתי הוא אליעזר שעל ידו רדפתי מלכים עד 
דמשק ואליעזר היה שמו שנא‘ וירק את חניכיו ילידי ביתו שי“ח 
מנין אליעזר הוי יח וג‘ מאות
R. Lazar said in the name of Bar Qapara: ben mesheq of my house [Gen. 15:2] 
- he is a ben bayit of my house, Eliezer, with whose aid I chased kings to 
Damascus. And Eliezer was his name, as it says, And he armed his retainers, 
his yelidei bayit [318 of his house - Gen. 14:14]. Where do we get 318? [By 
112 The Samaritan Pentateuch in this verse has the imperfect יירש instead of the participle form.
113 O.S. Wintermute, “Jubilees,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha, Ed. J.H. Charlesworth. 
(New York: Doubleday, 1985) 84 n. 14a.The translator suggests here that the author of 
Jubilees followed the LXX in this respect. H. Fox suggests that the bayit in this verse may 
have been understood as “woman,” one of its post-biblical meanings.
114 The Peshitta translation similarly translates the ben mesheq in v. 2: בר דרמוסקיא   ואליעזר 
.(”Eliezer the Damascene my ben bayit“) ביתי
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gematria, the numerical equivalent of the letters of Eliezer] אליעזר is 318. 
 The term ben bayit is also found in Eccl. 2:7, where it is paired with 
purchased slaves: לי היה  בית  ובני  ושפחות  עבדים   I bought male and) קניתי 
female slaves, and I acquired benei bayit…). Though the parallelism may 
suggest that the benei bayit are houseborn (as opposed to purchased) slaves, 
there is nothing else in the context to suggest a particular reference to 
slaves. The use of the accompanying verb היה in singular, though the 
phrase is in plural, further suggests the phrase is a collective noun, and 
may thus imply a general term for “household.” 
 One further relevant citation may be the הרכבים בית   men of the) בני 
house of the Rekhabites) in Jer. 35:⒌ Keukens suggests that these were 
homeborn slaves of the house of Rekhab.115 
 Most of the targumim for Gen. 15:3 translate ben bayit with the literal בר 
 ,however ,בר ביתא giving no hint as to the precise meaning. This term ,ביתי
also appears in the Imperial Aramaic used at Elephantine. Several of the 
documents om the Ananiah archive (for instance, Porten B⒊11) contain a 
witness signature of 116.נחום בר ביתא What is unusual about this witness is 
the lack of a father’s name. In contrast, other witnesses are described as PN1 
bar PN2, or with an adjective of nationality. This may indicate that the בר 
 here was a slave (though evidently capable of acting as a witness); but ביתא
it may also have been sufficient to identi him as belonging to the house. 
 Targum Pseudo-Jonathan proves more enlightening in this case. In 
Genesis 15:3 the phrase is translated as בר פרנסת ביתי, implying someone 
dependent on the support of the household.117 This phrase seems related 
to the Hebrew בן משק ביתי; in fact, Onkelos translates the בן משק ביתי in 
Gen. 15:2-3 as בר פרנסא. This term suggests someone dependent on the 
household, though not necessarily a slave. The Targum for Eccl. 2:7, in 
contrast, suggests the benei bayit were some sort of household administrators 
115 K. Keukens, “Die rekabitischen Haussklaven in Jeremia 35,” Biblische Zeitschrift n.f. 27 
(1983) 230.
116 The CAD (s.v. “bītu in mār bīti”) similarly cites a source (BE 91: 20) in which the Akkadian 
mār bīti describes a witness.
117 Sokoloff (s.v. פרנסה) and Dalman (s.v. פרנוסא) give as the meaning of פרנסה “support” 
or “maintenance.” Dalman suggests a comparison with Greek προνοος  “careful, prudent” 
(Liddell and Scott).
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 distinguished om the eved and amah, who contributed to the ,(גזברין)
support of the household:
 קניתי עבדין ואמהן מבניהון דחם ושאר עממיא ונכראין וגזברין 
דממנן על מזונא דביתי הוו לפרנסא יתי...
I acquired male and female slaves from the children of Ḥam and other nations 
and foreigners, and [I had] stewards in charge of the food of my house for 
my support... 
1.2.3.A Akkadian mār bīti
This phrase is the semantic equivalent of בן בית. The AHW (s.v. marū #10) 
takes māru in such phrases as mār ālim and mār bītim as generally Angehöriger 
von. It identifies mār bīti om OB sources on, and in an LB source, as 
referring specifically to a Haussklave. Dandamaev similarly suggested that 
the term in NB-LB sources was likely to refer to a “houseborn” slave.118 The 
CAD (s.v. bītu in mār bīti), in contrast, identifies mār bīti as an LB term 
meaning “administrator within a household” (or, when referring to a deity, 
as the first-born son of a temple’s god); at least one source (BE 9 14:6) is 
cited in which the same person is referred to as both a son (DUMU) to 
PN2 and a mār bīti (LÚ.DUMU.É) to PN3, making it unlikely that such 
person was a slave.119 Dandamaev’s conclusion is based primarily on the fact 
that most of the LB mār bīti sources, which are om the Murašu archives, 
seem to describe not “family members” but rather individuals who were 
used, like those identified as slaves, as agents in the family business. Yet 
he too acknowledges that the term might also include ee persons, noting 
that there is nothing else in the sources indicating that this term is used as 
a synonym for other slave terms, or that these people were sold, branded 
118 Dandamaev, Slavery in Babylonia 100-⒈ Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East 57 
was also of the opinion that the phrase referred to a houseborn slave.
119 S. Kaufman, The Akkadian Influences on Aramaic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1974) 70, similarly argues that the meaning in LB is “administrator, steward.” He argues 
that both the Akkadian and Aramaic forms are calques (i.e. loan-translations) om Iranian, 
but that the בר ביתא found at Elephantine may be of a completely different origin. This 
logic is unclear, unless he is making an assumption that the Elephantine instance must 
refer to a slave; nor is it clear why the biblical references to בן בית need be loanwords.
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or pledged, as one might expect of slaves. That is, there may be individuals 
“belonging to” a household who are neither family members nor slaves.
1.2.3.B Post-Biblical Sources
The majority of instances emphasize the ben bayit as one in a position 
of trust, and thus as someone who can be relied upon as an agent or 
representative. This is particularly clear om the mishnaic citations. In 
mTer. 3:4, the ben bayit is mentioned as one who can act as another’s agent 
with respect to the separation of terumah:
...הרשה את בן ביתו או את עבדו או את שפחתו לתרום תרומתו תרומה.
...One who authorizes his ben bayit, his eved, or his shifḥah to separate terumah 
- it is valid terumah.
 We may note here that the term is specifically distinguished om 
slaves; it is also distinguished om the term פועלים in the following 
mishnah, perhaps implying that the ben bayit (like slaves) would have more 
than a temporary economic connection with the household. MShevu’ot 
7:8 includes a ben bayit along with others who have control over another’s 
property, and who can be required to take an oath (with regard to this 
property) without a specific claim being made against them:
ואלו נשבעים שלא בטענה השתפין והאריסין והאפוטרופין והאשה הנושאת 
והנתונה בתוך הבית ובן הבית
These can be made to take an oath without a claim: partners, tenants, guardians, 
the wife who engages in business within the household, and the ben habayit.
Again, nothing in the section particularly indicates a slave. The commentator 
Penei Moshe (at yShevu’ot 7:8 38a s.v. uven habayit) took the term ben 
habayit here as literally the son of the house who has control over his 
father’s estate, as yet undivided, on behalf of the other beneficiaries; the 
Bavli, on the other hand, assumed it was a household member who engaged 
in business (bShevu’ot 48b):
תנא בן הבית שאמרו לא שנכנס ויוצא ברגליו אלא מכניס לו פועלין ומוציא לו פועלין 
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מכניס לו פירות ומוציא לו פירות ומאי שנא הני משום דמורו בה התירא
It was taught: the ben bayit spoken of is not one who walks in and out on his 
own legs [i.e. himself, as an employee], but who hires workers and makes 
use of income [from the assets]. Why is this one different? Because they rule 
[for themselves] permission in it [i.e. the assets, and are thus in a position 
of responsibility].
 This idea of trust and accountability is again emphasized in mTa’an. 
3:8: Ḥoni ha-Me’agel describes himself as like a ben bayit of God, who as 
such is asked by the populace to pray for rain:
על כל צרה שלא תבא על הצבור מתריעין עליה חוץ מרב גשמים. 
מעשה שאמרו לו לחוני המעגל: התפלל שירדו גשמים... התפלל ולא ירדו גשמים.
מה עשה? עג עוגה ועמד בתוכה ואמר לפניו: רבונו של עולם בניך שמו פניהם עלי שאני 
כבן בית לפניך. נשבע אני בשמך הגדול שאיני זז מכאן עד שתרחם על בניך. 
התחילו גשמים מנטפין... עד שיצאו ישראל מירושלים להר הבית מפני הגשמים...
One prescribes a fast to stave off any trouble that may befall the community, 
except too much rain. It happened that [the people once] said to Ḥoni ha-
Me’agel: Pray for rain to fall.... He prayed, but no rain fell. What did he do? 
He drew a circle and stood in it, and said before Him: Lord of the Universe, 
your people turned to me, as I am like your ben bayit. I swear in your great 
name that I will not move from here until you have mercy on your children. 
Rain began to fall ... until [after further pleas by Ḥoni to increase the amount 
of rain] the Israelites had to withdraw from Jerusalem to the Temple Mount 
because of the rain...
 In aggadic literature, the ben bayit features in a number of parables 
of the mashal-lemelekh type. Ziegler assumed the term ben bayit meant 
Freigelassener, based on his premise that these “king-parables” may be 
explained by comparison with the law and customs of the Roman Empire. 
He explained the following midrash in Exod. Rabbah (Rom) 43:6, for 
instance, by noting that it was these eedmen who tended to be the money 
lenders in the Roman empire:120 
120 Ignaz Ziegler, Die Konigsgleichnisse des Midrasch beleuchtet durch die römanische Kaiserzeit. 
(Breslau: Schlesische verlage-Anstalt, 1903) 247-24⒏
----------   Chapter 1. WHAT IS A “FEMALE SLAVE”? CONTEXT AND COMPARISON  ----------
— 84 —
ד“א ויחל משה. מהו למה ה‘ יחרה אפך בעמך. ר‘ יהודה ור‘ נחמיה. 
ר‘ יהודה אומר למה“ד למלך שהיה לו בן בית והשליטו על כל מה שהיה לו.
הלך אותו בן בית והלוה לבני אדם ע“י ערבים. 
הלוה לזה נ‘ זהובים ולזה ק‘ ולזה מאתים ברחו הלווים. 
אחר זמן שמע המלך ורע לו. א“ל השלטתיך על שלי אלא לאבדן. 
א“ל בן בית אני הלויתי ובאחריותי הם לשלם אני מעמידך על הכל. 
הרי פלוני ערב יש בידו ק‘ זהובים וביד פלוני נ‘. 
כך אמר משה להקב“ה למה אתה כועס לא בשביל תורתך באחריותי היא 
שאני וחבירי נקיים אותה אהרן ובניו יקיימוה יהושע וכלב יקיימוה 
יאיר ומכיר יקיימוה הצדיקים יקיימוה ואני אקיימנה. הוי למה ה‘ יחרה אפך.
Another matter: And Moses implored [the Lord - Exod. 32:11, after being 
made aware of the incident of the golden calf ]. Why [did Moses then ask:] 
Why, God, does your wrath burn concerning your people [i.e. was the answer not 
obvious]. R. Judah and R. Neḥemiah [gave opinions]. R. Judah says: To what 
is this similar? To a king who had a ben bayit and appointed him over all his 
property. This ben bayit went and made loans to people through guarantors; 
he loaned this one 50 gold pieces and this one 100 and this one 200. The 
borrowers absconded. After a time the king heard, and was displeased; he 
said to him “I have appointed you over my property, only to lose it!” The ben 
bayit said to him: “I made the loans, and it is my responsibility to pay them 
back; I will stand you for all of them. This guarantor has in hand 100 gold 
pieces, and this one 50.” Similarly Moses said to God: “Why are you angry? 
Not for your Torah - it is my responsibility, since I and my colleagues will 
uphold it: Aaron and his sons will uphold it, Joshua and Kalev will uphold 
it, Makhir and Ya’ir will uphold it, the righteous will uphold it, and I will 
uphold it.” Thus [the question]: Why, God, does your wrath burn...
 Ziegler noted also that a diminution of the wine ration was used as 
a mild punishment for slaves, suggesting a background for the following 
midrash (VaYiqra Rabbah (Margoliot) 12:1), part of an extended discussions 
on the pitfalls of wine-drinking:121 
דרש ר‘ ישמעאל לא מתו שני בני אהרן אלא על ידי שנכנסו שתויי יין. 
ר‘ פנחס בשם ר‘ לוי על הדא דר‘ ישמעאל למלך שמינ‘ לו בן בית נאמן 
ושומרו עומד על פתח החנות התיז את ראשו בשתיקה ומינה לו בן בית אחר. 
ואין אנו יודע‘ מפני מה הרג את הראשון אלא ממה שהמלך מצוה את השני 
121 Ziegler, Die Konigsgleichnisse, 240. Similar forms of this midrash are found in VaYiqra Rab. 
(Margoliot, p. 255) 12:5; Lev. Rabbah (ed. Rom) 12:1; and Esther Rabbah (ed. Rom) 5:⒈
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ואומר לו אל תיכנס לחנות אנו יודע שמתוך כן הרג את הראשון.
R. Ishmael interpreted: The two sons of Aaron died only because they entered 
[the Holy of Holies] after having drunk wine. R. Pinḥas in the name of R. 
Levi [compares] this [opinion] of R. Ishmael to a king who had appointed 
a loyal ben bayit, and observed him in the entrance to the market. Without 
saying a word, he cut off his head, and appointed another ben bayit. We know 
why he killed the first one only from what he commanded the second; as he 
said to him, ‘Do not enter the market,’ we know that this is why he killed 
the first one.
 We may also note a midrash (yBer. 9:1 13a, repeated in Exod. Rabbah 
15:18, Midrash Tehilim 4:3) in which the head of a ben bayit’s household 
is called a patron; this may suggest the ben bayit was a type of client, 
confirming Ziegler’s idea of a eedman. 
 Yet a dominant feature of this and other parables is their use to explain 
the relationship between the Deity and a biblical figure in terms of the 
interaction of a king with a ben bayit. Moses is prominent in these parables,122 
but they also include Aaron,123 Aaron and Miriam,124 David,125 and even 
122 Other parables in which Moses is compared to a king’s ben bayit are Exod. Rabbah 35:6, Num. 
Rabbah 4:1, 21:15, Midrash Tehilim 1891 2:13 מדרש תהילים, וילנא, B.Mandelbaum, פסיקתא 
Pesiqta deRav Kahana] 1:⒊=]דרב כהנא, 2 כרכים, ניו יורק: בית המדרש לרבנים באמריקה, 1987. 
123 See , e.g. Sifrei to Numbers (Horovitz, 134-135 ) pisqa 117:
לכל קדשי בני ישראל, כרת הכתוב ברית עם אהרן על כל קדשי הקדשים
לגזור דין ולכרות להם ברית לפי שבא קרח כנגד אהרן וערער על הכהונה 
משל למה הדבר דומה למלך בשר ודם שהיה לו בן בית 
ונתן לו שדה אחת במתנה ולא כתב ולא חתם ולא העלה לו בערכיים
בא אחר וערער כנגדו על השדה אמר לו המלך כל מי שירצה 
יבוא ויערער כנגדך על השדה בוא ואני כותב ואני חותם ואני מעלה לך בערכיים
 For all the hallowed things of Israel [Num. 18:8] - Scripture established a[n 
explicit] covenant with Aaron with respect to all hallowed things, to make 
a rule and establish a covenant. This is because Koraḥ came and claimed the 
priesthood om Aaron. To what is this similar? To a human king who had a 
ben bayit and gave him a field as a gi, but did not write and seal [a deed] or 
record it for him in the recorder’s office. Someone came and claimed the field 
om him. The king said to him: Let anyone who wants come and claim the 
field om you; I shall write and seal [a deed] and record it for you…
124 Aaron and Miriam (as opposed to Moses the אוהב): Sifrei Zuta (Horovitz, 75) on 
Num. 12:5).
125 David: Midrash Tehilim, 24:2
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Adam.126 Given both the importance of these biblical personages and the 
impression of trust, responsibility and closeness suggested in these parables, 
likely the intended parallel here is to someone who is not a mere slave or 
client, but more of a trusted retainer. This is also the sense in which ben 
bayit is understood by certain later commentators such as Rashi. In bSan. 
31b, for instance, Rashi comments on an address to one Uqva, expressed 
in the following terms: לדזיו ליה כבר בתיה (to him whose splendour is like 
that of bar bityah). According to Rashi s.v. (לדזיו ליה כבר בתיה, (בר בתיה is 
Moses. He gives two reasons for this interpretation, the second of which 
is relevant to the issue of the ben bayit:
כמשה, שהוא בן בתיה למי שמקרין עור פניו, כמשה שגידלתו בתיה בת פרעה.
לשון אחר כבר ביתיה, כמשה, שהוא בן בית, דכתיב בכל ביתי נאמן הוא, 
לדזיו ליה, על שם שהיה חכם וכתיב חכמת אדם תאיר פניו...
Like Moses, as he was the “son of Bityah” to the one whose face is lit 
up, Moses our Rabbi, who was raised by Bityah, the daughter of Pharaoh 
[Bityah is mentioned as a daughter of the Pharaoh in 1Chr. 4:18; according 
to tradition, this is the woman who raised Moses]. Another reading: Like 
his ben bayit [kebar beitei], like Moses, as he was a ben bayit, as it is written: 
He [Moses] is trusted in all My house [Num. 12:7]; to one whose splendour, 
as he [Moses] was wise, and it is written: A person’s wisdom lights up his face 
[Eccl. 8:1]. 
 Certain other parables describing more ordinary personages appear to 
emphasize the ben bayit as putative kin. Ḥovav, for instance, who was the 
son of Moses’ father-in-law and a member of the household, is described as 
a ben bayit in Sifrei Numbers (Horovitz) pisqa 7⒏ YSan. 10:2 28d (regarding 
the curse of Balaam) describes the manner in which women shopkeepers 
would lure unsuspecting Israelites into idolatry; the use of the term here 
implies someone initially a stranger, though not a slave, who is then 
integrated into the household:
 מה עשו בנו להן קנקלין מבית הישימון עד הר השלג והושיבו שם נשים 
מוכרות מיני כיסנין הושיבו את הזקינה מבחוץ ואת הנערה מבפנים 
והיו ישראל אוכלין ושותין והיה אחד מהן יוצא לטייל בשוק ולוקח לו חפץ מן 
126 Adam: Pesiqta deRav Kahana (Mandelbaum) 12:1, 26:⒊
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חנווני והיתה הזקנה מוכרת לו את החפץ בשוייו והנערה אומרת לו בא וטול לך בפחות כך 
ביום הראשון וכן ביום השני וכן ביום השלישי והיתה אומרת לו מיכן והילך אתה כבן בית 
היכנס ובור לך...
What did they do? They built enclosures from the house of the desert127 to 
the mountain of snow, and placed women there to sell types of sweetmeats. 
They put the older woman outside, and the young woman inside. And 
Israelites would eat and drink, and one of them would go for a walk in the 
market and buy an item from the shopkeeper. The old woman would sell 
him the item at its value, but the young woman would say to him: Come and 
take it for less; and so on, the first day, second day and third day. And she 
would say to him: From now on you are like a ben bayit; come in and choose 
for yourself...
1.2.3.C Conclusion 
We see the same pattern with respect to ben bayit as has been observed with 
the ben amah and yelid bayit: i) the biblical text is capable of supporting 
several meanings, among them “houseborn,” or an actual son, or a household 
dependant, as well as other sorts of household relationships; ii) the term 
has vague associations with slaves, but seems to be used with non-slaves 
as well. If there is an association of the term with the Akkadian mār 
bīti, there is a suggestion that such person could have been a functionary 
of some rank within the household; this sense is also suggested by the 
Targum for Ecclesiastes.
127 Mandelkern gives for the biblical יש[י]מן (as in Num. 21:20) vastatio, desertum.
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The term pilegesh, found in biblical and postbiblical Hebrew פלגש/פילגש, 
is generally taken as the equivalent of the English word “concubine”.1 Yet 
the idea of concubinage itself (like the idea of slavery) is quite vague,2 and 
this lack of precision is exacerbated in the attempt to compare concubinage 
terms in different languages and periods.3 
 Further, it is oen assumed that concubinage was in some way 
connected with female slaves. As Ellinson notes, for instance, postbiblical 
sources oen assumed that the pilegesh was a shifḥah who had been sexually 
coerced by her master;4 certain modern scholars also propose that a 
concubine would have started out as a slave, or that concubinage was in 
fact the inevitable disposition of all female slaves.5 
 In fact, the term appears sporadically in the Bible, in some instances 
associated with named individuals.6 In the Pentateuch the term appears 
1 This is so even in the earliest translations: we find such terms as פלקתא and לחנתא in the 
Targumim, παλλακὴ in the LXX, and concubina in the Vulgate (e.g., for Gen. 35:22). 
2 “Concubine” is generally not used as a precise legal term in English, but can describe a 
variety of relationships, both temporary and permanent, monogamous or otherwise. On a 
social level, “concubine” may connote semi-respectability or licentiousness, depending on 
perspective. 
3 I shall argue in chap. 7 that לחנתא, like its apparent Akkadian cognate laḫḫi/anatu, suggests 
a subordinate rather than a concubine.
4 Elyaqim Ellinson, Nissuin Not in Accordance with the Law of Moses and Israel [in Hebrew] 
(Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1975), 5⒊ Ellison cites as one notable example the מעשה בוסתנאי in the 
Iggeret Rav Sherirah Gaon, in which an antecedent of a particular gaonic dynasty was 
accused of having married his slave woman.
5 See, e.g., B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, 329; Patai, Sex and Family, 42; and Flesher, 
Oxen, Women or Citizens? 17 n. ⒘ This opinion will be discussed more fully below.
6 The named pilagshim are: Re’umah, the pilegesh of Naḥor (Gen. 22: 24); Bilhah, the 
slave-wife of Jacob (Gen. 35:22); Timnah, the pilegesh of Elifaz (Gen. 36:12); Ritzpah, 
the pilegesh of Saul (2Sam. 3:7 and 21:11); Qeturah, the pilegesh of Abraham (1Chr. 1:32, 
------------------------- CHAPTER 2  -----------------------
THE PILEGESH: 
STATUS OR TOPOS?
---------------------------  Chapter 2. THE PILEGESH: STATUS OR TOPOS?   ---------------------------
— 90 —
only in the foundation narratives in Genesis and not in any of the legal 
portions. The term has only one direct association with slaves, and we 
may thus deem this association incidental: Bilhah, the slave-wife of Jacob, 
is termed a pilegesh in Gen. 35:2⒉7 Unlike the terms shifḥah and amah, 
the term pilegesh is never associated with the male slave term eved. If it 
appears in lists at all, it is associated with wives (for instance, those of 
David in 2Sam. 5:13; of Solomon in 1Kings 11:3; and of the court in 
Cant. 6:8). The bizarre story of the pilegesh of Givah in Judges 19-21 uses 
kinship terminology otherwise associated with a marital-type situation: 
the woman is referred to as an ishah pilegesh (19:1, 28), the Levite as ishah 
(“her husband”; 19:3), and her father as the Levite’s ḥoten (“father-in-law”; 
19:4).8 Further, Qeturah is described in Gen. 25:1 as the ishah of Abraham, 
while in 1Chr. 1:32 she is described as his pilegesh.9 
 Most significant, in my opinion, is that certain pilagshim are very 
noticeably associated with sexual assaults: the assault on Bilhah by Reuven 
(Gen. 35:22); the rape and dismemberment of the pilegesh of Givah (Judg. 
19-2110); the alleged assault on Saul’s pilegesh by Avner (2Sam. 3:7); the 
assault on David’s pilagshim by his son Avshalom (2Sam. 16:21-2). There is 
the further curious point that the pilagshim in Ezek. 23:20, also associated 
with profligate sexual behavior, appear to be males.
 The term all but disappears in the pre-gaonic legal canon, with two 
exceptions that will be discussed below. It does appear sporadically in 
though in Gen. 25:1 she is called his ishah); Eifah and Ma’akhah, the pilagshim of Caleb 
(1Chr. 2:46, 48). There is only one direct instance in which pilagshim are associated in any 
way with slave terminology: Bilhah is called a pilegesh only in Gen. 35:22 and is otherwise 
described as an amah, shifḥah, or ishah. There is also an indirect association: Avimelekh, 
who is stated to be the son of Gideon’s (unnamed) pilegesh, is in one instance called a 
ben amah (Judg. 9:18). The significance of these instances is discussed further in this 
chapter.
7 As mentioned above, there is one indirect association in Judg. 9:18, in which Avimelekh 
is called a ben amah. 
8 Josephus in fact “upgraded” this woman to a wife (τών γονέων (his wife)); see Ant. 5:142 
(trans. H. St. J. Thackeray; 9 vols.; London: Heinemann, 1926-1965).
9 A midrash associated with Rav (Gen. Rab. 61:4 and elsewhere) identifies Qeturah as 
Hagar.
10 As noted in Harris, R. L. et al., eds., Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament 
[=TWOT] (2 vols.; Chicago: Moody, 1981) s.v. “concubine,” one-third of the biblical 
occurrences of pilegesh are in this Judges narrative.
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aggadic material, but apparently describes a (female) consort of low social 
status, rather than a specific legal status,11 as can be seen in the following 
midrash in Lev. Rabbah parsha 1:13:
מה בין נביאי ישראל לנביאי עכו“ם...ורבנן אמרי למלך שהיה לו אשה ופלגש
כשהוא הולך אצל אשתו הוא הולך בפרהסיא וכשהוא הולך אצל פלגשו הולך
במטמוניות
What is the difference between the prophets of Israel and the prophets of 
the other nations?... The Sages say: [it is like] a king who had an ishah and 
a pilegesh [in some versions a shifḥah]; when he goes out with his wife he 
does so in public view, but when he goes out with his pilegesh he does so 
discreetly.
 Undoubtedly, the pilegesh was associated with sexual behavior, and 
undoubtedly a sexual use was one of the functions of a female slave, though 
not an inevitable function. Even if we describe this as “concubinage,” however, 
I do not think the term “concubine” should be used as the translation for 
pilegesh. I will argue that a better translation is “consort,” to avoid the sole 
association with females that is implicit in the modern term “concubine” 
and thus include the male pilagshim in Ezek. 23:⒛ Further, I argue that 
pilegesh is used in the Bible as part of a literary motif rather than as an 
indication of a particular status, and that there is no necessary association 
of the pilegesh with slavery. The pilegesh is outside the family; his or her 
sexuality is not licit in the normative sense and leads to disinheritance or 
death. It is the pilegesh, not the slave, who is the true “other.”12
2.1 ON THE WIFE-SLAVE CONTINUUM?
As noted above, there is concern evidenced by both ancient and modern 
scholars to rank biblical females in comparison to a “legitimate” wife.13 For 
11 Several of these are discussed by Ellison, Nissuin, 47-4⒐
12 The pilegesh may have had some legal advantages in later periods as a contract can allow 
a mutual exit strategy. What became normative in later rabbinic law was the unilateral 
acquisition of the woman by the man accompanied by her inability to initiate divorce. 
[TM]
13 Modern Israeli law continues to use the term pilegesh with the specific legal meaning 
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the pilegesh, this is seen already in two apparently contradictory passages 
in the two Talmudim, which suggest a sort of unprotected wife. The first 
text is yKetub. 5:2 29d: 
אי זו היא אשה ואי זו היא פילגש 
רבי מאיר אומר אשה יש לה כתובה פילגש אין לה כתובה 
רבי יהודה אומר אחת זו ואחת זו יש לה כתובה 
אשה יש לה כתובה ותנאי כתובה פילגש יש לה כתובה ואין לה תנאי כתובה
What is a wife and what is a pilegesh? R. Meir says: a wife has a ketubbah 
[marriage contract], and a pilegesh does not have a ketubbah. 
R. Yehudah says: each one has a ketubbah; a wife has [both] a [written] 
ketubbah and [negotiated] conditions, and a pilegesh has a [written] ketubbah 
and no [negotiated] conditions. 
The second text is bSan. 21a:
מאי נשים ומאי פילגשים 
אמר רב יהודה אמר רב נשים בכתובה ובקדושין פלגשים בלא כתובה 
ובלא קדושין
What are wives and what are pilagshim? Rav Yehudah said in the name of 
Rav: wives have a ketubbah and qiddushin; pilagshim have neither a ketubbah 
nor qiddushin.
The Yerushalmi has been interpreted to mean14 that the pilegesh, like 
the wife, has qiddushin, though possibly not a ketubbah, contrary to the 
of “reputed wife” (A. L. Grivsky, “Concubinage in Israel” [in Hebrew] [Molad, 1959], 
666-70), a woman in a long-term relationship who has not undergone the formalities of 
marriage. Such a woman may benefit om certain legal rights accorded to wives in “formal” 
marriages, such as pension rights (Pinḥas Shifman, “Marriage and Cohabitation in Israeli 
Law,” Israel Law Review 16 [1981]: 456). Socially, however, she may be considered inferior 
(Daniel Friedmann, “The Unmarried Wife in Israeli Law,” Israel Yearbook on Human 
Rights 2 [1972]: 298). 
14 Rashi to Gen. 25:6, for instance, has נשים בכתובה פלגשים בלא כתובה (wives have a ketubbah, 
pilagshim do not have a ketubbah); this is taken as an indication that he understood the 
distinction between them to relate only to the ketubbah and thus assumed that both had 
qiddushin (see, e.g., Ellinson, Nissuin, 3).
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opinion in the Bavli. Ellinson has argued that while the passages are likely 
not contradictory, at least with respect to the idea that a pilegesh has no 
qiddushin,15 there is still no evidence in rabbinic law of any fixed halakhah 
with respect to the legal status of the pilegesh.16 We must also remember 
that the terms qiddushin, ketubbah, and tena’ei ketubbah do not appear in 
the Bible; these passages seem to be an attempt to impose later law on a 
term with which the Rabbis had no familiarity in “real life.”
 The view of a pilegesh as a quasi-wife is also found among modern 
scholars. TWOT has for “concubine”: “a true wife, though of secondary 
rank.”17 Grivsky assumes that the term pilegesh has always referred to a 
woman in a זיווג חפשי, a “ee couple,” arguing that ancient law made much 
less distinction than modern law between the legal rights of “wifehood” 
and those of less formal relationships; the distinction, he suggests, was 
primarily social.18 Morgenstern19 fit the pilegesh within his theory of marriage 
15 Ellinson, Nissuin, ⒍ In Ellison’s opinion, the Yerushalmi passage is discussing only the 
impact of the ketubbah, with no assumptions regarding qiddushin, and a ketubbah alone is 
not constitutive of marriage. As he notes, the assessment is complicated by the fact that 
there are alternate readings for each of the talmudic passages. MS Leiden for yKetub. 5:2 
29d, for instance, has:
ר“מ אומר אשה יש לה כתובה 
*[פילגש אין לה כתובה] 
ר“י אומר אחת זו ואחת זו אין **לה כתובה...
 * entire bracketed phrase added in margin by scribe possibly as a result of a 
homeotoleuton.
”.It seems to me“ ל“נ ,added in margin with a note by the scribe יש erased and אין** 
 Ellinson argues (ibid., 6) that R. Yehudah’s opinion in MS Leiden can be interpreted as 
meaning that a ketubbah is not constitutive; if it is present, the pilegesh gets whatever is 
explicitly set out, while the wife gets rights implied by law whether there is a contract or 
not. Several Bavli MSS for bSan. 21a have פלגשים בלא כתובה וקדושין, and an issue arises as 
to whether the word בלא governs both elements of the phrase or only the first. Ellinson 
(ibid., 2) agrees with the assessment of Naḥmanides on Gen. 25:6 (contra Abarbanel on 
Gen. 17 s.v. ושרי אשת אברהם and Rashi on Gen (25:6) that it does govern both elements, 
and the passage is thus stating that a pilegesh has neither qiddushin nor ketubbah.
16 Ellinson, Nissuin, 9⒍
17 R. Laird Harris et al., eds., Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (database 
updated 2006).
18 Grivsky, “Concubinage in Israel,” 666, 66⒎ Grivsky notes that in the Roman case, the 
distinction was used to indicate that the female in a “marriage” was a person of lower rank 
than her husband. 
19 See Morgenstern, “Additional Notes,” 56-5⒎
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development by arguing that the pilegesh was a woman in an incipient ba’al 
marriage — that is, unlike the woman in the beena marriage, who stayed 
with her father’s group, the pilegesh, likely acquired as a war captive or by an 
exchange of some kind, remained with the husband. Morgenstern argued 
that this type of incipient ba’al marriage likely always existed alongside the 
beena marriage type, until it gradually became the prevailing mode. He 
supports this proposition by noting, first, that the likelihood that pilegesh 
is a non-Semitic word may indicate that it was originally applied to foreign 
captives, and second, that this meaning (a foreign wife who stays with the 
husband) would fit the biblical instances of this term recording “ancient” 
traditions — the Genesis texts and Judges ⒚20 Aer ba’al marriage became 
prevalent, the term pilegesh, in Morgenstern’s opinion, “could acquire only 
one meaning, ‘concubine,’ since om the first it designated a wife of an 
inferior type and standing.”21 
 One may, however, argue against these (generally non-contextual) 
studies, particularly that of Morgenstern, that they are circular, starting 
with the premise that pilegesh must refer to a female and must refer to a 
type of relationship inferior to marriage.22 
 A second view places the pilegesh closer to the female slave and makes 
the specific assumption that a pilegesh would have started out as a slave in her 
master’s household. We have noted Ellinson’s observation that a blurring 
of the distinction between the pilegesh and the slave woman is already 
noticeable among early commentators, as can be seen in the following 
statement by the 12th century sage Avraham ben David (Rabad):23 
20 Morgenstern, “Beena Marriage,” 57-58, notes that Avimelekh’s mother is called a pilegesh 
in Judg. 8:31, though this seems to be a beena marriage with Gideon. He explains this 
exception in a somewhat farfetched way, by arguing that she could not be called an ishah, 
since this referred to a woman in a ba’al marriage; but the readers of this text, though 
it belongs to an “older” tradition, would not have understood amah and shifḥah in their 
original connections to beena marriage. This seems unlikely, if for no other reason that 
Avimelekh is actually called a ben amah in Judg. 9:⒙
21 Morgenstern, “Beena Marriage,” 5⒏
22 Further cautions with respect to Morgenstern’s argument were noted earlier in this 
chapter.
23 Ellinson, Nissuin, 5⒋ We may note the similar opinion of Naḥmanides on Lev. 19:20:
...יאמר הכתוב שהיא שפחה נערה לאיש ידוע כי הפלגש אשר היא משרת את האיש וישכב   
עמה תקרא נערה לו...
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...ובעלי הלשון דורשין פילגש...פי שגל. לפעמים למשגל ולשמש את הבית.
הפילגש נחשבה למעשה לשפחה המשמשת את בעלה...לעתים לתענוגות ולעתים 
למלאכות.
[Rabad states:] ‘The language experts explain pilegesh ... as pi shagel [ shagel = 
intercourse],24 at times to service and to serve the household.’ The pilegesh...is 
[thus] perceived as a shifḥah who services her master...sometimes for pleasure 
and sometimes for labor.
 More recent opinion also sees the pilegesh as a wife who is “tainted” in 
some way by slavery; this interaction of “slavery” with “wifehood,” however, 
is not understood consistently. Ariel, basing himself on the traditional 
etymology of pilegesh as אשה  half wife,” argues that such a woman“ ,פלג 
was more than likely to have started life as a slave, given that a ee woman 
would never have agreed to such a presumably reduced status, while a slave 
may have seen it as a step up, or was in any event coerced into such a 
relationship.25 Patai suggests that such a woman would have retained her 
slave status and this is what would distinguish her om a “wife.”26 Neufeld 
saw no philological difference between amah, shifḥah, and pilegesh, though 
he argued that the pilegesh may have been associated with a greater laxity of 
morals (based, for instance, on the Bilhah-Reuven incident of Gen. 35:22, 
to be discussed further below), and was possibly more akin to a prostitute.27 
McComisky also treated the three terms as synonymous, but seems to have 
considered them all equivalent to “concubine,” which he took to be in 
essence a “secondary wife.”28 Epstein, in contrast, designates concubinage 
 Scripture is saying that she is a shifḥah girl for a certain man. It is known that the 
pilegesh who serves a man and with whom he lies is called his ‘girl’ (na’arah)…
24 We may also note the association in the LXX of Aramiac שגלתה of Dan. 5:2, 3, 23 with 
the Greek παλλακαι, “concubines”; see further the discussion in chap. ⒎ 
25 Yaqov Ariel, “The Pilegesh and her Halakhic Status in the Bible,” Megadim 8 (1989): 58-
5⒐ The essence of pilagshut that differentiated it om “wifehood” was, in Ariel’s opinion, 
that it started as a real qinyan (purchase); with wifehood, in contrast, the term ba’al 
signified not a monetary transaction but a legal relationship with superficial resemblances 
to a qinyan. 
26 Patai, Sex and Family, 41-4⒉ 
27 E. Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws (London: Longmans, Green, 1944), 121, 
12⒊
28 Thomas McComiskey, “The Status of the Secondary Wife: Its Development in Ancient 
Near Eastern Law, A Study and Comprehensive Index” (Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis 
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as a specific legal status higher than that of the “slave-wife.” The biblical 
pilegesh reflects what he calls the “oriental” type of concubinage; she is part 
of a patriarchal, extended family structure in which the concubine is in 
essence a wife, with the same legal strictures regarding inheritance, adultery, 
and incest, but of lower rank than the chief wife. This type of extended 
family structure might also have included the eedwoman, captive wife, 
slave wife, and female slave, with associated legal statuses of descending 
rank, though not necessarily with discrete boundaries between these 
categories.29 This type of concubinage, in his opinion, disappeared as family 
structure changed, with the rise of non-agriculture based economies and 
the increased centrality of the individual; he argues that the later sages were 
unfamiliar with the “oriental” (corporate) style of concubinage and that their 
understanding of pilegesh reflects the “occidental” type of concubinage.30 
 There are difficulties with each of these arguments. The biblical 
evidence explicitly associates pilegesh with a slave in only one instance, so 
that one must question both the necessity of associating the term with 
slavery and its synonymy with amah and shifḥah. Epstein’s argument, on the 
other hand, seems to assume more of a legal distinction than is supported 
by the biblical text. While it is possible, or perhaps inevitable, that there 
were ranks of women within a complex household, this cannot be supported 
simply by assuming, first, that pilegesh means “female concubine,” and 
second, that all women were to be legally ranked according to a single 
concept of “marriage.” In summary, I do not think that there is compelling 
evidence to place the pilegesh anywhere on a wife-slave continuum.
2.2 FOREIGN LOANWORD? 
Following on the idea that the pilegesh is not part of any status hierarchy, 
the most interesting scholarly opinion is etymological: the term may be a 
foreign loanword. 
University, 1965), 1, 9⒈
29 Epstein, “The Institution of Concubinage,” 154, 15⒍ Raymond Westbrook, Old 
Babylonian Marriage Law (Horn: Ferdinand Berger, 1988), 111, also argues that 
there was a distinction between a “slave-wife” and a “slave-concubine” in Old 
Babylonian law.
30 Epstein, “The Institution of Concubinage” 156, 15⒐ 
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 There are traditions deriving pilegesh om a combination of Hebrew 
words, such as palag, peleg, and ishah, in effect meaning “half-wife” 
(Mandelkern, s.v. פלגש), or pilug and shimush, with the implication of a 
woman “used” by different men (Midrash Sekhel Tov to Gen. 35:22). As 
will be discussed in chapter 7, there is in fact evidence of half statuses 
in mishnaic and later law. Other scholars, however, suggest that these 
derivations are folk etymologies31 and question whether the term is 
Hebrew, or even Semitic, in origin. A computer search of the biblical text 
confirms that the combination lgš (or lqš) is in fact rare in biblical Hebrew, 
the only other instance being the description of the prophet Naḥum as 
 Naḥum 1:1). A further point against a Hebrew origin, suggested) האלקשי
by Rabin, is the absence in biblical Hebrew of a noun with a similar pattern32 
(although we may note that there are proper nouns that seem to have the 
same form, particularly פלשת and 33.(תגלת But the conclusive point, in 
Rabin’s view, arguing against a Semitic origin in general, is the lack of any 
phonetic-semantic parallels in other Semitic languages.34 This suggests the 
possibility of a loanword, and the consequent speculation as to why the 
term was borrowed. 
 Scholars have proposed various other languages of origin, including 
Egyptian (Mandelkern, s.v. פלגש), Greek παλλακὴ, and Hittite, as well 
as the reverse possibility that the term entered Greek and Latin as a 
Phoenicio-Semitic loanword.35 Rabin’s own proposal36 is that the term 
is composed of two Indo-European elements: the prefix pi-, “at, on, 
towards,” and the root legh-, “to lie down,” plus a suffix. The term is 
taken to mean “by-lier,” a concept that Rabin notes is expressed in other 
31 Regarding the former derivation, at least, this is the opinion of Even-Shoshan (s.v. 
 .(פלגש
32 C. Rabin, “The Origin of the Hebrew Word Pilegeš,” JJS 25 (1974): 35⒍
33 The latter represents the biblical version of the Akkadian (Tukultī) apil-ešarra. This 
suggests a possibility, which I shall not explore further here, that pilegesh is derived om 
an Akkadian compound that includes the term apil, “heir of.” The association with a male 
figure would certainly fit with the idea of male pilagshim in Ezekiel.
34 Rabin, “Origin,” 356-5⒎
35 See, e.g., McComiskey, “Secondary Wife,” 91 (Greek); John Pairman Brown, Israel and 
Hellas (ZAW Supp. 231; Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995), 70 (Hittite); Epstein, “Concubinage,” 
153 (Phoenicio-Semitic). A summary of earlier speculations on the origin of pilegesh is 
found in Rabin, “Origin,” 353 nn. 2-⒍
36 Rabin, “Origin,” 35⒏ 
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Indo-European languages, though with different terms. He suggests 
that the most likely Indo-European contact with Hebrew in this case 
would have been through the Philistines, though of course he can cite no 
extant parallels. While he acknowledges the difficulty posed by selecting 
linguistic elements om the “unlimited possibilities of the phonology of 
an unknown language,” he supports his contention by noting that many 
of the biblical references to pilagshim in the Israelite period have to do 
with men om Judah and Beǌamin, two areas in close contact with the 
Philistines.37 
 Levin supports this contention, adding a possible motive for the 
borrowing of this word: the prefix (e)pi suggests a non-endogamous woman, 
and the Philistines (=Pelasgians in Greek tradition) had a reputation (as 
attested in Herodotus) for “craving foreign women.”38 The attraction of this 
practice, particularly for men such as the Levite of Judges 19-20 who did 
not have a stable residence and might thus find it difficult to attract a wife, 
led to this type of “intermarriage” being incorporated within other cultures 
in contact with the Philistines, though subject to much censure.39
 Again, there is the difficulty with the arguments of Rabin and 
Levin that they start with the assumption that pilegesh refers to a female 
concubine, and thus that one must look for its derivation in appropriate 
phonetic-semantic combinations suggesting this sort of relationship.40 
Against this association is the use of pilegesh in Ezek. 23:30 and its apparent 
reference to males. Another difficulty with Rabin’s proposal, as he himself 
acknowledges, is the lack of an explicit “Philistine” connection for the 
Genesis narratives. Assuming that the “concubines” in these narratives are 
primarily slaves — specifically Hagar, Bilhah and Zilpah — he posits that 
later editors may have been reluctant to apply the term pilegesh to slave 
women. Their solution was thus to describe the women as both amah and 
ishah, to indicate their “in-betweenness” and lesser status.41 Again, this 
37 Rabin, “Origin,” 360, 36⒈
38 Saul Levin, “Hebrew {pi⒴légeš}, Greek παλλακὴ, Latin paelex: The Origin of Intermarriage 
Among the Early Indo-Europeans and Semites,” General Linguistics 23 (1983): 192, 194; 
Levin cites Herodotus, Histories, ⒍137ff. 
39 See Levin, “Hebrew,” 19⒊
40 See, for example, Rabin, “Origin,” 36⒊
41 Rabin, “Origin,” 362-6⒊
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argument is circular, as there is nothing to indicate that the term pilegesh 
in any of the Genesis narratives means “concubine.” As we have noted, 
Bilhah is in fact the only slave woman who is actually called a pilegesh, in 
the unusual verse Gen. 35:22, which describes her rape or seduction by 
Jacob’s son Reuven.42 This argument also overlooks Judg. 19:1, in which 
the Levite’s pilegesh is also called an ishah. 
2.3 THE PILEGESH AS A LITERARY TOPOS?
Various scholars, more correctly in my opinion, focus on the biblical pilegesh 
as a key player in a particular kind of motif. Several of these scholars have 
posited a succession scenario. Brown, for instance, notes the similarity 
between some of the biblical pilegesh references and various incidents om 
Greek literature, in which the act of taking the father’s concubine is primarily 
political. The pilegesh in his opinion is thus an “honorific” institution, with 
a key role in royal succession.43 Other scholars have similarly suggested a 
succession motif underlying the various biblical instances in which males 
have or demand intercourse with a pilegesh of their father or military 
superior: Reuven’s rape/seduction of Bilhah, disqualiing him om first-
born status (Gen. 35:22, 49:3-4); Ish Boshet’s accusation against Avner 
regarding Saul’s pilegesh Ritzpah, leading to Avner’s defection to David 
(2Sam. 3:7); Avshalom’s public sex with David’s pilagshim (2Sam. 16:21-
22), leading to Avshalom’s disqualification om kingship; and Adoniahu’s 
request to Solomon (through Batsheva) for Avishag, his father’s consort, 
which leads to his death (1Kings 2:22). Solomon understood this request 
as an explicit threat to his kingship:
42 Rabin, “Origin,” 362, also argues that Gen. 25:6, which refers to the sons of Abraham’s 
pilagshim, would include under the plural pilagshim both Qeturah, who is actually called a 
pilegesh in 1Chr. 1:31 (and a wife in Gen. 25:1), and Hagar, who is never explicitly called a 
pilegesh. As noted above (n. 130), there is a midrashic suggestion that Qeturah actually was 
Hagar, returned aer Sarah’s death, yet this is not at all clear in the biblical text. Further, 
the verse refers to the sons of the pilagshim being given gis, yet Hagar’s son Ishmael had 
already le. 
43 Brown, Israel and Hellas, 68-70. Brown raises the further issue, which will not be examined 
here, of whether this particular motif has been borrowed. He suggests that the term was 
Hittite or Luvian in origin, was borrowed by the Philistines, and was borrowed om the 
Philistines by both Israel and Greece (ibid., 70).
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[The king replied to his mother:] Why request Avishag the Shunamite for 
Adoniah? Request the kingship for him! For he is my older brother...
The purpose of these actions, Patai suggests, is a claim on a superior’s 
authority; in his opinion (based apparently on social anthropology 
assumptions) it was customary for a son, aer his father’s death, to 
marry all the father’s wives and concubines with the exception of his own 
mother, “to demonstrate definitely the fact of succession.” He suggests, 
based on the wording of Ezek. 22:10 ערות אב גלה בך (they have uncovered 
their father’s nakedness in you [Jerusalem]), that the custom was still 
in practice in Ezekiel’s time, though it was abhorred.44 Ariel, assuming 
that the pilegesh would have ranked somewhere between a semi-queen and 
slave-property, argued that such a status fitted her for this kind of role in 
securing succession.45 
 This assumption that the pilegesh was a key player in a succession motif 
would not explain other instances of the term, such as that in Ezek. 23:⒛46 
We may, however, consider the succession issue as simply one type of a 
more general class of aetiological motifs. Zakovitch and Shinan47 note that 
“sex stories” in general are equently used in the Bible to justi later 
events, particularly a loss of status. In addition to the pilegesh stories, they 
note, for instance, the incest of Lot’s daughters (Gen. 19:30-8), which 
explains the scornful attitude toward Ammon and Moav; the slaughter of 
the men of Shekhem by Simon and Levi to avenge the rape/seduction of 
their sister (Gen. 34:25, 49:5-7), which disqualifies them om first-born 
status aer Reuven; and Amnon’s rape of his half-sister Tamar (2Sam. 13), 
44 Patai, Sex and Family, 101, 103; see also Matitiahu Tsevat, “Marriage and Monarchical 
Legitimacy in Ugarit and Israel,” JSS 3 (1958): 24⒉ In support of his contention, Tsevat 
also notes that the Targum to 2Sam. 16:21 (regarding Avshalom) translates niveshet with 
itgaryah, “to provoke, challenge.” See also the suggestion of Tirzah Meacham, “The 
Missing Daughter: Leviticus 18 and 20,” ZAW 109 (1997): 254-59, at 258, who argues 
that the Leviticus incest rules are both an apologetic for the behavior of the patriarchs 
and a priestly polemic against the house of David and its profligate ways.
45 Ariel, “The Pilegesh,” 6⒋ 
46 On a plain reading, the incident of the pilegesh of Givah (Judg. 19-21) would also seem to 
be unrelated to succession; I shall argue below, however, that there may be a succession 
issue implicit in this story.
47 Yair Zakovitch and Avigdor Shinan, The Story of Reuven and Bilhah [in Hebrew] (Mif ’ale 
hameḥqar shel hamakhon lemada’e ha-yehadut; Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1984), ⒈
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which leads to his disqualification om kingship. We may thus propose 
that the pilegesh is one player in a number of “non-wife” relationships used 
for such aetiological stories. What characterizes pilagshim, whether male 
or female, is that they are “non-licit” sexual partners; as such, they attract 
danger, which leads to chaos.48 A more detailed examination of the use 
of pilegesh in certain passages will support the proposition that this term 
has a literary function rather than reflecting a specific status of concubine. 
We shall focus in particular on the apparent reference in Ezek. 23:20 to 
male pilagshim as well as the Bilhah-Reuven incident in Gen. 25:32 and the 
Judges 19-21 narrative. 
2.4 BIBLICAL EXAMPLES OF THREE INSTANCES 
OF PILEGESH AS TOPOS
2.4.A The Male pilagshim of Ezekiel. 23:20
Ezekiel 23 concerns the unfaithfulness of Jerusalem and Samaria, 
represented metaphorically as the sexual licentiousness of the sisters Oholah 
and Oholibah with their “lovers,” Egypt, Assyria, and Babylon. In verse 20, 
the pilagshim who are the object of Oholibah’s attentions in Egypt are, on 
a plain reading of the text, males, whose profligate sexuality leads to the 
breaking of the proper relationship with God:
ותעגבה על פלגשיהם אשר בשר חמורים בשרם וזרמת סוסים זרמתם
She lusted for their pilagshim, whose members were like those of asses and 
whose flow [of semen, according to Rashi] was like those of stallions.
 Rabin suggests that this use of a female term to refer to males may 
be a later, pejorative development.49 Yet it is just as reasonable to assume 
that it is the restriction of the term pilegesh to females which is the later 
development, much as the English term “concubine” has developed om 
48 It is possible that narratives of such an offense or attempted offense with a wife — e.g., 
Pharaoh and Sarah, Joseph and Potifar’s wife, David and Batsheva — have a different 
aetiological purpose.
49 Rabin, “Origin,” 36⒈
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a generic term for a “lover” to a term restricted to females.50 It is in fact 
in postbiblical translations and commentaries that the term pilegesh is 
restricted to females, a restriction that causes particular difficulties for 
those commenting on the Ezekiel verse. 
 The LXX to Ezek. 23:20 seems to acknowledge the “maleness” of the 
pilagshim here but avoids the issue by translating the term as Χαλδαίους, 
“Chaldeans”; other interpretations simply reject the idea of male pilagshim. 
The Targum to Ezekiel has:
ואתרעיאת למהוי שמשא* להון דבסר חמרין בסריהון וצחנת סוסין צחנתהון 
[*in some editions שמוטא]
She took pleasure in being a servant*51 to them whose flesh was the flesh of 
donkeys, and whose flow of semen was the flow of horses
[*in some editions ‘abandoned’]
 In an extended comment on this verse, Radak explains that it is 
appropriate to refer to female lewdness (a characteristic associated, of 
course, only with pilagshim, not wives) using male sexual terms: 
ותעגבה על פלגשיהם – פירשו המפרשים פלגשים עבדיהם כי פלגשים במקום הזה אנשים 
ולא נשים ויורה על זה אשר בשר חמורים בשרם שהוא כנוי לאבר האיש... והנכון בעיני 
שהוא כמשמעו ופירוש על כמו עם וכמוהו ויבאו האנשים על הנשים והדומים לו אמר כל 
כך חשקה בהם עד שנדמתה להם כמו פלגשיהם לא נשותיהם ולענין זה נוטה דעת המתרג‘ 
שתרגם ואתרעיאת למהוי שמוטא להון בטי“ת בקצת נוסחאות פי‘ שמוטא להם ובקצת 
נוסחאות שמשא כמו שפחה אשר בשר חמורים בשרם – וטעמו על הפילגשים כי גם ערות 
הנקבה מכונה בלשון בשר...
And she lusted after their pilagshim: The commentators interpreted their 
pilagshim as ‘their male slaves’ because pilagshim in that place were men, 
not women; and this is shown by whose flesh is like the flesh of donkeys, which 
describes the male member... In my view the correct [interpretation] is the 
50 In current usage according of The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical 
Principles (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), a “concubine” is a female: “one who cohabits with a 
man without being his wife,” a “kept mistress,” or, in polygamous societies, a “secondary 
wife.” In Late Middle English, however, the term also referred to a woman’s male lover 
(ibid.). Perhaps “consort” would be an appropriate term.
51 Here, too, there is a sexual connotation in the root ŠMŠ.
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literal one. The interpretation of al is like im, such as ‘the men came with 
the women’ and similar. [The verse thus stated]: She lusted after them to 
such an extent that she seemed to them like their pilagshim, not their wives. 
The [Aramaic] translator took this view of the issue, translating ואתרעיאת 
 with a tet in several versions, whose translation is ‘she was ,למהוי שמוטא להון
abandoned to them,’ and in several versions שמשא, like a female slave. Their 
flesh is like the flesh of donkeys — its usage is with respect to the pilagshim, 
because female genitalia are also described using terms like ‘flesh’...
 Other commentaries and translations twist the verse, so as to render 
the term pilegesh as an abstract noun meaning “concubinage.”52 Rashi, for 
instance, has: 
ותעגבה על פלגשיהם: על פלגשות‘ להיות להם לפלגש
 And she lusted after their pilagshim: after [their] concubinage, to be a pilegesh 
to them.
 The Vulgate translates על פלגשיהם as super concubito eorum (aer lying 
with them).
 Yet the context here clearly suggests a female associated with several 
males. A halakhic midrash in fact confirms that there was a belief, at 
least among later sages, that the Egyptians engaged in such polyandrous 
practices. This midrash comments on the introduction to the incest 
provisions in Leviticus 18, which contains a general warning against 
following the practices of Egypt and Canaan (v. 3): 
כמעשה ארץ מצרים...וכמעשה ארץ כנען...לא תעשו
You shall not copy the practices of the land of Egypt...or the land of 
Canaan...
 The sages set out their understanding of the nature of these practices 
52 Certain English translations are less reticent, using general terms for sexual partners 
such as “paramours” (KJV) or “profligates” (Jerusalem Bible). The Yiddish translation of 
Aaron Bergmann, The Old Testament in Hebrew and Yiddish (London: British and Foreign 
Bible Society, 1912), is quite direct, translating the word as קעבסמענער, “half husbands,” 
apparently the male equivalent of the female קעבסוויב, “half wife” or “concubine.” 
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(Sifra Aharei Mot 9:8, Weiss p. 85d53):
ומה היו עושים? האיש נושא לאיש, והאשה לאשה, האיש נושא 
אשה ובתה, ואשה ניסת לשנים.
And what did they do? A man would marry a man, a woman [would marry] a 
woman, a man would marry a woman and her daughter, and a woman would 
marry two [men].
 We may thus conclude that the pilagshim in this verse are male 
“consorts,” and it is the (immoderate) association with them that leads to 
censure on the part of the prophet.
2.4.B Gen. 35:22: Bilhah as pilegesh
This verse is placed aer a description of the travels of Jacob and his 
entourage south om Padan Aram. At Bethel (later part of the territory 
of Ephraim) Jacob is renamed “Israel”; the text then recounts the birth of 
Beǌamin on the way to Eat (Bethlehem in Judah, which is in a direct 
line south). Rachel dies aer this birth, and it is then that one would 
expect a summary such as “the sons of Jacob were twelve.” Instead, the 
Bible interrupts this summary with the record of an incident between 
Reuven and Jacob’s “slave-wife” Bilhah. This passage is both disturbing in 
content and unusual in structure:
ויהי בשכן ישראל בארץ ההוא וילך ראובן וישכב את בלהה פילגש אביו וישמע ישראל 
ויהו בני יעקב שנים עשר
And when Israel dwelt in that land, Reuven went and lay with Bilhah his 
father’s pilegesh and Israel heard 
[There is here a lacuna in the text, marked in some printed editions with a 
53 W. Ward argues based on linguistic evidence that it is in fact unlikely that “concubinage” 
existed in Pharaonic (Old and Middle Kingdom) Egypt, suggesting that the existence 
of harems and concubinage would have been inconsistent with the monogamy and legal 
equality that were the rule at this time. William Ward, “Reflections on Some Egyptian 
Terms Presumed to Mean ‘Harem, Harem-Woman, Concubine,’” Berytus 31 (1983): 
68, 7⒋
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 the Masoretic sign for parashah petuḥah indicating the end of a section.54 ,פ
There are also two different cantillation signs for the word ישראל: a sof pasuq, 
i.e., a full stop, associated with eastern MS traditions, and an etnaḥta, major 
pause/comma, associated with western MS traditions.55 Both are disjunctive 
accents.56]
And the sons of Jacob were twelve.
 The strange insertion at this point of the incident of Bilhah and Reuven, 
the physical lacuna in the text, and the apparent lack of reaction by Jacob 
suggest to some scholars that the text has been deliberately manipulated: 
material has been le out, or the abruptness of the text is meant to suggest 
that the rest of the story is to be found elsewhere.57 I suggest that there 
is a further puzzle in the use of the words “his father’s pilegesh” to describe 
Bilhah; the description seems, on the one hand, superfluous, and on the 
other hand contradictory, given that she has already been called his ishah. 
Further, the word is not used to describe Hagar or Zilpah, though their 
situations were similar. 
 The lacuna, called a pisqa be-emtsa pasuq [=PBP], is a section division 
occurring in the middle of a verse, which is presumed to be the result 
of exegetical activity, i.e., someone’s subjective assessment that there is a 
change in the content of the text, requiring a break.58 Source criticism in 
fact assigns the verse to two different strata: 22a is assigned to J and 22b 
to P. In the opinion of some scholars, however, this structure suggests 
the possibility that something has actually been dropped out of the text.59 
The possibility of variant readings of this verse is indicated by the LXX 
rendition, which attributes a reaction to Jacob with the words καὶ πονηρὸν 
54 See, e.g., Emanuel Tov, Textual Criticism of the Hebrew Bible (Minneapolis: 
Fortress, 1992), 50-51, for a discussion of the origins of these text divisions. 
55 Zakovitch and Shinan, The Story of Revuen and Bilhah, 2⒊
56 These signs indicate a separation om the following words, with the sof pasuq (silluq) being 
“stronger” than the etnaḥta. See, e.g., Tov, Textual Criticism, 6⒐
57 See, e.g., Shemaryahu Talmon, “’Pisqah Be’emṣa Pasuq’ and 11QP5a,” Textus 5 (1966): 18, 
who suggests that the lacuna in Gen. 35:22 points to 1Chr. 5:⒈
58 Tov, Textual Criticism, 51, 54-5⒌ According to Tov (ibid., 51), the practice found in the 
Masoretic group of texts of using spaces to indicate sections is also known om much 
earlier texts, including biblical texts found among the Dead Sea documents.
59 These arguments are summarized in Zakovitch and Shinan, The Story of Reuven and 
Bilhah, 2⒊
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ἐφάνη ἐναντίον αὐτου, “and the thing appeared grievous before him.”60 Tov 
suggests that this addition is actually a Hebraism, a translation of the 
phrase וירע בעיניו (and it was evil in his eyes), similarly translated by the 
LXX in Gen. 38:10; it was thus in his view likely based on a variant text 
which had these additional words.61 
 The motive behind such variations is similarly speculated upon by 
scholars, and is generally assumed to be related to the aetiological function 
of the incident. As the text was presumably manipulated, one wonders 
whether the reference to Bilhah as a pilegesh was deliberately inserted in 
order to give this incident the form of an aetiological “set piece.”
 Certainly the episode of Bilhah and Reuven was already represented 
in the Bible as the cause of Reuben’s disqualification om the status of 
firstborn. Genesis 49, for instance, records Jacob’s blessings for his sons; 
verse 4, itself something of a circumlocution, provides for Reuven:
פחז כמים אל תותר כי עלית משכבי אביך אז חללת יצועי עלה
Boiling over like water — you will not surpass; you mounted your father’s 
bed(s), and then you committed defilement — he mounted my couch.62 
1Chronicles 5:1-3 gives the similarly convoluted statement:63 
60 Translation of L. Brenton, The Septuagint Version: Greek and English (Grand Rapids, Mich.: 
Zondervan). We may note that Targum Yonatan also attributes a reaction to Jacob; see note 
6⒌
61 Emanuel Tov, The Text-Critical Use of the Septuagint in Biblical Research (Jerusalem 
Biblical Studies 8; Jerusalem: Simor, 1997), 8⒋
62 The verse has a number of unusual features aside om its obscure meaning. Gesenius 
suggests that the absence of a verb in the first phrase is a feature of exclamatory speech. 
See E. Kautzsch, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar (revised by A. E. Cowley; Oxford: Clarendon, 
1970), section 147c. As G. Brooke, “4Q Commentary on Genesis A,” in Qumran Cave 
4, XVII, Parabiblical Texts, Part 3 (DJD 22; Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 204, has noted, a 
verb in 2 m.s. perf. is found in other texts. The Samaritan Pentateuch [=SP], for instance, 
based on the MS used by Abraham Tal, The Samaritan Targum, has פחזת (you were hasty) 
instead of the noun פחז; the LXX has εξυβρισας (you were insolent). Other features noted 
are the use here, as in Ruth 2:14, of תותר instead of the expected תותיר (SP has תותיר), 
the use of the plural משכבי, and the abrupt transition om 2nd to 3rd person, suggested 
to be a feature of poetic speech (Gesenius, 53n, 124b, 144p). 
63 The comments on Reuven appear to take the form of an aside inserted into the main 
text. Zakovitch and Shinan, The Story of Reuven and Bilhah, 14, suggest that vv. 1-3 are 
structured as a chiasmus.
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 ובני ראובן בכור ישראל כי הוא הבכור ובחללו יצועי אביו נתנה בכורתו 
לבני יוסף בן ישראל ולא להתיחש לבכרה כי יהודה גבר באחיו ולנגיד ממנו 
והבכרה ליוסף בני ראובן בכור ישראל חנוך ופלוא חצרון וכרמי
And the sons of Reuven, the firstborn of Israel — though he was the 
firstborn, in his defiling of the couches of his father his birthright was given 
to the sons of Joseph the son of Israel, so that he was not included in the 
birthright; though Judah prevailed over his brothers, and a leader [came] 
of him, the birthright was Joseph’s — the sons of Reuven, the firstborn of 
Israel, were Ḥanokh and Palu, Ḥetzron and Karmi.
 Zakovitch and Shinan point also to a possible relationship of the 
incident to Deut. 33:6, a part of Moses’ blessings of the tribes, which 
states:
יחי ראובן ואל ימת ויהי מתיו מספר
Let Reuven live and not die, but his men shall be few. 
They suggest that this verse was possibly aware of a version of Gen. 35:22 
that referred to a curse upon Reuven condemning him to death and 
attempted here to blunt its effect;64 a later editor actually removed the 
curse om 35:22, which accounts for its odd structure. 
 These circumlocutions and the sense that something has been le 
out of Gen. 35:22 suggest that the biblical editors already had difficulty 
with the precise nature of Reuven’s sin, and consequently with the role of 
Bilhah. Did Reuven commit incest with his father’s wife? Was the phrase 
אביו  his father’s pilegesh), inserted precisely to mitigate such an) פלגש 
implication? Was it inserted because this story was seen as a well-known 
moral lesson in which the pilegesh plays an important role? There are two 
pieces of evidence that support the latter interpretation.
 Qumran document 4Q252 reacts to the mention of a pilegesh in this 
verse. The document in general highlights certain Genesis narratives in 
order to clari or re-present them.65 Column iv of this document contains 
64 Zakovitch and Shinan, The Story of Reuven and Bilhah, ⒕
65 Robert Eisenman and Michael Wise, The Dead Sea Scrolls Uncovered (New York: Penguin 
Books, 1992), 7⒎
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two references to pilagshim: it juxtaposes Timna (the pilegesh of Eliphaz, 
the son of Esau, in Gen. 36:12) and Bilhah (though, as we have noted, she 
is called the pilegesh of Reuven’s father only in Gen. 35:22):66 
תמנע היתה פילגש לאליפז בן עשיו ותלד לו את עמלק הוא אשר הכ[ה] שאול [...] כאשר 
דבר למושה באחרית ה[י]מים תמחה את זכר עמלק מתחת השמים[...] ברכות יעקוב 
ראובן בכורי אתה ורישית אוני יתר שאת ויתר עוז פחזתה כמים אל תותר עליתה משכבי 
אביכה אז חללתה יצועיו עלה.[...]פשרו אשר הוכיחו אשר שכב עם בלהה פילגשו ו[א]מר 
בכו[רי...]ל[...]ראובן הוא ראשית ער[...]
Timna was the pilegesh of Eliphaz, the son of Esau. And she bore him Amaleq, 
he whom Saul destroyed [...] as He spoke to Moses: In the latter days you 
will wipe out the memory of Amaleq from under the heavens [Deut. 25:19] [...] 
The blessings of Jacob: Reuben, you are my firstborn and the first fruits of my 
strength, excelling in dignity and excelling in power. You were unstable as water; 
you shall no longer excel. You went up onto your father’s bed. Then you defiled. 
He went up on his couches [... ] its interpretation is67 that he reproved him in 
that he lay with Bilhah his pilegesh. And he [s]aid [My] first[born.....]Reuven 
he was the first[...]
 I believe that this passage serves, among other possible functions,68 as 
a polemic against pilagshim. Two pilegesh references om Genesis are linked 
to each other and to Jacob’s blessing by means of two types of commentary: 
the use of other biblical references (in this case om Deuteronomy) to 
explain the verses in Genesis, and a pesher-type commentary explaining the 
meaning of 49:4b as a reproof.69 Through these various juxtapositions, the 
text makes an explicit aetiological connection between a relationship with 
66 The Hebrew is taken om Brooke, “4Q Commentary,” 203-⒋
67 According to the editor, this is a standard introductory formula in a pesher (204, note L. 5).
68 Compare, e.g., the suggestion by Eisenman and Wise, The Dead Sea Scrolls Uncovered, 
83-85, that the document is ultimately a Messianic pronouncement with a collateral 
condemnation of fornication, and the contrary suggestion by Moshe Bernstein, “4Q252: 
From Re-Written Bible to Biblical Commentary,” JJS 45 (1994): 124, to consider the 
document simply as a series of commentaries and to avoid seeking “artificial unifiers” in 
the text.
69 Bernstein, “4Q252,” 19, questions the use of the pesher form here, on the assumption that 
this form is connected with “sectarian commentary”; he posits, based on this sample, that 
the use of the pesher form may be broader. 
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a pilegesh and later loss of status, or worse; it reinforces the idea that the 
result of dealing with such women is disaster — the destruction of one’s 
descendants (Amaleq, supposedly the descendant of Esau, by Saul in 1Sam. 
14:48; 15:3, 7) or the removal of the rights of the firstborn (om Reuven, 
in Gen. 49). Of further interest are the variants in the biblical lemmata, 
particularly the use of עם  .lay) in Gen) שכב lay with) for the MT) שכב 
35:22,70 and פחזתה (you were unstable) for the MT פחז (he was unstable) 
in Gen. 49:⒋71 This might be further indication that the biblical verses in 
question were unstable. 
 A second piece of evidence is found in Targum Neofiti. In the edition of 
Diez Macho the words פילגש אביו (his father’s pilegesh) are le untranslated 
in the primary MS,72 which has: 
והוי כדי שרון ישראל בארעא ההיא ואזל ראובן וישכב ית בלהה ושמע ישראל והוון בנוי 
יעקב תרין עשר
 The words פילגש אבוי have been added as an interlinear gloss. 
 Diez Macho and other scholars have suggested that this omission is in 
fact a reflection of the mishnaic prohibition in mMeg. 4:10; this restricts 
the public dissemination of the Bilhah-Reuven incident, among others:
מעשה ראובן נקרא ולא מתרגם מעשה תמר מתרגם ונקרא מעשה עגל 
ראשון נקרא ומתרגם והשני נקרא ולא מתרגם ברכת כהנים מעשה דוד ואמנון לא נקראין 
ולא מתרגמין 
The incident of Reuven is read [in public] but not translated. The incident 
of Tamar [and Judah, in Gen. 38] is read and translated. The first incident of 
the calf [Exod. 32:1-20] is read and translated; the second [the continuation 
of the chapter in vv. 21-35] is read but not translated. The blessing of the 
70 It is not clear whether different nuances are implied by את and עם. The Bible uses both, 
as well as various prepositions with שכב including אצל (as in Gen. 39:10). It is perhaps 
significant that three instances referring to a שכבת זרע also use the particle את (Lev. 15:18, 
19:20, and Num. 5:13). Brown, Israel and Hellas, 68, suggests that the difference might be 
comparable to that in modern “vulgar” English between “lay” and “lie with.” 
71 As noted above (n. 58), both the SP and LXX have a verb in 2 m.s. perf.
72 This Targum uses לחנתה elsewhere in Genesis in the same manner as Onkelos for pilegesh 
and certain amah/shifḥah references to Bilhah and Zilpah; for Re’umah, however (Gen. 
22:24), it uses פלקה. 
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priests [Num. 6:24-6] and the incident of David and Amnon [with respect 
to Tamar, according to the Gemara (b. Meg. 25ab), in 2Sam. 13:1] are not 
read and not translated.
 The precise application of this rule is unclear, particularly whether the 
prohibition referred to the written Targumim. An expanded version of the 
ruling is found in tMeg. (Lieberman) 3:35, associated with R. Ḥaninah ben 
Gamliel, a second generation tanna:73 
מעשה ראובן נקרא ולא מיתרגם ומעשה בר‘ חנינה בן גמליאל שהיה 
קורא בכבול וילך ראובן וישכב את בלהה וגו‘ ויהיו בני יעקב שנים עשר, ואמ‘ למתרגם, אל 
תתרגם אלא אחרון 
The incident of Reuven is read but not translated. And it happened that 
R. Ḥaninah ben Gamliel, who used to read in Kabul74: ...Reuven went and 
lay with Bilhah, etc., and the sons of Jacob were twelve, told the translator: 
‘Translate only the last [part].’
 What is included in the “etc.,” however, is not clear om any of 
the MSS cited in the apparatus.75 We may note also that the Aramaic 
Targumim do actually translate this verse, more or less literally (TY adds 
an interpretation that is found in bShabb. 55b, among other places.76) 
McNamara, however, claims that all the restricted texts in mMeg. are 
missing in Neofiti, and thus that this Targum is dependent on a tradition 
73 In the opinion of P. S. Alexander, “The Rabbinic Lists of Forbidden Targumim,” JJS 27 
(1976): 180, R. Ḥaninah is the source of this ruling.
74 The first printed edition has בעכו.
75 MS ל is missing the words om את to עשר, but such shortening of verse quotations is 
common in rabbinic literature.
76 This talmudic reaction will be discussed below. The TY reads:
והוה כד שרא ישראל בארעא ההיא ואזל ראובן ובלבל ית מצעא דבלהה פילקתיה 
דאבוי דהות מסדרא כל קבל מצעא דלאה אימיה ואיתחשיב עילוי כאילו שמיש עימה 
ושמע ישראל ובאיש ליה ואמר ויי דילמא נפיק מיני פסולא...
 And it was when Israel dwelt in that land, Reuven went and disarranged the bed 
of Bilhah, his father’s concubine, which was arranged alongside the bed of his 
mother Leah; and it was attributed to him as if he had had intercourse with her. 
And Israel heard, and was ashamed, and said: ‘Woe lest an unworthy person is 
descended om me…’
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abiding by the mishnaic legislation.77 Alexander too argues that the 
pattern of omissions in Targum Neofiti confirms a rabbinic interest in 
regulating the Targum in general, and that this Targum was directly 
edited or followed a variant that had been edited. Zakovitch and Shinan,78 
noting the mixture of Aramaic and Hebrew, especially the use of the word 
 he lay), suggest that in fact none of the “offending” part of the) וישכב
verse was translated at first; various hands later translated different words. 
This explanation might account for the mixture of languages, yet it would 
seem that none of the explanations is sufficient to explain why only the 
words פילגש אביו are missing, and how such an omission would be seen as 
fulfilling the requirements of mMeg 4:10. It is possible, on the one hand, 
that the redactor thought that simply omitting these words would avoid 
shedding light on the situation; on the other hand, it is also possible that 
there was a textual tradition used by the translator that did not have these 
words in the original Hebrew. Again, such a possibility suggests that 
the word pilegesh in the biblical text plays a specific role. I would argue, 
therefore, that there is support for the possibility that the term pilegesh 
was not original to the verse in all MT versions and was deliberately added 
to impart a stereotypical moral lesson. 
 It is interesting to note that much extrabiblical and postbiblical writing 
on this incident is concerned with dissociating Reuven om any suggestion 
of incest. To the extent that these discussions reflect on Bilhah’s status, I 
shall discuss them further in chapter 7, as a further indication that Bilhah 
remained a biblical “insider” until relatively late.
2.4.C The ishah pilegesh of Judges 19
The last section of the book of Judges, ending with the civil war between 
Beǌamin and the rest of the tribes (chs. 19-21), begins in chapter 19 
with the bizarre story of the ishah pilegesh. Judges 19:1-3 describe her 
relationship with a certain Levite: 
77 Martin McNamara, The New Testament and the Palestinian Targum to the Pentateuch 
(Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1966), 4⒎
78 Zakovitch and Shinan, The Story of Reuven and Bilhah, 15-⒗ They note (p. 16) that in the 
related verse Gen. 49:4 (Jacob’s blessing of Reuven), the sin of Reuven is also le untranslated, 
and may have been thought to have been included in the prohibition in mMeg.
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ויהי בימים ההם ומלך אין בישראל ויהי איש לוי גר בירכתי הר אפרים 
ויקח לו אשה פילגש מבית לחם יהודה. ותזנה עליו פילגשו ותלך מאתו אל 
בית אביה אל בית לחם יהודה ותהי שם ימים ארבעה חדשים. ויקם אישה וילך אחריה לדבר 
על לבה להשיבו*
*qere = להשיבה
In those days, when there was no king in Israel, there was a Levite man living 
in the foothills of Mount Ephraim; he took an ishah pilegesh from Bethlehem 
[in] Judah. And his pilegesh ended her relationship with him79 and went away 
from him to her father’s house to Bethlehem [in] Judah and was there four 
whole months. And her husband arose and went after her to speak kindly to 
her and to bring her back [according to the qere]...
 On their return journey, lodging in Givah with an Ephraimite, they are 
beset by a mob of Beǌaminites, who demand that the Levite be sent out to 
them to be used sexually. The host sends out the Levite’s pilegesh instead; 
she is repeatedly raped and is found lying by the door in the morning 
(Judg. 19:27-8):
ויקם אדניה בבקר ויפתח דלתות הבית ויצא ללכת לדרכו והנה האשה פילגשו נפלת פתח 
הבית וידיה על הסף. ויאמר אליה קומי ונלכה ואין ענה...
And her lord rose up in the morning, and opened the doors of the house, 
and went out to go his way; and behold his ishah pilegesh was fallen down at 
the entrance of the house, and her hands were on the threshold. And he said 
to her, ‘Get up and let us go.’ But there was no answer...
 The Levite cuts her body into twelve pieces and sends them throughout 
Israel, inviting vengeance on Givah. A civil war ensues in which the tribe 
of Beǌamin is nearly destroyed. Having vowed not to give their daughters 
in marriage to any Beǌaminites, the remaining tribes nonetheless arrange 
to provide the remnant with women taken forcibly om Yavesh Gilad, and 
thereaer invite the Beǌaminites to replenish their supply of wives by 
setting upon the women at the yearly festival at Shiloh. 
 It is generally recognized that there is more to this narrative than simply 
79 This is not the usual translation of ותזנה עליו which is usually taken to imply some type of 
harlotry or other sexual misbehavior. I shall explain my translation in more detail below.
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the supposed “decadence” of later Hebrew literature.80 There is evidence of 
a deliberate attempt to emphasize the macabre and dehumanizing aspects 
of the narrative, especially in chapter 19, through various devices, many 
of which have been discussed by scholars: the use of darkness as a portent 
of danger and as associated with the sexuality of “unusual” women;81 the 
anonymity of the participants; the exaggerated, nightmare-like delay of 
the group’s departure om Bethlehem and their consequent failure to 
reach shelter before dark;82 and parody or mocking of other biblical events, 
through the use of similar themes or theme words: the young lad, pair of 
donkeys, and knife used by the Levite recalling the two young men, the 
donkey, and the knife accompanying Abraham on his way to sacrifice Isaac 
(Gen. 22:3, 10); the offer of a woman’s sexual services in order to save a 
male guest om homosexual rape, as at Sodom (Gen. 19:8); Saul’s cutting 
up of oxen into twelve pieces to rally the people, this time in defense of 
Yavesh Gilad (1Sam. 11:7).83 
80 As noted by Robert Boling, Judges (Anchor Bible 6A; Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 
1975), 278, citing earlier opinions of Wellhausen and Moore.
81 See, e.g., Weston Fields, “The Motif ‘Night as Danger’ Associated with Three Biblical 
Destruction Narratives,” in Sha’arei Talmon: Studies in the Bible, Qumran and the Ancient 
Near East Presented to Shemaryahu Talmon (ed. M. Fishbane and E. Tov; Winona Lake, 
Ind.: Eisenbrauns, 1992), 22, 26 who notes a similar use of darkness with respect to the 
destruction of Sodom in Gen. 19 and the final plague in Exod. 12:29 (“And it came to pass 
at midnight”). He describes the association of night and irregular types of female sexuality 
as an “allo-motif ” running throughout the Bible. 
82 See. e.g., Yair Zakovitch, “The Literary Paradigm Three-Four in the Bible” [in Hebrew] 
(Ph.D. diss., Hebrew University, 1977), 334, 336, who suggests that the impression of 
a deliberate manipulation of time is created in the narrative by a variation of the “three-
four” pattern that he argues is prevalent in the biblical text. The Levite’s five-day stay at 
his father-in-law’s has three distinct periods: the first three days; the fourth day, when by 
the usual three-four pattern one would expect the group to leave; and the fih day, when 
the group actually leaves. The description of the fourth day is marked by a lengthening of 
phrases, and the fih by a shortening of phrases and feeling of urgency; the effect is thus 
to create peaks and troughs of tension.
83 See, e.g. Jeremiah Unterman, “The Literary Influence of ‘The Binding of Isaac’ (Genesis 
22) on ‘The Outrage at Gibeah’ (Judges 19),” Hebrew Annual Review 4 (1980): 161-66, esp. 
162-63, on the parallels to the sacrifice of Isaac; Ken Stone, “Gender and Homosexuality 
in Judges 19: Subject-Honor, Object-Shame?” JSOT 67 (1995): 87-107, at 100, on the 
theme of homosexual rape as an act of asserting relative power relations and the rape of 
the Levite’s concubine as a proxy for this act; Yairah Amit, “The Story of the Pilegesh in 
Givea in the Hidden Dispute Against the Kingship of Shaul (Judges 19-21)” [in Hebrew], 
Bet Miqra 37 (1991) on the use of place names and events reminiscent of Saul narratives 
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 The number of such devices and allusions suggests that their inclusion 
is not coincidental and that they are meant to draw the reader’s attention 
to non-explicit aspects of the story. As Stone has noted,84 however, this 
very complexity leaves open the possibility for a variety of interpretations, 
at different levels of reading or with different socio-historical foci. Earlier 
commentators attempted to rationalize aspects of the story. Josephus and 
Pseudo-Philo, for instance, both attempt to justi the treatment of the 
pilegesh. Pseudo-Philo asserts not only that both the “concubine” and 
the Levite were dragged out by the mob, but that the woman was being 
punished because she “committed sin with Amalekites” (45:3).85 Josephus 
specifically calls the woman τών γονέων (his wife), and states that she le 
the Levite because they quarreled; the Beǌaminites demanded her and 
took her by force, and she was ashamed to show her face to her husband 
(Ant. 5:142). Certain rabbinic interpretations emphasized the story as a 
revelation of divine justice. According to a passage in bSan. 103b, the 
Israelites were overcome by the Beǌaminites because they valued human 
honor (i.e, the Levite’s) over divine honor: 
אמר להן הקב“ה הניחו לו שפתו מצויה לעוברי דרכים ועל דבר זה נענשו אנשי פ“בג אמר 
להן הקב“ה בכבודי לא מחיתם על כבודו של בשר ודם מחיתם
The Lord Blessed-Be-He said to them: ‘They left him [Micah, in Judg. 18] 
alone, as his bread was available to travelers; but on this matter the people of 
the pilegesh of Givah were punished.’ The Lord Blessed-Be-He said to them: 
‘You did not protest on behalf of my honor, but you did protest about the 
honor of flesh and blood.’
 Tanḥuma Vayeshev 2 similarly contrasts the Israelites’ avenging of the 
human affront in Judges 19-21 with their failure to act against Micah’s idol 
in the immediately preceding chapter of Judges:
תדע לך כח החרם שהרי השבטים שקנאו על פלגש בגבעה ולא קנאו על פסל מיכה הרגו 
בהן בני בנימין פעם ראשונה ושניה ושלישית...
in 1Sam.
84 Stone, “Gender and Homosexuality,” 88-8⒐
85 This translation is by Harrington, “Pseudo-Philo.”
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Know the power of the ban: The tribes who were incensed regarding 
the pilegesh of Givah but not about Micah’s idol had their people slain by 
Benjamin once, twice, three times...86 
 Certain scholars have interpreted the three chapters om a political 
perspective, either as reflecting in some degree actual events, or as 
promulgating some sort of political message.87 
 Other scholars prefer to see the elements of the narrative as the 
“materialization of a social reality of which they are a part and to which 
they respond.”88 Bal, in particular, emphasizes the role of the pilegesh 
within the larger social reality apparently represented in the book of 
Judges; the coherence of this book, in her view, lies not in a particular 
political chronology but in the systematic violence against women portrayed 
throughout the text.89 This perspective helps to focus on what om our 
point of view are the essential questions in chapter 19: Why a pilegesh, 
and what point do her rape and murder serve in the story? We may posit 
that it is her precariousness that makes her appropriate as a victim, again 
highlighting the use of the idea of the pilegesh as a player in a set piece.
  We may note first that the focus on the woman and her “unusualness” 
is highlighted by the use of inconsistent kinship terminology. In Judg. 
19:27 the Levite is referred to as the woman’s adon, “lord,” a term which 
might suggest a master-slave relationship. Yet up to this point he has been 
called simply her ish, “man” or “husband” (e.g., 19:3, 20:4); the relationship 
86 Pseudo-Philo also proposes a linkage of the Micah and Givah texts: the Israelites were 
punished because they overlooked the sin of Micah’s idol while allowing themselves to be 
provoked about the fate of the concubine (45:6, 46:7).
87 See, as a representative sample, Jan Fokkelman, “Structural Remarks on Judges 9 and 19,” 
in Sha’arei Talmon, 43, who argues that the chapters are a pro-monarchy polemic, with 
the phrase “there was no king in Israel” aming the narrative in its first and last verses 
(19:1 and 21:25) in order to underline the social chaos that results om the absence of 
a king; Amit, “The Story of the Pilegesh in Giveah,” 118, who sees the narrative as pro-
Davidic, serving to emphasize the ineffectiveness of the Beǌaminite Saul, who is om 
Yavesh Gilad (1Sam. 10:26), as compared to David, of the family of Boaz, who is related 
to Naomi’s husband om Bet Leḥem (Ruth 4:22); and Boling, Judges, 278, who sees the 
narrative as a postexilic exhortation to return to a united Israel and give up the antiquated 
notion of a loosely organized tribal confederation. 
88 See Mieke Bal, Death and Dissymmetry: The Politics of Coherence in the Book of Judges 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), ⒍
89 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, ⒌
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between the Levite and the woman’s father is expressed with ḥoten/ḥatan, 
“in-law” (e.g., 19:4, 5, 7, 9). The woman herself is referred to in various 
ways: with respect to the Levite, as an ishah pilegesh (a term unique to 
chapter 19, vv. 1, 27, and perhaps a contradiction in terms, if we take it 
as “consort-wife”), as simply pilegesh, or as simply ishah; with respect to 
her father, as na’arah; and by the host as an amah (19:19). The unusual 
relationship is heightened by the use of the ambiguous verb זנה ZNH in 
verse 2, sometimes translated here with reference to harlotry (e.g., KJV: 
“played the whore”), or as denoting faithlessness, particularly sexual. Rashi, 
for instance, has:
זנתה מביתו אל החוץ כל לשון זנות אינו אלא לשון יוצאת נפקת ברא 
יוצאת מבעלה לאהוב את אחרים
She went out from his house to the outside; the language of zenut is simply 
‘one who goes out,’ [i.e.,] a prostitute — she goes out from her husband to 
be a lover to others. 
The Targum to Judges has ובסרת עלוהי , “she slighted him” (Jastrow). 
 Bal has challenged, correctly I believe,90 the conventional meanings 
assigned to pilegesh as “concubine” and zonah as associated with harlotry. She 
interprets this chapter, among other narratives in Judges, as reflecting the 
tensions arising om the change between patrilocal marriage, in which the 
wife remains with her father, her natural “owner,” and virilocal marriage, 
in which the wife goes with her husband, a culturally-assigned owner.91 
Bal accepts the interpretation of pilegesh as a woman in the beena-type, 
patrilocal marriage described by Morgenstern (1929, 1931); the pilegesh in 
Judges 19 had challenged the virilocal system by leaving her husband (the 
implication of the term ZNH here)92 to return to her father, and had to 
90 In my article, “A Re-embracement of Judges 19: Challenging Public-Private Boundaries,” 
in Vixens Disturbing Vineyards: Embarrassment and Embracement of Scriptures, Festschrift 
in Honor of Harry Fox leVeit Yoreh (ed. Tzemah Yoreh et al.; Boston: Academic Studies 
Press), 53-64, I argue again that “consort” is a better translation of pilegesh and that ותזנה 
”.should be translated here as “she went away in anger עליו
91 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 5, 8⒐
92 On the question of the etymology of the biblical root ZNH, see, e.g., L. Koehler and 
W. Baumgartner, The Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament (Leiden: Brill, 
1995), s.v. זנה I and זנה II. The first root is connected both with the idea of harlotry 
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be eliminated.93 The “faithlessness” exhibited by the pilegesh would thus be 
interpreted differently by father and husband.94 
 While I do not wish to contest in detail Bal’s proposition, I think 
that her definition of pilegesh is too narrow; as Exum, among others, has 
noted, the idea of a beena-wife would not fit all biblical uses of pilegesh.95 
I do, however, agree that the vagueness of the terminology is deliberate, 
and that, as she notes, the story is structured around the tension between 
“inside” and “outside” the house.96 I suggest that Judges 19-21 again 
associates the pilegesh, the woman outside “normal” boundaries, with an 
aetiological challenge to authority (whether or not this passage represents 
an actual event). In this case there is an attempt by representatives of the 
youngest brother Beǌamin (through the men of Givah) to challenge the 
authority of the older brother Judah, now the “legal” firstborn, through 
the medium of the pilegesh of Bethlehem, a representative of Judah. Judah’s 
priority, we may note, is emphasized both at the beginning and at the end 
of this book, and the language is similar: Judah is nominated by God as 
first to the attack at the conquest (Judg. 1:1-2 and similarly nominated 
during the civil war (Judg. 20:18). 
 There is a further intra-biblical allusion to another “unusual” woman 
that reinforces the idea that the use of the pilegesh is an intentional literary 
device. Judges 19:27, quoted above, describes the action of the woman’s 
husband (now called her “lord”) aer her night of terror: ויפתח דלתות הבית 
(and he opened [vayiftaḥ] the doors of the house); these words specifically 
recall the vow of Yiaḥ in Judg. 11:31 that ultimately leads to the sacrifice 
and the idea of apostasy. The authors connect the second root with Akkadian zenû, “to 
hate,” a term found in Mesopotamian “divorce” clauses (see, e.g., CT 6 26a, ll. 9-12, as 
translated by Westbrook, Old Babylonian Marriage Law, 117). They also note, however, 
that the meaning “to be apostate” associated with the first root may be an extension 
of the meaning “to hate.” One might posit that the biblical language of zenut implies 
in general an idea of moving apart om the Deity or a person, whether the motive is 
faithlessness, hatred, or adultery. It thus need not imply the specific sin of harlotry. 
93 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 85, 92-9⒊
94 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 8⒏ Bal notes the definitions of zonah given by Koehler 
and Baumgartner as including a husband who does not live with his wife’s tribe. In the 
1995 edition of this work, however zonah is defined simply as “a woman occasionally or 
professionally committing fornication, prostitute, harlot.” 
95 J. Cheryl Exum, Fragmented Women (Valley Forge, Pa.: Trinity, 1993), 177 n. ⒔
96 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 90.
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of his daughter: 
והיה היוצא אשר יצא מדלתי ביתי לקראתי בשובי בשלום מבני עמון 
והיה לה‘ והעליתיהו עולה
...whatever comes out from the doors of my house to meet me upon my safe 
return from the Ammonites will be God’s, and I will sacrifice it as an ‘olah.
 The threshold is significant in both stories. Exum suggests that the pilegesh 
text is a castigation regarding of the dangers to an autonomous woman,97 one 
who has violated the boundaries between the domestic and the public spheres 
by leaving her husband. As Bal notes: “The boundary between inside and 
outside gives rise to ‘an almost obscene conflation of private and public. It 
brings with it all the solitude of absolute privacy with none of its safety…’”98 
Possibly the involuntary and coerced “prostitution” of the pilegesh serves as 
an ironic contrast to her autonomy and results in her being permanently 
excluded om the household, permanently on the threshold.99 The “proper” 
order is restored by allowing the taking of unmarried women. 
 We may also argue that there are a number of allusions to the incident 
of Bilhah and Reuven and the Genesis text in which it is set: the unusual 
97 Exum, Fragmented Women, 17⒐ 
98 Bal, Death and Dissymmetry, 195, quoting Elaine Scarry, The Body in Pain: The Making 
and Unmaking of the World (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985), 5⒊ Interestingly, 
it is this violation of public-private spheres that caught the attention of a later sage, as 
recorded in the following statement in bGitt. 6b: 
אמר רב חסדא לעולם אל יטיל אדם אימה יתירה בתוך ביתו שהרי פילגש בגבעה   
הטיל עליה בעלה אימה יתירה והפילה כמה רבבות מישראל  
 Rav Ḥisda said: A man should not throw excessive terror into his household, given 
[the story of ] the pilegesh in Gibeah – her husband terrorized her excessively, and 
it [or she] caused the downfall of tens of thousands of Israelites.
 I discuss this opinion further in “A Re-embracement of Judges 19: Challenging 
Public-Private Boundaries.” 
99 This association between thresholds and ambiguous status is powerfully suggested 
Margaret Atwood, The Handmaid’s Tale (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1985), a novel 
that depicts a dystopia in which young women are forced to bear children to a male elite 
whose wives are barren. The “handmaid” of the title describes her entry into an elite 
household in this way (ibid. 13): “On our first days we are permitted ont doors, but aer 
that we’re supposed to use the back. Things haven’t settled down, it’s too soon, everyone is 
unsure about our exact status. Aer a while, it will be either all ont doors or all back.”
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(non-)reactions of both Jacob and the Levite to the violence committed 
against the women; the emphasis on the twelve sons of Jacob in Genesis 
and the twelve dismembered body parts in Judges; and the juxtaposition of 
Judah (Rachel dies near Bethlehem; the pilegesh originates in Bethlehem), 
Joseph, the first of Rachel’s sons (the Levite and his host are Ephraimites) 
and Beǌamin, the second of Rachel’s sons (the murderers are Beǌaminites). 
This pattern of intra-biblical parallels, like the others noted by scholars, 
suggests the deliberate use of a motif.
 
2.5 CONCLUSION
We may conclude that the pilegesh, the “consort,” is a convenient figure 
in biblical aetiologies: illicit sexual behaviour with the pilegesh may lead to 
disaster, yet the term is sufficiently vague to allow the patriarchs to associate 
with them with no diminution of patriarchal stature. The use of the term 
pilegesh in Gen. 35:22 may thus have been an intentional insertion — to 
suggest the danger associated with the pilegesh (in this case, Reuven’s loss of 
firstborn status), but also to “soen” the suggestion that Reuven committed 
incest with his father’s wife (a concern quite evident in postbiblical sources). 
Similarly, Qeturah’s description as a pilegesh in Chronicles, though she is 
called an ishah in Genesis, may have been intended to “soen” Abraham’s 
relationship with her and thus enhance Sarah’s preeminence as Abraham’s 
only “wife.” Our results also indicate that the biblical pilegesh was also not 
conclusively associated with slavery. 
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As a source of information concerning slaves, the Pentateuch provides 
a number of conflicting laws that have served as the subject of much 
speculation concerning the historical development both of the pentateuchal 
text and of Israelite society. There is a notable disagreement in particular 
between the manumission rules of Exod. 21:2-11 and those of Deut. 
15:12-18 concerning the amah; the former pericope seems to emphasize 
her sexual function, suggesting that her role was that of either permanent 
breeder or concubine, while the latter pericope contains no such emphasis 
and in fact limits her term of service to six years. I suggest that the Exodus 
pericope is concerned with the question of competing control over a 
female and her children, a question that is also reflected in a number of 
Mesopotamian sources, but in no way suggests the automatic operation 
of a matrilineal inheritance of slavery or that the inevitable fate of the 
amah was concubinage. To support this suggestion, it is necessary to first 
assess this pericope in relation to certain of the conflicting manumission 
rules. We may then examine some of the structural and textual problems 
associated with this pericope and attempt to understand its function 
through a comparison with Mesopotamian parallels.
3.1 EXODUS 21:2-11 AND ITS RELATION 
TO OTHER MANUMISSION RULES1
Exodus 21:2-11 is one of a number of different pentateuchal rules on the 
subject of manumission of slaves. Each of the three pentateuchal “codes” 
in fact contains sections dealing with manumission. I will set out the texts 
1 Chapter five contains discussions of some of the postbiblical reactions to these rules.
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and translations in some detail here, so as to highlight some of the textual 
and philological problems:
1) Exodus 21:2-11 (E stratum) gives two apparently different rules with 
respect to the Hebrew eved and the amah. Verses 2-6 deal first with 
the male, limiting his term of service to six years unless he becomes 
attached to the household as an eved olam, called in later law the nirtza 
(i.e., one whose ear is pierced). The following pericope (vv. 7-11), 
however, specifies that the female sold by her father as an amah does 
not go out as “as the avadim do,” but must be assigned or redeemed: 
כי תקנה עבד עברי שש שנים יעבד ובשבעת יצא לחפשי חנם.  .2
אם בגפו יבא בגפו יצא אם בעל אשה הוא ויצאה אשתו עמו.  .3
אם אדניו יתן לו אשה וילדה לו בנים או בנות האשה וילדיה תהיה לאדניה (*) והוא יצא בגפו.  .4
ואם אמר יאמר העבד אהבתי את אדני את אשתי ואת בני לא אצא חפשי.  .5
והגישו אדניו אל האלהים והגישו אל הדלת או אל המזוזה ורצע אדניו את אזנו במרצע ועבדו   .6
לעלם.
וכי ימכר איש את בתו לאמה לא תצא כצאת העבדים.  .7
אם רעה בעיני אדניה אשר לא יעדה (*) והפדה לעם נכרי לא ימשל למכרה בבגדו בה.  .8
ואם לבנו ייעדנה (*) כמשפט הבנות יעשה לה.   .9
אם אחרת יקח לו שארה כסותה וענתה (*) לא יגרע.  .10
ואם שלש אלה לא יעשה לה ויצאה חנם אין כסף.  .11
Variants marked by (*)
Line 4: the Samaritan Pentateuch has לאדניו instead of לאדניה
Line 8: the qere is לו יעדה instead of לא יעדה
   :the Samaritan Pentateuch has העידה instead of יעדה
Line 9: the Samaritan Pentateuch has יעידנה instead of ייעדנה
Line 10: the Samaritan Pentateuch has וענותה instead of וענתה
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Translation 
⑵ If you purchase a Hebrew eved, he shall work for six years, and in the seventh year 
he shall go out ee with no obligation.
⑶ If he came in by himself, he shall leave by himself; if he has a wife, his wife shall 
go out with him.
⑷ If his master gave him a wife and she bore him sons or daughters, the woman and 
her children shall belong to her master, and he shall go out by himself.
⑸ If the eved shall say: ‘I love my master, my wife and my children, I shall not go 
out ee,’
⑹ his master shall bring him near the god,2 near the door or the post, and shall 
pierce his ear with a piercer, and he shall serve him forever.
⑺ If a man sells his daughter as an amah, she shall not go out as the male slaves go 
out.
⑻ If she is bad in the eyes of her master who has not assigned her [read: who has 
assigned her to him], she shall be redeemed; he is not allowed to sell her to a 
foreign nation, in trifling with her.
⑼ And if he has assigned her to his son, he shall treat her according to the law of 
daughters.
⑽ If he takes another, he shall not diminish her food, clothing, and sexual relations.
⑾  If he does not do these three things for her, she shall go out with no obligation; 
there is no money.
2) Following a discussion of murder and the talionic rule, Exod. 21:26-
27 specifies that an eved or amah must be released in the case of 
destruction of an eye or tooth:
וכי יכה איש את עין עבדו או את עין אמתו ושחתה לחפשי ישלחנו תחת עינו.  .26
2 The traditional interpretation of אל האלהים is “before the judges”; Onkelos, for instance, 
translates לקדם דיניא.
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ואם שן עבדו או שן אמתו יפיל לחפשי ישלחנו תחת שנו.  .27
Translation 
2⒍ If a man strikes the eye of his eved or the eye of his amah and puts it out, he shall 
send him ee for his eye.
2⒎ And if he knocks out the tooth of his eved or the tooth of his amah, he shall send 
him ee for his tooth.
3) The deuteronomic code, in contrast to Exodus 21, specifies a six-year 
limit of servitude for both Hebrew males and females. It also seems to 
add the possibility for the female to become an eved olam:
 Deuteronomy 15:12-18:
כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך שש שנים ובשנה השביעת תשלחנו חפשי מעמך.   .12
וכי תשלחנו חפשי מעמך לא תשלחנו ריקם.   .13
העניק תעניק לו מצאנך ומגרנך ומיקבך אשר ברכך ה‘ אלהיך תתן לו.   .14
וזכרת כי עבד היית בארץ מצרים ויפדך ה‘ אלהיך על כן אנכי מצוך את הדבר הזה היום.   .15
והיה כי יאמר אליך לא אצא מעמך כי אהבך ואת ביתך כי טוב לו עמך.   .16
ולקחת את המרצע ונתתה באזנו ובדלת והיה לך עבד עולם ואף לאמתך תעשה כן.  .17
לא יקשה בעינך בשלחך אתו חפשי מעמך כי משנה שכר שכיר עבדך שש שנים וברכך ה‘ אלהיך   .18
בכל אשר תעשה.
Translation
⑿ If your fellow Israelite, or female Israelite, is sold to you, he shall work for you six 
years, and in the seventh year you shall send him ee om you.
⒀ And when you send him ee om you, you shall not send him empty-handed.
⒁ You shall certainly furnish him om your flock, your threshing-floor and your winepress 
— om that with which the Lord your God has blessed you, you shall give him. 
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⒂ And you shall remember that you were an eved in the land of Egypt, and the Lord 
your God redeemed you; because of this I command this matter to you today.
⒃ And if he says to you: ‘I will not leave you because I love you and your house,’ 
because he fares well with you,
⒄ you shall take the piercer and put it through his ear and the door, and he shall be 
a permanent eved to you; and you shall do this even to your amah.
⒅ It shall not seem hard in your eyes when you send him ee om you, because he 
has doubled the value of a hired worker, having worked for you six years, and the 
Lord your God will bless you in all that you do.
4) Leviticus 25:39-46 (P stratum) provides yet another method of 
calculation of the slave’s term, in which the maximum term lasts until 
the Jubilee and any redemption paid is to be calculated with reference 
to this year. It also makes explicit that such a limited term applies only 
to those called aḥ (brother) (or at least to males):
וכי ימוך אחיך עמך ונמכר לך לא תעבד בו עבדת עבד.  .39
כשכיר כתושב יהיה עמך עד שנת היבל יעבד עמך.  .40
ויצא מעמך הוא ובניו עמו ושב אל משפחתו ואל אחזת אבתיו ישוב.  .41
כי עבדי הם אשר הוצאתי אתם מארץ מצרים לא ימכרו ממכרת עבד.  .42
לא תרדה בו בפרך ויראת מאלהיך.  .43
ועבדך ואמתך (*) אשר יהיו לך מאת הגוים אשר סביבתיכם מהם תקנו (*) עבד ואמה.  .44
וגם מבני התושבים הגרים עמכם מהם תקנו וממשפחתם אשר עמכם אשר הולידו (*) בארצכם   .45
והיו לכם לאחזה. 
והתנחלתם אתם לבניכם אחריכם לרשת אחזה לעלם בהם תעבדו (*) ובאחיכם בני ישראל איש   .46
באחיו לא תרדה בו בפרך. 
Samaritan Pentateuch Variants 
Line 44: ועבדיך ואמתיך in the plural instead of ועבדך ואמתך, and תקנהו in 
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the singular with a pronominal suffix instead of תקנו in the plural.
Line 45: הולדו instead of הולידו which could either be a shortened spelling 
or a change in verb pattern.
Line 46: תעבידו instead of תעבדו which changes the verb pattern to a 
Hifil.
Translation
(39) If your brother becomes poor among you and has been sold to you, do not work 
him with the work of an eved.
(40) He shall be like a hired worker, like a toshav,3 with you; he shall work with you 
until the year of the Jubilee. 
(41) And he shall go out, he and his children with him, and he shall return to his 
family, and he shall return to his ancestral holding.
(42) Because they are My avadim, whom I took out om the land of Egypt; they shall 
not be sold in the manner of an eved.
(43) Do not lord it over4 him; and you shall fear your God.
3 The meaning of this term will be discussed in chapter five.
4 The term perekh (lord it over), is oen associated with physical harshness, especially to 
describe the lot of the Hebrew slaves in Egypt, as in Exod. 1:13, ⒕ Rashi at Exod. 1:13, 
for instance, explains it as עבודה קשה ,המפרכת את הגוף ומשברתו (hard work that crushes the 
body and breaks it). In rabbinic literature, however, it has a more general psychological 
nuance, as seen in the following interpretation of the phrase in Sia BeHar parshah 6:2-3 
(Weiss, p. 109d): 
1. לא תרדה בו בפרך: שלא תאמר בו: ’החם את הכוס הזה‘ – והוא אינו צריך
2. ’הצנן לי את הכוס‘ – והוא אינו צריך,
3. ’עדור תחת הגפן עד שאבוא‘.
4. שמא תאמר: ’לצורך עצמי אני עושה,‘ 
5. והרי הדבר מסור ללב, שנא‘ ׳ויראת מאלהיך׳ וגו‘ 
6. הא כל דבר שהוא מסור ללב נאמר בו ’ויראת מאלהיך‘
 ⑴ Do not rule over him with perekh: Do not say to him, ‘Heat up this cup’ 
when it is not necessary, ⑵’Cool off this cup’ when it is not necessary, ⑶ ‘Hoe 
this vine until I return.’ ⑷ Lest you say ‘I really do need this [done],’ ⑸ the 
matter is assigned to your conscience, as it is said, You shall fear your God, etc. 
⑹ Behold it is stated about anything which is assigned to [your] conscience: 
You shall fear your God.
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(44) And your eved and your amah that you shall have — om the nations that 
surround you — om them you shall purchase eved and amah.
(45) And also om the children of the toshavim who reside with you — om them 
you shall buy, and om their families who are with them whom they sired in your 
land; and they will be a holding to you.
(46) And you shall bequeath them to your sons aer you, as an inherited holding; 
you may5 work them forever, but with your brothers, the Israelites, you shall not 
lord it over each other.
Finally, Lev. 25:47-55 reiterates the requirement to redeem an aḥ sold to a 
toshav or stranger, and provides for the method of calculating a yearly rate, like 
that of a שכיר (hired person), based on the number of years to the Jubilee.
 
3.1.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DIFFERENT 
AMAH RULES
Our interest in the biblical meaning of amah leads us in particular to the 
difference in treatment between males and females in Exod. 21:2-11 and 
the absence of this difference in Deut. 15:12-⒙ It seems to me that these 
pericopes have a major, if not primary, focus on the amah, as opposed to 
the male eved. Most significantly, Exod. 21:4 is used in midrash halakhah as 
the basis of the matrilineal principle for both slaves and gentiles (Mekhilta 
de R. Ishmael, as noted in the Introduction).
 In addition to various textual problems associated with these passages,6 
there are also several apparent conflicts in substance. Is the Deuteronomy 
provision a reinterpretation of Exod. 2:4-11?7 Scholarly assessment of the 
competing manumission rules in general, and the different treatments of 
 The essence of perekh, according to this passage, is the assigning of useless or imprecise 
work, simply for the sake of exerting one’s sense of control. 
5 This phrase was the subject of a tannaitic debate as to whether it implied an obligation or 
merely permission.
6 Many of these passages and the scholarly opinions surrounding them have been summarized 
by Chirichigno in Debt-Slavery.
7 For an analysis of Deuteronomy as containing reinterpreted layers, see Bernard Levinson, 
Deuteronomy and the Hermeneutics of Legal Innovation (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1997), 3ff.
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the amah in particular, offer no consistent approach or explanation. The 
interpretation of these rules has resolved itself into two basic trends. Certain 
scholars argue that these manumission provisions reflect a chronological 
development. It must be noted, however, that the stages of the chronology 
that each scholar proposes are dependent on the developmental model 
chosen. Some posit the relative lateness of the Leviticus provisions. Noth, 
for instance, relying on source-critical theory, accepts that the Leviticus 
Holiness Code (17:1-26:46) is to be dated to the transition between the 
pre – and postexilic cult.8 Kleiman argues specifically for the lateness of the 
slave provisions in Leviticus, using an economic model. He suggests that the 
redemption provisions of Lev. 25:47-50, in which the “income stream” is 
shortened based on the time remaining until the Jubilee year, reflect a more 
advanced economic system in which “opportunity cost” had to include a 
time variable; the redemption of the amah (פדיון) in Exod. 21:9, in contrast, 
looks more like a fixed sum, which approximates opportunity cost in a 
more stagnant, and thus possibly less developed, economy.9 Weinfeld argues 
for the lateness of the D stratum based on its more “humanistic” social 
philosophy; he in fact relies in part on the slave provisions of Deuteronomy 
15 in support of this view, suggesting that these provisions represent a 
progressive amelioration in the treatment of the slave.10 Schenker argues 
similarly that the manumission provisions of Deuteronomy 15 actually 
replaced those of Exodus 21, at least with respect to the female. In his 
view, Exod. 21:7-11 was designed to protect the male slave who desired to 
remain permanently with a mate given to him by the master by preventing 
8 Martin Noth, Leviticus, A Commentary (Old Testament Library; Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1965), 12⒏ Noth acknowledges that some of the material of which the Holiness Code is 
composed may be “quite old.” Cf. Karl Elliger, Leviticus (Handbuch zum Alten Testament 
Erste Reihe 4; Herausgegeben von O. Eissfeldt; Tübingen: Mohr, 1966), 16, who also sees 
the Holiness Code as an insert into the basic priestly writing. 
9 Ephraim Kleiman, “Opportunity Cost, Human Capital, and Some Related Economic 
Concepts in Talmudic Literature,” History of Political Economy 19 (1987): 264, 27⒎
10 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 282-8⒊ Weinfeld also suggests 
(ibid., 233) that the change in Deut. 15:17 regarding the method of creating an eved olam 
presupposes the existence of cult centralization; while Exod. 21:6 speaks of bringing the 
slave before God at one’s own door, this idea is eliminated in Deut. because the latter 
presumes the existence of an exclusive sanctuary in Jerusalem. Martin Noth, Exodus: A 
Commentary (Old Testament Library; London: SCM Press, 1962), 173-75, also argues that 
the deuteronomic provision is a more “progressive” stage in the development of the law.
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the master om selling her; Deut. 15:12 provided a simpler solution by 
allowing the female to go out aer seven years like the male.11 Finally, 
the recent analysis of Van Seters offers the controversial view that Exodus 
is actually the later work. He too relies in part on the slave provisions in 
support of his view, arguing, among other points, that the reference to 
“buying” a Hebrew slave in Exod. 21:2 implies the purchase of someone 
who was already a slave, as opposed to a debt-slave, and thus points to an 
era in which there was already commercial traffic in Hebrew slaves.12 
 A second trend of interpretation aims at reconciling at least some 
of the competing provisions (rather than regarding them as evidence of 
development) by arguing that each one reflects a different type of slavery, 
or at least a different facet of slavery. Here again, however, there is no 
consistent approach. Chirichigno13 has most recently made an extremely 
detailed study of the biblical manumission rules in which he posits that 
these rules were all part of a comprehensive social welfare scheme designed 
to restrict the permanent enslavement of Israelites and their dependants for 
debt, as well as the permanent alienation of patrimonial land. He further 
suggests that these rules could all have been operative in a very early period. 
Chirichigno, like Mendelsohn, argues that Exod. 21:2-6 and Deuteronomy 
15 both deal with a Hebrew “debt-slave,” that is, one who has been taken 
into slavery upon failure to pay a debt; Lev. 25:44, on the other hand, deals 
11 Adrian Schenker, “Affranchissement d’une esclave selon Ex 21,7-11,” Biblica 69 (1988): 
55⒌ Schenker suggests that it was at this point that the ketiv לא in Exod. 21:8 was 
amended to the qere לו. This issue will be discussed further below. Another scholar who 
accepts that Deut. was intended to provide a more liberal treatment for the amah is G. 
Vermes, Postbiblical Jewish Studies (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 69-70. 
12 John Van Seters, “The Law of the Hebrew Slave,” 540, 54⒌ He also argues (ibid., 541) that 
the piercing ritual for the permanent slave in Deut. 15:16, which refers simply to a door, 
is a private ceremony, while Exod. 21:6, with its reference to האלהים (the god), reflects 
a later, more public ceremony. This view contradicts conventional source-critical theory, 
which regards the Covenant Code as early and sees in the simplified procedure of Deut. 
15:16 a move om private to centralized cult rituals. For a critique of Van Seters’ general 
views on the lateness of Exod. with regard to cult provisions, see Heger, “The Law of the 
Hebrew Slave,” ZAW 108 (1999): 138-4⒈
13 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery; see, e.g., his summary on p. 34⒍ 
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with a Hebrew who has sold himself into slavery.14 Cardellini15 explains the 
differences between Exodus and Deuteronomy as theological, rather than 
differences in the substance of manumission.
 Given that a diachronic view of the manumission rules is very much 
dependent on the model chosen, I do not see any compelling reason to view 
Exodus and Deuteronomy as conflicting with respect to the Hebrew female. 
I argue that the Exodus pericope is addressing a particular type of problem, 
the question of competing rights to the same woman (and her children), 
whether between a master and a husband or a master and a father.
 I propose that om a functional viewpoint Exod. 21:2-11 must be read 
as a unified scheme referring to various types of family situations involving 
the eved and the amah:
⒈  A male bought as an eved is released aer six years, with no further 
obligation.
⒉  A wife who goes in with the eved is also released aer six years; a wife 
given to an eved by the master, along with her children, is not. In the 
latter case, the eved can choose to remain with her.
⒊  A female sold to a third party by her father as an amah is subject to 
various conditions:
a)  if she is not “assigned” to anyone, she must be redeemed by her 
father, and cannot be resold by the third party;
b) if she is assigned to the master’s son, she receives “the law of 
daughters”; 
c) she cannot be “constructively” sold to another by denying her her 
maintenance; if she is denied these rights, she is released, with no 
further obligation.
14 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 184-85, 351-52; Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East, 
85, 8⒐ Chirichigno in fact bases his opinion on the assumption (Chirichigno, Debt-
Slavery, 183-84) that the expression עבד עברי must mean “debt-slave,” though he offers 
no etymological or comparative grounds for this view.
15 Innocenzo Cardellini, Die biblischen “Sklaven” — Gesetze im Lichte des keilschriftlichen 
Sklavenrechts. (Bonner Biblische Beiträge 55; Bonn: Peter Hanstein, 1981), 34⒉
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 In effect, there are at least four “categories” of women referred to in 
this section:
⒤ a woman who goes into slavery with her husband, and is released with 
him;
(ii) a woman of unspecified status given to an eved by his master; she 
remains with the master, but the eved can choose to stay with her;
(iii) a woman (presumably a young woman) sold by her father as an amah, 
assigned to the master’s son; she must not be relegated in that case to 
a state of impoverishment; 
(iv) a woman sold as an amah who is not assigned; she must be allowed to 
be redeemed rather than being resold by the master.
 Underlying these verses, in my opinion, are questions regarding 
competing rights to women, with the overarching ethical concern of 
providing stability to family relationships. Concerning the rights of an 
eved versus those of his master, the text answers the question, “Who has 
rights to the eved’s wife?” A wife brought in by the eved follows him (v. 3); 
a wife given to him by the master follows the master, as do her children, 
but the eved has the option of choosing to remain with her in exchange 
for the rather overwhelming trade-off of permanent servitude (vv. 4-6). 
Concerning the rights of a father who sells his daughter and those of the 
buyer, who apparently buys her with the intention that she be “assigned,” 
the text answers the question, “Who has rights to the daughter?” If she is 
not assigned, she must be redeemed by the father, and the buyer forfeits 
all rights to her, including the right to resell her. If she is assigned to the 
buyer’s son, the “law of daughters” applies; this vague expression may imply, 
among other restrictions, that the buyer himself has no sexual rights to 
her.16 Once she has been assigned, she cannot be “constructively” removed 
in exchange for a replacement; if she is denied her appropriate rights, she 
must in effect be divorced, without her father having to redeem her.
16 Cf. the incest rules regarding daughters-in-law in Lev. 18:⒖
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 A different situation may be addressed in Deuteronomy 15; the amah 
in this case may be an adult who has sold herself, or the text may refer 
to the wife whom an eved brings with him when goes into servitude; 
according to the Deuteronomy rules, this amah, too, is to be provided with 
maintenance upon departure. With respect to the extension of permanent 
servitude to the female, Deuteronomy may address a lacuna in the Exodus 
pericope, namely, the case of an eved who has brought in his own wife but 
wants to stay permanently, a situation that does not seem to be covered in 
Exod. 21:⒊ Such an interpretation would then explain the absence in the 
Deuteronomy pericope of the words “I love my wife” as a motive for the 
eved olam remaining with the master.
 In support of this interpretation of Exod. 21:2-11, I shall look at 
various textual issues in this pericope that support the argument that it can 
be read as a unified whole. I shall then compare both Exod. 21:4 and 7-11 
to functional equivalents om various Mesopotamian sources in which 
questions of control over women and children are also reflected. 
3.2 AN ANALYSIS OF EXOD. 21:2-11
3.2.1 Is the Passage to be Read as a Unity?
As noted above, the conventional interpretation of this pericope sees verses 
2-6 and 7-11 as addressing separate situations; certain scholars maintain 
that the two pericopes may in fact derive om different eras.17 Verses 2-6 
seem a straightforward limitation of the term of a Hebrew eved to six years. 
Verses 7-11 are taken as referring to a situation in which a girl (likely a 
minor, though this is not explicit in the text) is sold by her father to a 
third party to be mated — whether to him or his son or some other male. 
The section then prohibits the buyer om selling her if he is displeased 
with her or attempting to “constructively” divorce her by withholding 
her “wifely” rights. This interpretation is based on certain assumptions 
regarding various terms used in this section. In particular, the meaning 
of the term יעד in verse 8 and the question of whether the ketiv לא or the 
qere לו in this verse is the original reading are crucial to an understanding 
17 See, e.g., Noth, Exodus, 177; Cardellini, “Sklaven,” 34⒉
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of the referents of the passage — i.e., what is to be done with the amah 
and with whom. The term יעד oen translated “assigned,” is interpreted by 
many scholars as indicating a specific type of relationship between a master 
and an amah (as opposed to, for instance, the ארש of Deut. 22:23 for the 
betrothal of a “ee” woman, or the חרף of Lev. 19:20 for the “betrothal” 
of a slave woman). It is also assumed by many scholars18 that the qere, אשר 
 who has assigned her to him), is the original reading, indicating) לו יעדה
that it is the master to whom the girl was “assigned” and suggesting that 
his deceiving of her (בגד בה) consists of finding her displeasing and wanting 
to sell her. 
 Other scholars posit a connection between the two pericopes based 
on literary analysis but view the two passages as symmetrical opposites. 
Zakovitch,19 for instance, views the two parts of Exod. 21:2-11 as examples 
of the “three-four” pattern that he identifies throughout the Bible. In this 
case, the pattern is revealed in the structure of the two pericopes. Each 
pericope consists of a main law and four sub-laws.20 The first three sub-
laws in each case follow the main law, while the fourth sub-law differs. For 
the eved, the main rule (v. 2) is that he goes out aer six years חנם, “with 
no obligation”; the situations in verses 3-4 accord with this rule, while the 
eved olam in verses 5-6 is an exception. Similarly, the main rule for the 
amah (v. 7) is that she does not go out like the eved; the cases in verses 
8-10 follow this rule, while in the case in verse 11 she goes out חנם. Thus 
the three-four pattern of the sub-rules emphasizes the exception in the 
fourth case:
בעוד ששלושת סעיפי המשנה הראשונים עולים בקנה אחד עם החוק העיקרי 
(העבד ”יצא לחפשי חנם“ והאמה ”לא תצא כצאת העבדים“), סעיף המשנה הרביעי 
חריג ואף יוצא דופן מן החוק העיקרי: העבד אומר: ”לא אצא לחפשי“ והוא עובד 
את אדוניו עבדות עולם, ואילו האמה תצא ”חנם אין כסף“.
While the three first parts of the pericope fit with the essential law (the eved 
18 As summarized by Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 247 n. ⒉
19 Zakovitch, “Literary Paradigm,” 450.
20 He also notes Cassuto’s comment that the 5+5 pattern is a deliberate reference to the 10 
laws of the decalogue (“Literary Paradigm,” 450 n. 41).
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‘goes out with no obligation’ and the amah ‘shall not go out like the avadim’), 
the fourth part of the pericope is irregular and even exceptional with respect 
to the essential law: the eved says: ‘I will not go out to freedom’ and he serves 
his master forever, while the amah ‘goes out free without money.’
 Zakovitch also suggests, based on this interpretation, that the two 
pericopes together form a chiastic structure: the main case for the eved 
corresponds to the exception for the amah and vice versa.21 
 Jackson also suggests a chiastic structure, but comprising the larger 
unit of Exod. 21:2-2⒎22 He does view 2-6 and 7-11 as related but argues 
that this occurs through a type of positional analogy: the two pericopes 
contrast the male “debt-slave,” who can be used for breeding without 
changing his status, with a female, who must have permanent status within 
the family (as an amah) before being used for breeding. In his view, this 
analogy emphasizes the difference between superficially similar cases in 
the two pericopes and thus highlights the case that is omitted: that of the 
female “debt-slave,” as she may not be used for temporary breeding.23 
 It must be noted, however, as argued by Meillassoux, that the question 
of whether female slaves are used for “breeding,” and the corollary question 
of whether “breeding” was a major source of slaves in any given period, 
are matters of debate, involving a complex underpinning of economics 
and ideology. Meillassoux posited circumstances in which it would more 
economical to have all slaves engage in production of goods that could be 
exchanged for more slaves.24 A connection between any part of Exod. 21:2-11 
and the “breeding” of slaves should therefore not be automatically assumed.
 Schenker also argues that verses 7-11, which deal with the (Hebrew) 
female sold by her father, are symmetrically opposite to verses 2-6, which 
deal with the Hebrew male: his term is limited, subject to one exception 
21 Zakovitch, “Literary Paradigm,” 45⒉
22 Jackson, “Analogy in Legal Science,” 15⒐
23 Jackson, “Analogy in Legal Science,” 162-6⒊
24 Meillassoux, Anthropologie de l’esclavage, 292-9⒊ Meillassoux argued (ibid., 302) that the 
greater the trend toward this kind of production, the greater the déféminisation of female 
slaves (and the lower the price differential between female and male slaves):
  S’il n’y a pas de préférence a priori sur l’un ou l’autre sexe, c’est que les 
  esclaves sont recherchés comme agents asexués de travail et que la
  qualité procréatrice des femmes n’entre pas en compte pour leur valeur.
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for permanent servitude; her term is permanent, subject to various types 
of redemption. Schenker prefers לא (the ketiv) in verse 8 as the original 
reading, and suggests that לו (the qere) was introduced as a result of the 
deuteronomic revisions to slave law: 
⑴ Verse 8 was designed to prevent the master om selling a female slave 
“assigned” to the eved olam of verses 5-⒍ Its purpose was to protect 
this permanent eved om losing his mate; that is, the “marital” bond 
is given precedence over the master’s rights over slaves.25 Schenker 
deduces this purpose om the wording of verse 8: it says explicitly that 
the master may allow her redemption or give her to a son if he has not 
assigned her, thus by implication he may not do so if he has assigned 
her. (One may question, however, why this would not simply be stated 
directly if this were the main intent.)
⑵ Schenker offers two arguments against the qere being the original 
reading in verse 8:
a) The situation implied by the qere — that is, a female slave mated to 
her master — would in his opinion apply to only a small proportion 
of female slaves; that is, most female slaves were not destined to be 
concubines.26 The word יעד (assigned) need not imply a permanent 
relationship, and thus the qere could apply to any female.
b) This situation would in his opinion also demand that רעה (bad), 
be interpreted in a sexual sense, and in his opinion it does not 
carry this meaning. Comparing the use of this term in Gen. 28:8 
(Isaac’s reaction to Canaanite women as potential mates for his son 
Esau), Schenker suggests a meaning of “unsuitable for marriage”; 
the term amah in this pericope would thus specifically suggest 
someone sold to be given in marriage. 
25 Schenker, “Affranchissement,” 550.
26 Schenker, “Affranchissement,” 55⒈ Contra, among others, B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman 
Law, 329, and Patai, Sex and Family, 42, who argue that the fate of most female slaves 
was to become concubines to their masters or to other “ee” men.
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⑶ As noted above, Schenker assumes that the difference between 
Exodus and Deuteronomy with respect to the treatment of the 
amah reflects a development in the law: the Deuteronomy provision, 
by allowing the female to become an eved olam, solved the problem 
of protecting the permanent slave. This would also explain why the 
choice to become an eved olam in Deuteronomy no longer includes 
the statement, “I love my wife.” At this point, the Exodus provision 
was reread with the qere form, to deal with the specific situation of 
a master who wanted to divorce a slave he had married (parallel to 
the situation of the captive woman in Deut. 21:14, but in this case 
for a Hebrew woman).27
 Chirichigno also assumes a relationship between the pericopes and (like 
Jackson) accepts the existence of a chiasmus in the larger passage consisting 
of verses 2-2⒎28 Like both Jackson and Zakovitch, he sees verses 2-6 and 
verses 7-11 as deliberately emphasizing opposing situations: verses 2-6, in 
his opinion, contemplate the sale of a (male) dependent by a debtor (not 
the sale of the debtor himself ), parallel to LH 117, and like that section 
aim at restricting the permanent enslavement of such dependants;29 verses 
7-11, in contrast, contemplate the type of transaction found elsewhere in 
the ancient Near East in which a female is adopted to be given in marriage 
and is not to be released unless this agreement is breached.30 Chirichigno 
suggests further that in this case amah is not to be given the same meaning 
here as in other biblical passages, where it denotes a chattel slave.31 
 I, too, agree that verses 2-6 and verses 7-11 are related. I do not 
agree, however, that they reflect opposite cases; rather, they are different 
permutations of issues of control. Such permutations find various 
functional parallels in Mesopotamian sources, several of which will be 
set out below.
27 Schenker, “Affranchissement,” 55⒌
28 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 19⒍
29 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 222-2⒊
30 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 24⒍ The case of a female sold for non-sexual purposes is, in 
his opinion, covered in Deut. 15:12-⒙
31 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 25⒈ 
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3.2.2 Akkadian Parallels
There are a number of cuneiform documents om various eras that 
have to do with transactions in female slaves. While a review of these 
documents is beyond the scope of this book, it may be noted that scholars 
agree that Mesopotamian evidence regarding the use of female slaves 
for “breeding,” or of the inheritance of slavery in general, is equivocal.32 
What is apparent in many of these documents, however, is a concern with 
speciing who had rights to these women, and also to their children. A 
sample of document types om different eras, to be cited below, reveals a 
functional similarity to the issues in Exod. 21:2-⒒ This is not to suggest 
a particular continuity among these documents, nor is it possible to point 
to a particular legal system as the specific origin of or influence on the 
biblical verses. Nonetheless, as functional equivalents, these parallels assist 
in illuminating specific points about the biblical provisions. 
 We may note first the “fitting-out” contracts, whereby a girl is sold, 
oen by her parents, to a third party who is to fit her out for marriage. 
In Nuzi sources these third-party arrangements are oen found within 
the so-called “adoption” contracts. Cassin lists a number of such adoption 
contracts involving the giving of girls to a third party either ⒤ ana martūti 
u kallūti (for daughtership and daughter-in-lawship) or (ii) ana aḫātūti (for 
sistership),33 all of which speci that the third party is to give the girl in 
32 For the 3rd-2nd millennium BCE, for instance, Diakonoff seems to have assumed that 
slave children would have been fathered by the master or someone on his household (I. M. 
Diakonoff, “Socio-Economic Classes in Babylonia and the Babylonian Concept of Social 
Stratification,” RAI 18 [1972]: 46; Diakonoff, “Slaves, Helots and Serfs,” 71), while Gelb 
suggested that the deliberate breeding of slaves was unlikely (I. J. Gelb, “From Slavery to 
Freedom,” 84-8⒍). Siegel’s assessment of certain Ur III documents led him to conclude 
that slavery in that period was “inherited, sometimes for as much as three generations 
aer generations” (Siegel, “Third Dynasty of Ur,” 39); yet he also noted (ibid., 42) that 
the distinction between slave and ee was not rigid, given the considerable documentary 
evidence of manumission as well as the absence of a strict class endogamy indicated by 
evidence of marriages between slaves and non-slaves. For the NB period, in Slavery in 
Babylonia, 656, Dandamaev concluded that slaves were more likely to have constituted a 
“hereditary estate” than a socioeconomic class; yet he also acknowledged that there is not 
enough evidence to determine any general rules regarding the status of offspring of slave-
ee marriages (ibid., 411). 
33 “Sistership” has various manifestations in both biblical and cuneiform sources. As just 
one example, Westbrook, Old Babylonian Marriage Law, 106, has discussed the possible 
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marriage. Cassin has divided these contracts into two types, depending on 
whom the girl is to be married to: in those characterized as in matrimonium 
servile, which use wording ⒤, the girl is given as a wife to a slave; in those 
characterized as in matrimonium coǌugale, which use both wording ⒤ and 
wording (ii), the girl is given to a non-slave.34 The two types, however, also 
share characteristics: there are specified alternatives to marriage, including 
giving the girl as a wife “at the gate”; and many of both types contain a 
clause35 prohibiting some third party om claiming the girl back om the 
buyer. Mendelsohn36 saw in this specification of alternatives a parallel to 
Exod. 21:7-11 and thus interpreted the biblical provision limiting the right 
to sell the girl as specifically reacting to the Nuzi situation. Whether Nuzi 
sources lie behind the biblical provision cannot be determined simply on 
the basis of the parallel, but one may note the similar concern in both cases 
with the fate of the girl and the powers of the third party over her. 
 Westbrook has also considered the possibility that Exod. 21:7ff 
represents the matrimonial adoption situation.37 He discusses three OB 
contracts that he regards as reflecting such a matrimonial adoption.38 In 
each case a daughter is given to a third party in exchange for a terḫatum 
(brideprice) and the exchange is expressed as some variation of ana 
meaning of “sistership” in OB marriage contracts that involve polygyny, suggesting that 
if the wives in such a case are described as “sisters,” the children of each may share in the 
dowries of both mothers.
34 E. M. Cassin, L’adoption ‘a Nuzi (Paris: Adrien Maisonneuve, 1938), 299ff. and 310ff. See, 
e.g., ibid., n. 433 (304-6), as an example of type ⒤, and Harvard Semitic Studies [=HSS] IX 
145 (312-14) as an example of type (ii). In the latter case, an amtu is the third-party buyer 
and the purchased girl may to be given to her son, who does not seem to be a slave (as the 
contract specifically forbids her to give the girl in marriage to an ardu). Cassin (ibid., 314, note 
to line 5) suggests that amtu here does not mean “slave”; but an equally plausible explanation 
of the son’s status is that the son of an amtu was not automatically considered an ardu.
35 This is usually a warranty with some form of the root BQR/PQR; this term will be 
discussed in chapter four.
36 Isaac Mendelsohn, “The Conditional Sale into Slavery of Free-Born Daughters in Nuzi 
and the Law of Ex. 21:7-11,” JAOS 55 (1935): 190, and Mendelsohn, Slavery in the 
Ancient Near East, 12-⒔ 
37 See Raymond Westbrook, Property and the Family in Biblical Law (JSOT Supplement 
Series 113; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1991), 88 n. ⒉ He notes, however, that there is an issue 
as to whether this type of adoption can exist in a system in which levirate marriage takes 
place. This issue is beyond the scope of this work.
38 Westbrook, Old Babylonian Marriage Law, 39ff. The three documents cited are CT 47 40, 
Waterman 72, and CT 33 3⒋
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martūtim u kallūtim (for daughtership and daughter-in-lawship); in one 
case it is explicitly stated that the third party is to fit the girl out and 
give her in marriage. Westbrook analyzes such documents as a hybrid 
of adoption and acquisition of a daughter-in-law; the adoption allows 
the buyer to give the girl to someone other than his son, as he would 
be required to do under a straight daughter-in-law acquisition (which 
he characterizes as a type of “inchoate” marriage, as in LH 155-56). If 
Westbrook’s analysis is correct, these contracts again reveal a concern with 
limiting where the girl is to be placed.
 Middle Assyrian Law [=MAL] A 43 is also relevant to the topic of 
control. While it deals with the case of a girl who has been betrothed 
rather than a girl sold as an antu, this passage illustrates concern with the 
respective rights of the father and the prospective father-in-law when the 
son to whom the girl was “assigned” (uddu, stated by Paul to be a cognate 
of Hebrew 39יעד) has died or disappeared. The passage sets out in great 
detail who has the right to dispose of the girl:
If... the son to whom he [the father-in-law] has assigned the wife has either 
died or disappeared, he may give her to whichever he pleases of the rest of 
his sons from the eldest to the youngest who is 10 years old. If the father is 
dead and the son to whom he assigned the wife is dead but the dead son has a 
son who is 10 years old, he shall marry her; but if the grandsons are less than 
10 years old, the girl’s father, if he pleases, shall give his daughter (to one of 
them) or, if he pleases, shall make a return (of the gifts) on equal terms... 40 
 Second, we may note that there are various references in the cuneiform 
sources to the question of ownership of the offspring of a slave and a non-
slave. Two of the law collections refer to the situation in which a male slave 
sires children; the outcomes are not consistent, suggesting that there is no 
39 Shalom Paul, “Exod. 21:10: A Threefold Maintenance Clause,” JNES 28 (1969): 48 n. ⒉ 
Paul neither agrees nor disagrees that Exod. 21:7-11 is a reflex of Nuzi contracts (ibid., 
49), but does relate some of the biblical terminology to Akkadian terms. In addition 
to the relationship between יעד and uddu, he also suggests that בגד in Exod. 21:8 is an 
“interdialectal functional equivalent” of Akkadian nabalkutu “to break an agreement” 
(ibid., 48 n. 6).
40 Translation of Martha Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor 
(Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1995), 169-70.
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underlying principle that the child follows the mother.41 LU [= Laws of 
Ur-Namma] 5 provides that if a male slave marries a “native” woman, one 
child goes into the service of the master; LH 175, in contrast, provides that 
if a warad ekallim or warad muškēnim marries a mārat awīlim, the master 
has no claim to the children. A further issue concerns the offspring of a 
slave woman and ee man and the ranking between the children of a first 
wife and those of the slave woman. Both LL [=Laws of Lipit Ishhtar] 25-
28 and LH 170-71 state that the children of the slave woman are not to be 
treated as slaves (in the latter case, the acknowledgement of these children 
by the father affects only their rights to his estate).
 The concern with the status of the offspring of such “mixed” unions is 
also reflected in various contracts. In several of the Nuzi documents of the 
in matrimonium servile type42 it is specified that the third party is to own 
any children of the marriage; in the first case the children are specifically 
described with the slave terms amtu and ardu. This express provision 
suggests that the matter was not automatic, and had to be specified. 
Similarly, Saarisalo cites one contract in which a mother buys a woman 
(who is not a slave) as a wife for a slave belonging to her son; here too the 
purchased woman’s children are described as “in the category of slaves” (ša 
ina libbi ardi u amti) and are to belong to the son.43 Westbrook notes, in 
contrast, an OB contract in which it is the children of a slave male and a 
ee female who are to belong to the slave’s master.44 
 We may note, finally, the type of contract in which a slave is eed, 
or a slave or non-slave adopted, on the express condition that he is to 
serve the master or adopter until the latter’s death. Such contracts will 
be discussed more fully in chapter five (where it is proposed that, like 
the eved olam of Exodus 21 and Deuteronomy 15, they reflect a “half 
slave, half ee” status). We may briefly note here several examples of Nuzi 
41 See also Hittite Laws 31-33, as to how the children are to be divided when one or both 
partners are slaves.
42 N. 432 (Cassin, L’adoption ‘a Nuzi, 302-4), n. 433 (ibid., 304-6).
43 NII, 120 (Aapeli Saarisalo, “New Kirkuk Documents Relating to Slaves” [Studia Orientalia 
3; Helsinki: 1934], 25). The author assumes that the wife would become a slave once she 
married a slave, but this is nowhere explicit in the text (ibid., 62).
44 Westbrook, Old Babylonian Marriage Law, 67, citing CT 48 5⒊
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contracts cited by Breneman45 in which males are “adopted” (ana marūti, 
“for sonship”). Of interest is the fact that they are to be given a wife by 
the adopter; in several of these contracts both the adopted male and the 
wife are to serve (PLḤ) the adopter until the latter’s death, and then the 
male may take his wife and children and go where he pleases.46 
 These sources, if they may be taken as a representative sample, indicate 
a concern with the disposition of women and their offspring in situations 
outside a “normal” marriage transaction conducted between the father of 
a woman and her prospective husband — cases, for instance, in which a 
female is provided for someone in service (as in Exod. 21:4-6), or in which 
a third party has contracted to give a girl in marriage (as in Exod. 21:7-11). 
It may thus be argued that this is the concern that underlies the examples 
in Exod. 21:2-⒒ Further, precise (and inconsistent) specifications in a 
variety of the cuneiform sources concerning the disposition of children in 
cases of “mixed” marriage suggest that there was no automatic assumption 
regarding the slave status of any offspring.
3.2.3 Specific Textual Issues in Exod. 21:7-11
3.2.3.A Ketiv (לא) Versus qere (לו) in Verse 8 and the Significance
   of bQiddushin 18ab
I posit that the ketiv לא is the original (and preferred) reading, as it is 
consistent with the issue addressed by the passage — that is, the question 
of who retains rights to the girl if she has not been assigned. Further, there 
seems to be talmudic evidence (bQidd. 18ab) that the qere versus ketiv issue 
was still being debated in the postbiblical period, which suggests that one 
cannot argue decisively that the qere was the original reading.
 It is to be noted, as Chirichigno47 suggests, that the majority opinion 
among scholars prefers the qere. Zakovitch, for instance, prefers the reading 
 :assigned her to him), om both a stylistic and logical point of view) לו יעדה
45 J. Mervin Breneman, “Nuzi Marriage Tablets” (Ph.D. dissertation, Brandeis University, 
1971), 215ff. He cites, for instance, HSS XIX 37, 40, 45, 39, 49, HSS V 57, Joint Expedition 
at Nuzi [=JEN] 57⒉
46 One example is HSS XIX 4⒌
47 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 247-4⒏
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⒤ this reading would parallel the wording לבנו ייעדנה (assigned her to his 
son), in verse 9; (ii) the ketiv לא יעדה (if he does not assign her), creates a 
logical difficulty: it implies that she must be redeemed if not assigned, but 
in that case, why would her relatives not simply argue that the condition in 
verse 11 applies (that is, she is being denied her maintenance rights), and 
claim her back without payment (48?(אין כסף Chirichigno49 notes, however, 
that there is also a logical problem created by the qere (though he does 
accept the qere): if verse 8 allows the master to rid himself of the woman 
he has assigned to himself (לו), why does verse 11, in contrast, seem to 
uphold her rights? Schenker, as noted above, posits a development om the 
ketiv to the qere as part of the deuteronomic revision in Deuteronomy ⒖50 
Breuer51 also argues for the qere: accepting that יעוד means “assignment” 
 he suggests that it is impossible to speak of such an assignment ,(זימון)
without designating to whom the girl is assigned. In his view, the later 
sages who accepted the ketiv were interpreting יעוד in its postbiblical sense 
as synonymous with qiddushin. Against this view, however, one might argue 
that it is possible to “assign” someone without speciing an object. Further, 
there are other reasons that the Sages might have preferred the ketiv, as will 
be argued below.
 Bavli Qidd. 18a supports the idea, first, that Exod. 21:7-11 was seen 
by the Sages as involving an issue of control, and second, that the ketiv/
qere debate had still not been resolved in the postbiblical period. The 
passage is part of a discussion regarding the manumission rules applicable 
to Hebrew females:52
הא קתני אינה נמכרת ונשנת ומני ר“ש היא דתניא מוכר אדם את בתו לאישות ושונה 
לשפחות ושונה לאישות אחר שפחות אבל לא לשפחות אחר אישות רש“א כשם שאין 
אדם מוכר את בתו לשפחות אחר אישות כך אין אדם מוכר את בתו לשפחות אחר שפחות 
ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי דתניא בבגדו בה כיון שפירש טליתו עליה שוב אין רשאי למוכרה 
דברי ר“ע ר“א אומר בבגדו בה כיון שבגד בה שוב אין רשאי למוכרה במאי קמיפלגי ר“א 
סבר יש אם למסורת ור“ע סבר יש אם למקרא ור“ש סבר יש אם למקרא ולמסורת. 
48 Zakovitch, “Literary Paradigm,” 451, 45⒉
49 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 24⒏
50 Schenker also suggests that לא is the lectio difficilior (Schenker, “Affranchissement,” 552).
51 Mordechai Breuer, “Amah Ivriah and Shifḥah Neḥerefet” [in Hebrew], Megadim 16 (1992), 2⒈ 
52 This passage will be discussed in more detail in chapter five.
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Was it not taught [in a baraita]: She can not be sold and sold again. Whose 
[opinion] is this [that a girl may not be sold into slavery more than once]? 
That of R. Shimon, as it is taught [in a baraita]: A man may sell his daughter 
into wifehood more than once, into slavery more than once, into wifehood 
after slavery, but not into slavery after wifehood. R. Shimon said: Just as a 
man may not sell his daughter into slavery after wifehood, he may not sell 
his daughter into slavery after slavery. The dispute of these tannaim is like 
another dispute of tannaim, as it is taught [in a baraita]: bevigdo bah [Exod. 
21:8] — once he has spread his talit over her he may not sell her — these 
are the words of R. Akiva. R. Eliezer says: bevigdo bah — because he trifled 
with her, he may not sell her again. On what do they dispute? R. Eliezer 
held that there is validity to the masorah, and R. Akiva held that there is 
validity to the accepted pronunciation (miqra), and R. Shimon held there 
is validity to both.
 The first part of the section discusses a tannaitic debate as to whether 
a father can sell his daughter into “slavery” (shifḥut) more than once. The 
essence of the debate between the anonymous view and that of R. Shimon 
seems to be an issue of when the father loses his right of control over the 
girl, at least with respect to selling her into slavery: only aer he has given 
her into marriage, or aer once selling her into slavery. 
 The talmudic editor then relates this dispute to another tannaitic 
debate, this one between R. Akiva and R. Eliezer, apparently regarding 
the meaning of בגד in Exod. 21:⒏ R. Akiva is said to have taken בבגדו as 
associated with ֶבֶגד (clothing): once the master has spread his talit over the 
girl (presumably to be taken in a sexual sense), the father loses his rights 
to resell the girl, as he would aer a marriage. R. Eliezer understands 
 in its usual sense of deceit:53 since the girl has been deceived once בגד
with respect to a shifḥut transaction, she cannot be sold into shifḥut again. 
The two disputes are summed up as a matter of masoret versus miqra 
(terminology that will be explained below): R. Akiva prefers the miqra 
(here associated with the reading ֶבֶגד), R. Eliezer prefers the masoret (בגד 
in its usual sense), and R. Shimon accepts both. 
53 Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 249-50, summarizes the contextual studies that have been made 
of this biblical term. Like Chirichigno, I accept that in Exod. 21:8 it refers to the breach of 
an agreement rather than the breaking of a relationship, in keeping with my interpretation 
of the pericope as a whole. 
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 I propose, however, that it is more logical to read this second debate 
as involving the issue of לא versus לו in Exod. 21:8 — that is, the miqra /
masoret issue relates to this term, and not to the term 54.בגד In other words, 
if בגד equals פרישת טלית (spreading the tallit), this would imply that the girl 
has become the master’s sexual partner in some way, in which case the qere 
 deceit), this would) בגידה equals בגד is the preferred reading. However, if לו
imply that the master has not performed his part of the bargain, in which 
case the ketiv is the preferred reading. This separate argument then became 
associated with the first debate with respect to the issue of control.
 This argument is based on two points:
1) In the maxims יש אם למסרת (there is validity to the masoret), and יש 
 there is validity to the miqra), masoret is taken to refer to) אם למקרא
the consonantal text, while miqra refers to the vocalization of the text 
as handed down by tradition. It may be argued that ֶבֶגד (clothing), the 
reading attributed to R. Akiva, fits neither of these criteria. The maxim 
would, however, be quite appropriate to the ֶבֶגד/בגידה argument if it 
referred to an underlying association with the qere/ketiv distinction /לו
 .לא
2) There is some textual instability with respect to this second debate, 
which suggests that this argument may have been amended over time. 
We may note first that the argument appears in both the Mekhilta de 
R. Yishmael, Neziqin, parshah 3 (Horovitz) and the Yerushalmi (yQidd. 
1:2 59c), but with different (or anonymous) attributions:
Mekhilta de R. Yishmael: מכילתא דרבי ישמעאל משפטים – מסכתא דנזיקין פרשה ג 
בבגדו בה. מאחר שבגד בה, נהג בה מנהג בזיון ולא נהג בה כמשפט הבנות, אף הוא אינו 
רשאי לקיימה, דברי ר‘ יונתן בן אבטלמוס; ואין בגידה אלא שקירה, שנאמר [מלאכי ב י] 
בגדה יהודה ואומר [ירמיה ה יא] כי בגוד בגדו בי בית ישראל; רבי ישמעאל אומר, באדון 
הכתוב מדבר אשר לקחה על מנת לייעד ולא ייעד, אף הוא אינו רשאי לקיימה; רבי עקיבא 
אומר, בבגדו בה, מאחר שפרש בגדו עליה.
54 I am not aware of much research concerning the relationship of the talmudic terms miqra 
and masoret with what eventually became the Masoretic qere versus ketiv; in this case, 
however, I think the issues are related. See Harry Fox, “There is a Source to the Verse” 
[in Hebrew], Sinai 116 (1995), 131-3⒌ 
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bevigdo bah: Since he trifled with her and treated her with contempt and did 
not treat her according to the law of daughters, he is not allowed to keep her 
— these are the words of R. Yonatan ben Astolmos. Begidah is simply the 
language of deceit, as it said [Mal. 2:11]: Judah has dealt treacherously, and it 
says [Jer. 5:11]: [Judah and Israel] have indeed dealt treacherously with me, etc. 
R. Ishmael says: Scripture speaks of the master, who took her on condition 
that he assign [her] and did not; he may not keep her. R. Akiva says: bevigdo 
bah — since he spread his beged over her.
 yQidd. 1:2 59c:
תני ר‘ שמעון בר יוחי כשם שאינו מוכרה לשפחות אחר אשות אף לא שפחות אחר שפחות 
מה טעמא דרשב“י בבגדו בה פעם אחת הוא בוגד בה ואינו בוגד בה פעם שניה מה מקיימין 
רבנן טעמא דר‘ שמעון בר יוחי בבגדו בה מכיון שפירש טליתו עליה עוד אין לאביה בה 
רשות
R. Shimon bar Yoḥai taught: Just as one does not sell [his daughter] into 
slavery after wifehood, [one does not sell her into] slavery after slavery. What 
is the reason of R. Shimon bar Yoḥai? bevigdo bah — he trifles with her 
once, but does not trifle with her a second time. How do the Sages interpret 
[bevigdo bah according to] the reason of R. Shimon bar Yoḥai? Since he 
spread his talit over her, her father no longer has authority over her.
 Second, we may note that Rashi at bQidd. 18a s.v. ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי 
states:
בדברי ר“ע גרסינן כיון שפירש טליתו עליה
We read in the words of R. Akiva: Because he has spread his talit over her.
This is, in fact, exactly what the printed text now reads. MS Munich 95, 
MS Oxford Opp. 248 (367)55 and MS Vatican 110-11 also support the 
reading as it stands in the current printed text, as do the Venice Edition 
and an early Spanish version.56 Rashi’s statement, however, suggests that 
55 Oxford Opp. 248 (367) changes the gender of the expression, אב למקרא and אב למסורת, 
according  to  the  Talmud  Text  Databank  of  the  Saul  Lieberman  Institute  of  Talmudic 
Research of JTS.
56 B.Bekh. 34a also associates R. Eliezer with bagad and masoret, exactly as in the extant 
version of bQidd. 18a: 
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he had a text in which the attributions were reversed: beged was associated 
with R. Eliezer and miqra, while bagad was associated with R. Akiva and 
masoret. The existence of such an alternative version is supported by two 
factors. First, the Yalqut Shimoni (remez 320 on Exod. 21) in fact contains 
a direct quote of such an alternative version:
תניא מוכר אדם את בתו לאישות ושונה לשפחות ושונה לאישות אחר שפחות אבל לא 
לשפחות אחר אישות ור‘ שמעון אומר כשם שאין אדם מוכר את בתו לשפחות אחר אישות 
כך אין אדם מוכר את בתו לשפחות אחר שפחות ובפלוגתא דהני תנאי דתניא בבגדו בה כיון 
שפירס טליתו עליה שוב אין רשאי למכרה דברי ר“א רע“א כיון שבגד בה שוב אין רשאי 
למכרה ר“א סבר יש אם למקרא ור“ע סבר יש אם למסורת ור“ש סבר יש אם למקרא ולמסורת
It was taught: A man may sell his daughter into wifehood more than once, 
into slavery more than once, into wifehood after slavery, but not into slavery 
after wifehood. R. Shimon said: Just as a man may not sell his daughter into 
slavery after wifehood, he may not sell his daughter into slavery after slavery. 
And in the dispute of these tannaim [it is like another dispute of tannaim], 
as it was taught: bevigdo bah: [Once] he has spread his talit over her he may 
not sell her again — these are the words of R. Eliezer. R. Akiva says: Because 
he trifled with her, he may not sell her again. [On what do they dispute?] 
R. Eliezer says there is validity to miqra, R. Akiva held there is validity to 
masoret, and R. Shimon held there is validity to both. [emphasis added]
 Further, while later commentators either agreed or disagreed with 
Rashi’s proposal, they did not express surprise at the fact that changes were 
proposed. Rashba, for instance, states (Ḥidushim, bQidd. 18b, s.v. דתניא):
 דתניא בבגדו בה כיון שפרס טליתו עליה שוב אינו רשאי למוכרה דברי ר“ע 
ר‘ אליעזר אומר כיון שבגד בה שוב אינו רשאי למוכרה. כך גריס רש“י ז“ל 
ור“ת ז“ל גריס איפכא כיון שפרס טליתו עליה כו‘ דברי ר‘ אליעזר ר“ע אומר כיון שבגד בה 
[As] it was taught: bevigdo bah — Once he has spread his talit over her he may 
דר‘ אליעזר סבר יש אם למקרא  רמינהי בבגדו בה כיון שפירש טליתו עליה שוב אינו רשאי   
למוכרה דברי ר“ע ר“א אומר כיון שבגד בה שוב אינו רשאי למוכרה.
 That R. Eliezer holds that there is validity to miqra. [And a baraita] is opposed to 
this: bevigda bah: once he has spread his tallit over her he is not allowed to sell her 
— [these are] the words of R. Akiva. R. Eliezer says: Once he has trifled with her he 
may not sell her again.
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not sell her again — these are the words of R. Akiva. R. Eliezer says: Because 
he trifled with her, he may not sell her again. This is how Rashi z”l reads it. 
And R. Tam z”l reads it the opposite: Once he has spread his talit over her, 
etc. — the words of R. Eliezer; R. Akiva says: Because he trifled with her. 
This seems to imply that both versions were familiar to these rishonim. 
 This alternate version may be the lectio difficilior, as it reverses the 
usual principles associated with the respective sages. This difficulty was 
noted, for instance, by Rashi (that is, masoret was usually associated with 
R. Eliezer, and miqra with R. Akiva, just as Rashi has proposed for bQidd. 
18b s.v. כיון שפירס טליתו עליה):
 דעל כרחך מיבעי ליה לאוקמי יש אם למקרא כר“ע כדאמרינן בסנהדרין בפ“ק 
ויש אם למסורת כר“א כדדייקי‘ בבכורות...
Of necessity it has to be interpreted that ‘there is validity to the miqra’ is 
according to R. Akiva, as we say in the first chapter of tractate Sanhedrin, and 
‘there is validity in the masoret’ is according to R. Eliezer, as we determine 
in tractate Bekhorot...
 As Rashba notes, the alternate version would place R. Eliezer ahead of 
R. Akiva, which would be appropriate, דר‘ אליעזר רביה דר“ע הוה (as R. Eliezer 
was the teacher of R. Akiva). It would also, however, associate R. Eliezer 
with the majority opinion that there is no slavery aer wifehood; Rashi 
suggests (bQidd. 19a, s.v. דאמר לשפחות) that this would be inappropriate, 
 because he is a Shammaite).57) משום דשמותי הוא
 J. N. Epstein58 also considered the alternate version as the original, 
citing additional references, and summarizing:
...וכך כתוב בכל הנוסחאות שלא עבר עליהן קולמוסן של מגיהי ספרים
...it is written in this way in all the versions which have not had editorial 
revisions.
57 The implication is, perhaps, that being a Shammaite he would not have preferred the 
reading that seems more lenient, according to the common assumption that Shammaites 
took the stricter view of halakhah.
58 J. N. Epstein, Introductions to Amoraic Literature [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem : Magnes, 1962), 
99 n. ⒒
-------------------------------  Chapter 3. THE AMAH OF EXODUS 21:2-11  ------------------------------
— 148 —
In his opinion, this is an example of a sugya muḥlefet, in which the opinions 
are reversed, and as such may be considered part of the pre-edited original 
source of the talmudic text.
 Finally, and most significantly, it appears that there was disagreement as 
to the workings of the particular analogy with ֶבֶגד/בגידה. The commentators 
were forced to propose somewhat far-fetched explanations. Rashi (bQidd. 
18b, s.v. למסורת), for instance, suggested that the explanation for the 
analogy was the absence of כתיב מלא (plene spelling):
בבגדו בה כתיב ולא בביגדו אין הברת חירק בלא יו“ד
It is written bivgado [with his garment] and not bevigdo [in his trifling] — 
there is no ḥiriq in a syllable without a yod.
 A different reason was suggested in Tosafot HaRosh (at bQidd. 18b):
וקצת קשה לי היכי דדייקינן שהמסורת הוא לשון בגידה מדלא כתיב בביגדו ביו“ד, אדרבה 
נידוק שהוא לשון בגד מדלא כתיב בבוגדו בוא“ו... המסורת היא לשון בגידה, דאי לשון 
פרישת טלית היה לו לכתוב ’בבגדו עליה‘
It is a bit difficult for me how we analyze that the masoret is a language of 
trifling on the basis that it is not written bevigdo with a yod, or even more 
so that it is the language of clothing, since it is not written bevogedo with a 
vav... the masoret is the language of trifling, since if it were the language of 
‘spreading a talit,’ it should have written in his spreading over her (aleha).
 It is plausible, therefore, to argue that the original argument as represented 
in the baraita in bQidd. 18ab had to do not with בגד but with the qere/ketiv 
distinction in Exod. 21:⒏ Over the course of time, this argument became 
associated with a בגד debate and with a masoret/miqra debate attributed to R. 
Akiva and R. Eliezer, necessitating various adjustments to the passage to make 
the arguments appear consistent. Given such a possibility, therefore, it cannot 
be conclusively argued that the qere לו was the original reading in verse ⒏
3.2.3.B “If He Takes Another” (אם אחרת יקח לו) in Verse 10
I argue that לו in this verse refers to the buyer’s son in verse 9, as opposed 
to the buyer himself. That is, the amah has been given to the son, and the 
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son has then taken another wife. The verb יקח (takes), may refer either to 
the son himself taking a wife, or to his father procuring for him another 
woman; the essence of the problem is that the first girl sold as an amah 
has her rights withdrawn in consequence and must then be allowed to 
go out. This interpretation would resolve the inconsistency, noted above, 
that arises in the passage if it is assumed that it is the buyer who is taking 
another woman for himself and consequently mistreating the amah: rather 
than be forced to redeem his daughter according to the situation in verse 
8 (however that is interpreted), the father of the amah might simply wait 
to argue that she has been denied the rights specified in verse 10, and she 
would then, according to v. 11, simply “go out” (ויצאה). 
 We may further argue that verse 10 is to be read as a continuation of 
verse 9, rather than as the start of a new point, by noting that the verse 
begins with אם (if ), without a coǌunctive vav. In contrast, the three major 
“remedies” provided in this section all begin with coǌunctive vav: והפדה 
(she shall be redeemed), in verse 8; ואם לבנו ייעדנה (if he assigns her to his 
son), in verse 9; ואם שלש אלה (and if these three things), in verse ⒒ Such a 
continuation suggests that the term כמשפט הבנות (according to the law of the 
daughters), in verse 9 — the precise meaning of which is unclear59 — might 
in fact be referring to this type of problem: the withdrawal of maintenance 
rights.60 Finally, it may be argued that this interpretation is consistent 
with realia: a girl forced upon the son by a father anxious to maintain this 
valuable reproductive asset in his household would be vulnerable to abuse. 
3.2.3.C “These Three Things” (שלש אלה) in Verse 11
As a consequence, I argue that this phrase refers to the three rights 
specified in verse 10, rather than the three alternatives in the entire passage 
59 In the opinion of John W. Wevers, Notes on the Greek Text of Exodus (SBL Septuagint and 
Cognate Studies Series 30; Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1990), 327, the “law” in this phrase is 
referring to the rules stated in vv. 7-⒏
60 While I do not wish to speculate in detail on the precise meaning of this term, it could also 
refer to prohibitions against incest of the type found in Lev. We may note also provisions in 
various Mesopotamian law collections concerning the sexual use by a father of a woman who 
has been designated for his son. See, for example, LH 155-5⒍
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(redemption, assignment to the son, provision of maintenance rights).61 
As argued above, the third remedy is actually the one in verse 11, with 
provision of maintenance rights being part of verse ⒐ The meaning of these 
three rights, particularly the last one,62 is not clear, but this does not affect 
the argument; om the context, they seem to refer to standard marital 
obligations.
3.3 CONCLUSION
It has been argued in this chapter that the cases addressed by Exod. 21:2-
11 find functional equivalents in cuneiform sources and concern competing 
rights of ownership of women and children in “non-standard” types of 
marriage situations, especially between slave and non-slave. Two points have 
been proposed in particular: 1) There was no commonly held assumption 
that the child of a slave woman would become a slave; rather, the status 
of the offspring of either a male or female slave, if relevant, needed to 
be expressly specified. The concern of Exod. 21:4, therefore, is not to 
express the matrilineal inheritance of slave status, but, on the contrary, 
to speci the fate of the offspring of a male slave who has not brought 
his own wife into service. 2) Exod. 21:7-11 suggest that an amah, at least 
one sold by her father, was a female placed in a dependent position and, if 
otherwise “unassigned,” given as a wife. The pericope may be compared to 
the “fitting-out” contracts that are found in cuneiform sources; the concern 
of the pericope is thus to provide for the disposition of the girl if she is 
not assigned in marriage. It cannot, therefore, be used as evidence that the 
inevitable fate of the amah was to be a concubine to her master. 
61 Contra Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 25⒊ For a summary of the different tannaitic opinions 
regarding this phrase, see David Henshke, “On the Nature of the Relationship of Targum 
Pseudo-Jonathan to Midreshe Halakha” [in Hebrew], Tarbits 68:2 (1999) 187-210, at 191-9⒎
 ,is usually taken to refer to a right to sexual intercourse. Targum Onkelos, for instance ענתה 62
translates it as עונתה and TY has מעייל לה (both terms suggesting “marital duty” according 
to Jastrow), while the LXX has ὁμιλίαν (“intercourse,” “companionship”). Paul, in contrast, 
argues that the term refers to an oil ration (Paul, “Exod. 21:10,” 52). He notes that the 
triad barley, clothing, and oil is found in maintenance clauses in cuneiform documents 
om various eras, as well as in Hos. 2:7 and Eccl.  9:7-⒏ He does not, however, explain 
the etymology of the Hebrew term.
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4.1 TREASON AND TRESPASS
A crucial biblical passage pertaining to the issue of a female slave’s marital 
status is the difficult law in Lev. 19:20-22, which describes an apparent 
sexual offense committed with a slave woman:
ואיש כי ישכב את אשה שכבת זרע והוא שפחה נחרפת לאיש והפדה לא נפדתה 
או חפשה לא נתן לה בקרת תהיה לא יומתו כי לא חפשה. 
והביא את אשמו לה‘ פתח אהל מועד איל אשם.
וכפר עליו הכהן באיל האשם לפני ה‘ על חטאתו אשר חטא ונסלח לו מחטאתו אשר חטא.
[The underlined section in the Samaritan Pentateuch reads, בקרת תהיה לו לא 
 The Samaritan text has included both the qere and the ketiv possibly .[יומת
testifying to the early existence of both readings. This directs the biqqoret 
and the avoided death sentence only to the man .
If a man has carnal relations with a woman who is a slave [shifḥah] and has been 
designated [neḥerefet] for another man, but has not been redeemed or given her 
freedom, there shall be an indemnity [biqqoret]; they shall not, however, be 
put to death, since she has not been freed. But he must bring to the entrance 
of the Tent of Meeting, as his guilt offering [asham] to the Lord, a ram of 
guilt offering. With the ram of guilt offering the priest shall make expiation 
for him before the Lord for the sin that he committed, and the sin that he 
committed will be forgiven him. (JPS translation; emphasis added).
 Because of its mention of a double death penalty, this passage on 
its surface suggests a comparison to the married woman who commits 
adultery (Deut. 22:22 — בעל בעלת   or perhaps the case of a man ,(אשה 
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who has intercourse with a betrothed virgin within a city1 (Deut. 22:23 
לאיש — מארשה  בתולה   Unlike the participants in these other .(נער[ה] 
offenses, however, the woman and the male offender in this case escape 
the death penalty, apparently because the woman is a slave. The slave 
woman is, it seems, not to be considered as partaking of the type of marital 
relationship with first the ish that would render a “ee” woman (and the 
male perpetrator) liable for death for adultery.
 Is this passage a confirmation of the mishnaic rule that marriage with 
slaves is impossible? At first glance it would appear to be strong support for this 
concept, stronger in fact than Exod. 21:4, which as we have seen is used as the 
traditional midrashic support for this element of the matrilineal principle.
 The precise implications of the passage, however, remain difficult to 
pinpoint, for a number of reasons:
a) There is no universal agreement on the meaning of the various hapaxes 
in verse 20, particularly neḥerefet and biqqoret.2 The JPS Tanakh 
translation quoted above, for instance, uses “designated,” one of the 
traditional interpretations of neḥerefet.3 Another trend of interpretation, 
however, considers neḥerefet to mean “betrothed,” based on a rabbinic 
understanding of Lev. 19:20 as referring to a woman half slave and half 
ee, and betrothed, perhaps, to another slave.4 The JPS translation of 
biqqoret as “indemnity” is based on recent scholarly opinion that this 
term is cognate with the Akkadian root BQR/PQR, which has been 
related to the idea of a property claim;5 variations of this term are 
1 Thus deemed to be consensual, as otherwise she could have cried for help.
2 As B. Schwartz notes (“A Literary Study of the Slave-Girl Pericope — Leviticus 19:20-22,” 
in Studies in Bible [Scripta Hierosolymitana 31; ed. S. Japhet; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1986], 
244, 247), the phrase חופש נתן is a hapax, the usual term for manumission (as in Exod. 
21:26-7) being לחפש שלח. Further, the use of shifḥah within the “legal” sections of the 
Pentateuch is also a hapax, the usual term being amah.
3 Onkelos, for instance, has אמה אחידא לגבר (an amah joined to a man); the LXX has οἰκέτις 
διαπεφυλαγμένη ἀνθρώπῳ (a slave kept for a man).
4 This half slave/half ee/betrothed idea, attributed to R. Akiva, is found with substantial 
variation in mKer. 2:5, tKer. 1:18, Sifra Qedoshim pereq 5:2-4, yQidd. 1:1 59a, and bKer. 
11a. The variants will be discussed in greater detail in chap. ⒍
5 See, e.g., E. A. Speiser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume 
(ed. M. Haran; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1960), 29-45, at 35-36, based primarily on the work 
of San Nicolo on OB sources. These opinions will be discussed further below.
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found in “warranty” provisions in cuneiform sale documents, including 
slave sales. This interpretation stands in contrast to the traditional 
understanding of biqqoret as either “investigation” or “lashes.”
b) The meaning and implications of the Samaritan Pentateuch variant are 
unclear though the verb is in the singular.
c) There are various structural oddities associated with the passage, 
including its casuistic form (unique in Lev. 19)6 and the jarring (at least 
to the modern eye) placement of this text in the middle of a group of 
agricultural regulations — restrictions on agricultural mixtures (כלאים 
in v. 19) and on collecting the uit of young trees (ערלה in vv. 23-25).
 I shall argue that the passage is, like Exod. 21:4-11 and Deut. 15:12 -18, 
concerned with the question of who has control over the slave woman and 
thus over any potential progeny. I propose that neḥerefet means “to be trifled 
with,” in this case, judging om the context, sexually. The implication here 
is that sexual intercourse with the first ish should have constituted a marital-
like bond between him and the shifḥah. Due, however, to the dubious nature 
of the intercourse — engaged in by the man with no intention of creating 
a permanent relationship, given the woman’s unee status and therefore 
her inability to protect herself – no such bond is created. I take neḥerefet 
to be similar to be’ulah, the term used in Deut. 22:22, but with a nuance 
of humiliation, as in unwanted sex. The term be’ulah is thus avoided here 
precisely because this woman is not to be considered a be’ulat ba’al, a woman 
with a husband. Consequently, there is no question of adultery, and neither 
the female slave nor the second ish is liable for death.
 As a consequence, therefore, this case is taken out of the realm of sexual 
crime and treated as a “trespass” in the general sense of an interference with 
a right. As a result, there is to be a claim, which I take as the meaning 
of biqqoret, by the first ish, and the second ish is to bring an asham, the 
usual sacrifice for a trespass. That is, by having carnal relations with 
another’s man’s slave who has already been used sexually, the second ish has 
challenged the first ish’s right to her, whatever that right may be. The first 
6 For a summary of the various structural issues, see, e.g., Karl Elliger, Leviticus, 24⒐
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ish is therefore entitled to a claim against him, though whether this is for 
compensation or another remedy is unspecified, and the second ish must 
bring an asham sacrifice, consistent with other cases of biblical trespass.
 Lev. 19:20 can then be translated:
If a man has carnal relations with a woman who is a slave and has [already] 
been trifled with [sexually] by a man, but has not been redeemed or given 
her freedom, it shall be a claim of trespass; they shall not, however, be put to 
death, since she has not been freed.
 When interpreted in this way, it can be argued that the verse has 
to some extent a functional similarity to the case described in Laws of 
Eshnunna [=LE] section 31, one of a series of laws in that collection 
(ss. 25-35) dealing with the establishment of rights over women and/or 
progeny.7 That section reads:
šumma awīlum amat awīlim ittaqab 1/3 mana kaspam 
išaqqal u amtum ša bēlīšama
If a man has deflowered8 the slave woman of [another] man, he
shall weigh out 1/3 manna of silver, but the slave woman is her master’s.
 Though this case deals with a woman who is a virgin and the question 
of what damages are to be paid for her loss of virginity, it does establish, 
like Lev. 19:20, that one does not acquire someone’s else’s female slave by 
intercourse, though compensation is required.
 What is the connection between the woman’s unee status and the 
absence of adultery? This is not, I propose, an indication of a biblical 
7 The various sections cover the following: section 25 — bride given to someone else; 26 — 
abduction of bride; 27-28 — marriage without consent of woman’s parents; 29 — second 
marriage of someone whose husband was abducted; 30 — second marriage of someone 
whose husband repudiated his city; 32 — price to be paid for child given for caregiving 
before it can be taken away; 33 — master’s right to slave’s child given away; 34 — master’s 
right to child of slave woman of the palace; 35 — one who adopts a child a slave woman 
of the palace gives another slave.
8 The AHW gives for naqābu in the G stem: durchbohren, deflorieren, implying that the 
slave here was a virgin. This verb seems to be cognate with the Hebrew נקב ”bore” or 
“perforate” and possibly with נקבה “female.”
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prohibition on slave-ee marriage. Rather, as suggested in the introduction, 
this is a result of the overarching dependence hierarchy in the Bible. In 
marriage, as in the relationship between God and Israel, a breach of such 
trust by the “lesser” party is treason. To restore the proper balance, both the 
wife and the adulterer must be killed.9 (Similarly, Israel’s treason against 
God invites punishment both for Israel and for the object of her idolatry.) 
The slave woman, being coerced, is incapable of such treason. (At some 
point, it is to be noted, the penalty for adultery was commuted, perhaps as 
the basis of the husband-wife relationship began to be seen as something 
founded in property law rather than a question of trust.)
 What precisely is the nature of the “crime” committed by the second 
ish in Lev. 19:20? As will be shown below, much has been written on 
the meaning of biqqoret and whether it is a type of remedy (such as an 
indemnity) or a claim for a breach of some specific type of property. One 
modern trend of thought takes it as implying the Roman idea of an actio 
in rem. I believe this question is significant: as will be argued below, it has 
implications regarding the development of property rights within a legal 
system. I shall argue that biqqoret means a claim with regard to any breach 
of one’s rightful due, however that right arises; and the crime it covers may 
be more properly called a trespass in its broadest sense. As such, biqqoret 
represents a less sophisticated concept than a claim for a specific property 
right. In the case of Lev. 19:20, I argue that the right in question is a 
vaguely proprietary right resembling ownership.
 In support of these interpretations, I shall propose that the apparently 
odd format and placement of this pericope support an emphasis on the 
issue of mixed ownership. I shall then analyze in depth the two hapaxes 
neḥerefet and biqqoret, including an assessment of Akkadian cognates and of 
postbiblical usage. Though I am arguing some functional equivalence with 
LE, I do not suggest any early borrowing om Eshnunna. In fact, there are 
indications that the passage is a late biblical text, as will be argued further 
below.
9 Finkelstein has made this argument with respect to the goring ox of Exod. 21; the ox, 
having killed a human, has upset the hierarchy and thus must be put to death to restore 
the hierarchy. Would the slave woman who murdered her master also be put to death, 
much like the petit-treason idea in English common law?
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4.2 THE ISSUE: MIXED OWNERSHIP
Scholars such as Noth and Elliger, focusing on the asham requirement in 
the pericope, deem the Lev. 19:20-22 passage to be a secondary insertion 
in the Holiness Code.10 Noth bases his conclusion on the fact that no 
particular animal is required for the asham sacrifice in this passage, 
suggesting that asham here means simply “compensation.” Noting the 
similarity to Lev. 5:15, where the penalty for an unintentional trespass 
of a sacred object (מעילה) is the monetary value of a ram as opposed to 
the animal itself, Noth argues that the Leviticus 19 passage also reflects a 
later simplification and secularization of cultic requirements.11 Elliger also 
suggests a literary dependence of verse 21 on Lev. 5:6 and ⒖ Our verse 
20, he argues, was conceived as a continuation of verse 21, rather than 
being a self-standing legal rule, and this is shown by its structure: the 
casuistic formulation in 20a and the fact that the legal consequence in 20b 
is formulated in the negative.12
 Whether or not the passage is a secondary insertion, we may note 
that Deuteronomy 22 contains a similar juxtaposition of the laws of seed 
mixtures (vineyard with another crop together), animals of different species 
working together, and mixtures of wool and linen woven together (vv. 9-11) 
with sexual offenses (vv. 14ff.), including the adultery and rape passages 
noted above. These associations suggest that the concern underlying both 
the Leviticus and Deuteronomy sections is the mixture of seed. This may 
account for the emphasis on seed in the phrase שכבת זרע  (literally: a lying 
of seed) in verse 20 (used, with respect to sexual offenses, only two other 
times, both with respect to adultery: Lev. 18:20, and Num. 5:13).
 Why, then, not include our passage in Deuteronomy 22? I would argue 
that this is again to emphasize its difference om the case of adultery. First, 
it is not unusual to find slaves treated as agricultural assets: in the biblical 
text slaves are listed with cattle (and in some cases with sons and daughters) 
10 B. Schwartz, “A Literary Study” 244 argues that it is the asham command of vv. 21-22a 
that must be the central concern of the periscope, as it is syntactically the main clause, and 
constitutes half of the fi-two words of the periscope. 
11 Noth, Leviticus, 143, 146-4⒎
12 Elliger, Leviticus, 24⒐ 
-----------------------------------  4.2 THE ISSUE: MIXED OWNERSHIP  ----------------------------------
— 157 —
as part of the patrimony of a pastoralist or farmer,13 and this vaguely 
proprietary association is found in other ancient legal systems as well.14 
This sort of connection is hinted at in Num. Rab. 10:1, which attempts to 
harmonize the disparate ideas in Leviticus 19 by positing an agricultural 
setting and drawing a moral conclusion om the word asham:
וכי תבאו אל הארץ ונטעתם כל עץ מאכל וערלתם ערלתו את פריו מה כתוב לפניה 
ואיש כי ישכב וכי מה ענין זה לזה אלא אדם שהוא הולך ומתחבר בחברו בנטיעותיו 
ומתוך שהוא נכנס ויוצא בתוך ביתו הוא נחשד על שפחתו וכשם שאדם פורש את עצמו 
מן פרות ערלה כך יהיו המקלקלים בשפחות פורשים מן הכשרים ליום הדין שאמר ר‘ יודן 
בשם ר‘ לוי אלו שהם נוהגים התר בשפחות בעולם הזה עתידים להתלות בקדקדי ראשיהם 
לעתיד לבוא שנאמר אך אלהים ימחץ ראש איביו קדקד שער מתהלך באשמיו
When you enter the land and plant any tree for food, you shall regard its fruit 
as forbidden [Lev. 19:23]. What is written before this? A man who has carnal 
relations [Lev. 19:20ff ]. What does one issue have to do with the other? [It 
refers to] one who goes and teams up with his friend [to help him with his] 
planting, and as a result of entering and leaving his house is suspected [of 
having a relationship] with [his friend’s] shifḥah. As a man separates himself 
from forbidden fruit, so those who sin with shefaḥot are separated from the 
righteous on the Day of Judgment, as R. Yudan said in the name of R. Levi: 
13 Gen. 24:35, for instance, has the following descriptions of Abraham: וה‘ ברך את אדני מאד 
 And the Lord has blessed) ויגדל ויתן לו צאן ובקר וכסף וזהב ועבדים ושפחות וגמלים וחמורים
my master greatly and he has become great and He has given to him flocks and cattle and 
silver and gold and slaves and maidservants and camels and asses). Similar lists are found 
in Gen. 12:16 and 20:14 with respect to Abraham, and 30:43 with respect to Jacob. Job is 
similarly described (1:3):
ויהי מקנהו שבעת אלפי צאן ושלשת אלפי גמלים וחמש מאות צמד בקר וחמש מאות   
אתנות ועבדה רבה מאד…
 And his property was seven thousand sheep, and three thousand camels, and five 
hundred yoke of oxen and five hundred she-asses, and a very great slave-force…
14 As one example, one may note the recommendation of Xenophon that slaves may benefit 
om the same kind of training given to animals (Xenophon’s Socratic Discourse: An 
Interpretation of the Oeconomicus [trans. C. Lord; commentary by Leo Strauss; Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1970], 56, XIII: 6), as well as the need to prevent slaves, like 
animals, om producing offspring without the master’s knowledge (ibid., 41, IX:5). We 
may also briefly note here the fact that Mesopotamian BQR/PQR warranties are found in 
particular in sale documents involving land, fixtures, slaves, and cattle. This association, 
which will be discussed further below, also recalls the Roman concept of res mancipi, 
applicable to slaves, real estate, and animals.
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Those who behave in a loose manner with shefaḥot in this world will be 
suspended by the top of their heads in the time to come, as it is said: God 
will smash the heads of His enemies, the hairy crown of him who walks about in 
his guilt [asham — Ps. 68:22].
 Certain scholars have posited that the preoccupation with mixtures, 
especially in the P stratum, is connected with a matrilineal idea. M. Weber, 
for instance, argued that this preoccupation with mixtures reflects the 
priestly struggle against mixed marriages detailed in Ezra and Neḥemiah, 
while S. Cohen argues that these laws of prohibited mixtures provided an 
ideological context for the later development of the matrilineal principle by 
postbiblical sages.15 
 It is my contention, however, that the specific emphasis of Lev. 19:20-
22 goes beyond simply a desire to avoid mixtures of seed. It is the ownership 
of any progeny that might result om such mixture with which this section 
is concerned. This question arises (as it does in the case of adultery and 
the similar case in LE 31), because there are two apparent “owners” of the 
shifḥah. This concern would also explain the asham requirement, as the case 
is treated as one of trespass rather than as adultery. If the phrase biqqoret 
tihyeh is taken to mean “it will be a claim” (as I shall argue below), the 
structure of verse 20 can be characterized as a tripartite diagnosis pattern, 
found elsewhere in the P stratum. As Yaron16 explains, this pattern consists 
of: a) a protasis in casuistic form, describing the situation (“if X…”); b) a 
diagnostic phrase, characterizing the situation (“she is guilty,” or, as in this 
case, “it will be a claim”); c) an apodosis, giving the consequences (here, 
“he will bring an asham”). Perhaps not coincidentally, another example of 
this pattern may be found in the asham provision of Num. 5:6-7, which 
specifies the action to be taken in the case of trespass. Like Lev. 19:20, 
this section also begins with the איש כי (if X…) formula:
דבר אל בני ישראל 
15 Max Weber, Ancient Judaism (trans. H. Gerth and D. Martindale; New York: Free 
Press, 1952), 350; S. Cohen, The Beginnings of Jewishness, 300. For a summary of other 
scholarly opinions on the biblical preoccupation with mixtures, see S. Cohen, The 
Beginnings of Jewishness, 30⒈
16 Reuven Yaron, Introduction to the Law of the Aramaic Papyri (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 
110-⒒
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1) איש או אשה כי יעשו מכל חטאת האדם למעל מעל בה‘ 
2) ואשמה הנפש ההוא 
3)  והתודו את חטאתם אשר עשו והשיב את אשמו בראשו
וחמישתו יסף עליו ונתן לאשר אשם לו
Speak to the Israelites:
[a] When a man or a woman commits any sin toward a fellow man, thus 
breaking faith with the Lord,
[b] that person will be guilty;17
[c] they [JPS = he] shall confess the wrong that they have [JPS = he has] 
done; he shall make restitution in the principal amount, and add one-
fifth to it, giving it to him whom he has wronged.
 The situation in Lev. 19:20 can thus be characterized as a claim of 
trespass by the first ish as against the second, who has challenged his right to 
the slave, the appropriate consequence being (as in Num. 5:6-7) an asham.
4.3 THE RELATIONSHIP: 
THE MEANING OF NEḤEREFET LA-ISH
4.3.1 Prior Opinions
 Though the form neḥerefet is considered a hapax, the root ḤRP does 
exist in the Bible. Most dictionaries identi at least two homonyms: 
ḤRP II, meaning “to spend the winter,” and ḤRP I (with its associated 
noun ḥerpah) connected in both the Qal and the Pi’el with the idea of 
slandering, insulting, and abasing. Even-Shoshan is definite in assigning 
neḥerefet to an unspecified third root; Mandelkern (s.v. חרפ I) suggests a 
connection between neḥerefet (as well as certain other instances of ḤRP I) 
17 The JPS translation has “and that person realizes his guilt.” The verb אשמה, according to 
Mandelkern, is a 3rd f.s. perfect; together with the vav inverso, I think it may be translated 
as above.
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and an Arabic root meaning “to sell,” proposing for neḥerefet the meaning 
 ,partnered). Ben-Ḥayim similarly looks to a Semitic cognate) משתפת
suggesting a connection with the Ge’ez PḤR (despite the inversion of 
letters), meaning a prenuptial covenant or promise. He notes that this root 
is also used for the Ge’ez translation of the biblical ארש (betrothed).18
 It must be acknowledged, however, that these scholarly assessments 
have been influenced by the traditional ideas of neḥerefet as “betrothed” or 
“assigned,” and that these ideas in turn are derived solely om the presumed 
analogy with Deut. 22:22 or 2⒊ The assumption is that the slave woman 
must be in some sort of relationship with a male (given the apparent parallel 
to the Deuteronomy provisions19), but her slave status prevents her om 
being “fully” married (a position supported in later law by mQidd. 3:12); 
hence a description for this lesser relationship had to be found.
 The idea that neḥerefet means “assigned,” found in some of the 
Targumim and the LXX, may have been suggested by a comparison with 
the pidyon and ḥofesh terminology in Exod. 21:7-11 and an assumption 
that the slave woman אשר לא יעדה (who was not assigned) in that passage 
must be the slave woman referred to in Lev. 19:⒛20 The origin of the 
“betrothal” idea21 is less clear, although there is a tradition discussed in 
bQidd. 6a that seems to associate the idea with a Judean custom:
איבעיא להו חרופתי מהו ת“ש דתניא האומר חרופתי מקודשת שכן ביהודה 
קורין לארוסה חרופה ויהודה הויא רובא דעלמא ה“ק האומר חרופתי מקודשת 
שנאמר והיא שפחה נחרפת לאיש ועוד ביהודה קורין לארוסה חרופה ועוד לקרא 
אלא ה“ק האומר חרופה ביהודה מקודשת שכן ביהודה קורין לארוסה חרופה
18 Ze’ev Ben-Ḥayim, “And She is a Shifḥa Neḥerefet to Man (Leviticus 19:20)” [in Hebrew], 
Leshonenu 7 (1935): 36⒋
19 In Shmuel Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh” [in Hebrew], Shenaton 4 (1980):94, 
Loewenstamm argues:
והרי אין טעם להבדיל אלא בין מקרים דומים בלבד, משמע שגם כאן נמצא יחס של אישות.  
 There is no reason to distinguish except between similar situations, meaning 
that here also is a relationship of marriage.
20 This is Ibn Ezra’s view on Lev. 19:⒛ Against this idea must be noted the fact that 
neither the Targumim nor the LXX use the same word to translate neḥerefet in Lev. 
19:20 and ye’adah in Exod. 21:8, apparently seeing no connection between them.
21 As reflected in the rabbinic sources listed in n. 4 above.
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It was asked [of the sages]: [Regarding the specific wording by which a 
man may indicate to a woman that she is betrothed to him,] What about 
[‘You are] my ḥarufah? Come and hear, as it was taught [in a baraita]: If 
one says [‘You are] my ḥarufah,’ she is betrothed, because in Judah they 
call a betrothed woman a ḥarufah. And is Judah the majority of the world? 
[No, therefore] this is the way it should be stated: If one says [‘You are] my 
ḥarufah,’ she is betrothed, as it is stated [in Lev. 19:20]: And she is a slave 
woman neḥerefet to a man, and also, in Judah they call a betrothed woman a 
ḥarufah. And [do we need the confirmation of Judean custom] in addition to 
a biblical statement? [No;] rather this is the way it should be stated: If one 
says in Judah [‘You are] my ḥarufah,’ she is betrothed, because in Judah they 
call a betrothed woman a ḥarufah. [emphasis added] 
 It is not clear, however, whether this custom was the origin of the 
betrothal idea or a later development. The betrothal idea may also underlie 
the Samaritan Pentateuch variant יומת לא  לו  תהיה   there shall be a) בקרת 
biqqoret for him; he shall not be put to death). The emphasis on “he shall 
not be put to death,” rather than the MT’s “they shall not be put to death,” 
suggests a parallel with Deut. 22:25-27, non-consensual intercourse with 
the betrothed virgin, where only the male is liable for death. Targums 
Onkelos and Yonatan for Lev. 19:20 may be interpreted as being familiar 
with both the “betrothed” and “assigned” traditions. TO has: אמא  והיא 
לגבר  אמתא :and she is a maidservant assigned to a man). TY has) אחידא 
.(a maidservant and eed woman betrothed to a man) וחרתא מתארסא לגבר
 The “betrothal” idea had a following among later commentators,22 
although no explanation is given as to why neḥerefet would have been 
preferred to the biblical ארש. Certain modern scholars attempt to address 
this issue by suggesting that the term neḥerefet is reserved for the special 
22 Maimonides, Hil. Issurei Biyah 3:13 has שפחה חרופה האמורה בתורה היא שחציה שפחה וחציה 
-The shifḥah neḥerefet mentioned in the Torah is she who is half) בת חורין ומקדשת לעבד עברי
slave and half-ee betrothed to a Hebrew slave). He explains the nature of this relationship 
at Hil. Ishut 4:16: המקדש אשה שחציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין אינה מקודשת קידושין גמורין עד 
 One who betroths a woman who is half slave and half ee: she is not betrothed) שתשתחרר
in full betrothal until she shall be eed). Rashi on Lev. 19:20 equates the “assigned” and 
“betrothed” traditions: חורין בת  וחציה  שפחה  חציה  כנענית  לאיש…ובשפחה  ומיוחדת   מיועדת 
…who is designated [meyu’edet] and betrothed [meyuḥedet] to a man) המאורסת לעבד עברי
[refers] to a Canaanite slave woman who is half ee betrothed to a Hebrew slave). The 
KJV translation at Lev. 19:20 simply has “betrothed.”
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condition of a slave betrothed to someone other than her owner,23 or for 
a type of inchoate betrothal where the transfer of the slave to her new 
“purchaser” is not yet complete.24 Other scholars simply accept one or the 
other (or both) of the traditional meanings.25
 R. Westbrook, in contrast, sought a resolution to this issue by going 
outside the traditional meanings, and argued that the term is a Nifal of 
 taking the latter in its sense of “to pledge.”26 He thus proposes that ,ערב
this is a case of a wife (taking ishah here as “wife” rather than “woman”) 
who has been pledged to a creditor by her husband to pay off a debt. While 
in the creditor’s household, she has been sexually abused by him (reading 
MT le-ish as la-ish, i.e, that man). Her husband may then claim her back 
(Westbrook’s translation of biqqoret, as will be explained below) without 
paying off the rest of his debt, though without this being a case of adultery. 
His translation would thus be, “If a man has sexual intercourse with a 
married woman, she being a slave pledged to the man…” There is some 
support for the meaning “pledged” in the Targumim: Neofiti translates 
 ,(a maidservant pledged to a man) אמתא משעבדה לגבר as שפחה נחרפת לאיש
and לשעבד can be equivalent to להשכן (to pledge) (Jastrow, s.v. ,עבד Shafel), 
while MS A of the Samaritan Targum has סולה מרהנה לגבר, with רהן again 
23 Schwartz, “A Literary Study,” 24⒍  
24 Neufeld, Ancient Hebrew Marriage Laws, 165; Noth, Leviticus, 142-4⒊ Neufeld argued 
(perhaps influenced by the rabbinic characterization of Lev. 19:20 as involving a woman 
half slave, half ee) that Lev. 19:20 is “qualified” adultery, involving a shifḥah who has been 
sold for marriage or concubinage but for whom the full purchase price has not been paid; 
thus the purchaser has not yet fully redeemed her and the seller has not yet set her ee.
25 Ben-Ḥayim, “Shifḥah Neḥerefet,” 365, followed by Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 94, 
argued in favor of “designated” or at least that “betrothed” should not be taken in its later 
technical legal sense as an element of marriage. Other scholars simply accept “betrothal” 
(see, e.g., Elliger, Leviticus, 249; Gordon Hugenberger, Marriage as a Covenant: A Study 
of Biblical Law and Ethics Governing Marriage Developed from the Perspective of Malachi. 
[VT Supp. 52; Leiden: Brill, 1994], 287-88), or equate “betrothal” with “designated” (see, 
e.g., Even-Shoshan, s.v. חרפ; and Milgrom, “The Betrothed Slave-Girl, Lev. 19 20-22,” 
ZAW 89 [1977]: 43-50, at 43 n. 1).
26 Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 10⒍ Westbrook explains the derivation of 
neḥerefet om arav by arguing for the “known” interchange of ayin with ḥet and bet with 
peh. He further supports his argument by suggesting a functional similarity between Lev. 
19:20 and the category of pledge cases found elsewhere in the Near Eastern Codes (for 
instance, LH sections 115-19), which include situations in which the pledged person is 
iǌured or killed while in the creditor’s control. Westbrook’s arguments will be further 
examined below.
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meaning “to pledge” (Jastrow, s.v. רהן, Hifil). Yet the proposed interchange 
om נערב to נחרף is unclear. In the rare use of the passive idea of “to be 
pledged (or made surety)” (as in Gen. 43:9), a construction with the Qal 
form is used.27 Further, there is no suggestion that shifḥah here refers 
specifically to a debt-slave.28
 While I do not agree with Westbrook’s proposed explanation, I do 
agree that the resolution of this hapax is to be found outside the traditional 
meanings, and specifically within the range of meanings already associated 
with the biblical ḤRP I. A brief review of the biblical occurrences of this 
root follows.
4.3.2 The Semantic Range of the Biblical ḤRP I
 An inductive/contextual survey of this term throughout the Bible 
reveals a general idea of dishonoring someone by failing to give them their 
due or expected status, in both Qal and Pi’el, and regardless of the relative 
dating of the various sources in which it occurs. Based on the parallelism 
in Proverbs 14:31, the presumed opposite of לחרף is לכבד, “to honor”:
עשק דל חרף עשהו, ומכבדו חנן אביון
He who withholds what is due to the poor affronts [ḤRP] his Maker, he who 
shows pity for the needy honors Him. [JPS translation, emphasis added]
 Terms complementing this verb include דראון קלון,   and most לגדף, 
significantly לגדל על, suggesting that through someone else’s aggrandizement 
one’s own status is diminished (Zeph. 2:10; Ps. 55:13; Job 19:5). This 
sense would fit with many, if not all, of the occurrences of ḤRP I, notably 
Isaiah’s accusation against Sennaḥerib concerning his insult to the Deity – 
 ,Whom have you blasphemed and reviled…) (2Kings 19:22) את מי חרפת וגדפת
Isa. 37:23, emphasis added), though the word is not always or necessarily 
27 Gen. 43:9 has: אנכי אערבנו (I [Judah] will be surety for him [Beǌamin]).
28 Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East, 55 similarly assumed that Lev. 19:20 
referred to a betrothed woman who had been pledged as a debt slave and that the right to 
sexually use a female slave was commonly assumed in the ancient Near East, but gave no 
explanation for his derivations.
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used with someone of high status. In several instances the reduction in 
status implied by this word is a matter requiring payback: om Naval, for 
refusing food to David’s troops (1Sam. 25:39); om Ephraim, for looking 
to Egypt and Assyria instead of seeking divine aid (Hos. 12:15). The idea 
of an affront to one’s status as a matter requiring compensation is found 
elsewhere in the ancient Near East.29
 Looking now to the noun ḥerpah as a lowering of status, it is significant 
that a woman’s ḥerpah is oen connected to uncontrolled or unproductive 
sexuality. The metaphorical description of Babylon as a female slave (one 
of the few explicit connections of ḤRP with slavery) associates the slave’s 
ḥerpah with her nakedness (Isa. 47:3). Other instances of a woman’s ḥerpah 
include 2Sam. 13:13, where the term is associated with a non-virgin in a 
state of non-marriage (the raped woman, Tamar, who cannot look to her 
half-brother the rapist for marriage); Isa. 54:4, where it is associated with 
a widow; Isa. 4:1, where it is associated with a single woman; and Gen. 
30:23, where it is associated with childlessness.
 Rachel’s statement in the latter verse aer the birth of Joseph — אסף 
 God has taken away my ḥerpah) — does not convey an idea) ה‘ את חרפתי
of “reproach” (the KJV translation, following the LXX30) or “shame,” but 
suggests that she had been replaced in Jacob’s esteem by her sister and the 
two slave women, since they had given birth to sons.31
 Though the principal meaning of biblical Nifal is considered to be 
29 The Akkadian law collections mention in particular the offense of slapping another’s 
cheek as a matter requiring compensation (LE 42, LH 202-5); in LH the penalty varies 
according to the degree of inequality of status between the offender and the victim. The 
offense of cheek-slapping is also mentioned in the Hebrew Bible and New Testament 
[=NT]. In Lam. 3:30 it is specifically associated with ḥerpah:
יתן למכהו לחי ישבע בחרפה
 [With respect to the advantage of bearing insult while maintaining one’s faith:] 
Let him offer his cheek to the smiter; let him be surfeited with mockery.
30 The LXX uses the form of ὄνειδος, “blame” or “reproach” (Liddell and Scott).
31 Perhaps a similar connection with improper male sexuality is reflected in the association 
of ḤRP I with the state of being uncircumcised. Thus the Israelites’ uncircumcised state 
in Egypt is described as ḥerpah (Josh. 5:9); Goliath, accused repeatedly of dishonoring 
Israel (with variations of ḤRP I: 1Sam. 17:10, 26, 36, 45), is called by David הערל הפלשתי 
 that uncircumcised Philistine – vv. 26, 36); the giving of Dina to the uncircumcised) הזה
Shekhem is called ḥerpah by her brothers (Gen. 34:14); the word of God is described as 
ḥerpah to those with “uncircumcised ears” Jer. 6:10). 
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reflexive, the binyan can also serve as the passive for both Qal and Pi’el.32 
It is interesting to note that in postbiblical Hebrew only the Qal passive 
participle form ḥarufah is apparent, oen used as a substantive (in only one 
instance, bQidd. 6a, with respect to betrothal terminology, is it associated 
with anyone other than the slave woman of Lev. 19).33 Of particular interest 
in this respect is the biblical word yeḥeraf in Job 27:6:
בצדקתי החזקתי ולא ארפה לא ירחף לבבי מימי
 A recent article by Joösten suggests that yeḥeraf here is a Qal middle 
(or stative) form, rather than a Qal active imperfect, given the qametz as 
the second vowel rather than the expected ḥolem.34 The verse would thus 
carry a more passive meaning, which we propose to translate:
I held fast to my righteousness, and will not let go; my heart will not be 
dishonored /moved from its place all my life.
 This sense appears to be confirmed by the Targum to Job. Stec’s critical 
edition gives the following as the primary variant for 27:6, using the the 
verb 35;חסד according to Jastrow this verb is to be taken in a passive sense 
as “to be put to shame”:36
בזכותי תקיפית לא אשבקנה
לא יחסד לבביי מן יומיי
32 Paul Joüon, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew (2 vols.; trans. and rev. by T. Muraoka; Subsidia 
Biblica 14/I, II; Rome: Pontificio Instituto Biblico, 1996), 1:150-5⒈
33 See, e.g., mZev. 5:5; tKer. 1:16, 19; 4:5; Sia Qedoshim pereq 5:10 (Weiss 89d); Sia Dibura 
DeḤovah pereq 21:7 (Weiss 27c); yQidd. 1:1 59a; yYev. 6:1 7b; yNaz. 8:1 57a; bShabb. 72a, 
bYev. 55ab, bGitt. 43a, bZevah. 48a, 54b, bKer. 11a, 12b, 25b. M. Moreshet, Lexicon of the 
New Verbs in Middle Hebrew [in Hebrew] (Ramat Gan: Tel Aviv University, 1981) does 
not indicate ḤRP I in his list of new tannaitic verbs, suggesting that ḥarufah is not a new 
form.
34 Jan Joösten, “The Function of the Semitic D Stem: Biblical Hebrew Materials for a 
Comparative-Historical Approach,” Orientalia 67 (1998): 202-31, at 2⒓
35 Other MSS, identified by D. Stec, The Text of the Targum of Job: An Introduction and 
Critical Edition (Studies in the History and Culture of the Ancient Near East 14; Leiden: 
Brill, 1998), as belonging to a Spanish/North Aican family, have יהרהר (Jastrow: “to 
entertain impure thoughts”).
36 The verb חסד is used, for instance, in the Targum to Pss 40:15 and 71:24, to translate MT 
.(to be ashamed) חפר
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I held firmly to my merit, I will not let go,
My heart will never be put to shame.
 Joösten goes on to suggest that Qal middle forms may have been 
replaced by other stems, particularly the Nifal in Hebrew; that is, though 
the Nifal is defined as primarily a reflexive form, it could also express 
a meaning closer to a Qal middle.37 The Nifal neḥerefet of Lev. 19:20 
could then be related to the yeḥeraf of Job, in the sense of “dishonored,” 
depending, of course, on the relative date of this passage.38 It is of interest 
to note that the later commentator Maimonides did in fact connect the 
neḥerefet of Leviticus with the yeḥeraf of Job; he related both terms, 
however, to an Arabic cognate meaning “to turn away,” and was constrained 
to interpret Lev. 19:20 accordingly:
And in the same way this meaning [of לב as indicating a deficiency of opinion] 
is to be found in the dictum My heart shall not turn away so long as I live, the 
meaning of which is: my opinion shall not turn away from, and shall not let 
go of, this matter. For the beginning of this passage reads: My righteousness I 
hold fast and will not let it go; My heart shall not turn away so long as I live. In 
my opinion, it is with reference to this meaning of yeḥeraf that the expression 
shiphḥah neḥerefet le-ish is to be explained, [the term neḥerefet] being akin to 
an Arabic word, namely munḥarifa’ [turned away] — that is, one who turns 
from being possessed as a slave to being possessed as a wife.39
4.3.3 A Possible Akkadian Cognate
 Levine has raised the possibility that the biblical neḥerefet is related 
to the Akkadian verb, ḫarāpu. This verb is translated as fruh werden, “to 
be early” (AHW s.v. ḫarāpu I, CAD s.v. ḫarāpu A); Levine makes the 
37 Joösten, “Semitic D Stem,” 22⒏
38 The dating of Job is a matter of issue; Pope, for instance, argues that while the final 
redaction might be dated to the 3rd century B.C.E., the Dialogue portion may have 
antecedents going back to the 7th century (Marvin H. Pope, Job [Anchor Bible 15; Garden 
City: Doubleday, 1965], xxxvi-xxxvii).
39 Maimonides, The Guide of the Perplexed (trans. S. Pines), Part I, chapter 39, 8⒏ The 
translator, Pines (ibid., 88 nn. 13, 16, 18), though accepting that the Arabic inḥarafa 
(meaning “to turn away,” “to deviate”) was cognate with the yeḥeraf of Job, nonetheless 
preferred the traditional “shall not reproach” for the translation of this verse.
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connection with the biblical term by translating neḥerefet as “assigned in 
advance” and positing that it is therefore outside the usual meaning of 
biblical ḤRP as “to blaspheme” or “to slander.”40 I think it is possible 
to accept that the Hebrew and Akkadian terms are cognate without the 
necessity of accepting either of Levine’s propositions. In the following 
instances, taken om Neo-Assyrian [=NA] and Late Babylonian [=LB] 
sources, one may argue that the sense of the Akkadian ḫarāpu I is not 
simply to be early, or first, but to act in another’s place, and by extension 
to take (or attempt to take) precedence over someone:
a) Assyrian  and Babylonian Letters [= ABL] 3 (K 492; SAA 10, 191); 
NA, 672-669 B.C.), a letter om Adad šumu-uṣur to Essarhaddon 




Let us make these slaves go first [i.e., in place of the prince] and give them 
to drink...
b) ABL 1164 (British Museum – Signature Budge) [=BU] 89-4-26,6; 
Rituels Accadiens p. 113); Seleucid era letter found at Uruk regarding 
the akitu festival of Ishtar of Arbella; the statue of the deity is being 
returned to Arbella om Melkia, and a question is addressed to the 
king as to the appropriate protocol:
2. Ištar ultu Melkia
3. taḫarrupu pān šarri terrab
4. idati šarru errab
5. ulâ šarru errab
6. idati Ištar terrab
Should Ishtar go first out of Melkia, enter before the king, and the king at 
her side, or should the king enter with Ishtar at his side
40 Baruch Levine, Leviticus (JPS Torah Commentary; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication 
Society, 1989), 130.
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3) ABL 311 (K 630, SAA 5, 199); NA, letter to Sargon II om Šarru-
emuranni, quoting the king’s accusation of a breach of protocol:
5. mā attā taḫarrupu
6. tunammeše mā ina pān bēl pāḫāti
7. ša Arrapḫa lā tadgul
...you are precipitate, you set out; you did not wait upon the governor of 
Arrapḫa [i.e., he should have gone first, and you have usurped his position]
 We may thus posit that this nuance of the Akkadian term is quite 
similar to the biblical ḤRP I (including the term neḥerefet) in the sense of 
usurping or denying someone’s status.41
4.3.4 Proposed Meaning of neḥerefet la-ish
 I maintain that Lev. 19:20, rather than referring to a woman connected 
with a man in some legally recognized relationship such assignment, 
betrothal, or marriage, in fact refers to the opposite: a woman humbled 
sexually by a man and thus degraded as not being in any legally reputable 
relationship. The question is: Does this type of relationship carry with 
it the same prohibitions against incest as the other relationships do? It 
is interesting to note that there is some precedent in the rabbinic sources 
specifically connecting neḥerefet to sexuality. One may note, first, the 
explanation given by Aquilas for neḥerefet in yQidd. 1:1 59a:42
דאמר ר‘ יוסי בשם ר‘ יוחנן תרגם עקילס הגר לפני רבי עקיבה והיא שפחה נחרפת לאיש 
בכתושה לפני איש כמה דאת אמר ותשטח עליו הרפות אמר ר‘ חייה בשם ר‘ יוחנן כן 
פירשה ר‘ לעזר בי רבי שמעון לפני חכמים והיא שפחה נחרפת לאיש בכתושה לפני איש 
כמה דתימר בתוך הריפות בעלי
41 Levine himself (ibid.) argues for this sense in a biblical instance, Judg. 5:18, translating 
”.there as “his soul precipitously exposed itself to death חרף נפשו למות
42 Saul Lieberman, Greek in Jewish Palestine (New York: JTSA, 1965), 19, suggests that 
this is one of only two occasions when Aquilas does not translate into Greek. This 
perhaps indicates that the meaning was unclear even to Aquilas, and he thus tried to 
use a Hebrew metaphor rather than a precise Greek equivalent.
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As R. Yose said in the name of R. Yoḥanan: Aquilas the proselyte translated 
before R. Akiva: And she is a shifḥah neḥerefet... — ground before a man, as you 
say: ...and scattered groats [i.e., grains] on top of it... [2Sam. 17:19, with respect to 
the woman who disguised the well]. R. Ḥiyya said in the name of R. Yoḥanan: 
R. Lazar of the house of R. Shimon explained before the sages: And she is a 
shifḥah neḥerefet to a man — ground before a man, as you say: [Though you pound 
the fool in a mortar] with a pestle along with the grain… [Prov. 27:22].
 The word כתושה “crushing” or “pounding” (Jastrow), seems to be a 
euphemism here for sexual intercourse, with the later sages attempting 
to explain this derivation of Aquilas in a somewhat forced manner by 
associating neḥerefet with harifot, “small grains” (i.e., material that has been 
ground with a pestle). A similar derivation is found in bKer. 11a:
א“ר יצחק לעולם אינו חייב אלא על שפחה בעולה בלבד שנאמר והיא שפחה נחרפת לאיש 
ומאי משמע דהאי נחרפת לישנא דשנויי הוא דכתיב ותשטח עליו הריפות...
R. Isaac said: He is never liable except for a shifḥah with whom he has had 
intercourse, as it is said: and she is a shifḥah neḥerefet le-ish. What is the 
meaning of this neḥerefet? It is language [implying] a change [in condition], 
as it is written [2Sam. 17:19]: …and scattered groats on top of it.
 Both Naḥmanides and Ibn Ezra also looked to other instances of ḤRP for 
elucidation, each detecting in Lev. 19:20 a sexually vague sort of status for the 
woman. Ibn Ezra associated neḥerefet directly with the noun ḥerpah. He stated 
that this woman is definitely the Hebrew slave of Exod. 21:7, assigned to a 
master or his son, and her ḥerpah consisted in the fact that her status was in 
limbo; true betrothal would not take place until she was eed or redeemed:
ומלה נחרפת...לפי דעתי שהמלה מגזרת חרפה בעבור היותה שפחה
והיא בתולה ברשות אחר ואינה מאורשה
[Concerning] neḥerefet... in my opinion the word is derived from ḥerpah, 
on account of her being a slave: she is a virgin in the control of another but 
not betrothed.
 Naḥmanides conversely assumed this was a serving woman in a ee 
relationship with her master. He derived neḥerefet om ḥoref (winter), 
arguing:
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...והנראה אלי כי הוא מלשון כאשר הייתי בימי חרפי בימי נעורי וכן לא יחרף לבבי מימי 
שלא יהיה לי לב נער ויקראו ימי הנעורים ימי חורף כי החרף בראשית השנים... 
יאמר הכתוב שהיא שפחה נערה לאיש ידוע כי הפלגש אשר היא משרת את האיש וישכב 
עמה תקרא נערה לו כי גם כל משרת האדם יקרא נערו ומורגל בלשון חכמים לאמר על 
השוכבת עם האיש משמשת עמו...מנסיפדה בלע“ז וכן בלשון חכמים דקרו לה רביתא 
דפלניא והענין שאינה אשתו לגמרי אבל נתן לה קדושין והיא לו לנערה משמשת
It seems to me that this is from the language in When I was in the days of my 
ḥoref [Job 29:4] — the days of my boyhood; also My heart will never yeḥeraf 
[Job 27:6] — that I will not have the heart of a boy. And they call boyhood 
the days of ḥoref [winter], because winter is at year’s beginning... Scripture 
is saying that she is a shifḥah, a man’s ‘girl’ (na’arah). It is known that the 
pilegesh who serves a man and whom he lies with is called his ‘girl,’ just as 
a male who serves a man is called his ‘boy.’ And it is usual in the language 
of the Sages to describe a woman who lies with a man as ‘servicing’ him... 
mancipada in the vernacular,43 and also in the language of the sages, who 
called her ‘the girl of so-and-so.’ The key is that she is not fully his wife, 
though he has given her qiddushin and she is a girl who ‘services’ him.
 Ben Ḥayim, though noting the talmudic precedents, rejected any 
association of neḥerefet with the language of be’ilah, apparently because he 
objected to the attempts of modern commentators to derive this association 
om an Arabic cognate meaning “to pick” or “to pluck.”44 Considering this 
association too vague, he also suggested that the preposition in the phrase 
le-ish would be inappropriate with the idea of niv’elet. One may argue 
43 The meaning of this word is unclear. One may note, however, the word mançeba in 
medieval Spanish, meaning “female servant,” “concubine,” “young girl,” indicating a 
blending of various concepts: R.S. Boggs et al., Tentative Dictionary of Medieval Spanish (2 
vols.; Chapel Hill, N.C., 1946), s.v. mançeba.
44 Ben-Ḥayim, “Shifḥah Neḥerefet,” 363, 36⒋ One may note, however, a similar association of 
intercourse with the idea of “plucking” in Gen. Rab. 45:⒉ Commenting on the reference 
to Hagar in Gen. 16:1 as the shifḥah of Sarai, the Midrash states:
שפחת מלוג היתה והיה חייב במזונותיה ולא היה רשאי למכרה בעון קומי ריש לקיש מהו   
דתנא עבדי מלוג אמר להון כמה דתימא מלוג מלוג
 She was a shifḥah who was [part of the wife’s property in which the husband 
had] a usuuct (melog); [the husband] was obliged to maintain her but could 
not sell her. They asked before Resh Laqish: What was taught [about] melog 
slaves? He said to them: What is plucked is plucked [om the root מלג, ‘to 
pluck’; that is, the husband had a right to ‘use’ such slaves, including sexually, 
but was not obligated for such use].
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against this, however, that the biblical range of ḤRP does directly suggest 
a sexually inappropriate status, without the need to find the support of a 
cognate; the preposition le – would then carry the meaning of “before” — 
i.e., “humiliated” or “humbled” before a man.45
4.4 THE OUTCOME: 
THE PHRASE BIQQORET TIHYEH
The precise nature of the remedy for a vaguely proprietary crime is also of 
interest in connection with the more general question of the development 
of “true” property rights in a legal system. Essential to such rights is the 
ability to transfer the property completely out of one person’s control 
and into another’s; essential to that idea is a transferee’s ability to claim 
his or her right to the property against the entire world. Specifically, the 
transferee may trace the property beyond the immediate transferor so as 
to ensure there will be no trouble om previous owners. And key to that 
ability is the development of a certain type of warranty, in which the 
transferor warrants to the transferee that there will be no claim against 
the property by some third party (such as a previous owner); if such a 
claim is made, the transferor warrants it will in some way guarantee the 
transferor’s right against the world at large — for instance, by ensuring 
that the claimant will come to court to argue his or her right against the 
new transferee. It is this kind of warranty that many scholars claim to lie 
behind the PQR/BQR warranties, and, by extension, the word biqqoret. 
 There is, however, a remedy of compensation for iǌury as between two 
people, X and Y, where one has iǌured the other. The iǌury need not 
necessarily be a claim against property; it may be a physical iǌury, or an 
interference with someone’s status relationship (for instance, X claims that 
Y’s slave is not really his slave), or a trespass on property in the modern 
sense (X interferes with Y’s use of his property without actually claiming 
the property is his). The claim here is relevant only between X and Y.
It is this kind of warranty that is assumed to lie behind the PQR/BQR 
warranties in Akkadian slave sales. 
45 It may also be noted that l – can be taken as indicating agency with a passive form, 
translated as “by.” See, e.g., Gesenius 121f, though it is argued in Joüon/Muraoka, A 
Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 2:483-84, that this use of l – is probably inequent.
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4.4.1 Prior Opinions
There are two main trends of interpretation of this phrase, as Loewenstamm 
notes, among the traditional translations and commentaries. One tradition 
accepts a straightforward connection with biblical Hebrew levaqqer in 
the general sense of “to look into,” “to examine” (Mandelkern: diligenter 
inspicere, animum advertere), and translates biqqoret as “inquiry.” Thus the 
LXX has ἐπισκοπὴ ἔσται αὐτοῖς (there shall be an inspection to them46), 
an idea reflected in certain modern translations.47 A second tradition, 
prevalent among the Aramaic Targumim48 and tannaitic opinion, associated 
biqqoret with an idea of punishment; yet within this tradition there is no 
consistency as to who is to be punished or how. Targum Neofiti suggests 
that both the man and woman were punished, with מרדו אנון חייבין (they 
are subject to chastisement49). Tannaitic opinion, in contrast, specified that 
the woman alone was to be flogged:
ומה בין השפחה לבין כל העריות ...כל העריות אחד האיש ואחד האשה שוין במכות ובקרבן 
ובשפחה לא השוה את האיש לאשה במכות ולא את האשה לאיש בקרבן
What is the difference between the shifḥah [of Lev. 19:20] and all the other 
sexual sins [such as incest]? ...In the case of the other sexual sins the man 
and the woman are equal with respect to flogging and sacrifice, but in the 
case of the shifḥah the man is not treated equally to the woman with respect 
to flogging, and the woman is not treated equally to the man with respect to 
the sacrifice. (mKer. 2:4)50
Pseudo-Jonathan covers both trends with פישפוש יהוי בדינא למלקי היא מחייבא 
(there shall be an inquiry in law; she is subject to lashes). The Vulgate 
46 Certain manuscripts have αὐτῶν (of them”) or αὐτῇ (of her); a later version has ὄνειδος 
ἔσται αυτᾣ (there shall be blame to him), which the editor suggests is comparable to the 
Samaritan Targum version⒮ at Lev. 19:⒛
47 The older JPS translation, for instance, has “inquisition.”
48 The term בקורתא used by Onkelos appears to be a hapax in that Targum, and thus its 
meaning is unclear. The Samaritan Targum MS A translates the term as בגנו, possibly 
equivalent to ערוה; this concept is central to the discussion of this verse in Sifra Qedoshim, 
to be discussed in chapter six.
49 Jastrow s.v. מרדותא ,מרדו. 
50 This Mishnah reflects one version of a unit that also appears in tKer. and Sifra Qedoshim 
with substantial variations, and these will be analyzed in more detail in chapter six.
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assumed flogging, but for both: vapulabunt ambo (they shall be flogged 
together). The punishment of the female slave was widely accepted among 
later commentators and translations.51 As Loewenstamm notes, however,52 
the linguistic association of biqqoret with the idea of punishment is 
extremely difficult, though there were attempts to explain the association 
by a play on words; several such (not particularly convincing) attempts are 
summarized in Midrash Leqaḥ Tov to Lev. 19:20 (ed. Rom):
בקרת תהיה מלמד שהיא לוקה יכול אף הוא ילקה ת“ל תהיה. היא לוקה והוא אינו לוקה. 
ד“א בקרת תהיה (ב‘ קראי) [בקראי] תהא דתנו רבנן במסכת מכות גדול שבדיינין קורא 
והשני מכה והשלישי אומר הכהו. מאי קורא אם לא תשמור לעשות את כל דברי התורה 
הזאת וגו‘. אמרי לה בקורת ברצועות של בקר כדתנן ורצועה של עגל בידו כפולה אחת 
לשתים ושתים לארבעה ושתי רצועות עולות ויורדות בה
biqqoret tihyeh: This [phrase] teaches that she is whipped. Perhaps he should 
also be whipped? The text has she shall [the verb in 3 f.s.]; [thus] she is 
whipped, and he is not. Another matter: [Read the phrase biqoret tihyeh as] 
‘It shall be with reading,’ as it was taught in Tractate Makkot [with respect 
to the procedure for whipping]: ‘The highest ranking judge reads out, the 
second does the whipping, and the third says: ‘He has hit him.’ What does 
he read? If you do not take care to keep all the matters of this Torah, etc.’ 
[Deut. 28:58; additional verses are set out in mMak. 3:14]. Some say biqqoret 
[means] with straps of cow[hide] [i.e., apparently deriving biqqoret from 
baqar (cattle)], as it was taught in a Mishnah [mMak. 3:12, regarding the 
whip to be used]: ‘And a strap of calf[skin] is in his hand, folded into two 
and then into four, and two straps run up and down it....’53
51 Rashi, for instance, at Lev. 19:20, s.v. בקרת תהיה, has היא לוקה ולא הוא (She is flogged and 
he is not). Maimonides specifies (Hil. Issurei Biyah 3:14):
ביאת שפחה זו משנה מכל ביאות אסורות שבתורה ,שהרי היא לוקה...והוא חיב קרבן אשם   
 The intercourse of this slave woman differs om all other forbidden acts of 
intercourse in the Torah for she is flogged… and he is liable for a guilt offering. 
 The KJV to Lev. 19:20 translates “she shall be scourged.”
52 Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 9⒎
53 Another possible derivation of the idea of punishment is suggested by Mandelkern’s 
translation of biqqoret (among other meanings) as animadversio. This noun is translated 
generally as ‘notice’ but particularly ‘unfavourable notice,’ and by extension ‘blame,’ 
‘punishment’ (The Pocket Oxford Latin Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 
A similar extension of the idea of ‘inspection’ to a concept of ‘punishment’ may also have 
existed in biblical Hebrew. I shall argue, however, that biqqoret is more closely connected 
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 A third possibility associates biqqoret with an issue of ownership. This 
idea seems to have first been raised by Naḥmanides, who related biqqoret 
to the idea of hefqer/hevqer, usually translated, “ownerless property.” In his 
explanation of biqqoret tihyeh, Naḥmanides wrote:
ואני סבור שהיא מילה יחידית בכתוב אבל היא מורגלת בלשון ארמית ובדברי רבותינו 
מלשון הפקר... ופירוש הפסוק הזה שאמר בשפחה הזאת אע“פ שהיא נחרפת לאיש, לא 
תהיה לו לאשה כי בקרת תהיה לו, כלומר מופקרת תחשב אצלו...
I think that though this is a unique word in Scripture, it is common in 
Aramaic and in the works of our sages, from the language of hefqer ... and the 
interpretation of this verse is that [Scripture] said about this slave woman that 
even though she is ‘servicing’ a man, she is not to be considered his wife, but a 
biqqoret for him — that is, she is deemed ownerless property with respect to 
him [and thus available to all, so there is no question of adultery].
 In so relating biqqoret to an idea of property, Naḥmanides coincidentally 
anticipated a modern line of research which associates both biqqoret and 
the postbiblical hefqer/hevqer with the Akkadian root BQR/PQR. The latter 
root has among its meanings (AHW s.v. baqāru) vindizieren, in essence, to 
assert a claim in property. Various modern scholars, particularly E. A. 
Speiser, have accepted this association, based particularly on the work of 
M. San Nicolo.54 Some of the modern biblical interpretations (such as the 
JPS version quoted at the beginning of the chapter) have followed Speiser’s 
line of reasoning, translating biqqoret as “indemnity.”55
 There is no agreement, however, as to precisely what San Nicolo’s 
research revealed and its applicability to the Hebrew biqqoret, and the 
various debates have become rather complex. As will be summarized in 
more detail below, Speiser’s interpretation of San Nicolo has been rejected 
by such scholars as Loewenstamm and Westbrook, yet the question of the 
association of the Akkadian and Hebrew terms has not been resolved.
 I shall argue that biqqoret in Lev. 19:20 does mean “claim” in the 
to the idea of “claim,” and it is equally possible that the idea of “inspection” or “inquiry” 
may itself be an extension of that concept.
54 Speiser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” 35-3⒍ For a summary of scholarly opinions on 
the Akkadian connection, see Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 94-95; Schwartz, “A 
Literary Study,” 250 n. 36; and Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 102-⒊
55 As noted by Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 10⒌
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general sense of a challenge to someone else’s ownership, whether or not 
in the form of a specifically legal demand. In support of this argument I 
posit the following: a) there are in fact several biblical instances of BQR 
meaning “claim”; b) the Hebrew biqqoret is cognate with Akkadian BQR/
PQR forms, found particularly in warranty clauses;56 and c) contrary to 
the assertion of Loewenstamm,57 there is evidence in postbiblical Hebrew 
of the use of the root BQR/PQR as a legal term in the sense of “claim,” 
particularly in the expressions iggeret biqqoret and hefqer/hevqer. These 
points will now be argued in more detail.
4.4.2 Biblical Instances of BQR as “Claim for Trespass”
 Within the passage in question, it should first be noted that the 
meaning “claim” fits the requirement of an asham offering in Lev. 19:20 
— that is, an offering brought to expiate a trespass, in this case a challenge 
to the ownership of another’s slave woman.58 This meaning also fits well 
within the diagnostic pattern of verse 20, as I have argued above.
 Further, contrary to Schwartz’s contention that there are no other 
biblical occurrences of forms of BQR/PQR for which a meaning of “claim” 
56 These are provisions oen found in sale contracts (or other transactions) involving land, 
fixtures and slaves, in which the seller agrees to protect the buyer (in various ways) should 
the sale be attacked. These will be discussed more fully below.
57 Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 96, n. ⒔
58 For a summary of the nature of the asham, see, e.g., Jacob Milgrom, Cult and Conscience: 
The Asham and the Priestly Doctrine of Repentance (Studies in Judaism in Late Antiquity 
18; Leiden: Brill, 1976), 12⒌ One must note here Milgrom’s proposition (ibid., 124-25) 
that there are two categories of asham: inadvertent trespass against sacred objects (the cases 
enumerated in Lev. 5:14-16 and 17-19) and trespass against the Lord’s name through 
the making of a false oath (the cases enumerated in Lev. 5:20-26 and its variant in Num. 
5:6-8). For the case of Lev. 19:20-22, he suggests that the oath that has been breached 
is the adultery prohibition of the Sinaitic covenant, to which every Israelite had sworn 
allegiance (Milgrom, “The Betrothed Slave-girl,” 48-49). While it is beyond the scope of 
the study to investigate the detailed nature of the asham, I disagree with the opinion that 
the false oath is the single principle underlying the non-sacred trespass cases in Lev. 5:20-
25/Num. 5:6-8; this latter proposition of Milgrom is in part based on reading the phrase 
 ,in Lev. 5:22 as applicable to all the cases of non-sacred trespass (Milgrom ונשבע על שקר
Cult and Conscience, 100-101), which seems too broad a reading. Therefore I do not agree 
that a false oath needs to underlie the Lev. 19:20-22 passage in order to explain the asham 
requirement.
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would be appropriate,59 we may note several instances in which a claim 
idea does in fact suit the context. Mandelkern in his concordance cites 
eight other biblical occurrences of forms of BQR, all, it may be noted, 
in supposedly later works.60 Ezekiel 34:11-12 contains in particular three 
attestations of the term that may be translated “claim”:
כי כה אמר אדני ה‘: הנני אני ודרשתי את צאני ובקרתים. כבקרת רעה עדרו ביום היותו בתוך 
ענן  ביום  שם  נפצו  אשר  המקומות  מכל  אתהם  והצלתי  צאני  את  אבקר  כן  נפרשות,  צאנו 
וארפל. 
Behold thus says the Lord God: I shall demand my sheep and claim them. 
Like the claim of a shepherd over his flock when he is among his scattered 
sheep,61 so I will claim my sheep and I will rescue them from all the places to 
which they were dispersed on the day of cloud and dust [emphasis added].
 The contextual fit provides a strong argument for the meaning “claim” 
in this case, particularly given that the following verse 13 starts with 
 ,And I will take them out); the passage describes, in other words) והוצאתים
the actions of a shepherd in retrieving parts of his flock that have become 
intermingled with others. There are, in addition, two other suggestive 
points. In verse 11 the term ובקרתים can be seen as a complement to 
 I shall demand).62 The term DRŠ, likeBQR, can have the sense) ודרשתי
of visiting or investigating, but can also have a more “urgent” sense of 
demanding or requiring (Mandelkern, s.v. דרש: poscere63). The Targum 
59 Schwartz, “A Literary Study,” 250.
60 Lev. 13:36 and 27:33, 2Kings 16:15, Ezek. 34:11-12 (3x), Ps. 27:4, and Prov. 20:2⒌
61 In Moshe Greenberg, Ezekiel 21-37 (Anchor Bible 22A; Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 
1997), 699-700, Greenberg considers this reading “strained” and suggests instead “when 
there are among his flock some [animals that have got] separated.” This reading seems 
to be supported by the Targum to Ezekiel which has:
ביומא דהוי עניה ומפריש להון
 On the day that there was one [among] his flock and separated om them.  
 One may argue, however, that the implication is the same in both readings: the flock, or 
part of it, has become dispersed, requiring the shepherd to go and physically retrieve the 
sheep.
62 Greenberg, Ezekiel, 699-700, suggests that the pair drš-bqr in this verse is a deliberate 
variation of the pair drš-bqš in verse ⒍
63 This sense may be taken, for instance, in Gen. 42:22:
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for Ezekiel in fact translates ודרשתי here as ואתבע, which can have the 
meaning “claim” (Jastrow, s.v. תבע). One may argue for a similar extension 
of meaning for BQR. The second point relates to the noun biqqoret, part 
of the long construct chain at the beginning of verse ⒓ This form is 
taken by Mandelkern as the construct form of a noun biqqrah, and like 
the biqqoret of Lev. 19:20 it is a biblical hapax.64 One may posit that these 
nouns are synonyms, or at least related in meaning, both perhaps related to 
the Pi’el of BQR, similar to the pattern observed with the nouns yabbashah 
and yabbeshet, both of which mean “dry land.”65
 One may also note 2Kings 16:15, Aḥaz’ instructions to Uriah regarding 
the altars of the First Temple. The first part of this verse is as follows:
ויצוהו המלך אחז את אוריה הכהן לאמר על המזבח הגדול הקטר את עלת הבקר ואת 
מנחת הערב ואת עלת המלך ואת מנחתו ואת עלת כל עם הארץ ומנחתם ונסכיהם וכל דם 
זבח עליו תזרק...
And King Aḥaz commanded the priest Uriah: On the great altar you shall offer 
the morning burnt offering, and the evening meal offering, and the king’s burnt 
offering and his meal offering, with the burnt offerings of all the people of the 
land, their meal offerings, and their libations. And against it you shall dash the 
blood of all the burnt offerings and all the blood of the sacrifices…
 The last clause of this verse then provides: ומזבח הנחשת יהיה לי לבקר, 
which the JPS translates as “And I will decide about the bronze altar,” 
noting that the meaning of the Hebrew is unclear. Heger argues that the 
verse implies that while Aḥaz had formulated a new and elaborate sacrificial 
ויען ראובן אתם לאמר הלוא אמרתי אליכם לאמר אל תחטאו בילד ולא שמעתם וגם דמו הנה נדרש
 And Reuven answered them saying: Did I not say to you saying, ‘Do not sin against 
the child’? And you did not heed [them — the words], and behold, his blood is 
demanded.
64 Further, there are no instances of this noun (that I can detect) in tannaitic sources.
65 While Mandelkern does not specifically associate yabbeshet with yabbashah (or with any 
other verbal root), Gesenius does (Kautzsch, Gesenius’ Hebrew Grammar section 84b b), 
deriving both om the Pi’el of YBŠ. Joüon/Muraoka also give the two words as synonyms, 
including them within the group of nouns with doubled second consonants and two short 
vowels (Joüon, A Grammar of Biblical Hebrew, 1:252, s. 88a). The latter group, as they 
state, tend to have as feminine fours qattalah or qattelet. If baqqarah and biqqoret fall under 
this pattern, the vocalization of the latter would have to be explained.
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ritual to go along with the new altar he had built which gave a greater role 
to the priests, he reserved the right to minister by himself at the older 
bronze altar.66 The last clause in the verse may thus mean: “The bronze 
altar is mine to claim [i.e., it is still my right to worship there].”
4.4.3 BQR/PQR as “Claim” in Akkadian Sources
Scholarly discussion of the association of the Hebrew biqqoret with the 
Akkadian BQR/PQR centers around M. San Nicolo’s research of the 
Akkadian forms in his 1922 work on the Schlussklauseln of OB contracts 
(i.e., the end sections, which are taken to be the operative sections). His 
research is understood to have concluded that the Akkadian terms connote 
the idea of the Roman actio in rem — that is, claim for the return of an 
item based on a particular type of “property right.”67 I shall argue that the 
use of this technical Roman term has been misleading, and that Akkadian 
BQR/PQR forms can be translated to simply mean “claim.” Positing a more 
general sense for the Akkadian BQR/PQR not tied to a particular type of 
claim makes it easier to assert a connection with the biblical biqqoret, without 
having to devise (as R. Westbrook has done) a specific scenario appropriate 
to an actio in rem concept. A brief review both of the scholarly discussions 
and of various instances of BQR/PQR will illustrate this proposal.
4.4.3.A San Nicolo’s Study of BQR in Old Babylonian Sources
The verb baqāru (AHW s.v. baqāru), is found throughout Babylonian as well 
as in OA sources. From MB onward, the form is mainly paqāru. There are 
two categories of meaning given for the G stem (with appropriate variations 
of meaning in Gt, S, D and N): a more general meaning of anfechten, “to 
dispute,” and a more specific meaning of vindizieren – that is, to assert a 
claim of an item which is currently in the possession of another party, 
claiming that one’s own right to the item is superior.68 The second meaning 
66 Paul Heger, Three Biblical Altar Laws, 272, n. 1⒑
67 For detailed explanations of these terms see below, n. 8⒉
68 This is something like the English law concept of replevin, a claim made by one whose 
chattels are wrongfully removed. There are related noun forms with corresponding 
meanings; however, no feminine forms are given. Thus, following the AHW definitions, 
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is associated particularly with the use of BQR/PQR in sale documents and 
similar transactions, usually involving land, buildings, fixtures, and large 
animals, as well as slaves; such documents, particularly om the OB, NB 
and LB periods, oen contain a BQR/PQR warranty. In essence, these 
warranties provide that the buyer will be protected in some way if a BQR/
PQR claim arises in the slave or other “object.” The term is also found in 
“process” documents, which record proceedings before judges.
 Earlier discussions of BQR/ PQR forms in warranties sought to give 
much more narrow interpretations to these forms, oen by analogy to 
modern legal remedies. Thus it was proposed that BQR/PQR in a warranty 
meant a redhibitory action by the buyer, who might seek to annul the 
sale and have his money returned on the grounds that there was some 
flaw in the sale or sold item.69 Cassin’s translation of PQR forms in Nuzi 
documents uses revendication,70 which in its strict legal sense implies an 
action by an unpaid seller to reclaim possession of the sold goods until 
paid. These narrower meanings have been specifically rejected.71 The ana 
ittišu lists, in contrast, appear to assign a very wide meaning to baqāru; it 
is given as the Akkadian equivalent of INIM.GÁ.GÁ, along with ragāmu, 
which has the very general sense of “claim.”72
 The specific meaning of vindizieren received a detailed analysis and 
support in San Nicolo’s work, in which he surveyed the use of BQR both 
in OB documents and in the LH. He noted, first, that this material seems 
to include not only claims of (unpaid) vendors but also those of third 
parties (that is, persons other than the buyer and seller in a particular 
transaction).73 Second, he suggested that BQR as a verb always has as direct 
the claim itself, der Vindikation, is expressed by baqrū (MB and NB paqrū), as well as by 
the infinitive paqāru in NB. (The Nuzi form, according to the AHW, can also be pirqu, 
which is attributed to a metathesis). The claimant, der Vindikant, is expressed by a form 
derived om the participle, baqirānum (MB onward paqirānu, Nuzi also pariqānu), and 
also occasionally by the participle itself pāqiru (MB, Nuzi).
69 J. Oppert, “Une femme gardienne de son mari,” ZA 3 (1888): 2⒈
70 See e.g., Cassin, L’adoption ‘a Nuzi, 30⒈
71 See, e.g. Paul Koschaker, Babylonsich-Assyrisches Burgschaftsrecht (Leipzig: Teubner, 1911), 
176 n. 8; Guillaume Cardascia, Les archives des Murasu, une famille d’hommes d’affaires 
babyloniens a l’epoque perse (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1951), 147 n. ⒊
72 Materials for the Sumerian Lexicon [= MSL], 1, 80, ⒙
73 M. San Nicolo, Die Schlussklauseln der altbabylonische Kauf — und Tauschvertrage 
(Munich: Oskar Beck, 1922), 160.
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object a particular item, such as a field or slave (as opposed, for instance, 
to the more general claim term ragāmu, which might apply also to a claim 
against a person).74 Finally, he argued that all the surveyed occurrences of 
BQR are found together with some dingliche (“real”) right of such vendor 
or third party — that is, a claim of some sort on the particular item that is 
the object of the transaction.75 This right is oen not named expressly in 
the document, but is to be deduced om the context. Such property rights 
would include, for instance, Cassin’s idea of the right of an unpaid vendor 
to take back the goods conveyed and hold them until he received payment, 
as well as pre-emptive rights (Naherechte) on the part of a vendor’s heirs 
(for instance, the right to contest a sale of items which would form part of 
their ultimate inheritance).
 As examples of the types of “real” rights that might form the basis for a 
BQR claim, San Nicolo classified the various forms of BQR that are found 
in the LH, which may be summarized as follows:76
 Section 279: a warranty applicable to the sale of slaves, providing that 
the seller is to “answer” for a BQR claim in the slave: 
šumma awīlum wardam amtam išāmma baqrī irtaši nādinānšu baqrī ippal.
 Section 118, the sale of a pledged slave by a creditor cannot be 
challenged (ul ibbaqqar); according to San Nicolo this assumes the 
right of a (perhaps unfairly) foreclosed debtor to assert his ownership 
right in the slave.
 Section 150, a wife’s bequest of her husband’s estate where there is a 
written document cannot be challenged by her sons (ul ibaqqarūši); and 
 Section 179, a bequest by an entum, nadītum, or zikrum cannot be 
challenged by her brothers (ul ibaqqarūši). According to San Nicolo, 
these sections reflect underlying Naherechte on the part of the woman’s 
sons or brothers, which would allow these heirs to contest the disposal 
74 San Nicolo, Die Schlussklauseln, 17⒋
75 San Nicolo, Die Schlussklauseln, 15⒍
76 San Nicolo, Die Schlussklauseln, 156-5⒎
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of her husband’s or father’s estate.
 Section 185 (a child adopted by an awilum); 
 Section 187 (a child of a girsiqûm, muzzaz ekallim or zikrum); and 
 Section 188 (a child adopted by a mār ummānim), each with the 
prohibition ul ibbaqqar, assume the right of some third party, perhaps 
the natural parent, to claim the child.
 Based on his review, San Nicolo concluded that, despite the ana ittišu 
listing, BQR had a different nuance than RGM, and was to be interpreted 
more narrowly, as:
...der Inanspruchnahme einer in fremder Gewere befindlichen Sache auf Grund 
eines behaupteten dinglichen Rechtes an derselben....Formell glaube ich die 
eigenliche Beteutung von baqâru noch enger fassen zu müssen, and zwar einfach 
als den für die Eigentumsverfolgung typischen Ausdruck, der dann als solcher 
neben das römische vindicare zu stellen ist.77
 Driver and Miles, in their study of the LH, came to a similar 
conclusion: “baqārum is the technical term for claiming property in an 
action, expressing what the Roman phrase vindictam imponere implies.”78
4.4.3.B The Scholarly Debate on the Relationship of biqqoret to 
  Akkadian BQR/PQR
As noted above, the JPS translation of biqqoret in Lev. 19:20 as “indemnity” is 
based on recent scholarly opinion that this term is cognate with the Akkadian 
root BQR/PQR. One of the first to suggest this association was E. A. Speiser,79 
77 San Nicolo, Die Schlussklauseln, 164-6⒌ Vindicare is in essence to assert a right in a thing; 
see further the definition of actions in rem, infra n. 8⒉
78 Driver and Miles, The Babylonian Laws, 1:9⒎
79 Speiser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” 35-3⒍ Saul Lieberman, Tosefta KiFshutah [in Hebrew] 
(New York: Bet Ha-Midrash Le-Rabbanim Be-Ameriqa, 1955-1988) 6:360 n. 5 and E. Y. 
Kutscher, “On the Terminology of Documents in the Talmud and Geonic Literature” [in 
Hebrew], in Hebrew and Aramaic Studies (Jerusalem: Press, 1977), 126, accepted Speiser’s 
association, without, however, substantiating it. For a summary of scholarly opinions on 
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who in turn quoted the study by San Nicolo. Speiser argued that the Hebrew 
biqqoret implied an obligation to make good the economic loss caused by the 
impairment of the slave’s value (on the assumption that she had been a virgin, 
and could therefore no longer command a full brideprice).80
 Loewenstamm, however, argued against associating the Hebrew biqqoret 
with the Akkadian root. He suggested that Speiser had misinterpreted San 
Nicolo, and assumed that the latter was speaking of a remedy (in damages) 
against a particular person, rather than a claim in a particular object:
דיונו המפורט של סן ניקולו כולו מוקדש לראיה שמינוח המשפט האכדי ייחד את המונחים 
baqru [בקרו] ו-baqāru [בקרו] ללא יוצא מן הכלל לאותן התביעות המכונות במשפט 
הרומי actio in rem  (מילולית: תביעה אל החפץ) ואף פעם לא לסוג האחר המכונה שם 
actio in personam  (מילולית: תביעה על בן אדם). 
San Nicolo’s detailed discussion was entirely dedicated to showing that 
Akkadian legal terminology assigned the terms baqrū and baqāru without 
exception to those claims that were called in Roman law actio in rem (literally: 
a claim in an object) and never to the other type that was called actio in 
personam (literally: a claim against a person).81
 Loewenstamm went on to explain the difference as being that an actio 
in rem means a claim that one’s right in an object is good against the 
world at large, while an actio in personam is a claim for damages against a 
specific person.82 He did not, however, discuss whether such an actio in rem 
idea would be an appropriate interpretation of Hebrew biqqoret; he simply 
argued that there was no question in the Leviticus pericope of anything to 
indemni, and adopted the traditional interpretation of “investigation” for 
biqqoret.83 
the Akkadian connection, see Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 94-95; Schwartz, “A 
Literary Study,” 250 n. 36; and Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 102-⒊ 
80 Speiser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” 3⒍
81 Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 9⒌
82 As defined by Adolph Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law (Transactions of the 
American Philosophical Society ns 43/2 [1953]), actions in rem in Roman law (also called 
vindicationes) were actions in which the plaintiff asserted a right (such as ownership, or a 
servitude) to a certain thing; they could be asserted against anyone who held the thing. In 
contrast, actions in personam were actions in which a plaintiff ’s claim was based on some 
obligation (contractual or delictual) owed to him by a specific person.
83 Loewenstamm, “Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 9⒎
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 Milgrom and Schwartz, both noting Loewenstamm’s argument, also 
rejected the meaning of “indemnity”; Schwartz further argued that “no 
known Hebrew use of פקר/בקר is even close to the suggested sense,” and 
proposed the meaning “legal dichotomy,” based on the idea of “split, divide” 
associated with the Hebrew root.84 Several scholars have also extended this 
discussion of the Akkadian connection to postbiblical Hebrew and Aramiac 
forms of BQR/PQR.85
 Westbrook agreed with this criticism of Speiser’s translation, but still 
argued in favor of the Akkadian connection; he thus interpreted biqqoret tihyeh 
as “’there is an actio in rem’ i.e. ‘the owner of the property has the right to 
claim his property back.’”86 In order to interpret Lev. 19:20 as encompassing 
a return of property, however, he was obliged to compare it to LH 117, 
arguing that it referred to a wife pledged as a debt-slave, and allowing the 
husband a claim for her return (without a claim for adultery) if she had been 
sexually violated by the creditor while in his house.87
 One may posit that one of Loewenstamm’s concerns (though he did not 
state this explicitly) was that by accepting an association between the Akkadian 
or Hebrew terms and the Roman actio in rem idea, one is also assuming that 
the legal systems in question were aware of the Roman type distinction between 
“property” and “persons.” Further, one is then forced to posit that a slave would 
have been considered “property” (i.e., like a res) in such a system. Conversely, 
by accepting the specific association made by Loewenstamm and Westbrook 
between BQR/PQR and the Roman actio in rem, one is then forced to posit 
“return of property” scenarios that may not be consistent with the biblical text.
84 Milgrom, “The Betrothed Slave-girl,” 43 n. 2; Schwartz, “A Literary Study,” 250, 25⒈ 
The dichotomy in the latter’s opinion resulted om the fact that this was a capital case 
in which no death penalty could be exacted and an asham must be offered.
85 Speiser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” 35-36; Lieberman, Tosefta KiFeshutah, 6:360 n. 5; 
and Kutscher, “Terminology of Documents,” 126, all go so far as to suggest that all the 
postbiblical BQR/PQR forms are related to Akkadian. S. Kaufman, Akkadian Influences on 
Aramaic, 80, on the other hand, considers this postbiblical connection to Akkadian to be 
somewhat “forced”; in his opinion a better etymology, at least for the postbiblical form 
hefqer/hevqer, would be the Syriac and Mandaic PQR, meaning “to run wild.”
86 Westbrook, Biblical and Cuneiform Law, 10⒌ As noted above (re the meaning of neḥerefet), 
Westbrook takes Lev. 19:20 as similar to LH s. 117: a man has pledged his wife as a 
debt-slave; the wife has been sexually violated by the creditor while in his house; and now 
“an action lies for her return,” but with no claim for adultery.
87 The difficulties with Westbrook’s position have been noted above. 
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 I think it is possible to answer the question at hand — whether there 
is an association in meaning between Hebrew biqqoret and Akkadian BQR/
PQR — in the affirmative, without the necessity of taking a position on 
any of the larger issues in this dispute (including, for instance, whether 
the Roman actio in rem idea meant simply a remedy or implied the actual 
existence of an underlying “property right,”88 whether any legal system in 
the ancient Near East had a concept of “property rights,”89 and whether 
slaves would have been considered “property” in such systems90). Several 
examples of the use of BQR/PQR, in a sample of both OB and later 
Babylonian documents (including warranties and process documents) 
suggest that its meaning is not as narrow as San Nicolo proposed. The 
root may be taken as indicating a more general idea of “claim” — one not 
necessarily associated with the assertion of a specific “property right,” but 
more generally denoting a dispute about someone’s relationship with a 
person or item.
88 On this issue, see e.g. the discussion of H. Jolowicz, Roman Foundations of Modern Law 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1957; repr. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1978), 77-7⒏
89 For a brief idea of the range of opinion on this complex topic, we may note the view of 
Cardascia, “Le concept babylonien,” 25, who argued that Babylonian sources reflect only an 
undifferentiated concept of ownership, a direct relationship between person and object, 
without the type of constitutive elements that were recognized in the Roman system 
and without a clear differentiation between ownership of an item and possession of it; 
and the view of Koschaker, Rechtsvergleichende Studien, who argued that the LH consists 
of various layers, some layers reflecting more “primitive” ideas of ownership. Koschaker 
argued specifically that the slave warranty in s. 279 seems to presuppose that a claim 
might be raised in the slave by some third party without it being alleged that the vendor 
or buyer was a thief; this stands in contrast to LH ss. 9-13, where the mere presence of 
a third party claim seems to put the onus on buyer and seller to prove their contractual 
right to the item (p. 51). He also argued (p. 46) that while the warranty in s. 279 assumes 
that a third party could trace an item into the hands of the current possessor, LH 125, the 
case of goods stolen while on deposit, appears to assume that an owner who has parted 
with possession of an item, in this case the “depositor,” must look for satisfaction only to 
the person to whom he has ceded possession, the “depositee,” if the goods are stolen; he 
may not, therefore, follow the goods into the hands of the thief or the current possessor. 
In the latter situation he found a parallel to the concept of Hand wahre Hand in early 
Germanic law, by which someone who voluntarily gave up possession of an item without 
actually conveying it (such as in a deposit) retained only the right to claim it back om 
the depositee.
90 In the Mishnah, as one example, slaves seem at times to be classed with “movable” 
property, at times with “immovables,” and at times with persons; see Introduction, n. 
99 on this issue. 
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4.4.3.C “Non-Narrow” Uses of BQR/PQR in Process Documents 
  and Warranties
a) We may note first an OB process document in which BQR is used in 
connection with a dispute in land:
 In TD 232 (UAZP 265, Lagaš, Rim-Sin), S and A (apparently not the 
vendors) dispute an orchard (S u A ibqurūma). The outcome of the 
case is that the “plaintiffs” acknowledged the right of the “defendant,” 
and agree not to BQR further:
[dayyānū] ubbirūšunukunūšim lā nitûru lā nibaqrukama
[The judges] took from them for you [the following affirmation]: We will 
not contest and not BQR you.
 Thus in contrast to San Nicolo’s suggestion that BQR/PQR verbs have 
as their direct object the item claimed, the person being “sued” seems 
to be treated as the direct object in this case, suggesting that the BQR 
form here means something like “we will not make a claim against 
you.” This form also recalls the form ul ibaqqarūši in LH ss. 150 
and 179; these again seem to imply that the woman herself in these 
sections is the object of the verb, rather than some specific property.
b) In CT II 39 (UAZP 262, Sippar, Sabium), S (apparently not the vendor) 
disputes with respect to the house of S2, and the dispute goes before 
the judges (S ibqurma ana dayyānū illikūma). The outcome is:
dayyānū dīnam ušahizūšunūti S arnam imidūšuma kunukkam ša lā ragāmi 
ušēzibūšu ul itārma S ana bītim S2 ul iraggamu
The judges caused a decision to be rendered for them; they imposed a fine on 
S, and caused a document to be made [by which] S will not contest or claim 
[against] S2 [with respect to] the house
 No reason for the process is given in this case. It may be asked 
whether the issue was precisely that the possessor had been disturbed 
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for no particular reason; in other words, the BQR implies simply an 
interference with someone’s relationship with the object in question. 
In this regard, one may also note that an arnum (penalty) is imposed 
against the baqirānu (claimant). The imposition of a fine or penalty 
would seem to be a curious result if the BQR were merely a claim 
of ownership which had failed. It may be posited that the penalty 
reflects a punishment for an unwarranted disturbance. Further, one 
may note that ragāmu (claim) in the outcome clause seems to be used 
as a synonym for the term baqāru with which the process started.
  As San Nicolo himself noted, the “property right” supposedly 
underlying the BQR may be difficult to ascertain or no longer 
recognizable.91 Cases such as the above illustrate that the “claim” 
may in fact be quite general or remote, without necessarily implying 
ownership in a particular item or person by the claimant.
c) Certain cases in which a person seems to be the “object” of the BQR 
form suggest that the nature of the relationship is being disputed, 
rather than an ownership claim being asserted. This is seen, for 
instance, in an OB adoption document cited by Ellis,92 in which A has 
been adopted by T. The document contains the following statement (as 
reconstructed by Ellis):
bāqir A T ibaqqa[ru] mana kaspam išaqqal
 Ellis has translated this as “a claimant of A who claims against T [shall 
pay 1 mana of silver],” suggesting that A will be claimed by some 
third party, perhaps A’s natural mother, though it is not clear om 
the context who is anticipated as the baqirānu (claimant). Veenhof,93 
however, suggests that the object of the BQR is A’s status, not A 
herself, a dispute which might perhaps be raised by T’s heirs. In other 
91 San Nicolo, Die Schlussklauseln, 16⒉ 
92 Maria de J. Ellis, “An Old Babylonian Contract om Tel Harmel,” JCS 27 (1975): 135 
lines 20-2 (text), and 136 (translation).
93 K. R. Veenhof, “A Deed of Manumission and Adoption om the Later Old Assyrian 
Period,” in zikir šumim — Assyriological Studies Presented to F. R. Kraus on the Occasion of 
his Seventieth Birthday (Leiden: Brill, 1982), 380 n. 60.
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words, the essence of the BQR is a contestation of the relationship 
between the adopter and the person adopted, rather than a claim for 
the return of the person. With this concept in mind we may turn again 
to the phrase ul ibbaqqar in LH ss. 185, 187 and 188, and propose that 
these may be interpreted as “it [the adoption] shall not be disputed” 
rather than “he [the child] shall not be claimed.”
d) One final doubt with respect to interpreting BQR/PQR too narrowly 
may be raised with respect to the operation of BQR/PQR clauses in 
slave sale warranties. A form of BQR/PQR appears in Babylonian slave 
sale documents (or other transactions in slaves, such as exchange or 
pledge) om the OB period onward. From the LB period, however, 
the range of contingencies warranted against expands considerably; 
further, the remedy specified seems to change. The following table 
represents a very brief summary of the key elements of these warranties 
found in documents om the OB and LB periods, in order to illustrate 
this transition:
OB94              ana baqrīšu/ši [i.e., of the Slave] 
                 [Vendor] izzaz or itanappal
                 The Vendor will stand [or answer] 
                 for a baqrum in the Slave
LB95          pūt lā siḫi lā paqirānu lā arad šarrūtu lā
(Darius I)   mār banûtu lā širkūtu lā bīt sisî lā bīt kussî 
                 lā bīt narkabti ša ina muḫḫi [Slave] illâ [Vendor] nāši
Vendor bears the responsibility that no rebelliousness, PQR-er, 
royal service, freedom, temple service, attendant service, cavalry 
94 See, e.g., TD 133 (UAZP 82, 11 Samsu-iluna), VS VII 50 (UAZP 84, 7 Ammi-ditana), 
TD 156 (UAZP 85, 37 Ammi-ditana). The latter states as the remedy kīma ṣimdat šarri 
izzazzū, possibly a reference to the baqrūm warranty imposed in LH 27⒐ The latter two 
documents also contain a warranty providing for a three-day examination and a one-month 
warranty against the appearance of epilepsy: ūm ⒊KAM teb’ītum warḫum ⒈KAM benNum. 
A bennum warranty is also mentioned in LH 27⒏
95 See, e.g., Aug. 65, Dar. 212, VS V 73, VS V 85, PSBA 6: 102, Dar. 537, VS V 126 (all 
om the time of Darius I).
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service, throne service, chariotry service will arise in the Slave
 or
pūt [contingency] ša ina muḫḫi [Slave] illâ [Vendor] nāši
 and/or
ūmu ša paqāri ina muḫḫi [Slave] ittabšū [Vendor] [Slave] (ina pan 
dayyānē) umarraqamma ana [Buyer] inamdin 
On the day that there will be a paqāru in the Slave, the Vendor will 
clear the Slave (before the judges) and give [him] to the buyer.
 The reason for the expansion of contingencies has been debated by 
scholars. Krückmann and others have proposed that many of the added 
contingencies consist of new obligations and duties of a public legal nature, 
reflecting a more complex social organization.96 Krückmann treated these 
contingencies as separate and grouped them into private claims (which 
included the BQR/PQR forms), public claims of state and temple, and 
latent defects in the slave. Despite Krückmann’s analysis, however, it is not 
clear that all the terms are necessarily mutually exclusive. BQR/PQR in its 
various forms, for instance, may have been a generic term comprising any 
interference with the new owner’s possession of the item; the additional 
terms may have been added simply for clarity. Yaron97 has noted this 
tendency to redundancy in both ancient and modern documents.
 An LB process document gives a hint of this generic use. Cyr 332 
(Marx pp. 32-35,) concerns a slave “S.” “A” appears to have been an original 
owner of this slave; while the document is broken, she appears to have sold 
him to “N” (Marx, for instance, reconstructs a transaction consisting of the 
96 See, e.g. O. Krückmann, Babylonische Rechts – und Verhaltungs-Urkunden aus der 
Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen (Leipzig: Hof-Buchdruckerei, 1931), 39; Herbert 
Petschow, Die neubabylonischen Kaufformulare (Leipzig: Theodor Weicher, 1939), 5⒎
97 Reuven Yaron, “On Defension Clauses of Some Oriental Deeds of Sale and Lease, 
From Mesopotamia and Egypt,” BiOr 15 (1958): 18, a process he terms “fatty 
degeneration.”
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word iddinu98). Aer several further transactions, the slave was sold by the 
wife of “N” to “I,” who seems to be one of the litigants in the process. His 
declaration (to the judge) is:
... A aššat...[ ]da ana paqāru S ana muḫḫīya tallikuma riqqi...ana maḫarka 
allika itti A
…”A,” the wife of…has come before me “PQR”ing the slave [as] a temple 
officer… I have come before you with “A”
The process continues:
...A ūbilma maḫaršunu ušzizzi A istassūma mimma ša riqqūtu u mār banûtu 
ša S lā tukallimu...
…He brought “A” and set her before them. They (questioned?) “A,” [but] 
she does not prove anything about the temple post or free status of “S.”
 “I,” on the other hand, was able to show contracts for all the transactions 
in the slave starting om “A.” The decision was therefore:
1 mana 50 šiqil kaspam adi [ ] mana kaspam eli A iprusūma ana I iddinū... 
kūm ša A muquttû ša mār banûtu ša S ana I tamqutu
Against “A” they decided 1 mana 50 shekels together with [ ] of silver and 
gave it to “I”...because “A” had lodged a claim against “I” with respect to the 
free status of “S.”
 In other words, this was a process started by the paqrū of “A,” yet there 
appears to be no personal ownership claim being made by “A.” Rather, she 
is claiming that the slave either belongs to the temple or has been eed. 
As Marx noted,99 it is completely unclear what interest “A” would have 
had in bringing this claim. Dandamaev100 assumed that the amount levied 
against “A” by the judges was a fine for having brought a false suit, the 
98 Victor Marx, “Die Stellung. der Frauen in Babylonien gemäss den Kontrakten aus der Zeit von 
Nebukadnezar bis Darius,” Beitrage zur Assyriologie 4 (1902): 32-3⒊
99 Marx, “Die Stellung,” 34:2⒌
100 Dandamaev, Slavery in Babylonia, 19⒋
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amount of the fine being equal to the last sale price of the slave, plus an 
addition. Kohler/Peiser,101 on the other hand, argued that there was some 
sort of ownership right being claimed by “A”: either a type of pre-emption 
privilege (Zugrecht) that could be exercised by the first vendor each time a 
new sale occurred, or the right to claim the services of a eed slave as some 
sort of patron. In this case, the amount paid by “A” was assumed to consist 
of the last sale price plus interest. Even assuming such a right, however, 
this would still not explain why “A” would be claiming the status of temple 
officer for the slave in question. Marx suggested that the process may have 
been a claim for a mandattu (payment), perhaps for arrears in rent owed 
while “S” was performing temple services; again, this would not explain 
why “A” would have been claiming ee status for him. In summary, this 
appears to be a use of BQR/PQR outside a specific ownership claim.
4.4.3.D Conclusion
The above examples show that BQR/PQR is used in contexts that suggest 
it means a general “claim” or contest of someone’s relationship with the 
person or item, without specifically implying a return of the item based 
on superior ownership. An actio in rem scenario can, in fact, be posited 
to explain some of the instances of Akkadian BQR/PQR, particularly in 
warranties; in other instances, however, it is difficult to pinpoint what, if 
any, “property right” is being asserted. Further, the actio in rem concept 
suggests the existence of a precise distinction between “persons” and 
“property,” as existed in later Roman law. While it is true that forms of 
BQR/PQR are oen associated with transfers of land, fixtures, slaves, and 
large animals--items that could be considered essential “property” in an 
agricultural society--I do not think that the Roman concept of “property” 
can be automatically applied to the Mesopotamian or biblical systems 
without much further investigation.102
101 J. Kohler and F. E. Peiser, Aus dem Babylonischen Rechtstleben (Leipzig: Eduard Pfeiffer, 
1891), 2:4⒍
102 I suggest that one uitful area for such an investigation might be a comparison between 
the pattern of use of BQR/PQR in connection with slaves, animals and immovables with 
the Roman concept of res mancipi (see Berger, Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law, s.v. 
res mancipi, mancipatio). 
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4.4.4 BQR/PQR as “Claim” in Postbiblical Hebrew
There are numerous instances of the roots BQR/PQR in both postbiblical 
Hebrew and Aramaic. The Hebrew forms have such a wide range of 
meaning that scholars both ancient and modern have proposed at least 
two, and even three, different original roots, though there is no agreement 
as to what these were.103 There are, however, at least two forms of this 
root in postbiblical Hebrew that in my opinion are connected to the idea 
of “claim”:
1) The noun biqqoret is found three times in tannaitic law collections, in 
tArakh. 4:3 (one MS), and in mKet. 11:5 and tKet. 11:3 in connection 
with a document called an iggeret biqqoret. These sources deal with the 
issue of competing claims against land. One case involves land inherited 
by orphans om their father, which is also claimed by their father’s 
widow in order to realize upon her ketubbah, or by a creditor of their 
father; another case involves land which was to be available to satis 
the ketubah obligation to a divorced woman, but which the husband 
had dedicated as sanctified property (heqdesh) before the divorce. From 
contextual analysis of these sources, as well as an examination of the 
103 The Arukh, for instance, assumed that there was one root relating to the idea of 
quarrel and another to the idea of eedom:
  PQR 1 PQR 2 BQR
  derived om a derived om the equal to PQR 2
  Persian root noun אפיקורוס
 QAL feindliche Absicht zugellos zugellos
 Hifil etwas freigeben etwas freigeben
 Among modern scholars, Moreshet, Lexicon of New Verbs, 114 and 289-90, suggested 
one root which relates to the idea of a place of pasturage and another related to the 
noun אפיקורוס. The entries in the Talmud Concordances (Ch. Kosovsky, Otsar Lashon 
ha-Talmud; M. Kosovsky, Concordance of the Talmud Yerushalmi [New York: JTSA, 
1982]) suggest three trends of meaning, relating to the ideas of inspect, quarrel, and 
abandonment, and varying according to binyan:
  Bavli Yerushalmi 
 QAL PQR 1: deny, cast off the laws of  BQR 1: inspect, rebel, act insolently
  the Torah 
 Hifil PQR 2: abandon, quit or take out BQR 2: abandon, quit or of one’s control
  take out of one’s control
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wording of the iggeret biqqoret in post-tannaitic formularies, one may 
conclude that biqqoret means “claim.” The iggeret biqqoret is seen to be 
a document issued by a Beit Din when land was sold at its direction 
to meet the claims of a widow or creditor, and was intended to give 
the purchaser of the land the same protection as a deed of sale; the 
term biqqoret referred to the circumstances (i.e., a claim) which led 
to the sale. Very similar in effect and content was the iggeret mazon, 
issued when land was sold to provide a wife with maintenance, and again 
referring to the circumstances which led to the sale.
2) The tannaitic sources in general (Mishnah, Tosea, halakhic midrash 
and the baraitot in the Talmudim) also contain numerous instances of 
the noun hefqer/hevqer and its related Hifil and Hofal verb forms.104 These 
forms are generally interpreted as having to do with abandoned or 
ownerless property (see, e.g. Jastrow, s.v. בקר). I shall argue that a more 
precise translation of hevqer/hefqer is “claimable property.” To render one’s 
property “ownerless” is in effect to allow it to be claimed by someone else. 
This idea is particularly noticeable in the application of hefqer/hevqer to 
slave women, to suggest that they have been sexually available to all.
With respect to Aramaic instances of BQR/ PQR, we may briefly note here 
that certain of the Targumim use BQR/PQR in the sense of “to cast ee” 
or “to be unbridled,”105 concepts that might be argued to relate to the idea 
104 Forms of BQR are generally found in the Mishnah, while in other sources forms of PQR 
predominate.
105 Qal forms of BQR and PQR, found rarely in tannaitic sources, are more equent in 
various Jewish Aramaic sources, including the Targumim. A summary of the Targum uses 
follows:
 a) Targum Pseudo Jonathan uses PQR in the general sense of “to let go ee”:
 Verse Context MT Targum
 Exod. 22:4 cause [a field] to be eaten יפקר יבער
 Exod. 23:11 let [the land…] lie fallow ותפקר פירהא ונטשתה
 Deut. 25:5 [the levirate widow] shall לא תהוי אתת שכיבא לא תהיה
  not be married abroad הפקירא בשוקא החוצה לאיש זר
  unto one not of his kin  לגבר חילונאי 
 
 b) BQR/PQR in Targum Neofiti similarly has the sense of “to cast off ” or “let go ee”; 
however, Kaufman and Sokoloff in their Neofiti concordance have also assumed an 
equivalence of PQR with PKR, “to demolish”:
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of “abandonment.”106
4.4.4.A The iggeret biqqoret
a) Orphan’s Property: mKet. 11:5 and tKet. 11:3 
 When orphans’ property was subject to a claim by their father’s widow 
or by one of their father’s creditors, a specific procedure had to be 
followed in order that the property could be sold. The property was 
valued, and then advertised for a specific period of time, set out in 
mArakh. 6:1:107
שום היתומים שלשים יום ושום ההקדש ששים יום ומכריזין בבקר ובערב...
The valuation [period] for [the property of ] orphans is thirty days, and the 
valuation [period] for consecrated property is sixty days, and one advertises 
in the morning and evening...
 An issue that would naturally arise in such cases is whether the 
property had been properly valued, so that the orphans would realize the 
maximum amount possible aer the claim against the property had been 
met. MKet. 11:2-4 discusses the case of a widow who has undertaken on 
 Verse Context MT Targum
 Exod. 22:4 cause [a field] to be eaten יפקר יבער
 Exod. 23:24 utterly overthrow [idols] מפכרא) תפגר הרס תהרסם)
 Exod. 32:2 break off [gold rings] פכרו פרקו
 Lev. 26:30 I will cast your carcasses ואפקר ית פגריכון ונתתי את פגריכם
 c) Targum Jonathan to the Prophets uses BQR in the sense of “unbridled”:
 Verse Context MT Targum
 Jud. 9:4 vain and light [fellows] סריקין ובקרין ריקים ופחזים
 Jer. 23:32 by their lies and their  בשקריהון ובבקרותהון בשקריהם ובפחזותם
  wantonness [false prophets]
106 As noted above at n. 85, Kaufman, The Akkadian Influences on Aramaic, 80, suggested that 
Hebrew hefqer/hevqer is related to Mandaic and Syriac PQR, meaning “to run wild.”
107 When the Mishnah is quoted without an apparatus, it indicates that there are not significant 
variants in the Mishnah codices. If the codices generally agree on a reading which is not in 
the printed editions, the Mishnah will be quoted according to one of the codices.
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her own to value and sell her husband’s property, to support herself or 
realize on her ketubbah, and the question of whether her sale would be valid 
in the event of a misvaluation of the property. Mishnah 5 then discusses 
the case in which the valuation and sale are undertaken by a Beit Din and 
a misvaluation has occurred. The issue is made dependent on the presence 
of an iggeret biqqoret. The following sets out mKet. 11:5 according to the 
Mishnah codices and two MSS of bKet. 99b (Vatican Ebr. 113=  and ז 
Vatican Ebr. 130 = ט) and several of its variants:
1. שום הדינין שפחת שתות או הותיר שתות מכרן בטל. 
2. אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אם כן מה כח בית דין יפה.
3. אבל אם עשו אגרת בקרת אפלו מכרו שוה מנה במאתים או שוה מאתים במנה מכרן קים.
Variants
הוסיפו =  ז שהותיר = ר  הותיר] = ק פ ל ט  שפחתו = ז  שפחת] = ק פ ל ר ט   .1
רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומר] = ז ט אמר רבן שמעון בן גמליאל] = ק פ ל ר   .2
מיכרן קיים] =  ל ז ט  אם כן] = ק פ ר   
אבל אם] = ר ז ט  ואם = פ  אלא אם] = ק ל   .3
The variants are not particularly significant. They denote efforts at clarifi-
cation (line 1) and different formulations of phrases (line 3) as well as what 
seems to be some differences in the Babylonian formulation (line 2).
Translation
[1] A valuation of the judges that is a sixth too small or a sixth too large 
[over “market”108 value] – their sale is invalid.
[2] R. Shimon ben Gamliel [RSB”G] said: the sale is valid, otherwise how is 
the power of the Beit Din superior?
[3] But if they drew up an iggeret biqqoret, even if they sold [something] 
worth one maneh for 200, or worth 200 for one maneh, their sale is valid.
 The precise meaning of iggeret biqqoret is not evident om the context. 
Its effect, however, may be understood as follows: unless an iggeret biqqoret is 
issued, any misvaluation by the judges greater than 1/6 of the actual value 
108 I use “market value” here in the sense of what the item would fetch at a public auction, 
and do not imply the existence of any particular type of market economy.
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would render a sale invalid; if an iggeret is issued, however, any claim (at least 
for misvaluation) is precluded, regardless of the amount of any error. The 
iggeret, in other words, was the buyer’s protection, much like a deed, against 
the sale being challenged; without it, even though the property had been 
publicly advertised, it would still have been possible to overturn a sale. The 
contrasting opinion of RSB”G (clause 2 above) suggests that any transfer by 
a Beit Din would be valid, regardless of the amount of misvaluation.
 This interpretation seems confirmed in the corresponding passage in 
tKet. 11:3 (Lieberman), which also defines the iggeret biqqoret in terms of 
its effect:
אי זו היא איגרת בקורת? שום היתומים שלשים יום, ושום הקדש ששים יום. מכרו שוה מנה 
במאתים, או שוה מאתים במנה, מכרו קיים. רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומ: שום הדיינין שפחת 
שתות, או הותיר שתות, מכרן קיים.
היא שמכרה שוה מנה ודינר במנה, אפי אומרת אני אחזיר את הדינר ליורשין מכרה בטל. 
רבן שמעון בן גמליאל אומ לעולם מכרה קיים, ותחזיר את הדינר ליורשין, ובלבד שתשייר 
מקצת. לפיכך אם פחתה, או הותירה, אין לה אלא כשער שמכרה.
[1] What is an iggeret biqqoret? The valuation [period] for [the property of ] 
orphans is thirty days, and the valuation [period] for consecrated property is 
sixty days. If they sold [something] worth a maneh for 200, or worth 200 for 
one maneh, his sale is valid. R. Shimon ben Gamliel says: A valuation of the 
judges that is under by one-sixth, or over by one-sixth, their sale is valid.
[2] She [a widow] who sold [something] worth a maneh plus a dinar for a 
maneh, even if she says ‘I will return the dinar to the heirs,’ her sale is invalid. 
R. Shimon ben Gamliel says: Her sale is always valid, and she returns the 
dinar to the heirs, as long as she leaves a portion. Thus if she estimated it 
under or over, she claims only the price at which she sold it.
 The first clause summarizes the effects of mArakh. 6:1 and the last 
clause of mKet. 11:5: a court109 advertises orphans’ property for 30 days, 
109 Lieberman notes (Tosefta KiFeshutah, 6:361) that the Erfurt MS has:
אף שום היתומים הדיינין...ונמחקה המלה ”יתומים“  
 Also the evaluation of the orphans the judges… And the word “orphans” is 
erased.
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and if an iggeret is given, the sale is valid regardless of any misvaluation. 
RSB”G’s contrary opinion here suggests that without an iggeret the sale is 
still valid if the misvaluation is within certain limits. S. Lieberman confirms 
this interpretation:
...אם שמו הדיינין ומכרו בלי בקורת, וטעו בשתות, מכרן בטל. אבל אם עשו אגרת בקורת 
אפילו טעו הרבה מכרן קיים, ודברי רשב“ג הוא מאמר המוסגר. ולפ“ז היה אפשר לפרש 
שרשב“ג אינו חולק אלא על טעות בשתות, אבל ביותר משתות אף הוא מודה שמכרן בטל, 
כמפורש בתוספתא כאן.
...If the judges made a valuation and sold [the property] without 
a biqqoret and erred by a sixth, their sale was invalid. But if they 
executed an iggeret biqqoret, even if they erred by much their sale was 
valid, and the words of RSB”G are bracketed [i.e., between clauses 1
and 3 in mKet. 11:5]. According to this, it could be interpreted that RSB”G 
disputed [with the tanna qamma, the anonymous first opinion] only with 
respect to an error in the amount of a sixth; but if [the error] was more than a 
sixth, even he agrees that their sale was invalid, as explained in Tosefta here.
(Clause 2 then deals with a further dispute between the majority and 
RSB”G, reflected in mKet. 11:4, concerning the case of a widow who wants 
to realize her ketubbah by selling land belonging to the orphans.)
 It should be noted here that there is a textual issue associated with 
mKet. 11:5: it is possible to read clause 3 of this mishnah as also belonging 
to RSB”G rather than to the tanna qamma — that is, it is RSB”G who is 
suggesting that the iggeret biqqoret issued by a Beit Din is what precludes 
any claims of misevaluation. This reading is suggested in particular by 
some of the Mishnah MSS, which, as noted above, show a great deal of 
variability in clauses 2-3a.110 I believe that whether the opinion belongs to 
RSB”G or the tanna qamma makes no difference to the question of the 
meaning of biqqoret; according to either opinion, the effect of the iggeret 
would be to protect the purchaser in the event of a misvaluation. I shall 
simply note here that the traditional view111 attributes clause 3 to the tanna 
110 In particular, it is the readings in the MSS Kaufmann and Parma, which lacks the words 
.that suggest that it is RSB”G who is associated with the iggeret biqqoret ,מכרן קיים
111 Modern scholars are not in agreement on this point. Lieberman, as indicated in the quote 
above, did not attribute clause 3 to RSB”G; David Halivni, “Commentaries on Mishnah 
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qamma, as Maimonides indicates in his commentary to this mishnah:
אגרת חקירה ודקדוק, והיא שהיתה שם שומה והכרזה וכותבין שהם הרבו להתישב 
ולדקדק כפי יכלתם, וגם זה דברי תנא קמא והלכה כמותו
[The iggeret biqqoret is] a letter of research and inspection, that there was 
a valuation and public announcement, and they write that they sat and 
checked much, to the best of their ability; this [part of the Mishnah] is also 
[attributed] to the tanna qamma, and the halakhah follows his opinion.112
 Returning to the issue of the meaning of biqqoret, the above quote om 
Maimonides also indicates the main trend of traditional interpretation: the 
essence of the document was its confirmation that the property had been 
advertised. Biqqoret, in other words, was understood as “inspection,” and the 
and Baraita” [in Hebrew], Tarbits 29 (1959-1960):32-46, at 45, in contrast, did, based 
primarily on the evidence of MS Kaufmann:
וזה מניע אותי לפרש שמחלוקת רבן שמעון בן גמליאל וחכמים היא רק כשעשו איגרת ביקורת.   
וכך מתפרשת המשנה: תנא קמא סובר מכרן בטל אף אם האונאה לא היתה יותר משתות. על 
זה טוען רבן שמעון בן גמליאל: אם כן מה כוח בית דין (שעשה אגרת ביקורת) יפה? (ומהו 
הדין)? אלא אם עשו איגרת ביקורת אפילו מכרו שווה מנה…מכרן קיים… ומכאן נובע שאין 
מאמר מוסגר במשנה זו.
 And this drives me to explain that the dispute between Raban Shimon ben 
Gamliel and the sages is only when they made an iggeret biqqoret. Thus the 
Mishnah is explained: the first tanna holds that their sale is canceled even if the 
difference was not more than one sixth. On this Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel 
claims: if that is so how is the power of the beit din (which made the iggeret 
biqqoret) greater? (And what is the law)? Rather if they made an iggeret biqqoret 
even if they sold what was worth a maneh… their sale… And om here flows 
the fact that there is no parenthetical remark in this Mishnah.
112 Kapaḥ, in his edition of Maimonides’ Mishnah commentary, notes that other MSS of this 
commentary have different versions of this last phrase; the reading above, however, seems 
confirmed by Maimonides’ opinion in Hil. Malveh veLoveh, 12:11:
ובית דין שהכריזו ובדקו יפה יפה ודקדקו בשומא אף על פי שטעו ומכרו שוה מנה במאתים או   
מאתים במנה הרי מכרם קים .אבל אם לא בדקו בשומא ולא כתבו אגרת בקרת...וטעו והותירו 
שתות או פחתו שתות מכרם בטל. 
 And the court which advertised and checked very carefully and examined the 
evaluation even though they erred and sold what was worth a maneh for 200 
or 200 for a maneh – behold their sale stands. But if they did not check the 
evaluation and did not write an iggeret biqqoret… and they erred more than one 
sixth or less than one sixth – their sale is canceled.
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document invited prospective buyers to inspect the property and confirm 
for themselves the valuation assigned by the Beit Din.113 It seems that the 
earliest detailed association of the iggeret biqqoret with advertisement appears 
in amoraic and later layers of talmudim. In the Bavli, for instance, by accepting 
that the iggeret biqqoret refers to an advertisement, the sages were compelled to 
conclude that since the iggeret is mentioned only in clause 3 of the mishnah, 
clause 1 must refer to cases in which there was no iggeret, and thus no 
advertisement, and were thus constrained to explain why no advertisement was 
performed. Various proposals and customs are cited to suggest that, despite 
the wording in mArakh. 6:1, advertisement was in fact dependent on the type 
of property, the nature of the transaction, or the locality (bKet. 100b):
הא מדסיפא בדאכרוז הוי רושא בדלא אכרוז...ולא קשיא כאן בדברים שמכריזין עליהן 
כאן בדברים שאין מכריזין עליהן ואלו הן דברים שאין מכריזין עליהן העבדים והמטלטלין 
והשטרות... ואיבעית אימא כאן בשעה שמכריזין כאן בשעה שאין מכריזין דאמרי נהרדעי 
לכרגא למזוני ולקבורה מזבנינן בלא אכרזתא ואב“א כאן במקום שמכריזין כאן במקום 
שאין מכריזין דאמר רב נחמן מעולם לא עשו אגרת בקורת בנהרדעא סבוא מינה משום 
דבקיאי בשומא א“ל רב יוסף בר מניומי לדידי מיפרשא לי מיניה דרב נחמן משום דקרו להו 
בני אכלי נכסי דאכרזתא
Since in the last clause [it says that] an inspection [takes place], the first 
clause must [refer to cases] with no inspection… This is not a difficulty: the 
last clause [refers to] items that they announce, the first clause to items that 
they do not announce. These are items that are not announced: slaves, movable 
property, and deeds… And [alternatively] if you want, say the last clause refers 
to a time when they announce and the first clause to a time when they 
do not announce, as the Nehardeans say that for poll-tax, maintenance and 
burial [expenses] one sells without an announcement. And if you want, say 
the last clause refers to a place where they announce and the first clause to 
a place where they do not announce, as Rav Naḥman said: They never drew 
up an iggeret biqqoret in Nehardea. [People] understood from this that they 
were experts in valuation, [but] Rav Yosef ben Minyomi said to them: Rav 
Naḥman explained to me that it was because they called them consumers of 
publicly auctioned goods. [emphasis added]
113 Rashi at bKet. 99b, s.v. אגרת בקרת, also states: 
הכרזה ולשון בקורת שמבקרין אותה בני אדם ע“י הכרזה.  
 A public announcement and an iggeret biqqoret which people examine/evaluate 
through the public announcement.
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 The underlined dictum is a summary of a longer discussion quoted 
in yMeg. 4:4 65b attributed to western amoraim of the third to fourth 
generations:114
תני עבדים והשטרות ומיטלטלין אין להם איגרת ביקורת מהו איגר‘ ביקורת ר‘ יודה בר פזי 
אמר אכרזה עולה בר‘ ישמעאל אמר עבדים שלא יברחו שטרות ומיטלטלין שלא יגנבו
It was taught in a baraita: There is no iggeret biqqoret for male or female slaves 
or for movable property. What is an iggeret biqqoret? R. Yudah bar Pazi said: 
an announcement. Ulla bar R. Ishmael said: [One avoids giving any hint of 
a sale of ] slaves, so that they will not [be tempted to] flee; [and one avoids 
announcing the value of ] deeds and movables, so they will not be stolen.
 Despite these Talmudic discussions, however, I suggest that biqqoret 
means “claim,” and this may be seen more precisely by examining actual 
samples of this document.115 Various forms of a document called iggeret 
biqqoret are found in the formularies of Rav Hai Gaon (10th century, 
Pumbedita) and Rav Yehudah b. Barzilai (12th century, Barcelona), and in the 
Sefer ha-Itur (12th century). There are in addition two other types of deed 
called iggeret: the iggeret mazon and the iggeret mered. Based on an analysis 
of these documents, I shall argue that the term biqqoret is a reflection of the 
circumstances under which this document was issued – that is, as the result 
of a “claim” by a widow or creditor against land belonging to orphans.
b) Document Samples om the Various Mediaeval Formularies
 One must first address the question of whether these mediaeval 
documents can serve as useful evidence of the association of biqqoret with 
the idea of “claim,” despite their later dates.
114 This passage appears with minor differences in ySan. 1:2 19b and in a shortened form in yKet. 
11:6 34c quoted below:: 
 מהו אגרת בקרת ר‘ יהודה בר פזי אמר אכרזה עולא בר ישמעאל אמר עבדים שלא יברחו 
ושטרות ומטלטלין שלא יגנבו
115 Lieberman (Tosefta KiFeshutah, 6:360 n. 25), noting Speiser’s definition of the biblical 
biqqoret, also argued that the original meaning of postbiblical iggeret biqqoret had to do 
with a claim or dispute, stating: וכוונת המלה ”בקר“ הוא לתבוע, לדרוש (the meaning of the 
word baqar is ‘to claim, to demand’).
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 The question of the relationship among the formularies, and the 
documents used as precedents, is open. Assaf suggests, however, that as 
documents had to be draed by scribes, under the control of the Beit Din, 
their general structure (נוסחא) was likely fixed, though not necessarily the 
finer points (דשטרא  He states further that though Rav Hai’s 116.(השופרא 
is the oldest extant gaonic formulary, there was likely an earlier formulary 
belonging to Rav Saadya, and that it is possible Rav Yehudah b. Barzilai 
made use of material om the latter.117 Halberstam similarly suggests that 
the compiler of the Itur was also familiar with at least some of the works 
of Rav Yehudah.118 We may thus assume that there was some degree of 
continuity in the content of these documents, so that it is not beyond the 
realm of probability that the documents reflect much older concepts. This 
assumption is at least partly confirmed by the fact that, as will be shown, 
the general structure of the iggeret is consistent in all the samples. 
 The following sets out the operative passages of the iggeret biqqoret 
samples found in the formularies. I have marked the operative passages of 
each document as a-d in the translations:
Iggeret biqqoret: Formulary of Rav Hai Gaon (10th century Pumbedita):119
[א] אנן בידינא דחתימין לתתא כד הוינא במותב תלתא כחדא ועלו לקדמנא פלוני ופלוני 
בני פלוני מיתנא ואמרו בי [כי] בחיוהי דאבונא פלוני הוא מסיק [=הוה] ביה פלוני בן 
פלוני שטר חוב או מלוה... ובעה מננא לשלאמא ליה נשייה דאית ליה על אבונא ...ואנן לית 
אנחנא יכלין למיזבאן ההיא (על) ארעא אלא על ממריהן דדכירנא [צ“ל דבי דינא]... 
[ב] – ואנן בידינא ידענא ואשתמודענא דארעא הדא די פלוני מיתנא היא ובדקנא ועיינא 
במילאייהון ואשכחנא דצריכי להתעסק בצורכייהו ואכרזנא על ההיא ארעא תלתין יומין
[ג] ...וזבן יתה בהון פלוני בן פלוני ושלים הלין זוזי דמי זיבונא דנא ויהבנון להו לפלוני 
116 Simḥah Assaf, “Sefer HaShetarot of Rav Hai Gaon” [in Hebrew], Musaf Hatarbits 1 
(1930): ⒍
117 Assaf, “Sefer HaShetarot,” ⒎
118 Shlomoh Halberstam, The Book of Documents of the Rabbi and Patriarch Rabbenu Yehuda 
bar R. Barzilai of Barcelona [in Hebrew] (new ed.; Jerusalem, 1967), ⒋
119 Hebrew text om Assaf, “Sefer HaShetarot,” 71-72; the amendments in square brackets 
are those of Assaf. Though Assaf notes (p. 67) that this sample is not found in either of 
the two main MSS of the formulary, but rather in another collection, he identifies it (p. 
68) as unquestionably of gaonic origin. 
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דהו בעל החוב עד גמירא...
[ד] ...וכדו איסתלקא ידוהון [צ“ל ידהון] ורשותהון דהנהו יאתמי ורשותא [ד]כל דאתי 
מחמתיהון סילוק גמור מההיא ארעא ולית להון חולק ואחסנא בגוה ולא דין ולא דברים 
ואנו ב“ד מכרנו לפלוני זה מכירה זו מכירה גמורה חתוכה וחלוטה שרירא וקיימא 
דלא למיהדר מינה ודלא להשניא ולא נשתייר בה כלום ליתומים הנזכרים שום שיור 
בעולם... וכותב למן היום ולהכא לא יהא רשות ליתומים אלו ולא לשום אדם שיבא מארבע 
רוחות העולם לעורר על פלוני זה הקונה ולא על הבא מכחו מחמת מכירה זו או מחמת 
קרקע זה שקנה על פינו ומאמירנו וברשותינו אין ערעורו שוה כלום וכל מי שיבא עם כל 
כתב של לכל [של כל] לשון בן ובת ואח ואחר [צ“ל ואחות] קרוב ורחוק יורש ונוחל יהודי 
וארמאי דיקום ויהגה ויטעון ויערער על פלוני זה יהיו דבריו וטענותיו ושטרותיו הבל ואין 
בם מועיל וחשובין כחרש הנשבר שאין בו ממש ואנו ב“ד ראינו שמצוה על היתומים לפרוע 
חוב שעל אביהם ועל כן החזקנו כל זה במכירה זו ואנו ב“ד ידענו והכרנו שהקרקע שקנה 
פלוני מן פלוני בן פלוני הנפטר וכל אחריות דאתי הוא על היתומים...
Translation
(a) We the members of the Beit Din [whose names are] sealed below, in a 
session of three [judges] as one [state]: A and B the sons of C, deceased, came 
before us and said: [Since] our father’s lifetime X son of X’ holds a note of 
obligation (or loan) against him…and he has asked us to pay the burden that 
he has against our father… We are not able to sell this land [out of which we 
want to pay the debt] except according to the orders of the Beit Din…
(b) We the Beit Din found out and satisfied ourselves about this land that 
belonged to C the deceased, and we examined and investigated their affairs, 
and found the necessity to occupy ourselves in their needs. We advertised 
about this land thirty days…
(c) Z bought it for this amount and paid these zuzei, the amount of this 
purchase, and they gave them to X, the creditor, in full…
(d) And now the authority and right of these orphans and the right of anyone 
[claiming] on their behalf has completely ceased in this land, and they have 
neither portion nor inheritance in it, and no suit or process.120
120 The phrase לא דין ולא דברים, found in postbiblical Hebrew (see, e.g., the wording in mKet. 
 is the semantic equivalent of the Akkadian dēnu dabābu laššu ,(דין ודברים אין לי בנכסיך :9:1
(there shall be no suit or litigation) and the Aramaic ולא דין ולא דבב. This form of the 
Akkadian phrase is found in particular in NA contracts, though various forms of dēnu-
dabābu clauses are also found, according to the AHW and the CAD, in MA, Nuzi and NB 
documents. The phrase is oen found in connection with an exclusion or renunciation 
of claims against the new owner of land or other items; see, e.g., Governor’s Palace 
Archive [=GPA] 17 (Kalah, 8th century BCE), ll. 10ff, a sale of a field by one eunuch to 
another, which contains an exclusion of claims against the buyer of the land, starting 
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We the Beit Din have made this sale to this Z, a complete sale, irreversible 
and permanent, fit and established, not be reneged upon or changed; and 
there remains to the orphans mentioned no remnant [in the land] at all…
And he writes: From this day on, neither these orphans nor anyone anywhere 
in the world have any right to make a claim against this Z the purchaser or 
anyone [claiming] through him, on account of this sale or on account of this 
land that he purchased according to our word, authorization, and right; the 
claim of such a person is worth nothing. Anyone who comes with any written 
document in any language, [whether] son, daughter, brother, sister, near or far, 
heir or inheritor, Hebrew or Aramean, who may stand and argue and claim and 
protest against this Z, his words, claims, and deeds shall be worthless; there 
shall be no effect to them, and they are considered like a broken potsherd with 
no substance. We the Beit Din considered that it was a commandment on the 
orphans to satisfy their father’s debt; thus we have upheld this with this sale. 
We the Beit Din knew and recognized that this land that Z bought from the 
late A son of B and all the liability thereon is on the orphans.
Iggeret biqqoret: Sefer ha-Itur (12th century, Marseilles):121
[א] כתב בכך ובכך איך פלו‘ מזמין ליתמי דפלו‘ לדינא ואפיק שטר חוב וכתובה דהוה ליה 
על אבוהון וחזינא מדינא למגבי מנכסי דיתמי מדינא לרווחא דידהו ואפיכנן אזכותא דידהו 
[ב] ואכריזנן על ארעא דהיא זיבורית דילהון תלתין יומין
[ג] ולבתר הכי אתא פלו‘ דנן ואוסיף עלנא דמי דההיא ארעא כך וכך וזביננא ליה אנחנא 
בי דינא לפלו‘ בן פלו‘ והוא דילי‘ ואשלים אילין זוזי לידנא ויהבינן להו לבעל חוב כמה 
with the words tuāru dēnu dabābu laššu aḫīšu lū mār aḫīšu lū mammanušu qurbu (there 
shall be nor return, suit, or litigation [whether] by his [the seller’s] brothers, nephews, or 
anyone related to him). The Aramaic phrase is found equently in Elephantine contracts, 
with a similar idea of precluding any claim or process. See, e.g., Bezalel Porten and 
Ada Yardeni, Contracts, vol. 2 of Textbook of Aramaic Documents from Egypt (Jerusalem: 
Hebrew University, 1989), ⒉2, ll. 12ff., a settlement of the boundaries of a parcel of land, 
in which the complainant then agrees not to bring any further claims:
12. …לא אכהל אגרנך דין ודבב אנה ובר לי וברה  
13. לי (אח ואחה לי קריב ורחיק) על ארקא זך…  
 I shall not be able to institute against you suit or litigation — I or my son or 
my daughter (my brother or sister, near or far) on that land…
121 Hebrew text om ג בקורת  ב‘  אות  ראשון,  חלק  תרמ“ה),  ווארשא  צילום  (דפוס  (תש“ל)  העיטור   ספר 
הכרזה Sefer HaItur]. The title of the document in this formulary is given as] ע“ב  ,והיא 
indicating that the advertisement was thought to be the primary element. 
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דאיתחייבו יתמי מדינ‘ 
[ד] ואשלימנ‘ הדא ארעא לפלו‘ דנן לי‘ ולירתוהי בתרוהי ומן יומא דנן ולעל‘ ולא ליהוי 
רשותא ליתמי לערעורי בההיא ארעא מידי ואחריות דהאי זבינא איתמי כחומר כל שטר 
זביני דנהיגין בישראל דלא כאסמכתא ודלא כטופסא דשטרי וכו‘
(a) He wrote as follows: How X summoned the orphans of Y to law, and 
produced a note of obligation or ketubbah that he had against their father. 
We saw that by law [we must] collect from the property of the orphans for 
your satisfaction, and we looked after your right.
(b) We advertised land out of the poorest [level of the orphans’ estate] for 
30 days.
(c) After this Z came and paid us the value of this land to such and such an 
amount and we the Beit Din sold it to him, to Z son of Z’, and it is his; he 
paid these zuzei into our hand, and we gave them to the creditor, according 
to what the orphans owed by law,
(d) And we gave over this land to Z, to him and to his heirs after him from 
this day onwards and the orphans shall have no right to claim anything on 
this land. And the responsibility of this sale is complete as the stringencies 
of any sale contract which is practiced in Israel – not like reliances and not 
like the formula of contracts.
Iggeret biqqoret: Formulary of Rav Yehudah b. Barzilai:122
[א] אלו בית דין החתומין למטה כך היה שיצא שטר חוב או משכונה או שטר כתובה או 
שטר בית דין שהיה לו לגבות כך וכך דינרין מנכסי פלוני שנפטר...וראינו מן הדין שהיה 
לנו לגבות מנכסי היתומים לאלתר ולא היה בנו כח להשהות אותן השטרות עד שיגדלו 
היתומים מפני ייפוי כח דינם...
[ב] חפשנו אחר עזבון הנפטר ומצינו שדה פלוני שהיא ראויה לימכר...ואכריזנא על ארעא 
דא תלתין יומין כדאמור רבנן...
[ג] אתא פלוני דנן על דמי ארעא כך וכך וזבנינא ליה אנחנא בי דינא להא ארעא לפלוני 
בר פלוני והיא דיליה ואשלים אילין זוזי דמיה זיבונא לידנא אנחנא בי דינא ויהיבנא לה 
לאיתתא או לבעל חוב כמא דאיתחייב יתמי מן דינא 
122 Halberstam, Book of Documents, ⒗ 
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[ד] ומיומא דנן ולעלם לא ביתמי ולא בשום איניש בעלמא לתבוע ללוקח הזה בהאי 
ארעא מידי ואחריותא דהאי ארעא דזביננא לפלוני דנן יהא איתמי ושטר הכרזה זו 
ובקרות זו ומכירה זו חתוכה וחלוטה וכו‘
Translation
(a) The [members] of the Beit Din [whose names are] sealed below [state] 
thus: A note of obligation, or a security, or a ketubbah, or a document of the 
Beit Din, has arisen [that allowed the holder] to collect so many dinarin 
from the property of X, who died… We saw that by law we were required 
to collect [the amount] from the orphans’ property immediately; we did 
not have the power to delay [the implementation of ] these deeds until the 
orphans became adults, as their legal position was stronger…
(b) We sought deposited merchandise123 of the deceased and found a field 
suitable for sale… and we advertised about this land for thirty days, as was 
stated by our Sages…
(c) This Z came [and offered] on the value of the land such and such, and we 
the Beit Din sold this land to Z son of Z’ and it is his. He paid these zuzei, 
the value of the sale, to us, the Beit Din, and we gave [it] to the woman, or 
the creditor, according to what the orphans owed by law.
(d) From this day and forever neither the orphans nor anyone else may make 
any claim whatever about this land against this purchaser. The liability of 
this land that we have sold to this Z shall be to the orphans. The deed of this 
advertisement, baqrut, and sale is final and irredeemable. 
 From an analysis of these sections we may argue that the samples 
display a consistent structure:
a) A statement of how the Beit Din came to be involved, as the result of 
claims against property belonging to orphans, either by their father’s 
widow, wanting to realize upon her ketubbah, or by one of their father’s 
creditors.
b) An affirmation that some land of the orphans was chosen by the Beit 
Din for sale and advertised for thirty days. In the formulary of Rav 
123 Koehler and Baumgartner, Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon, s.v. עיזבון.
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Yehudah (section d above) it is reiterated that the advertisement and 
the baqrut are separate stages.
c) A confirmation that the property was purchased and the purchase 
money used to pay off the widow or creditor. 
d) Detailed instructions precluding the orphans (or parties claiming 
through them) om challenging the valuation and confirming that 
the transfer to the buyer has an effect equivalent to any other sale. 
This section is the longest in each of the samples (the formulary of 
Rav Hai in fact seems to contain two such sections) and also shows the 
most variability. These facts suggest that it was the section of primary 
importance, and its details were draed (and in some cases repeated) 
in accordance with the legal opinions of the scribes or to adapt the 
document to local conditions or requirements.124
 From this structure it is reasonable to conclude that the main function 
of this iggeret was to provide the purchaser of the land with the same kind of 
status and protection om adverse claims that he would get om an ordinary 
deed of sale. Though it was important to affirm that the legal requirements, 
including the advertisement, were carried out correctly, this does not appear 
to have been the essential part of the document. The term biqqoret, in other 
words, refers to the “claim” of the widow or creditor which instigated the sale; 
that is, it refers to the circumstances under which the sale was made.125
124 There is also a sample quoted in the Encyclopedia Talmudit, om a source cited as נוסח בעל 
 nd); in this case the creditor has traced the land into) התרומות שער ג, הובא בבית יוסף סי‘ קג
the hands of the orphans, producing a שטרא דאדרכתא (tracing document). This sample, 
like those above, precludes a further variation:
ומן יומא דנן ולעלם לא יהא רשותא להאי למיתבעיה מידי בהאי ארעא  
 And om that day onwards this one shall have no right to make any claim in 
this land.
 and confirms the transfer of ownership in the following words:
ואחריות ההוא ארעא על פלוני בן פלוני דידיעא לנא דהוא מרא דארעא מן קדמת דנא  
 And liability of that land on X son of Y which is known to us is that he is the 
owner of that land om before.
125 In much the same way, for instance, a modern municipality that seizes land and sells it for 
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 This terminological effect is confirmed when we examine another 
example of an iggeret issued by a Beit Din, the iggeret mazon. Again, the 
iggeret form seems to have been used since this was not an ordinary deed 
of sale given by the owner to the purchaser, but a sale carried out by a Beit 
Din. The need for this document, as explained by Rav Yehudah,126 arose 
when a wife and children were le, through the death or absence of the 
husband, without adequate maintenance; the Beit Din was then authorized 
to take some of the husband’s assets held on deposit by someone else, or 
offer some of the husband’s land for sale. Rav Yehudah’s formulary gives a 
sample of an iggeret mazon issued to the purchaser in the case of a sale of 
land. The following sets out its operative sections:
Iggeret mazon: Formulary of Rav Yehudah Barzilai127
[א] ...אנו בית דין החתומים למטה כך היה דאתת קדמנא פלוניתא בת פלוני אשת פלוני 
וקבלת קדמנא ונתערמה על דחקה ועל צרכה ואמרת לפנינו ידיע לכון רבותי שהלך פלוני 
בעלה היום כמה ימים למדינת הים ולא הניח לי שיעור מזון אפי‘ לשלשה חדשים ואין לי 
סיפוק במה לזון ולהתפרנס ומעשה ידי אינן מגיעין לכלום ואני צריכה הרבה למזונות ועתה 
רבותי חושו לצרכי ועיינו במזונותי 
[ב] ואנו בית דין ראינו דבריה נכונים וחפשנו אחר ממון בעלה ולא מצאנו דבר ראוי למכור 
כמו שדה פלוני או תכשיט פלוני והרשינוה למוכרה והכריזו על אותה שדה והגיעו לכך וכך 
דינרין ועשינו בהכרזת השדה כדבעי וכאמור רבנן 
payment of arrears of taxes will issue a document called a “tax deed” to the purchaser. This 
document differs om an ordinary deed of sale (though it is intended to put the purchaser 
in the same position) and calls attention to the circumstances under which the sale was 
made. 
126 Rav Yehudah’s formulary (Halberstam, Book of Documents, 61-62) mentions four types of 
situations, which are here summarized:
…כגון שמת ראובן והניח אלמנה ויתומים והיה לו ממון אצל שמעון…כגון ראובן שהלך למדינת   
הים והוא במקום רחוק ויש לו מזון ביד אחרים…כגון מי שיש לו ממון אצל אחרים ונשטה (צ“ל 
ונשתטה)…כגון ראובן שיש לו אשה ובנים והלך למדינת הים או שמת והניח קרקעות…
 For example, if Reuven died leaving a widow and orphans, and he had [le] money 
with Shimon [as a deposit]…[or] Reuven went abroad a great distance, and had 
maintenance [or possibly ממון, money] with others…[or] someone had money with 
others and he became demented…[or] Reuven had a wife and children and went 
abroad or died, and le land…
127 Hebrew text om Halberstam, Book of Documents, 62-63; Halberstam has indicated 
possible errors in round brackets.
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[ג] לא יצא עליה לוקח שיתן בה כמו פלוני בן פלוני שנתן בה כך וכך דינרין וראינו אנו בית 
דין למוכרה להדין פלוני ופייסנוהו בכך כי היה חושש משום תרעומת שהוא במדינת הים 
שלא יערער עליו בכלום לכשיבוא וחזרנו על פלוני זה ופייסנוהו הרבה לקנותה ושמע 
ממנו וקנאה ממנו בכך וכך דינרין וצוינו לו להוציאן לאשתו במזונותיה כהוגן וכתיקון 
חכמים ולתת לה כל חדש וחדש כך וכך במזונותיה וכן עשה פלוני דנן
[ד] ולכך כתבנו לה מעשה בית דין זה שאנו בית דין מכרנו לו שדה זו לצורך מזון האשה 
ולא יהא כח לא ביד פלוני בעל האשה היום או מחר ולא ביד שום אדם לערער עליו בכלום 
ומעכשיו ילך פלוני זה הלוקח ויחזיק ויקנה שדה פלוני (מעשה) ויעשה בה כל חפצת נפשו 
הוא והבאים מכחו ויהא ראשי לירש ולהוריש לנחול ולהנחיל ולעשות בה כל חפצת נפשו 
מהיום ולעולם...ועל פלוני בעל האשה ועל יורשיו אחריו לפצות ולהדיח ולסלק מעל פלוני 
זה ומעל יורשיו אחריו כל ערעורין שבעולם ולהעמיד שדה זה שזכרנו לו בחזקתו ובחזקת 
הבאים מכחו בלא שום פסידא בעולם ובכן אם יצא על שדה זו שום כתב וקיום בעולם על 
פלוני זה בעל האשה ועל יורשיו אחריו ולסלקו ולפצתו מעל פלוני זה הלוקח ומעל יורשיו 
אחריו כי כן מכרנוהו לו אנו בית דין כדי שתהא אחריותו על פלוני זה ועל יורשיו אחריו כי 
מכיון שמכרנוהו אנו בית דין לצורך מזונות אשתו כאלו הוא מכרה בעצמו דמי ויפינו כח 
הלוקח שתהא אחריותו עליו ועל יורשיו כאחריות וכחומר כל שטר מכירות... כתבנו וחתמנו 
מעשה בית דין זה ונתננוהו ביד פלוני זה להיות בידו וביד הבא מכחו לראיה ולזכות...
Translation
(a) …We the Beit Din who[se names are] sealed below [state] thus: X, 
daughter of Y, wife of Z, came before us and approached us and made plain 
her distress and need. She said before us: ‘It should be known to you today, 
my lords, that Z (her husband) went abroad days ago, and did not leave me 
a maintenance portion for even three months; and I do not have enough 
to maintain or support myself, and what I earn amounts to nothing, and I 
require much for maintenance. Now, my lords, consider my need and look 
out for my maintenance.’ 
(b) We the Beit Din deemed her words to be correct. We sought assets of 
her husband and did not find anything suitable [for her] to sell [on her 
own], such as a particular field or jewelry, so we authorized her to sell it. 
They advertised this same field, and it came to such and such dinarin, and 
we conducted the advertisement as required and stated by the Sages.
(c) The only buyer who emerged who would give such and such dinarin was 
A son of B, and we the Beit Din deemed it acceptable to sell [the field] to 
this person. We had to persuade him about this, because he was worried 
about a complaint [from] the one abroad, that he did not return and make 
any claim against him. We went back to A and exerted much pressure on 
him to buy it, and he listened to us and bought it from us for such and such 
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dinarin. We ordered him to take out [from the sale price] the amount of 
maintenance for his [i.e., the absent husband’s] wife that was appropriate and 
prescribed by the Sages, and to give her such and such each month for her 
maintenance. And A did so.
(d) For this reason, we have written for her this instrument of the Beit Din, 
that we the Beit Din sold him this field for the wife’s maintenance. Neither 
Z, the woman’s husband, nor any person shall have the power today or in 
the future to claim against him [the buyer] for anything. A, the buyer, may 
now go and possess and acquire this field, and he, as well as anyone under 
his authority, may do whatever he pleases with it, and is allowed to succeed 
to it and transmit it, to inherit it and bequeath it, and do whatever he pleases 
with it, for now and for ever… Z the husband and his heirs after him must 
save and clear and remove from A and his heirs after him any claims in the 
world, and to place him, and everyone under his authority, in possession of 
this field that we [s]old128 him, with no loss at all. Similarly, if any writing or 
attestation in the world emerges with respect to the field, [the responsibility] 
is on Z the husband and his heirs after him to remove [it] and deliver A the 
buyer and his heirs after him. For in this way we the Beit Din have sold [it] 
to him, that the responsibility for it shall be on [Z] and his heirs; since we 
the Beit Din sold it to [A] to protect [Z’s] wife, it is the same as it he sold it 
himself. We have perfected the power of the buyer, so that the responsibility 
[to maintain the buyer in possession or free from claims] is on [Z] and his 
heirs, like the liability and substance of any deed of sale… We have written and 
sealed this instrument of the Beit Din and put it in the hand of this A, to be for 
him and anyone under his authority as evidence and right…
The structure of this document is thus seen to be quite similar to that in 
the iggeret biqqoret samples:
1) A statement of how the Beit Din came to be involved, in this case 
as the result of a plea by the wife that she was le without adequate 
support when her husband went abroad.
2) An affirmation that certain land of the husband was chosen by the Beit 
Din for sale and was advertised.
128 The Hebrew here has זכרנו, but this may be מכרנו.
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3) A confirmation that the property was purchased and the purchase 
amount used to provide the wife with an income for her maintenance.
4) A detailed direction protecting the purchaser om any claims, particularly 
om the husband, and confirming that the transfer to the buyer has the 
same effect as if it had been made by the husband himself. 
 We may note, first, that advertisement is also an element in this type 
of sale. Second, the protection against claims is again emphasized, it being 
in fact stated that the iggeret was issued precisely because the purchaser was 
worried about such claims. Third, as in the case of the iggeret biqqoret, the 
term mazon calls attention to the circumstances under which the sale was 
made; though advertisement is also a feature of this sale, this fact does not 
figure in the name of the deed.
 There are also samples of an iggeret mered, issued by a Beit Din in the 
case of a “rebellious wife.” As Gulak interprets the wording of the two 
samples he quotes,129 the effect of the document was to cancel the husband’s 
obligations under the wife’s ketubbah; the wording of the document attests 
to a public tearing-up of the ketubbah along with a declaration that the 
husband was now ee to marry someone else.130
 From these samples it may thus be concluded that an iggeret was a 
document issued by a Beit Din that cancelled a right that would normally 
be cancelled by a private document (such as a deed of sale or a get). Its title 
conventionally referred to the circumstances under which the Beit Din 
became involved – biqqoret meaning “claim,” mazon referring to a widow’s 
maintenance, and mered meaning “rebelliousness.”
c) Conclusion
We may thus propose that the Mishnah and Tosea sections quoted 
above are predicated upon the assumption that the iggeret biqqoret was 
equivalent to a deed of sale. Unless such a document was given to the 
129 Asher Gulak, A Compendium of Documents Used in Israel [in Hebrew] (Sifriyah Mishpatit 
5; 1926), 65-6⒍ 
130 In cases in which polygamy was allowed, any contractual restriction on taking another wife 
was also cancelled.
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purchaser, his right to the property could be challenged on the ground of 
a misevaluation (within certain limits). Such a situation would leave the 
purchaser in a precarious position; hence the issuing of the iggeret might 
also act as an enticement to otherwise reluctant buyers. The dictum עבדים 
 There is no iggeret biqqoret for male or) ושפחות ומיטלטלין אין להם אגרת בקרת
female slaves or for movable property) in yMeg. 4:4 65b, quoted above, may 
be understood on its plain meaning (despite the explanations of R. Yudah 
and Ulla) that no deed was necessary in these cases: for מטלטלין (moveable 
property), deeds were not required in any event (mQidd. 1:5); and in this 
particular case, slaves were treated as 131.מטלטלין
4.4.4.B Sanctified Property and biqqoret: tArakh. 4:3
A number of regulations in Mishnah and Tosea discuss the case of property 
subject to the claim of a wife’s ketubah, or to the claim of a creditor, when the 
property had previously been sanctified or dedicated to Temple use (heqdesh). 
The question in this case is which of the claims would take precedence. 
MArakh. 6:1 (last part) appears to give the “human” debt precedence:
המקדיש נכסיו והיתה עליו כתבת אשה רבי אליעזר אומר כשיגרשנה ידיר הנאה 
רבי יהושע אומר אינו צריך...
One who sanctifies his property and was subject to a claim for his wife’s 
ketubbah – R. Eliezer says: When he divorces her, he makes her forswear 
any [future] benefit [from him, so that he cannot remarry her and recover 
the property free of the obligation of heqdesh]; R. Yehoshua says: It is not 
necessary…
 MArkhin 6:2 appears to confirm this, but specifies the mechanism: the 
property is redeemed om heqdesh, by paying any additional value:
המקדיש נכסיו והיתה עליו כתבת אשה ובעל חוב אין האשה יכולה לגבות כתובתה מן ההקדש 
ולא בעל חוב את חובו אלא הפודה פודה על מנת לתן לאשה כתובתה ולבעל חוב את חובו
One who sanctifies his property and was subject to a claim for his wife’s 
131 As discussed above, with respect to the legal position of slaves a question arises as to 
whether they were, or were always, considered “property.” See also Introduction, n. 9⒍
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ketubbah and a creditor’s claim – the wife cannot claim her ketubbah [directly] 
from the heqdesh, nor can the creditor claim his debt, but the one who redeems 
[the heqdesh] does so on the condition of giving the wife [the amount of ] her 
ketubbah and the creditor [the amount of ] his debt.
 Tosefta Arakhin 4 discusses the same issue, again appearing to give the 
“human” debt precedence (4:1). Section 4:3 provides:
המקדיש את הבהמה ומתה יש לה פדיון
המקדיש את המתה אין לה פדיון
הפודה מיד הקדש שלא ביקורת הקדש פדוי שיד הקדש על העליונה...
If one sanctifies an animal and it dies, it can be redeemed.
If one sanctifies a dead animal, there is no redemption.
If one redeems something that has been sanctified, which is not biqqoret, the 
sanctified object is redeemed, since sanctification takes precedence…
 J. Neusner interprets tArakh. 4:3 as referring to situations in which the 
sanctified object is redeemed in exchange for an object of much less value; 
the redemption is still valid.132 He thus translates biqqoret here as “without 
a price [specified]”; it is not clear om where this translation is derived. It 
can be argued, however, that an interpretation of biqqoret as “claim” would 
fit this context as well; that is, if there is no competing claim (such as a 
ketubbah or debt), the redemption is deemed valid without an accounting. 
4.4.4.C PQR in Other Formulary Documents
Both S. Lieberman and E. Y. Kutscher133 noted several later manifestations 
of the root PQR that they suggested would support its connection with 
132 Jacob Neusner, A History of the Mishnaic Law of Holy Things (Leiden: Brill, 1979), 4:4⒋ 
The 18th century Tosea commentator David Pardo (Ḥasdei David) took the meaning of 
biqqoret om the traditional understanding of iggeret biqqoret:
פי‘ בלא שומא והכרזה הנקרא אגרת בקורת  
 The meaning is ‘without valuation and advertisement,’ which is called iggeret 
biqqoret.
 Again, it is difficult to see why an unvalued and unadvertised item could not be redeemed.
133 Lieberman, Tosefta KiFeshutah 6:360, n.25; Kutscher, “Terminology of Documents,” 12⒍
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dispute or claim; this is the noun פיקאר, which Lieberman translated as 
 This word is found, for instance, in bTa’an. 24b, at least in the .תביעה וריב
version quoted in the Arukh (s.v. פקר I). Rabbah had sentenced someone to 
punishment, as a result of which the person died; the Persian King Shapur 
was about to interfere, but was warned by his mother: לא ליהוי פיקר בהדי 
 This phrase might be translated “not to have any claim/dispute with .יהודאי
these Jews,” perhaps warning the king not to challenge Rabbah’s right to 
impose a death sentence; but it must be noted that the version of the phrase 
in the standard Bavli edition has יהודאי בהדי  דברים  עסק  ליהוי   which ,לא 
suggests more simply “not to have any dealings with these Jews.”134
 Lieberman and Kutscher also noted the appearance of the word in several 
later formularies, as part of a document called a שטר אביזריא. Assaf describes 
this document as a 135ופצוי מחילה   in other words, a document in — שטר 
which one person acknowledges that he is forgiving certain claims against 
another person. Among the lists of items forgiven are included the words 
וה[ימ]ר פיקר  כל   Though the general import of the document (as in .ומן 
the iggeret biqqoret) is that the person making the document is thereaer 
precluded om raising these claims again, it is difficult to know precisely 
what these two terms mean.136 Thus the term פיקר, though suggestive, does 
not have an explicit association with the idea of “claim.”
4.4.4.D The Association of hevqer/hefqer with “Claim”
 The concept of hevqer/hefqer, eed or abandoned property, is not found 
in the Bible, as noted by Herzog;137 much debate, however, exists around 
this concept in the Talmudim. Though terms such as “property” and 
134 For the question of whether Jewish courts retained the right to impose capital penalties 
see Simḥah Assaf, “The Punishments aer the End of the Talmud” [in Hebrew], Sifriyah 
Mishpatit 1 (1922): ⒗ 
135 Assaf, “Sefer HaShetarot,” 22 n. ⒉ 
136 As Loewenstamm noted (“Biqqoret Tihyeh,” 96 n. 13). The phrase quoted oen appears 
in the formulary of Rav Hai Gaon (Assaf, “Sefer HaShetarot,” 23); the version in the 
formulary of Rav Yehudah ben Barzilai is היאמר ולא  פיקאר  לא  עליו  לי   ,Halberstam) ואין 
Book of Documents, 10). There does not appear to be agreement as to the meaning of these 
terms, though Halberstam suggests that R. Yehudah’s phrase means, “I have no quarrel or 
account with him.”
137 I. Herzog, The Main Institutions of Jewish Law (London: Soncino, 1980), 1:28⒐
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“ownership” are difficult to transpose om one language or legal system 
to another, B. Cohen138 suggests that hevqer/hefqer would be included 
within the Roman term derelictio, and can be defined as להם שאין   נכסים 
 :items that have no owners). Cohen notes four types of hevqer/hefqer) בעלים
items that have never had owners (such as wild animals), items deliberately 
abandoned by their current owners, and items rendered ownerless either 
through the effect of the law (for instance, the property of a convert who 
dies without Israelite heirs) or as a deliberate penalty by a court.139 In all 
four cases, however, the essence of hevqer/hefqer, as the Hifil form suggests, 
was that it was immediately “claimable” by someone else.140 The rabbinic 
debates illustrate this point, as they center around the question of when 
precisely one can be considered dissociated om one’s property: Is this 
accomplished by the mere declaration of the owner, or must the property 
first be seized by someone else for the abandonment to be “consummated”? 
One may see the workings of this debate in mNed. 4:8, concerning the case 
of someone who has vowed not to receive any benefit om his iend; the 
issue concerns whether there is any way for the iend to give him food 
when he has no means of obtaining it otherwise:
1. היו מהלכין בדרך ואין לו מה יאכל נותן לאחר משם מתנה והלה מותר בה.
2. אם אין עמהם אחר מניח על הסלע או על הגדר ואומר הרי הן מובקרים לכל 
3. מי שיחפוץ והלה נוטל ואוכל ורבי יוסה אוסר.
Variants:
מופקרין = ר 2. מובקרים] = ק פ ל  
If they [the one who vowed and his friend] were en route, and he had nothing 
to eat – [the friend] gives [food] to another person as a gift, and it is then 
permitted to [the one who vowed]. If there is no other person with them, 
138 Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, 2:⒒ Cohen suggests that the Roman derelictio would also 
include the rabbinic concept of יאוש, “resignation” or “forsaking,” basically the point at 
which the owner of the objects that have been lost or stolen is deemed to despair of having 
them returned. I shall here concentrate specifically on the concept of hevqer/hefqer.
139 Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, 2:11-⒓, 11-⒓ 
140 As noted above (n. 85), Spieser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” 35, and Kutscher, “Terminology 
of Documents,” also suggested a relationship between the Akkadian BQR/PQR and 
postbiblical Hebrew hevqer/hefqer, but gave no explanations for this opinion.
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[the friend] places [the food items] on a rock or fence and says: ‘These are 
abandoned to anyone who wants [them],’ and [the one who vowed] takes 
them and eats. But R. Yose forbids this.
 The view of R. Yose is explained in bNed. 43a:
אמר ר‘ יוחנן מ“ט דר‘ יוסי קסבר הפקר כמתנה מה מתנה עד דאתיא מרשות נותן 
לרשות מקבל הפקר עד דאתי לרשות זוכה
R. Yoḥanan said: What is the reason of R. Yose? He was of the opinion that 
hefqer is like a gift. Just as a gift [is not effective] until it comes from the 
control of the giver into the control of the taker, so hefqer [is not effective] 
until it comes into the control of the acquirer.
 Contrary, therefore, to the general view of the sages in the above 
Mishnah, R. Yose held that hefqer was not complete until some third party 
had claimed the item; such a claim could not be accomplished in this case 
because the vow-taker had prohibited himself any benefit om his iend.141 
 The specific issue of whether or not hefqer/hevqer takes effect only when 
the item is claimed by someone else is of particular interest as it applies 
to slaves. The question of when precisely the “tie” between master and 
slave is broken becomes especially relevant in unusual situations, such as 
the flight and capture of the slave, or the master’s abandonment of the 
slave; in the latter case, is the abandonment of the slave in effect equivalent 
to manumission? The Talmudim grappled here with the interrelationship 
of the two concepts: whether hefqer required a transfer of control, and 
141 The issue of the exact point of transfer over an item arose also in cases other than hefqer. 
We may note here one such example om bEruv. 71a. The issue concerns how the death 
of a ger who had no heirs would affect his share of an eruv, and the underlying principle 
of the debate is expressed in terms of the view of the two Houses regarding when transfer 
would pass:
אלא הכא בהא קמיפלגי דב”ש סברי ביטול רשות מיקנא רשותא הוא ומיקנא רשותא בשבת   
אסור וב”ה סברי אסתלוקי רשותא בעלמא הוא ואסתלוקי רשותא בשבת שפיר דמי
 What is the nature of the dispute? The House of Shammai are of the opinion 
that a cancellation of ownership [automatically] confers the acquisition of 
[that] ownership [on the successor], and conferring ownership on Sabbath is 
forbidden; and the House of Hillel is of the opinion that it is just the giving up 
of ownership, and the giving up of ownership on Sabbath seems fine. 
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whether the slave could ever receive control of himself while still a slave. The 
following ruling expressed in yGit. 4:4 45d, it has been suggested, parallels 
Roman law,142 which held that an abandoned slave remained a slave, but 
without an owner (servus derelictus).143 According to the Yerushalmi ruling, 
an abandoned slave remained in a similar kind of limbo; the master who 
abandoned him could make no use of him, but on the other hand, could 
not manumit him:
ר‘ אבהו בשם רבי יוחנן אמר המפקיר את עבדו אינו רשאי לשעבדו 
ואינו רשאי לכתוב לו גט שיחרור
R. Abahu said in the name of R. Yoḥanan: he one who declares his slave hefqer may 
not cause him to serve, but also may not write him a deed of manumission. 
 The Babylonian opinion (bGitt. 38ab) on the other hand, appears to 
allow the severing of one’s relationship with a slave through abandonment, 
though there was a dispute as to the further necessity of a get:
דאמר שמואל המפקיר עבדו יצא לחרות ואינו צריך גט שיחרור...
דאמר רב חייא בר אבין אמר רב אחד זה ואחד זה יצא לחירות וצריך גט שחרור...
As Samuel said: [If ] one declares his slave hefqer, [the slave] goes out free, 
and does not require a deed of manumission…
As Rav Ḥiyya bar Avin said in the name of Rav: Both the one [the slave 
declared hefqer] and the other [the slave declared sanctified] go out free, and 
require a deed of manumission…144
142 Solomon Zeitlin, “Hefqer and Yei’ush,” [in Hebrew], in Studies in the Early History of 
Judaism, (New York: Ktav, 1978), 4:45⒈
143 See, e.g., W. W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in 
Private Law from Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 
27⒋ Buckland in fact argued that Jewish law did not admit of such a class of slaves without 
masters, since slavery was relative, and eedom was merely “hidden by the power of the 
master” (ibid., n. 7); thus without a master, there was no slave.
144 Maimonides accepted the opinion of Rav as definitive (Hil. Avadim, 8:13):
המפקיר עבדו יצא לחרות וצריך גט שחרור ואם מת האדון שהפקירו היורש כותב לו גט שחרור  
 If one abandons his slave, he goes out ee and requires a deed of manumission; and if 
the master who abandoned him dies, his heir writes him a deed of manumission.
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 The Yerushalmi commentators were aware of this discrepancy of 
opinion, and attempted to reconcile R. Yoḥanan’s comment in yGitt. with 
the Bavli by explaining that it was not that the master was prohibited om 
writing a manumission deed, but that he need not do so:
ואינו רשאי: כלומר שאינו מחוייב דס“ל המפקיר עבדו א“צ גט שחרור דס“ל כשמואל
בבלי דף ל“ח... [פ“מ]
‘He may not [write a deed of manumission]’: that is to say, he is not obligated, 
for he thinks that the one who declares his slave hefqer – he [the slave] does 
not need a deed of manumission, for he thinks like Shmuel in bGitt. 38 
[Penei Moshe = Moshe Margolis, 18th century]
ה“ג ואינו צריך לכתוב לו גט שחרור... [ק“ה]
We read it this way: ‘He does not have to write him a deed of manumission.’ 
[Qorban HaEdah = David Fraenkel, 18th c.]
 More recent opinion attempts to attribute the difference to foreign 
influence. S. Zeitlin argued that the two passages reflect a difference 
between eastern and western opinion, with the latter possibly influenced by 
Roman law. B. Cohen, on the other hand, seems to read all these opinions 
as establishing hefqer equal to manumission, with the main difference being 
whether or not a get was required; in his opinion, the view of Samuel in 
bGitt. possibly reflected a later, more liberal Roman attitude.145
 In summary, there is rabbinic evidence that the concept of hefqer, 
especially as it applied to slaves, was understood as rendering something 
in one’s possession as claimable by someone else. The literal meaning of 
lehafqir, in other words, may be taken as “to cause to claim,” consistent 
with a Qal meaning of “to claim.”
4.4.4.E The Proposed Meaning of biqqoret
 Based on the analysis above, it may be argued that the word biqqoret in 
Lev. 19:20, like its postbiblical counterpart (and related BQR/PQR terms) 
145 Zeitlin, “Hefqer and Yei’ush,” 451; B. Cohen, Jewish and Roman Law, 2:19-⒛
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refers to a claim, in the general sense of a contestation of a relationship. It 
need not imply a return of the item claimed, but it may include a right to 
be compensated or a right to dispute a status.
4.5 CONCLUSION
 On its surface, Lev. 19:20-22 seems to suggest that female slaves 
are incapable of “marriage” by deeming that a sexual transgression with 
such a woman, unlike that with a be’ulat ba’al, is not considered to be 
adultery. It has been proposed, however, that the concern of the Lev. 
19:20 pericope is not with slave-ee intermarriage, but rather to speci 
which of competing “users” of a shifḥah is to maintain control over her. 
This conclusion is largely based on a survey of the meanings of the hapaxes 
neḥerefet and biqqoret in verse 20, as well as a functional comparison to 
LE 3⒈ It has been argued that the term neḥerefet in Lev. 19:20 is the 
Nifal of the biblical verb ḤRP I, which carries the general connotation 
of a diminution of status (a connotation that can also be seen in some 
instances of the possible Akkadian cognate harāpu I). In this instance 
(as in other biblical occurrences of forms of ḤRP I, such as ḥerpah in 
Gen. 30:23), it carries the specific meaning of debasement associated with 
“improper” sexuality. It has also been suggested that biqqoret carries the 
general meaning of “claim.” It has been argued that there are other biblical 
instances of BQR for which the meaning “claim” is appropriate, that the 
biblical term is cognate with Akkadian BQR/PQR forms, which themselves 
can carry the general meaning of “claim,” and that the root בקר|פקר BQR/
PQR in postbiblical Hebrew, at least in the forms biqqoret and hevqer/
hefqer, continued to carry the meaning of “claim.”
 Lev. 19:20 may thus be translated as follows:
If a man has carnal relations with a shifḥah, who has been debased by a man, 
but has not been redeemed or given her freedom, there shall be a claim; they 
shall not, however, be put to death, since she has not been freed.
 The effect of Lev. 19:20-22 is thus to speci that while this situation 
is not one of adultery, there is recognition of a difference between an 
exclusive sexual relationship with a wife (where adultery does apply) 
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and a casual relationship with a shifḥah. There is no hint, however, of a 
prohibition against “intermarriage” with slaves. Together with the analysis 
in chapters one and two, therefore, it may be argued that there is no direct 
biblical evidence that female slaves could not function as “wives.”
 With respect to the second element of the matrilineal principle, an 
assumption that a child’s slave status would be inherited through its 
mother, it has been argued that Exod. 21:4 does not support such an 
assumption. The next chapter will continue analysis of the matrilineal 
principle in rabbinic literature. 
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5.1 INTRODUCTION
As we have noted in the Introduction, mQidd. 3:12 sets out a matrilineal 
principle for the inheritance of slave status. As we have noted in previous 
chapters, it is unlikely that such a principle existed in the Bible. Further, 
a survey of other tannaitic sources leads to the conclusion that even in 
postbiblical law there were other principles of inheritance that competed 
with the matrilineal idea, especially where slavery was seen to interact with 
other “variables,” such as ethnicity. We shall examine in particular rabbinic 
attitudes to the inheritance of slavery with respect to three different rules:
a) MQidd. 1:2 provides that a Hebrew amah is to be released at puberty, 
that is, at the appearance of two pubic hairs.1 This rule does not have a 
direct biblical precedent, either in Exod. 21:7 regarding the amah sold 
by her father or in Deut. 15:12 regarding the amah who is to be released 
aer six years. I propose that this was a deliberate mishnaic addition 
in response to the matrilineal principle, a necessary addition to the 
manumission list for Hebrew females. That is, given the assumption in 
the Mishnah of a matrilineal inheritance of slave status, it was desirable 
that the Hebrew female should be eed before she could give birth 
to any “native-born” Hebrew slaves. A review of various postbiblical 
sources reveals that the manumission “list” for Hebrews in general, and 
1 For an overview of the issue of puberty and legal minority and majority through the end 
of the gaonic period see Tirzah Meacham (leBeit Yoreh), Sefer Ha-Bagrut Le-Rav Shemu’el 
Ben Ḥofni Ga’on Ve-Sefer Ha-Shanim Le-Rav Yehudah Ha-Kohen (Jerusalem: Yad ha-Rav 
Nisim, 5759), especially 17-2⒌
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females in particular, had in fact several different permutations. One may 
demonstrate here a non-linear development in genealogical principles. 
b) Leviticus 25:44-46 (with respect to the purchase of slaves “om the 
nations that surround you”) appear to speci that “permanent” slaves 
may only be purchased om among non-Hebrews. An issue then 
arises as to a possible conflict with the provisions regarding the various 
“banned” nations in Deut. 7:1-3 and 20:16-⒘ Among the various 
sources to be reviewed in this chapter, one’s “nationality,” and hence 
“enslavability,” appears to have been determined patrilinealy. This 
principle led in some cases to conflicts with the matrilineal idea. 
c) We have noted in chapter one that the mishnaic matrilineal principle 
is asymmetric with respect to the status of the offspring in slave-
ee intermarriages: if the mother is a slave, the child is also a slave 
(mQidd. 3:12), while if the mother is ee, the child is a mamzer 
according to some opinions (mYev. 7:5). There is, however, evidence of 
a rule according to which all children of such “mixed” marriages were 
considered mamzerim.
 It may be posited, therefore, that the matrilineal principle that is 
reflected in mQidd. 3:12 was only one of a number of “genealogical” concepts 
that were put forward by the Sages. The above variability thus serves as 
evidence that attitudes regarding matrilineal inheritance of slavery were not 
consistent among postbiblical sages, lending further credence to the idea 
that this principle was not a direct, lineal derivative of biblical law.
  
5.2 THE FREEING OF THE HEBREW 
AMAH AT PUBERTY
5.2.1 Pentateuchal Rules on the Acquisition and Manumission of Slaves
Though mishnaic law in mQidd. 1:2-3 provides a systematic outline of the 
acquisition and manumission of slaves, this is not the case in the biblical 
text. The only explicit source of enslavement mentioned in the pentateuchal 
rules is sale: in the case of reduced circumstances (those covered by Lev. 
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25:10, 39 and 47, which are possibly self-sales given the use of the form 
nimkar), for the (Exod. 22:2, though it is not clear whether the thief is 
sold simply as punishment or also to provide recompense for his the), and 
in various unspecified circumstances (the male of Exod. 21:2, the daughter 
of Exod. 21:7, the males and females of Deut. 15:12, and the “foreigners” 
of Lev. 25:44). Various other of the conventional sources of slaves are 
mentioned implicitly; for instance, the enslavement of female captives aer 
marriage to them (yefat to’ar) appears to be forbidden by Deut. 21:10-14, 
om which one may deduce that such use of captives was familiar. The 
netinim (e.g., Ezra 2:58, Neḥ. 3:26) are generally considered to be hereditary 
temple slaves.2 Finally, as we have noted earlier, tradition assumes that 
Exod. 21:4 refers to the breeding of slaves om slave mothers.
 Far more detailed among the pentateuchal provisions are the 
regulations regarding the manumission of slaves. There are various 
differences in substance among these rules, the most obvious having to do 
with the different terms of years in each passage and the different “ethnic” 
designations, especially the use of ivri in Exod. 21:2, ivri/ivriyah in Deut, 
15:12, and aḥ in Leviticus 2⒌ For convenience, these major differences may 
be summarized in table form:
TYPES OF MANUMISSION APPLICABLE TO “ETHNIC” DESIGNATION
    Female   Male Categorization  
1) Fixed Term:
6 years (Exod. 21) no  yes ivri
6 years (Deut. 15) yes  yes aḥ, ha-ivri/ha-ivriyah 
Jubilee (Lev. 25) not clear yes aḥ
2) “Permanent” Service
eved olam (Exod. 21)  no  yes ivri
eved olam (Deut. 15) yes  yes  aḥ, ha-ivri/ha-ivriyah
bequeathed (Lev. 25) yes  yes om the surrounding 
       nations and toshavim
2 See, e.g., Haran, Encyclopedia Miqrait [=EM] (9 vols; Jerusalem: Mossad Bialik, 1968), 
5:984, s.v. נתינים; some  scholarly  opinion  finds  a  parallel  between  the  netinim and the 
Babylonian irkūtu institution (ibid., 985).
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3) Destruction  yes  yes none
of eye or tooth
(Exod. 21:25-6)
4) Redemption
pidyon (Exod. 21:8) yes  no bat ivri* 
ge’ulah (Lev. 25) not clear yes aḥ
5) Death of Master not clear yes** aḥ
(Lev. 25:44-5)
* By implication from the previous passage, Exod. 21:2-6, which deals with 
the eved ivri
** By implication from Lev. 25:44-5: if the non-aḥ could be bequeathed, one 
assumes that the aḥ could not, and his service would end upon the master’s 
death.
5.2.2 The Mishnaic Manumission Scheme for Hebrew Females
In mishnaic law significant additions and changes are apparent in the rules 
regarding the acquisition and manumission of slaves, including the idea 
that the Hebrew amah is to be released at puberty. These rules are found 
primarily in mQidd. 1:2-3:3 
Mishnah Qidd. 1: 2 (acquisition and release of a Hebrew slave)
1. עבד עברי נקנה בכסף ובשטר
2. וקונה את עצמו בשנים וביובל ובגרעון כסף.
3 The mishnayot om mQidd. 1:2-3 here and below are are quoted om the standard 
printed edition. Most of the differences in the MSS appear to be minor and of the type 
usually found in Middle Hebrew MSS: for instance, the use of plene spelling (especially in 
Kaufmann (ק) and Lowe Cambridge 470.1 (ל), and the exchange of the final ם for the final 
 and Rambam Mishnah text om his commentary in Judeo-Arabic ,ק and (פ) in Parma 138 ן
 שהיא) the use of abbreviations, and the use of the full antecedent in the relative clause (ר)
in line 3 of mQidd. 1:2, in MSS ק פ ל ר of the Mishnah codex). The latter is indicative of 
the Eretz-Yisraeli tradition while the shortened form ש – is a Babylonian development. JTS 
ENA 208⒌1 has only minor changes om this text though its evidence is incomplete due 
to the agmentary natrue of the manuscript.
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3. יתרה עליו אמה העבריה שקונה את עצמה בסימנין.
4. הנרצע נקנה ברציעה וקונה את עצמו ביובל ובמיתת האדון.
Translation
1. A Hebrew eved is acquired by money or deed,
2. and acquires himself by [a term of six] years, or by the [occurrence of the] 
Jubilee or by a diminution of the [purchase] money.
3. The Hebrew amah is in a better position than he is, as she acquires herself 
with signs [of puberty].
4. The nirtza is acquired by piercing [of his ear], and acquires himself by the 
[occurrence of the] Jubilee or by the death of the master.
Mishnah Qidd. 1:3 (acquisition and release of a Canaanite slave)
1. עבד כנעני נקנה בכסף ובשטר ובחזקה
2. וקונה את עצמו בכסף על ידי אחרים ובשטר על ידי עצמו דברי ר‘ מאיר.
3. וחכמים אומרים בכסף על ידי עצמו ובשטר על ידי אחרים ובלבד שיהא הכסף משל 
אחרים.
Variants4: Munich 95 skips part of the Mishnah in line 3 and reads as 
follows: 
וחכמים...אחרים] וחכמ‘ או‘ בכסף על ידי עצמו ובלבד שיהא הכסף משל אחרים
Both JTS ENA 208⒌1 and Rambam add the word אף aer וחכמים אומרים 
Translation
1. A Canaanite slave is acquired by money, deed, or usucaptio,
2. and acquires himself by money given by others, and a deed given by 
himself—these are the words of R. Meir.
3. The Sages say: by money given by himself, and a deed given by others, as 
long as the money belongs to others.
4 The last line of mQidd. 1:3 is the subject of scholarly debate, particularly with respect to its 
substance and relative date. I shall simply note the variants to it here, without commenting 
on these issues. The manuscripts checked include Munich 95, Oxford Opp. 248 (367), and 
Vatican 1⒒ Here, too, JTS ENA 208⒌1 attests to the reading presented above wherever 
the text is present.
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 We may note in general that there are various differences between this 
and the biblical scheme, including the mishnaic distinction between the 
“Canaanite” and the “Hebrew” and the fact that, in contrast to Weinfeld’s 
proposal that there was a developing tendency, as reflected in the D source, 
to think of the slave as an aḥ (brother),5 the Mishnah still refers to these 
people as eved, shifḥah, and amah. The Mishnah has also added material 
that has no direct biblical precedent: the rules of acquisition for Hebrews, 
the limitation of the term of the permanent slave to the Jubilee, all the 
rules for “Canaanites,” and most particularly, the release of the Hebrew 
amah at puberty. The Hebrew amah appears to get not only the modes 
of release of the Hebrew eved (the “manumission list” of שנים, יובל, גרעון 
 סימנים years, Jubilee, diminution of the [purchase] money), but also – ,כסף
(signs). In effect, the provisions of Exod. 21:7-11 have been ignored. 
 In this regard, a question arises as to the precise meaning of יתירה עליו 
(in a better position than he is): does it necessarily imply that the female 
receives everything that the male does, plus the extra element of “signs,” 
or does it imply merely that she is in a better position than he is because 
she is exempt om slavery once she reaches puberty? The definition of Ch. 
Kosovsky6 suggests that it implies the receipt of something additional:
יתר ...על: נופל על דבר שיש בו תוספת עודפת
In a better position...than: One happens upon something with a preferable 
supplement.
 Even-Shoshan, however, seems to suggest the idea of “advantageous 
position”:
יתר עליו: עדיף עליו
In a better position than: Superior to.
 Kadari notes,7 with respect to the semantic field of the mishnaic yeter/
yoter, that the word can serve as the opposite to both paḥot, “less [than 
5 Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School, 28⒊
6 Ch. Kosovsky, Concordance to the Mishnah [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Massadah, 5713), s.v. 
.יתר
7 Menahem Zevi Kadari, Syntax and Semantics in Postbiblical Hebrew [in Hebrew] (Ramat-
Gan: Bar Ilan University, 1995), 2:493.
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x]” (which would imply the presence of x plus something additional), and 
ḥaser, “lacking [x]” (which would imply the presence of x only). There are 
other occurrences of yeter … alav in the Mishnah that suggest that when 
this term is used as part of a list it does not necessarily imply inclusion of 
all members of the list. One such instance occurs in mKetub. 4:4:
האב זכאי בבתו בקדושיה בכסף ובשטר ובביאה, וזכאי במציאתה, ובמעשה ידיה, 
ובהפרת נדריה, ומקבל את גטה, ואינו אוכל פרות בחייה. נישאת – יתר עליו 
הבעל שאוכל פרות בחייה וחיב במזונותיה בפרקונה ובקבורתה...
A father has authority over his daughter with respect to her qiddushin by 
money, deed, and intercourse, and has control over what she finds, and her 
handiwork, and the annulment of her vows, and receives a get [on her behalf ], 
but does not have rights to the interest/produce [from her property] during 
her lifetime. If she is married, her husband is in a better position than he 
[the father] is, because he has rights to the interest during her lifetime, but 
is liable for her support, ransom, and burial...
 The phrase יתר עליה, “in a better position than her,” here would seem 
to refer only to the last point in the father’s list, the right to receive 
income; it cannot imply that the husband receives all the benefits of the 
father, since two of elements in the list (receipt of qiddushin and get on 
the woman’s behalf ) are inapplicable to the husband. This issue, therefore, 
is not straightforward, and this lack of precision can be seen in various 
talmudic discussions.
5.2.3 The “Manumission List” in Midreshei Halakhah 
As noted above, the Mishnah overlooks the provisions of Exod. 21:7-
11 with respect to the Hebrew amah. Mekhilta de R. Yishmael, Neziqin, 
parshah 3 (Lauterbach)8 appears to address this very issue, explaining how 
the Exodus section was to be reconciled with the provisions of Leviticus 
and Deuteronomy:9 
8 The quotation is taken om Lauterbach’s edition Mekhilta de R. Ishmael, Neziqin, p. 70, 
rather than Horovitz’s edition, because the text in Horovitz has internal references with 
abbreviated texts in this section.
9 The other reconciliations in the Mekhilta include the following:
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לא תצא כצאת העבדים לא תצא בראשי איברים כדרך שהכנענים יוצאים אתה אומר 
לא תצא בראשי איברים כדרך שהכנענים יוצאים או לא תצא בשנים וביובל כדרך 
שהעבדים יוצאים ת“ל כי ימכר לך אחיך העברי או העבריה ועבדך שש שנים מגיד 
שהיא יוצאה בשש וביובל מנין ת“ל כי עבדיי הם מכל מקום הא אין עליך לדון כלשון 
אחרון אלא כלשון ראשון לא תצא כצאת העבדים לא תצא בראשי איברים כדרך 
שהכנענים יוצאים.
She shall not go out as the avadim do [Exod. 21:7]—She shall not go out upon 
damage to the primary members [of the body] as the Canaanites do.10 You 
say [this means] she shall not go out upon damage to the primary members 
as the Canaanites do, but is it that she shall not go out with [a term of ] 
years or the Jubilee like the [Hebrew] slaves go out? Scripture states [Deut. 
15:12]: If your fellow Hebrew, male or female, is sold to you, they shall serve you 
six years —this indicates she goes out in six [years]. And whence do we know 
she goes out in the Jubilee year? Scripture states [Lev. 25:42]: They are my 
slaves—in all cases. Therefore [since the six years and Jubilee term are already 
covered], you must determine the matter according to the former language, 
not the latter. She shall not go out as the avadim do [means] she shall not go 
out upon damage to the primary members as the Canaanites do.
 Exodus 21:7 is thus interpreted as a contrast to the treatment of 
Canaanite slaves in Exod. 21:26-2⒎ The latter passage in fact makes no 
explicit reference to the ethnicity of the slave, Canaanite or otherwise. 
 a) Exod. 21:2-6 deals with the Hebrew eved sold into slavery by a court as punishment for 
a crime.
 b) The talionic-type release in Exod. 21:26-7 is taken to refer only to “Canaanite” slaves.
 c) Deut. 15:17, which seems to give the female the right to remain an eved olam, is taken 
as being limited to the words העניק תעניק לו in v. 14 – that is, one also has an obligation 
to provide maintenance for the Hebrew amah upon her release, but she does not become 
a permanent slave.
10 This is based on the quasi-talionic provisions of Exod. 21:26-⒎ The restriction of these 
provisions to “Canaanites,” though nowhere explicit in the biblical text, is also found in 
the Mekhilta de R. Ishmael (Neziqin, Lauterbach, p. 70), apparently based on the similar 
use of the terms eved and amah in Lev. 25:44:
רבי אליעזר אומר בכנעני הכתוב מדבר אתה אומר בכנעני הכתוב מדבר או אינו אלא בעברי ת”ל תקנו עבד 
ואמה
 R. Eliezer says: Scripture [at Exod. 21:26-7] speaks of a Canaanite slave. You say Scripture 
speaks of a Canaanite, but perhaps it is only a Hebrew? Thus it is stated [Lev. 25: 44]: 
[From them, i.e., non-Hebrews] you may buy an eved and an amah.
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Frankel11 has argued that the tradition reflected in the Mekhilta may already 
be reflected in the LXX translation of Exod. 21:7, which reads: ἐὰν δέ τις 
ἀποδῶται τὴν ἑαυτοῦ θυγατέρα οἰκέτιν οὐκ ἀπελεύσεται ὥσπερ ἀποτρέχουσιν αἱ 
δοῦλαι (And if anyone sells his daughter as an οἰκέτις, she shall not depart as 
the δοῦλαι [feminine] depart.) The LXX seems to be using the two different 
terms, οἰκέτις and δοῦλη, to emphasize that the amah of Exodus 21 is an 
οἰκέτις, and she does not go out as the female slaves (δοῦλαι) do (in place of 
ha-avadim of the MT). Frankel, in fact, saw little significance in this use of 
the feminine form δοῦλαι, arguing this use was probably an unintentional 
reflection of the feminine θυγατέρα, “daughter.” The primary significance 
of the LXX translation, in his view, lay in the use of the different terms 
οἰκέτις and δοῦλαι. Elsewhere in the LXX, he suggests, forms of δοῦλος are 
used for “foreign slaves” (e.g., Lev. 25:44). Thus in his opinion the LXX 
is making the same distinction as the Mekhilta de R. Ishmael above, which 
interpreted Exod. 21:7 as restricted to “Canaanite slaves.” Like the rabbinic 
halakhah, therefore, the LXX has reconciled Exod. 21:7 and Deut. 15:12: as 
distinct om the οἰκέτις and her specific rules in Exodus, the δοῦλη in Deut. 
would follow the usual rule and go out, like the male, in six years; that is, 
all except for the οἰκέτις go out in six years. 
  Even accepting Frankel’s assessment of the significance of this LXX 
distinction in terms, the question still remains as to the precise meaning 
of οἰκέτις. As we have noted earlier, the meaning of any of the Greek 
“slave” terms, both in the LXX and elsewhere, is difficult to pinpoint. In 
Schenker’s opinion, the οἰκέτις in verse 7 refers specifically to someone 
intended for marriage.12 Yet elsewhere in the LXX, as we have seen, οἰκέτις 
is also found for the translation of shifḥah (Lev. 19:20, Prov. 30:23) while 
in other translations of MT shifḥah and amah (including the amah of 
Deut. 15:17), one finds παιδισκη or δοῦλη. In analyzing the masculine term 
οἰκέτης, Spicq13 notes a range of associations: it is used for eved in the LXX, 
apparently thus suggesting a “slave,” but it is also used for people who do 
not seem “servile,” and is oen a synonym of ὑπηρέτης, the meanings of 
11 Zechariah Frankel, Über den Einfluss der palästinischen Exegese auf die alexandrinische 
Hermeneutik (Leipzig: 1831; repr. Westmead: Gregg International Publishing, 1972), 9⒈
12 Schenker, “Affranchissement,” 55⒉ Similarly, Chirichigno, Debt-Slavery, 251, goes so far 
as to state that the MT amah means something other than a (chattel) slave in this case.
13 Spicq, “Le vocabulaire de l’esclavage,” 218-⒚
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which include “assistant” and “aide-de-camp” (Liddell/Scott). Gibbs and 
Feldman discuss the use of οἰκέτις in the later books of the LXX, Josephus, 
and contemporary papyri, concluding that in all these sources this and 
other “slave” terms were increasingly regarded as synonyms.14  
 The Mekhilta also attempts a derivation for the association of the 
Hebrew amah with signs based on the wording of Exod. 21:⒒ The precise 
hermeneutics, however, are not at all clear:15 
אבא חנין אומר משום רבי אליעזר ויצאה חנם בבגר אין כסף בסימנין
Aba Ḥanin said in the name of R. Eliezer: She shall go out for nothing [Exod. 
21:11]—[This means] as an adult. With no money [ibid.]—With signs.
 These passages thus confirm for the Hebrew amah a manumission 
list consisting of signs in addition to at least years and Jubilee. This list 
is at least partially confirmed in the other midrash halakhah to Exod, 
the Mekhilta de R. Shimon ben Yohai [=Mekh. deRashbi], Mishpatim, 21:7 
(Epstein-Melamed p.165); in this case, however, the exegesis is presented 
in the name of R. Akiva:
לא תצא כצאת העבדים: שלא תהא נוטלת אחריו דלאים ובלריות למרחץ דברי ר‘ 
אל[י]עזר אמ‘ לו ר‘ עקיב‘ אמר לו ר‘ עקיבא מה אני צריך והלא כבר נאמר לא תעבד 
בו עבדת עבד“ מה ת“ל לא תצא כצאת העבדים – שלא תהא יוצאה על השן ועל העין 
כעבדים שהיה בדין ומה עבד כנעני שאין יוצא בשנים וביובל ובגרעון כסף הרי הוא 
יוצא על השן ועל העין זו שיוצאה בשנים וביובל ובגרעון כסף אינו דין שיוצאה על 
השן ועל העין ת“ל לא תצא כצאת העבדים
She shall not go out like the avadim [Exod. 21:7]—[This means] that she shall 
not carry pails and ropes to the bath after him [the master]; these are the 
words of R. Eliezer [that is, v. 11 refers to the type or place of work, and 
14 Gibbs and Feldman, “Josephus’ Vocabulary for Slavery,” 290, 294, 29⒌ They also note that 
the differing patterns of use of “slave” terms throughout the LXX raises the possibility of 
separate authorships (ibid., 300).
15 Vermes, Post-Biblical Jewish Studies, 71 suggests that there were in fact two traditions of 
exegesis harmonizing Exod. 21:7-11 with the other provisions, both reflected in these 
passages of Mekhilta de R. Yishmael: one used the Exod. section to distinguish the Hebrew 
female om Canaanite slaves, and the other assumed that the section assigned to the 
female the special case of “signs” (two pubic hairs). He does not, however, explain the 
hermeneutic methods by which the concept of signs was actually derived om v. ⒒
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not to manumission]. R. Akiva said to him: Why do I need [v. 7 for that 
explanation]? Does it not already say: Do not work him [a Hebrew] with the 
work of an eved [Lev. 25: 39]? [Then] what does the Torah [mean by] She shall 
not go out like the avadim—that she shall not go out [because of a destroyed] 
tooth or eye like the avadim. It would be logical that if the Canaanite eved, 
who does not go out by [term of ] years, Jubilee, or diminution of price, 
goes out by [a destroyed] tooth and eye, she who does go out by [term of ] 
years, Jubilee, or diminution of price, would [all the more so] go out by [a 
destroyed] tooth and eye. Therefore the Torah must state: She shall not go out 
like the avadim [to exclude the latter possibility].
 This midrash thus confirms the manumission list for the amah as 
including the term of years, Jubilee, and diminution of price, though it 
contains no derivation of signs.
 In contrast, Sifrei Deut. pisqa 118 (Finkelstein 177) restricts the 
female’s manumission list to signs. The midrash in question addresses the 
reason that both males and females need to be mentioned specifically in 
Deuteronomy 15:
אחיך העברי או העבריה: יש בעברי מה שאין בעבריה ובעבריה מה שאין בעברי. 
עברי יוצא בשנים וביובל ובגרעון כסף, מה שאין כן בעבריה. עבריה יוצאה בסימנים 
ואינה נמכרת ונשנית ומפדים אותה על כרחה מה שאין כן בעברי. הא לפי שיש בעברי 
מה שאין בעבריה ובעבריה מה שאין בעברי צריך לומר בעברי וצריך לומר בעבריה.
 Your brother the Hebrew male or the Hebrew female [Deut. 15:12]—There 
are [matters applicable] to the Hebrew male that are not [applicable] to 
the Hebrew female, and [matters applicable] to the Hebrew female that 
are not [applicable] to the Hebrew male. The Hebrew male goes out by 
[term of ] years, the Jubilee, and diminution of price, which is not so for the 
Hebrew female. The Hebrew female goes out at signs [of puberty], is not 
sold a second time, and is redeemed against her will, which is not so for the 
Hebrew male. Thus since there are [matters applicable] to the Hebrew male 
that are not [applicable] to the Hebrew female, and [matters applicable] 
to the Hebrew female that are not [applicable] to the Hebrew male, it is 
necessary to refer [both] to the Hebrew male and to the Hebrew female.
 This midrash thus specifically excludes the application of שנים, יובל, גרעון 
 ,years, Jubilee, diminution of the [purchase] money) om the female) כסף
restricting her manumission to signs of puberty. In effect, contrary to the 
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Mishnah, the text specifically excludes the application of Deuteronomy and 
Leviticus to the Hebrew female, giving apparent priority to Exodus. 
 Further complexity is added upon an examination of Midrash Tannaim 
to Deut. 15:12 (Hoffman p.85). A passage is cited with the same format 
as that in Sifrei. Here, however, the emphasis is merely on the special case 
of סמנים, “signs”: there is neither a reconciliation with the other mishnaic 
provisions nor an exclusion of them:
ולמה צריך לומר העברי או העבריה לפי שיש בעבד עברי מה שאין באמה עבריה 
ובאמה עבריה מה שאין בעבד עברי עבד עברי בית דין מוכרין אותו ועובד את הבן 
מה שאין כן באמה עבריה ואמה עבריה יוצאה בסימנין ומפדין אותה בעל כרח האב 
מה שאין כן בעבד עברי הא לפי שיש בזה מה שאין בזה ויש בזה מה שאין בזה 
צריך לומר העברי או העבריה
Why is it necessary to state the Hebrew male or the Hebrew female? Because 
there are [matters applicable] to the Hebrew eved that are not [applicable] to 
the Hebrew amah, and to the Hebrew amah that are not [applicable] to the 
Hebrew eved. The Hebrew eved—the Beit Din can sell him, and he works 
for the son [after the death of the original master], which is not so for the 
Hebrew amah. And the Hebrew amah goes out at signs [of puberty] and is 
redeemed against the will of the father,16 which is not so for the Hebrew 
eved. Thus because there are [matters applicable] to this one and not to that 
one, and to that one and not to this one, it is necessary to state the Hebrew 
male or the Hebrew female.
5.2.4 The Manumission List in bQidd. 18a
A baraita in the Bavli adds yet further complexity to the issue of the 
manumission list:
תנו רבנן יש בעברי שאין בעבריה ויש בעבריה שאין בעברי. יש בעברי שהוא יוצא 
בשנים וביובל ובמיתת האדון מה שאין כן בעבריה. ויש בעבריה שהרי עבריה יוצאת 
בסימנין ואינה נמכרת ונשנית ומפדין אותה בעל כורחו מה שאין כן בעברי.
The rabbis taught [in a baraita]: There are [matters applicable] to a Hebrew 
male and not to a Hebrew female, and [matters applicable] to a Hebrew female 
and not to a Hebrew male. With respect to a Hebrew male, he goes out [from 
16 The expected form would be בעל כרחו של האב.
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slavery] after [a term of ] years, the Jubilee, and the death of the master, which 
is not so with the Hebrew female. And with respect to a Hebrew female, the 
Hebrew female goes out with signs of puberty, and is not sold twice, and she 
is redeemed against his will, which is not so for the Hebrew male. 
 The baraita thus suggests, like Sifrei Deut. pisqa 118 (Finkelstein 177), 
that the amah is restricted to signs. Yet there are two important differences 
between these sources: the talmudic baraita is associated with the reading 
כרחו האדון against his will), and the element) בעל   death of the) מיתת 
master) in the manumission list, whereas Sifrei Deut. has the reading בעל 
כסף against her will), and uses) כרחה  diminution of price) in the) גרעון 
manumission list.
 We may assume, given their common structure, that the talmudic baraita 
and Sifrei Deut. pisqa 118 are related. In that case, is it possible to tell which 
has the original readings? We shall focus on two variants in particular.
5.2.4.A “Against His/Her Will” (בעל כרחו – בעל כרחה)
The two Bavli MSS Munich 95 (כרחו בעל  אות‘   and Vatican 111 (ומפדין 
 .(against his will) בעל כרחו support the reading of (ופודין אותה בעל כורחו)
Oxford Opp. 245 (367) has an abbreviation here: ‘כרח. The reading בעל 
 against his will), however, is also attested elsewhere. Rashba, in his) כרחה
Ḥidushim to bQidd. 18, has: 
ת“ר יש בעברי מה שאין בעבריה ויש בעבריה וכו‘ שהעבריה יוצאב בסימנין ואינה 
נמכרת ונשנית ומפדין אותה בעל כרחה
Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: There are [matters applicable] to a Hebrew 
male and not to a Hebrew female, and [matters applicable] to a Hebrew 
female, etc.: the Hebrew female goes out with signs of puberty, and is not 
sold twice, and she is redeemed against her will. 
Further in the discussion the following sentence also appears:
...ותנא בה מפדין אותה בעל כרחה.
And he [the tanna] taught concerning her: They redeem her against her will. 
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 He did, however, question the absence of כסף  diminution of) גרעון 
price). From this it may be inferred that while he did have בעל כרחה (against 
her will) like the reading in Sifrei Deut, he did not have the complete Sifrei 
manumission list. 
 Finally, we may note that the Yalqut Shimoni attests to two readings:
ת“ר יש בעבריה מה שאין בעברי שהעבריה יוצאה בסימנין ומפדין אותה בעל כרחה 
ואינה נמכרת ונשנת. (שמות משפטים כ“ב)
Our rabbis taught [in a baraita]: There are [matters applicable] to a Hebrew 
female which are not [applicable] to a Hebrew male, the Hebrew female goes 
out with signs of puberty, and she is redeemed against her will, and is not sold 
twice. (Exod. Mishpatim 22)
אחיך העברי או העבריה: יש בעברי מה שאין בעבריה ובעבריה מה שאין בעברי.עברי יוצא 
בשנים וביובל ובגרעון כסף מה שאין כן בעבריה.עבריה יוצאה בסימנין ואין נמכרת ונשנת 
ומפדין אותה בעל כרח מה שאין כן בעברי.     (דברים ראה טו, רמז תתצח)
Your brother the Hebrew [male] or Hebrew [female] —There are [matters 
applicable] to a Hebrew male and not to a Hebrew female, and [matters 
applicable] to a Hebrew female and not to a male: The Hebrew male goes 
out [from slavery] after [a term of ] years, in the Jubilee, and with diminution 
of price, which is not so with the Hebrew female. The Hebrew female goes 
out with signs of puberty, and is not sold twice, and she is forcibly redeemed, 
which is not so for the Hebrew male.   (Deut. Re’ei 15, remez 88)
 Though it is thus difficult to trace the text history of this reading, it 
might be argued that בעל כרחה (against her will), at least om the point of 
view of logic, is the lectio difficilior, as it would imply that the redemption 
of the girl, presumably for her benefit, is done against her will. Yet we may 
note at least one citation om rabbinic literature in which this phrase is in 
fact used in connection with the conferring of a benefit. Midrash ha-Gadol 
on Exod. 12:36 discusses the giving to the Israelites of Egyptian plunder 
that is discussed in the biblical verse: 
אמר ר‘ אמי מלמד שהשאילום בעל כרחן אמרי לה בעל כרחן דישראל 
ואמרי לה בעל כרחן דמצראי... ומן דאמר בעל כרחם דישראל משום משוי.
Rabbi Ami said: This teaches that they lent to them against their will. Some 
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say [it was] against the will of the Israelites, some say against the will of 
the Egyptians.... Those who say [it was] against the will of the Israelites 
[maintain that it was] because of the burden [of carrying it].
 Still, some support for the idea of בעל כרחה (against her will) as the 
earlier version may be derived indirectly om the talmudic discussion of 
 against his will) that follows the baraita in bQidd. 18a, as between) בעל כרחו
Rava and Abaye:
ומפדין אותה בע“כ סבר רבא למימר בע“כ דאדון א“ל אביי מאי ניהו דכתבנא ליה שטרא 
אדמיה אמאי נקים מרגניתא בידיה יהיבנא ליה חספא אלא אמר אביי בעל כרחיה דאב 
משום פגם משפחה אי הכי עבד עברי נמי נכפינהו לבני משפחה משום פגם משפחה הדר 
אזיל ומזבין נפשיה ה“נ הדר אזיל ומזבין לה הא קתני אינה נמכרת ונשנית
In Munich 95 and Oxford Opp. 248 (367) there are some errors including a 
homeoteleuton in Munich 95 in the last line om the word ומזבין. Vatican 
111 in the last line changes ליה to לה but Oxford Opp. 248 (367) has  ליה. 
‘And she is redeemed against his will.’ Rava reasoned: Against the will of the 
master. Abaye said to him: What is this, we wrote him a deed for the value? 
Why? If he is holding a pearl, do we give him a sherd? Rather, Abaye said: 
Against the will of the father, on account of the shame to the family. [The 
stammaitic response is:] If so, for the Hebrew eved we could also force his 
family [to redeem him] on account of the shame to the family. But he could 
just go back and sell himself again. But here too [the father] could go back 
and sell [his daughter] again. Therefore the tanna teaches: She is not sold 
[into slavery] more than once.
 The pisqa in the printed version of bQidd. 18a that introduces the 
dispute contains merely the acronym בע“כ (though this is expanded to בעל 
 in both MS Munich 95 and MS Vatican 111). It may be argued that כרחו
the ultimate editor of the sugya had before him only the term בע“כ, and 
assumed it meant בעל כרחו. Aminoaḥ in fact suggests that the entire dispute 
here between Rava and Abaye is actually a compilation by a later editor:17
ולפנינו סוגיא פומבדיתאית אבל בזמן מאוחר הניחו כי לפנינו מו“מ בין אביי ורבא, 
17 N. Aminoaḥ, The Redaction of Tractate Qiddushin in the Babylonian Talmud [in Hebrew] 
(Tel Aviv University, 1977), 1⒔ 
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והגיהו בגמרא כנוסח שלפנינו.
We have before us a Pumbeditan sugya; at a later time, however, they assumed 
that before us was a discussion between Abaye and Rava, and they edited it in 
the Gemara according to the version that we [now] have.
 Aminoaḥ suggests that the dispute actually reflects opinions of the two 
sages which are expressed elsewhere. A discussion in bQidd. 16a,18 of the 
methods by which the Hebrew eved acquired himself cites a baraita to the 
effect that the element “diminution of purchase price” listed in mQidd. 1:2 
can involve various equivalents to money: 
תנא וקונה את עצמו בכסף ובשוה כסף ובשטר
Oxford Opp. 248 (367) and Vatican 111 are missing the word שטר but Vat. 
111 corrects that. 
It was taught in a baraita: He [the Hebrew eved] acquires himself by money, 
by an equivalent to money, and by a deed.
 The stammaim (anonymous editors) concluded that שטר (deed) must 
refer to a גט שחרור (deed of manumission), since if it referred to a bond or 
promissory note it would be שוה כסף (equivalent to money) and that would 
create a repetition in the text. This opinion is supported with a statement 
of Rava, who argues that the giving of a manumission deed was at the 
option of the master: 
אמר רבא זאת אומרת ע״ע גופו קנוי
Rava said: This means that the Hebrew eved is acquired bodily.
 According to Aminoaḥ, the editor of the sugya in bQidd. 18a implied 
to Rava the opposite conclusion with respect to the Hebrew female: the 
manumission of a female by a deed was not at the option of the master. 
Abaye, on the other hand, is associated with the idea that the slave always 
has the upper hand with respect to a redemption (bQidd. 20a):
18 See also the discussion of this passage in chapter six, concerning the meaning of שטר.
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ת״ר נמכר במנה והשביח ועמד על מתאים מנין שאין מחשבין לו אלא מנה...
Our rabbis taught: If he [the Hebrew eved] was sold for one manah, and his 
value increased to 200, from where [do we know that for the purposes of 
redemption] he is assessed at only one manah?
 These two principles, according to Aminoaḥ, were put together by the 
talmudic editor to create the dispute in bQidd. 18a.19 If Aminoaḥ is correct, 
and the dispute is a later addition, this lends support to the idea that בעל 
.against his will), too, is a later reading) כרחו
 
5.2.4.B Diminution of Purchased Price (גרעון) or Death of the 
  Master (מיתת האדון)
It may be further suggested that the term כסף  purchase price) in) גרעון 
the Bavli’s manumission list is the lectio difficilior. The Rashba (Ḥidushim, 
bQidd. 18a) argued that גרעון כסף would have to be assumed to be applicable 
to the Hebrew female slave om the word מפדין (redeemed); this was the 
reason for its exclusion om the manumission list for the Hebrew eved in 
the baraita at bQidd. 18a:
 לא בעא למתני בעברי שאין בעבריה גרעון כסף דמחזיא ברייתא דתקשי 
 רישא אסיפא
It was not necessary to teach diminution of purchase money [as a matter 
applicable] to the Hebrew male and not to the Hebrew female, as the 
beginning of the baraita would then be seen to contradict the end [in which 
it is said that redemption is not applicable to the male]. 
 Halivni20 suggested that מיתת האדון (death of the master) was the original 
version, and that there was an earlier form of the Mishnah which contained 
the list שנים, יובל, מיתת האדון (years, Jubilee, and death of master):
 מ״מ נראה שהברייתא שם מצטטת משנה קדומה שבה היתה כתובה מיתת האדון במקום 
גרעון כסף. ואלה שהיתה להם הגירסה במשנה כמו שהיא לפנינו גורסים בברייתא כמו 
19 Aminoaḥ, Redaction of Tractate Qiddushin, 1⒓
20 Halivni, Sources and Traditions: Seder Nashim (Tel Aviv: Dvir, 1968) ⒈ 
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שהוא בספרי...
In any event it seems that the baraita there [bQidd. 18a] quotes an earlier 
Mishnah in which ‘death of the master’ was written instead of ‘diminution 
of purchase price.’ Those who had a version of the Mishnah like ours would 
have read the baraita in the way it appears in Sifrei [Deut.]...
 He suggests, however, that the reason for the substitution was the 
presence of a different classification scheme:
כלומר, בעוד שיתר היוצאים נשלחו היוצא בכסף שילח את עצמו. 
יוצא בכסף הוא סוג אחר.
That is, though the others [of the Hebrew avadim] who are released are sent 
out, the one who goes out with money sends himself out. One who goes out 
with money is [of ] a different category. 
 One might argue, however, that מיתת האדון (death of the master) in 
the manumission list also reflects a different principle than שנים ויובל (years 
and Jubilee) as was in fact noted by a tosafist: 
וממיתת האדון לא קשיא דאיכא למימר דבר שאין לו קצבה לא קתני 
(תוספות הראש קידושין י״׳ח ע״׳א)
‘Death of the master’—there is no difficulty here. It is [possible] to say that 
a matter which has no fixed term is not taught.
 In summary, there are some indications, though not completely 
without difficulty, that the reading in Sifre Deut., as the lectio difficilior, is 
the original.
5.2.5 Conclusion
It may be posited that there was originally a postbiblical “core” teaching that 
dealt merely with the special case of “signs” assigned to the Hebrew female. 
This core is reflected in the Midrash Tannaim. The question may then have 
arisen as to whether this special case was to operate to the exclusion of 
the provisions in Leviticus and Deuteronomy (the trend reflected in Sifrei 
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Deut), or in addition to them, which required reconciliation of Leviticus and 
Deuteronomy with Exodus (the trend reflected in the Exodus Mekhiltot). 
The Mishnah appears to summarize this debate (although, because the 
meaning of the term יתירה עליו (in a better position than him) is unclear, 
it is not certain which side of the debate the Mishnah has taken).21 It may 
also be posited that there was a core “manumission list” consisting of years 
and the Jubilee (ויובל כסף) ”to which the term “dimunition ,(שנים   (גרעון 
was added. 
5.3 THE INTERACTION OF 
SLAVERY AND NATIONALITY
As we have seen in section ⒌2, the manumission pericope associated with 
the P [=Priestly] stratum appears to provide that only “outsiders” can be 
treated as permanent slaves. The precise definition of these “outsiders,” 
however, led in later law to an apparent interaction between a matrilineal 
inheritance of slavery with a patrilineal inheritance of nationality.
5.3.1 Levitucus 25 and the “Ethnic” Differentiation of Slaves 
Leviticus 25:44-45 specifies who may be treated as permanent slaves:
And your eved and your amah that you shall have—from the nations that 
surround you – from them you shall purchase eved and amah. And also from 
the sons of the toshavim who reside with you—from them you shall buy, and 
from their families who are with them whom they sired in your land; and 
they will be a holding to you.
 Among the many issues with respect to the implications and language 
of these verses, there appears to be no agreement as to who precisely is 
21 One might argue, in contrast, that the midreshei halakhah are variously interpreting an 
ambiguous Mishnah, at least with respect to the question of “signs” for the female. The 
parallel versions of the baraita in Sifrei, Midrash Tannaim, and the various Bavli passages, 
however, reflect differences in the corresponding manumission list for males, which cannot 
be straightforwardly explained as different interpretations of the Mishnah. I think it is 
thus more logical to assume, at least in the case of this baraita, that it was a teaching 
independent of the Mishnah.
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intended in this pericope, particularly with respect to the term toshav 
(resident). Thus, for instance, the EM defines this term as יושב בבית אחר 
ביתו לבן  נחשב  אינו  אבל  שלחנו,  על   ,one resident in another’s house) וסמוך 
and dependent on his table, but not considered his ben bayit); Chirichigno 
assumes that like the sakhir (hired laborer) it referred to people who had 
to seek dependency and protection om an Israelite because they had no 
land of their own.22 
 From Exod. 12:45 it is clear that neither the toshav (resident) nor 
the sakhir (hired laborer) were considered close enough to the household 
to share in the Passover sacrifice. All the appearances of the term in the 
Pentateuch happen to be associated with verses belonging to the P source. 
One might therefore posit a postexilic referent for this term:23 perhaps the 
religiously suspect remnant of Judeans le behind; or the foreign deportees 
relocated to Israel and Judea (although the deportees of Esarhaddon in 
Ezra 4:4 are called am ha-aretz, “people of the land”); or the offspring of 
intermarriage between the returnees and foreigners (we may note that in 
Ezra 10:14 the text describes one who takes in foreign wives as ha-hoshiv 
nashim nokhriyot, “those who brought back foreign women”). In other 
words, toshav might have described one who was not a member of the 
surrounding nations, but who also could not be clearly identified as an 
“Israelite.” Targum Onkelos and TY both translate toshavim with totavya 
arelya (uncircumcised toshavim), perhaps to emphasize their non-Israelite 
status. The apparently superfluous words in verse Lev. 25:45, asher holidu 
be-artzekhem (whom they sired in your land), may also have been intended 
to emphasize the fact that such “unidentifiables” were not to be regarded 
as Israelites despite having been born in the land of Israel. 
 An issue arises, however, as to whether toshav might refer to the seven 
“banned” nations described in Deut. 7:1-3 and 20:16-17 (including the 
“Canaanites”), who are subject to the ḥerem, “ban”. This institution was 
22 EM s.v. תושב; Chirichigno, Debt Slavery, 133 n. ⒉ 
23 Following the argument of Deller, “Assyrisch um/nzarḫu,” ZA 74 (1984): 238, with respect 
to the term אזרח. Noting that this term, too, is associated with the P source, Deller 
suggests that the word derives om Neo-Babylonian um/nzarḫu, which he translates 
as “homeborn”. He posits that the Israelite deportees might have been influenced by 
Babylonian concepts of “nationality” and attempted to apply such ideas to their own 
situation.
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assumed to involve the complete destruction of the offending nation, 
and rendered its property off-limits;24 this would seem to preclude even 
the taking of slaves. The dilemma is discussed by certain of the biblical 
commentators and seems to have been a matter of controversy. Rashbam’s 
commentary on Deut. 29:7, for instance, assumes that even Canaanite 
slaves were allowed in certain circumstances:
לא תחיה כל נשמה: כשתבא להלחם עליהם לא תקרא להם לשלום...אבל אם יבואו אליך 
מדעתם להיות עבדיך קודם שתלך עליהם כמו הגבעונים יכול אתה להחיותם
You shall leave no soul alive [Deut. 20:16]: If you come to war with them, 
do not welcome them (call to them for peace) ... but if they come to you 
consciously to be your slaves before you go out to [attack] them, like the 
Gibeonites [Josh. 9:21], you may spare them.
 In contrast, Ibn Ezra, commenting on this apparent biblical 
contradiction as well as on the use of the term Canaanite slave in the 
Mishnah (commentary to Lev. 25:45), assumed that toshav must refer to 
any resident foreigner with the exception of the banned nations:
וגם מבני התושבים הדרים בארץ כנען... והם מהגוים הנזכרים או מצרים 
וכל עם חוץ משבעת הגוים...ויתכן שחז״׳ל אמרו עבד כנעני כל הגר הגר בארץ כנען ואינני 
[איננו] כנעני בייחוסו או הם ידעו להוציא זה הדבר לאמתו כי דעתנו נקלה כנגד דעתם
And also from the children of the toshavim [Lev. 25:45]—those who reside in the 
land of Canaan... And these are from the nations mentioned or Egypt or any 
nation, except the seven [banned] nations... It is likely that the Sages spoke 
of the Canaanite slave [meaning] any stranger living in the land of Canaan 
but not a Canaanite in origin; or they knew how to derive this correctly [as 
an exception], since our knowledge is weak compared to theirs.
 Further, the use of resident “foreigners” as slaves would also create 
difficulties if they were members of the particular nations whose right 
to join the Israelite community was affected by the prohibitions and 
restrictions in Deut. 23:4 and 8-9 (Ammonites, Moabites, and Edomites). 
Could such slaves have then participated in the cultic rituals ordinarily 
24 EM, s.v. חרם.
----------------  Chapter 5. THE ‘INHERITANCE’ OF SLAVERY IN RABBINIC LAW  ---------------
— 240 —
open to slaves, though not to members of these three nations? If such 
slaves were manumitted, would they become Israelites? We may gather the 
extent of the complexities involved in these competing prohibitions by 
noting the simpliing solution of Maimonides (Hil. Issurei Biyah, 12:25): 
aer the mass deportations of Sennaḥerib, one would no longer have been 
able to distinguish a member of the banned or prohibited nations, and 
such issues could no longer be relevant: 
כשעלה סנחריב מלך אשור בלבל כל האומות וערבם זה בזה והגלה אותם ממקומם... לפיכך 
כשנתגיר הגר בזמן הזה בכל מקום, בין אדומי בין מצרי בין עמוני בין מואבי בין כושי בין 
שאר אומות – אחד הזכרים ואחת הנקבות מתרין בקהל מיד.
When Sennaḥerib the king of Assyria arose he scrambled all the nations and 
intermixed them and deported them... Therefore when someone converts 
today in any place—whether Edomite, Egyptian, Ammonite, Moabite, 
Kushite, or from any other nation—both males and females are permitted to 
come into the community immediately.
5.3.2 Sifra Behar parshah 6 and its Parallels
Attempts to sort through the various prohibitions with respect to “foreign” 
slaves and nationality were nonetheless put forward by the sages. Sia 
Behar parsha 6:4 (Weiss p.109d-110a) on Lev. 25:44-45 (MS Vatican 31) 
reveals one such solution: an appropriate interpretation of the biblical text 
is used to permit the enslavement of one whose mother was a Canaanite, 
as long as the father was of “one of the nations”:
1. וגם מבני התושבים הגרים עמכם מהם תקנו בניהם ובנותיהם
2. הן עצמן מנ׳ תל מהם תקנו
3. וממשפחתם אש׳ עמ‘ מה תל‘ מנ׳ אתה או אחד מכל משפחות הארצו׳
4. שבא על אחת מן הכנענ׳ וילדה ממנו בן מותר אתה לקנותו עבד
5. תל׳ לו׳ ממשפח אש עמהם
6. או אחד מכל הכנענים שבא על אחת מכל משפחות הארץ וילדה ממנו בן
7. מותר אתה לקנותו עבד תל‘ לו‘ אשר הולידו בארצכם
1. And also from the children of the toshavim who live with you, from them you 
may acquire—their sons and daughters. 
2. From where [do we learn that one may acquire the toshavim] themselves? 
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Scripture says: you may acquire them.
3. And from their families who are with them—What is the meaning of this? 
From where do you learn: [If ] a member of any of the nations
4. has intercourse with a Canaanite [woman], and she gives birth to his son, 
you may acquire him as a slave? 
5 Scripture says: from their families who are with them.
6. Or: Any Canaanite who has intercourse with a female of any of the nations, 
and she gives birth to his son, 
7. can you acquire him as a slave? Scripture says: whom they sired in your 
land.
 The last statement, it may be noted, is equivocal. Further, there are 
some variants for כנענים such as אומות in the tertiary witnesses with respect 
to line 6 of the passage.2525 
 Further permutations of this passage appear in the Bavli, each with its 
own twist. In bYev. 78b we find a version of the passage is clearly being 
used to support the principle, attributed to R. Yoḥanan, that nationality 
:hood”) is inherited through the father-אומות“)
כי אתא רבינא א״ר יוחנן באומות הלך אחר הזכר נתגיירו הלך אחר הפגום 
שבשניהם באומות הלך אחר הזכר כדתניא מנין לאחד מן האומות שבא על הכנענית 
והוליד בן שאתה רשאי לקנותו בעבד שנאמר וגם מבני התושבים הגרים עמכם מהם תקנו 
יכול אפי׳ אחד מן הכנענים שבא על אחת מן האומות והוליד בן שאתה רשאי לקנותו בעבד 
ת״ל אשר הולידו בארצכם מן הנולדים בארצכם ולא מן הגרים בארצכם
When Ravina came, R. Yoḥanan said: [With respect to] nations, it 
[inheritance of status] followed the male. If they converted, it followed the 
[parent] with any taint [in status]. Nations followed the male, as it was 
taught [in the baraita]: From where do we know that if a member of one 
of the nations had intercourse with a female Canaanite and sired a son, you 
are allowed to buy him as a slave? As it is said: And also from the sons of the 
toshavim who reside with you, from them you may buy. Is it possible that if a 
25 The witnesses include only Vatican 31 (as Assemani 66 is incomplete and lacking this 
section) Breslau ב, and the first edition of Venice and tertiary witnesses, Midrash HaGadol 
and Yalqut Shimoni. As will be discussed below (n. 26), the Midrash HaGadol seems to 
have been influenced by Maimonides. In the ב MS, either the word מכל was accidentally 
dropped, so that we may take משפחות as “families,” or there is some sort of influence here 
om the version of this passage in bQidd. 16b (to be discussed below), and משפחות means 
“of the female slaves.”
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male Canaanite had intercourse with a female of one of the nations and sired 
a son, you would be allowed to buy him as a slave? Scripture thus states: that 
they sired in your land —from those who are born in your land, but not from 
those who live in your land.
 Again, however, the last statement is equivocal. Rashi (bYev. 78b s.v. 
 rationalizes the rule by postulating that it is always the (מן הנולדים בארצכם
female who remains in her own land:
...דרך אשה להיות במקומה ודרך איש לגלות הלכך הנולדים בארץ ודאי אמו משבעה אומות 
אבל הנולדים במקום אחר ודאי אמו משאר אומות...
The woman’s way is to stay in her place, and the man’s way is to leave. Thus, 
for those born in the land, their mother is certainly from one of the seven 
[banned nations], but for those born elsewhere, their mother is certainly 
from one of the other nations...
 In other words, if a toshav and a female Canaanite have a child, this is 
assumed to take place in Israel; the offspring would thus be included within 
the words ממשפחתם אשר עמכם (om their families who are with them) and 
would therefore also be a toshav. Conversely, if a male Canaanite has a child 
with a female of one of the other nations, it is assumed that the birth would 
take place outside Israel, wherever the mother is, and thus the offspring 
would not be אשר הולידו בארצכם (that they sired in your land). This “proves” 
that “nationality” is inherited through the father.
 A version which on the surface appears similar to the text in bYev. 78b 
is found in bSotah 3b. The context is a discussion of biblical hermeneutics 
between the schools of R. Ishmael and R. Akiva:
דתנא דבי רבי ישמעאל כל פרשה שנאמרה ונישנית לא נישנית אלא בשביל דבר שנתחדש 
בה לעולם בהם תעבדו רשות דברי ר׳ ישמעאל ר״ע אומר חובה מאי טעמא דרבי ישמעאל 
איידי כתיב לא תחיה כל נשמה איצטריך נמי לכתיב לעולם בהם תעבדו *למשרי אחד מכל 
לאחד  מנין   ** דתניא   * לקנותו  רשאי  שאתה  בן  ממנה  והוליד  הכנענית  על  שבא  האומות 
מבני  וגם  ת״ל  בעבד  לקנותו  רשאי  שאתה  בן  ממנה  והוליד  הכנענית  על  שבא  האומות  מן 
התושבים הגרים עמכם מהם תקנו יכול אף הכנעני שבא על אחת מן האומות והוליד ממנה 
מן  ולא  בארצכם  הנולדים  מן  בארצכם  הולידו  אשר  ת״ל  בעבד  לקנותו  רשאי  שאתה  בן 
הגרים בארצכם **
(* and ** added to text, to be discussed below)
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As it was taught from the school of R. Ishmael: If a passage is repeated, this 
is because the repetition has something novel. You may work them forever 
[Lev. 25:46]—[This is] a permission, in the words of R. Ishmael. R. Akiva 
says: It is an obligation. What is the reason of R. Ishmael? Since it is written 
[Deut. 29:7]: Do not allow any soul to live, it was necessary also to write you 
may work them forever, to permit [the following]: A member of one of the 
nations who has intercourse with a female Canaanite and sires a son, you are 
allowed to purchase him, as it was taught: How do we know that if a member 
of one of the nations has intercourse with a female Canaanite and sires a 
son, you are permitted to buy him as a slave? Scripture states: and also from 
the sons of the toshavim who reside with you, from them you may buy. Is it also 
possible that if a Canaanite who had intercourse with a female of one of the 
nations sired a son, you are permitted to buy him as a slave? Scripture states: 
whom they sired in your land—from those who were born in your land, and 
not from those who reside in your land.
 R. Ishmael interprets the words in Lev. 25:46 as permissive: their 
purpose is to show that, despite the broad wording of Deut. 20:16, one is 
permitted to take Canaanites as slaves. If, however, we examine the words 
marked * in the text, it is clear that the talmudic editor assumed that the 
issue of a female Canaanite and a male non-Canaanite was a Canaanite 
(and thus the necessity for the phrase in Lev. 25:46). Thus the supporting 
baraita seems to have been interpreted in a manner completely contrary to 
that in bYev.—it is the mother who determines nationality, and the child 
of a Canaanite mother may be enslaved. It would then follow that in the 
second element of the baraita the child of a non-Canaanite mother would 
be excluded om slavery, and it is not clear why this would be so. We 
may propose, therefore, that either the talmudic editor misunderstood the 
baraita, or that it was susceptible to several interpretations.
 A further permutation of this baraita appears in bQidd. 16b. Again 
there is the statement of R. Yoḥanan that nationality is inherited through 
the father. In this version, however, the second element of the baraita raises 
a further complexity: it deals not simply with people of two nationalities, 
but with slaves of two nationalities:
כי אתא רבי אמר רבי יוחנן באומות הלך אחר הזכר נתגיירו הלך אחר הפגום שבשניהם מאי 
באומות הלך אחר הזכר כדתניא מנין לאחד מן האומות שבא על הכנענית והוליד בן שאתה 
רשאי לקנותו בעבד ת״ל וגם מבני התושבים הגרים עמכם מהם תקנו יכול אף עבד שבא 
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על שפחה מן האומות והוליד בן שאתה רשאי לקנותו בעבד ת״ל אשר הולידו בארצכם מן 
הנולדים בארצכם ולא מן הגרים בארצכם
When Rabbi came, R. Yoḥanan said: [With respect to] nations, it [inheritance 
of status] followed the male. If they converted, it followed the [parent] with any 
taint [in status]. What is the meaning of ‘nations followed the male’? As it was 
taught: From where do we know that if a member of one of the nations had 
intercourse with a female Canaanite and sired a son, you are allowed to buy him 
as a slave? Scripture states: And also from the sons of the toshavim who reside with 
you, from them you may buy. Is it possible that if a male slave had intercourse with 
a female slave from one of the nations and sired a son, you would be allowed to 
buy him as a slave? Scripture states: that they sired in your land — from those 
who are born in your land, but not from those who live in your land.
 Rashi noted the difference and attempted to explain why the child of 
slaves would not be enslavable: they are garim (those who reside) but not 
noladim (born) (bQidd. 16b, s.v. מן הגרים בארצכם):
שהולידו בני ארצכם במקומות אחרים מבנות שאר אומות ובאו הבנים לגור כאן אצל 
אבותם ובתורת כהנים גרסינן ולא מן הכנענים שבארצכם כלומר שנולדו מן הכנענים
[Sons] that natives of your land sired in other places by women from the 
other nations, and the sons came here to live with their fathers; and in Sifra 
we read ‘and not from the male Canaanites’ in your land, which is to say, who 
were born of the Canaanites.
 Finally, we may note that Maimonides extended the slave-nationality 
issue to the first element of the baraita as well (Hil. Avadim 9:3):26 
אחד מן האומות שבא על שפחה כנענית שלנו הרי הבן עבד כנעני שנאמר ׳אשר הולידו 
בארצכם׳ אבל העבד שלנו שבא על אחת מן האומות אין הבן עבד שנאמר ׳אשר הולידו 
בארצכם׳ ועבד אין לו יחס
A member of one of the nations who has intercourse with our female 
Canaanite slave, the son is a Canaanite slave, as it is said: that they sired in 
your land. But if our male slave has intercourse with a female of one of the 
nations – the son is not a slave, as it is said: that they sired in your land, and 
a slave has no kinship.
26 Midrash HaGadol מ has obviously been influenced by Maimonides (see n. 25 above).
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5.3.3 Conclusion
In a case in which a question of the nationality of a potential slave arose 
(specifically, whether the individual would be considered a member of the 
seven banned nations), we find evidence that nationality was considered to 
be inherited through the father. Attempts to reconcile this principle with 
the idea of a matrilineal inheritance of slavery led to a variety of results, 
which seem to depend on whether the nationality principle or the slavery 
principle was given precedence.
5.4 TOSEFTA QIDDUSHIN 5:11: “SYMMETRICAL” 
INHERITANCE OF MAMZERUT?
As noted, in the mishnaic rule of mYev. 7:5 it is only the child of a 
ee female and slave male who would be treated as a mamzer. There is 
some hint, however, that in the complex working out of the principles of 
genealogy, mamzerut was the fate of any issue that resulted om impaired 
qiddushin. Of particular interest is a baraita attributed to R. Meir (which 
we may term the “five nations” baraita), found in tQidd. 5:11, y. Qidd. 
3:13 64d, and bYev. 99a. It concerns a working out of the inheritance of 
status among various “peoples” (umot): slaves, gentiles, converts, eedmen, 
mamzerim, and Israelites. The versions in each source differ; of special 
interest is the fact that the Tosea version suggests that offspring of any 
slave-ee Israelite relationship, and not just the child of a slave male and 
ee Israelite female, would have been a mamzer.27
tQidd. 5:11 (Lieberman p. 297)
1. היה ר‘ מאיר אומ‘ יש איש ואשה שמולידין חמש אומות כיצד
2. גוי שיש לו עבד ושפחה ולהם שני בנים נתגייר אחד מהן הרי אחד גר ואחד גוי
3. נתגייר רבן וגיירן לעבדים והולידו בן והולד עבד
27 For reasons of brevity, only the relevant sections of the baraita have been quoted. There 
are numerous variations in the sources, but these do not directly affect the argument.
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4. (נשתחרר אחד מהן הרי אחד והולידו בן הולד ממזר)
נשתחררה שפחה ובא אליה אותו עבד והולידו בן הולד משוחרר
5. נשתחררו שניהם והולידו בן הולד עבד משוחרר
yQidd. 3:13 64d
1. תני משום ר‘ מאיר יש איש ואשה שמולידין חמש אומות כיצד
2. מי שיש לו עבד ושפחה והולידו בנים הרי גוים נתגייר אחד מהן הרי אחד גר ואחד גוי
3. נתגייר רבו וגיירו לשני עבדים והולידו בנים הרי אילו עבדים 
אמר ר‘ זעירא הדא אמרא גוי שבא על שפחה והוליד בן הוולד עבד
4. שיחרר שפחה והולידה הוולד ממזר
5. ואחר כך שיחרר העבד והוליד בן הרי זה בן עבד משוחרר
bYev. 99a
1. תניא היה ר“מ אומר איש ואשה פעמים שמולידין חמש אומות כיצד
2. ישראל שלקח עבד ושפחה מן השוק ולהן שני בנים ונתגייר אחד מהן נמצא אחד גר
ואחד עובד כוכבים
3. הטבילן לשם עבדות ונזקקו זה לזה הרי כאן גר ועובד כוכבים ועבד
4. שחרר את השפחה ובא עליה העבד הרי כאן גר ועובד כוכבים ועבד וממזר 
5. שחרר שניהם והשיאן זה לזה הרי כאן גר ועובד כוכבים ועבד וממזר וישראל
מאי קמ“ל עובד כוכבים ועבד הבא על בת ישראל הולד ממזר
Translations
tQidd. 5:11
1. R. Meir used to say: One man and one woman [can] sire five nations 
[umot]. How?
2. A gentile who has a male and female slave, and they produce two sons, 
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[and] one of them [i.e., the sons] converted, the result is that one [son] is a 
convert [ger] and one a gentile. 
3. [If ] their master converted, and they [i.e., the parents] converted to slaves 
[that is, until they became the slaves of Jews, they were simply gentiles], and 
they sired [another] son, the child is a slave. 
4. [a] [If ] one of them [the male or female] was freed, that is one, and they 
sired [another] son, the child is a mamzer.
[b] [If ] the female slave was freed, and the same male slave had intercourse 
with her, and they sired a son, the child is a freedman [meshuḥrar]. 
5. [If ] both [the male and female slave] were freed and sired a son, the child 
is a freedman. 
yQidd. 3:13 (64d)
1. It was taught in the name of R. Meir: One man and one woman [can] sire 
five nations [umot]. How?
2. [If ] one has a male and female slave, and they produce sons, these are 
gentiles. If one converted, one is a convert and one is a gentile.
3. His master converted and caused the two slaves to convert, and they 
produced sons: these are slaves.
R. Zeira said: This means that if a gentile has intercourse with a female slave 
and sires a son, the child is a slave.
4. [If ] he freed the female slave and she gave birth, the child is a mamzer.
5. And [if ] he then freed the male slave and he sired a son, this is the son 
of a freedman.
bYev. 99a
1. It was taught: R. Meir used to say: One man and one woman [can] 
sometimes sire five nations [umot]. How?
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2. An Israelite who bought a male and female slave from the market, who 
had two sons, and one converted, there results one who is a convert and one 
who is a gentile.
3. [If ] he caused them to be immersed as slaves [i.e., to take the first step of 
conversion], and they were put together [and another child resulted], there 
is now a convert and a gentile and a slave.
4. [If ] he freed the slave woman and the male slave had intercourse with 
her [and another child resulted], there is now a convert and a gentile and a 
slave and a mamzer.
5. [If ] he freed both and caused them to marry [and another child resulted], 
there is now a convert and a gentile and a slave and a mamzer and an Israelite.
What does this teach? A gentile and a male slave who have intercourse with 
an Israelite women—the child is a mamzer.
 For our purposes we may concentrate on element number 4, dealing in 
each case with the offspring of a slave partner and a eed partner. In the 
Tosea version, parts 4[a] and 4[b] seem to be two inconsistent versions of 
the rule in such a case. Part [a], though grammatically difficult, suggests that 
the child would be a mamzer regardless of which parent was ee and which 
remained a slave. Part [b] deals only with the case in which the female had 
been eed; inconsistent with part [a] (and with the Mishnah), the child here 
is a “eedman.” Part [a] which is marked in parentheses in the text is missing 
in the Erfurt Tosea MS. It is also missing in the versions of this baraita in 
the Talmudim; the latter directly reflect the mishnaic rule that the offspring 
of a ee woman and slave man is a mamzer: 
 Can the Tosea version in [a] be relied upon as evidence of an extant 
rule that the offspring of any slave-ee relationship was a mamzer? In his 
tosean commentary, Lieberman considered this version to be corrupt;28 
section ⒜ is missing in the Ehrfurt MS and this is a doubled section so 
he considers the correct reading to be section ⒝ only, but with והולד ממזר 
instead of הולד משוחרר in line with the Bavli and Yerushalmi:
28 Lieberman, Tosefta kipeshutah tQidd., loc. cit., 980-8⒈
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[If ] the slave woman were freed and a slave had intercourse with her and she 
birthed [their] child, the child is a mamzer. 
Yet its very difficulty may argue in favor of its originality (as the lectio 
difficilior). We may further argue that it is the Talmudim that have 
summarized as well as edited an earlier version; evidence of this procedure is 
seen, for instance, in the summary in bYev. and the amoraic comments.29 
 Finally, we may note that both Josephus and Philo seem familiar with 
a rule that the offspring of a slave female would also normally have been 
considered simply “illegitimate” or base-born (Greek νόθος), rather than 
specifically a slave. Josephus, for instance, describes Avimelekh, the ben 
amah of Judg. 9:18, as a νόθος (Ant. 5:233), as opposed to the son of 
an οἰκέτις, or similar phrase. Philo similarly discusses the children of the 
amahot/shefaḥot Bilhah and Zilpah:
The base-born sons (νόθοι) of the handmaids [Bilhah and Zilpah] received 
the same treatment as the legitimate, not only from the father... since his 
paternity extends to all alike, but also from the stepmothers.30 
29 There is a puzzling comment by the Karaite commentator Yaqub al-Qirqisani on this “five 
nations” baraita, translated as follows (B. Chiesa and W. Lockwood, Ya’Qub al-Qirqisani, 
Abu Yusuf: On Jewish Sects and Christianity; A Translation of “Kitab al-anwar,” [Judentum 
and Umwelt 10; Frankfurt: Peter Lang, 1984] 1:119) :
 They [Rabbanites] maintain that if a man’s wife gave birth to a child by a non-
Jew [גוי] or a Jewish slave, the child is legitimate [כשר], provided that the woman 
had been the victim of force or deceit. They regard a Jewish slave as being on the 
same footing as a non-Jew, who comes under the Commandments and deserves: 
“To be put to death together with the adulteress” <Lev. 20, 10>, and whose status 
is the same as that of a citizen [אזרח]. They say that R. Meir, speaking of the 
“five peoples,” said that if a non-Jew and a slave, have intercourse with a Jewish 
woman and the woman bear a child, that child is a bastard [ממזר]. Those who 
came aer them said: “The halakhah is in accordance with R. Meir,” while those 
who preceded them said: “The words of the scribes need confirmation om the 
Torah, but the words of the Torah do not need confirmation.” This is like the 
saying of Scripture: “Let them bring their witness, that they may be justified” 
<Isa. 43, 9>. Of course, this also renders void the claim of those who assert that 
their teachings have been transmitted om the prophets.
 The version of the rule cited here follows that found in the Talmudim. The precise nature 
of his criticism of Rabbanite law is unclear; he seems, however, to suggest that there are 
other rules with respect to the inheritance of slave status besides the one he has quoted. 
30 Philo, On the Virtues (tr. F.H. Colson), 22⒋ S. Cohen notes (The Beginnings of Jewishness 
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5.5 VARIABILITY IN GENEALOGICAL THINKING
This chapter has reviewed certain tannaitic traditions that relate to the 
issue of the inheritance of slave status. It has been argued that two of 
the cases reviewed reflect rabbinic attempts to reconcile a matrilineal 
inheritance of slavery with biblical provisions. The considerable variation 
shown in these attempts is taken as an indication that the implications 
of matrilineal inheritance of slavery were neither commonly agreed upon 
among postbiblical sages, nor based on long-held traditions. It was 
proposed that the rule of “signs” for the Hebrew amah, which has no direct 
biblical precedent, was devised as a necessary adjunct to the matrilineal 
inheritance of slavery, so as to prevent a “native”-born slave class; it was 
further proposed that the “signs” rule as it stands in the Mishnah reflects 
a debate, the elements of which are in turn reflected in various midreshei 
halakhah and baraitot, as to how “signs” were to be reconciled with the 
biblical manumission provisions in Exodus and Deuteronomy with respect 
to the amah. It has also been argued that with respect to the question 
of slaves om the biblically banned seven nations, there is evidence in 
rabbinic sources of a patrilineal determination of the “nationality” of 
potential slaves, and in turn a variety of attempts to reconcile this rule 
with matrilineal inheritance of slavery. 
 It was also argued that there is evidence of a tannaitic opinion, in one 
version of tQidd. 5:11, that the offspring of any slave-ee union would 
have mamzer status, contrary to the mishnaic rule that mamzer status 
would apply only to the offspring of a slave father and Israelite mother. 
271-72) that Philo also uses νόθος to describe the offspring of Jewish-gentile marriages, 
regardless of whether the male or the female was the gentile, and thus argues that Philo 
was not familiar with a rule of matriliny regarding either gentiles or slaves.
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6.1 THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PARALLEL BARAITOT
In tannaitic sources Lev. 19:20 serves as the basis of a rule regarding “sex 
right” to the shifḥah neḥerefet. That is, the status of the shifḥah of Lev. 19:20 
is constructed in these sources, through a comparison of the legal effect of 
the sexual offence in Lev. 19:20 with the legal effects of other prohibited 
sexual liaisons. This comparison is found, with considerable variation, in 
mKer. 2:4b-6, tKer. 1:16-18, Sia Qedoshim pereq 5, a baraita in yQidd. 
1:1 59a and a baraita in bKer. 11a. Given the difficulties in the text of Lev. 
19:20, some of which were examined above, such variation in the sources is 
not surprising. I propose, however, that such differences indicate significant 
variations in opinion regarding the status of the shifḥah neḥerefet and the 
matter of slave-ee intermarriage. The net result is the creation of a new 
sort of offence with a female slave woman, one akin in some respect to the 
incest prohibitions, but so unclear as to its protagonists and punishments 
as to make it virtually unworkable in practice. 
 The nature of the relationship implied by the biblical term neḥerefet is 
taken in two of the sources to mean either marriage (Tosea) or betrothal 
(Sia) between a slave woman (or a woman who is “half-slave, half-
ee”) and a ee man. The Mishnah, in contrast, avoids mentioning the 
relationship at all, and this attitude is also reflected in the two Talmudim. 
The question then arises: can this difference be accounted for as simply 
the result of scribal error or oral transmission, or does it require a more 
substantive explanation, such as a difference in opinion? To state the issue 
om another perspective: Does the Tosea passage simply comment on 
the associated Mishnah passage, or does it reflect a distinct viewpoint? 
------------------------- CHAPTER 6  -----------------------
RABBINIC INTERPRETATIONS 
OF LEVITICUS 19:20-22
---------------  Chapter 6. RABBINIC INTERPRETATIONS OF LEVITICUS 19:20-22   --------------
— 252 —
Similarly, does the Sia passage merely reflect the midrashic derivation of 
the Mishnah rules, or does it too reflect a different opinion? 
 These questions are of interest, not merely with respect to the 
development of ideas concerning slave-ee intermarriage, but also with 
respect to the issue of parallels among the various tannaitic sources. Neusner, 
for instance, in commenting on such parallels, has argued that versions of a 
shared item in different sources show only alternate wordings of a single text, 
not a history of ideas.1 I shall argue in contrast that the parallel passages on 
the shifḥah neḥerefet do reflect differences in ideas concerning slavery. I shall 
argue further that the Tosea version of the parallel was likely the original 
(or “more” original). This conclusion, while contrary to the conventional 
assumption that Tosea is later than, and comments upon, Mishnah, is in 
accord with recent observations that suggest a priority for Tosea in certain 
cases.2 Finally we may question the existence of a “half-slave, half – ee” 
status as one of the proposed meanings of neḥerefet; does this represent a 
real status or is it merely a convenient contruct?
 To address these questions, I shall first set out the relevant passages 
in Mishnah and Tosea, noting briefly significant textual variations in the 
sources. I shall then discuss in detail the Sia passage, especially its numerous 
variants with respect to the crucial issue of intermarriage between slave and 
ee, as this source contains the most extensive discussion of the law of 
the shifḥah neḥerefet. I shall then propose an explanation of the relationship 
among these passages and those in the two Talmudim. Finally, I shall propose 
various ideas concerning the meaning of “half-slave, half-ee.”
6.2 MISHNAH KEREITOT 2:4B-6
The base text is taken om MS Parma deRossi 138 (3.(פ Comparisons 
were made to MSS Kaufmann A50 (ק), Lowe (Cambridge Add. 470.1) (ל), 
1 Jacob Neusner, “The Synoptic Problem in Rabbinic Literature: The Cases of the Mishna, 
Tosepta, Sipra and Leviticus Rabba,” JBL 105 (1986) 50⒍
2 See, e.g. Harry Fox, “Introducing Tosea: Textual, Intratextual and Intertextual Studies” 
28; Shamma Friedman, “The Primacy of Tosea to Mishnah in Synoptic Parallels,” in 
Introducing Tosefta, 100.
3 MS Kaufmann A50 (ק) has some errors and several corrections making it easier to use MS 
Parma as the base text.
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Maimonides (ר), Munich 95 (מ), London British Museum Add. 25, 717 
(L), Vatican Ebr. 120 (V120), Vatican Ebr. 119 (ו), Firenze Nationale Central 
Biblioteca II.⒈7 (F) and the following geniza agments: Cambridge TSE II 
 TS NS 32⒐270 and TS F II ⑵ 60. No relevant material was found ,(ג) 88
in the latter two witnesses. Aer the quotation of the text according to 
MS Parma with some minor corrections, significant variants will be noted 
but not abbreviations, obvious errors or minor changes in orthography. 
An asterisk * indicates that all manuscripts except those indicated have 
the reading in the lemma. When a significant variant has changes in 
orthography or an error but still attests to a particular reading, the word 
and the relevant MS will be underlined.
1. ומה בין שפחה לשאר כל העריות
2. שלא שווה להם לא בעונש ולא בקרבן
3. שכל העריות בחטאת והשפחה באשם
4. כל העריות אחד האיש ואחד האישה שווים במכות ובקרבן
5. ובשפחה לא הישווה את האיש לאשה במכות
6. ולא את האשה לאיש בקרבן
7. כל העריות עשה בהן את המערה כגומר וחייב על כל ביאה וביאה
8. החמיר בשפחה שעשה בה את המזיד כשוגג
9. אי זו היא שפחה 
10. כל שחציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין
11. שנ‘ והפדה לא נפדתה כדברי ר‘ עקיבה
12. ר‘ ישמעאל אומר זו היא שפחה וודיי
13. ר‘ לעזר בן עזריה או‘ כל העריות המפורשות משייור אין לנו אלא שחציה שפחה וחציה בת חורים
14. כל העריות אחד גדול ואחד קטן הקטן פטור
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15. אחד ער ואחד ישן הישן פטור
16. אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד השוגג בחטאת והמזיד בהיכרת
 L V120 לבין = מ  F לכל = ר ו לבין כל = ק ל ג  לשאר כל] = פ   .1
באשם כל העריות בנקבה ושפחה בזכר  באשם כאחד = ג  באשם] = פ ק ל ר   .3
באשם כל העריות בחטאת בנקיבה ושפחה בזכר = ו  L F V120 מ =
F = חסר = ר ו   לא  V120 L את] = פ ק ל ג מ הישווה] = *   הושווה = ק   .5
וביאה] = *   .7
V120 L = ובשפחה לא עשה בה את המערה כגמור ודינו חייב על כל ביאה וביאה
F ודאית = ל ר ו  V120 ודאי = ג מ וודיי] = פ ק   .12
 F = שיור ושיור = ר  ומשיור = ג  משייור] = פ ק ל   .13
חסר = ו משוייר = V120 L מ 
Translation
⒈ What is the difference between [the] shifḥah and [the] rest of the forbidden 
relationships?
⒉ That they are not treated equally with respect to punishment or sacrifice;
⒊  that all the [other] forbidden relationships require a ḥattat sacrifice, and the 
[offence with the] shifḥah [requires] an asham sacrifice.
⒋ [With] all the [other] forbidden relationships the man and the woman are equal 
with respect to lashes and sacrifice,
⒌ with respect to the shifḥah the man is not made equal to the woman with respect 
to lashes,
⒍ and the woman is not made equal to the man with respect to sacrifice.
⒎ [With] all the [other] forbidden relationships the one who is [merely] aroused is like 
the one who consummates intercourse, and is liable for each act of intercourse,
⒏ it is stricter with respect to the shifḥah, as with respect to her the one who acts 
intentionally is like the one who acts inadvertently.
--------------------------------------  6.2 MISHNAH KEREITOT 2:4B-6  -------------------------------------
— 255 —
⒐ Who is a shifḥah [in this case]?
⒑ Anyone who is half-slave, half-ee,
⒒ as it is said redeemed she has not been redeemed [a literal translation of the infinitive 
absolute form in Lev. 19:20] – according to the words of R. Akiva [who interprets 
each element of the infinitive absolute form separately].
⒓ R. Ishmael says: This is a certain/definite shifḥah.
⒔ R. Lazar ben Azaria says: All the forbidden relationships [are] stated explicitly; there 
is none remaining except [that regarding] the woman who is half-slave, half-ee.
⒕ [With] all the [other] forbidden relationships, if one is an adult and one a minor, 
the minor is exempt [om punishment];
⒖ if one is awake and one asleep, the one asleep is exempt;
⒗ If one acts intentionally and the other inadvertently, the one who acted 
inadvertently [is liable for] a ḥattat sacrifice, and the one acting intentionally [is 
liable to] excision.
 A number of comments may be made on the variants illustrated. In line 1, 
Mishnah codices MSS – קל and BT geniza agment ג seem to have the correct 
reading because each word serves as the basis of the variants in Maimonides 
and in the BT MSS while the reading in פ seems to be an error. 
 The MSS of BT have an addition to the Mishnah in line ⒊ This addition 
is also found in the printed edition of Mishnah in bKer. 10b but is erased by 
R. Shmuel Kaidenover (Rashaq). This phrase does appear in tKer. 1:16 and in 
Sia Qedoshim pereq 5:⒑ Another addition less thoroughly attested in the BT 
MSS is at the end of line 7 which seems to be an attempt to fill in the parallel 
situation concerning the slave woman which is absent in the Mishnah. 
 The original reading in line 12 is according to codex MSS פ ק ל (with 
some orthographic differences) and this is supported by agment ג with 
the addition of וי״ו and by ר with the same addition but without the initial 
 מ“מ and by BT MS F without any prefix. It is possible that the initial מ“מ
vocalized with a hiriq may have been a contraction of the question “who” 
 with the meaning “who is le/who is remaining” which would be (מי)
appropriate for the continuation which answers the question. The reading 
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in the printed edition is ומה שיור which is translated “and what remains” 
but we have no evidence in the manuscripts for a separate word מה. The 
majority of the BT MSS have a verb form, a pu’al participle, instead of 
the noun. The other possibility to explain the מ״מ is the addition of a 
phoneme to imitate nearby words such as מפורשות. In any case the question 
is clear. 
 The precise intention of the term וודיי (line 13) is not clear, either in 
its form in MSS ק פ and ג מ with a different spelling, or the declined form 
 it may ספקV120. If it is intended as the opposite of 4 ו F ל ר in MSS ודאיית
simply reflect an opposition to R. Akiva’s identification of the shifḥah as חציה 
 There is also the possibility, as will be discussed in a .שפחה חציה בת חורין
comparison of this section to its parallels in other sources, that the term 
refers to a “Canaanite” slave. MS ק adds the interrogative particle אי to the 
start of the clause זו היא שפחה in line 12 creating a question. This reading is 
an error because the structure calls for a statement rather than a question.
 The only other place with great variation is the gender and the spelling 
of the word ודיי. It is either an abstract noun in the masculine meaning 
“something which is clear and certain” or an adjective describing שפחה in 
which case it should be in the feminine. Since the best manuscripts have 
mixed readings it is difficult to decide which is original.
6.3 TOSEFTA KEREITOT 1:16-18
The base text is om the Zuckermandel edition (p. 562) which he based 
on MS Erfurt (ע), with line numbers added for convenience though not 
according to Zuckermandel’s line numbers. The variants underlined in lines 
13 and 20 and the homeoteleuton in line 17 filled in with brackets are 
taken om Vienna MS Cod. Hebr. 20 (ב). The remaining changes between 
Zuckermandel’s edition om the Erfurt MS and the Vienna MS are minor, 
chiefly differences in orthography, definite article and abbreviation.
אלו דברים שבין שפחה חרופה לכל עריות  .1
4 Kadari, 1:96 Syntax and Semantics [Hebrew]. Kadari confirms that וודיי as an appositive 
can appear either declined or not, even with respect to the same noun; there appears to be 
no semantic significance in the difference. He also cites instances in which it is used as a 
subject paired with the term ספק (e.g. mQidd. 4:3).
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כל עריות שבתורה הרי אלו חייבין על זדונן כרת ועל שגגתן חטאת ועל לא הודע אשם תלוי  .2
מה שאין כן בשפחה חרופה  .3
כל עריות שבתורה עושה אונס כרצון שאין מתכוין כמתכוין מערה כגומר ישינה כעירה כדרכה   .4
ושלא כדרכה חייבת על כל ביאה וביאה
מה שאין כן בשפחה חרופה  .5
כל עריות עשה קטן כגדול לחייב על הגדול  .6
ובשפחה אם היה קטן הרי אלו פטורין  .7
כל עריות שניהן לוקין ובשפחה היא לוקה והוא אינו לוקה  .8
כל עריות שניהם מביאין קרבן ובשפחה הוא מביא והיא אינה מביאה  .9
כל עריות בחטאת בשפחה באשם  .10
כל עריות בנקבה ושפחה בזכר  .11
כל עריות חייב על כל ביאה וביאה בשפחה אחת על ביאות הרבה  .12
כל עריות שבתורה בית דין חייב על הוראתן מה שאין כן בשפחה חרופה  .13
כל עריות כהן משיח שהורה ועשה חייב ובשפחה עשה אף על פי שלא הורה מביא אשם ודאי  .14
ר‘ ישמעאל אומר בשפחה כנענית הכתוב מדבר נשואה לעבד כנעני  .15
אחרים אומרים משמו זו נשואה לבן חורין  .16
ר‘ עקיבא אומר מן התורה חצייה שפחה וחצייה בת חורין [ר‘ אלעזר בן עזריה אומ‘ מן התורה   .17
חצייה שפחה חצייה בת חורין] 5 נשואה לבן חורין
5 Lieberman, תוספת ראשונים: פירוש מיוסד על כתבי יד התוספתא וספרי ראשונים ומדרשים בכתבי) 
 was surprised (יד ודפוסים ישנים, ניו יורק וירושלים: בית המדרש לרבנים באמריקה, תשנ“ט, 594 
that Zuckermandel had not corrected MS Erfurt here but placed it in the apparatus. 
Lieberman held that the text in brackets is the original reading and that it was dropped 
by a scribal error in the Erfurt MS on which Zuckermandel’s edition is based. This 
homeoteleuton is due to the repetition of the phrase בת חורין. The reading בן in line 13 is 
a graphic error.
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הבא על אחת מכל עריות האמורות בתורה הוא בהעלם אחד והיא בחמשה העלמות הוא מביא   .18
חטאת אחת והיא מביאה חמש חטאות היא בהעלם אחת והוא בחמשה העלמות היא מביאה 
חטאת אחת והוא מביא חמש חטאות
כל עריות אחד גדול ואחד קטון הקטן פטור  .19
אחד נעור ואחד ישן הישן פטור  .20
אחד שוגג ואחד מזיד השוגג בחטאת והמזיד בהכרת  .21
Variants
כן] = ב     בן = ע  .13
ר‘ אלעזר בן עזריה אומ‘ מן התורה חצייה שפחה חצייה בת חורין] = ב      ∩ = ע.  .17
נעור] = ב   נוער = ע  .20
Translation
⒈ These are the [different] matters between the shifḥah ḥarufah and the forbidden 
relationships:
⒉ All those [who transgress] the forbidden relationships in the Torah if they act 
intentionally are liable to excision, if they act in error for a ḥattat sacrifice, and if 
they were not aware [that they transgressed] for a conditional asham sacrifice,
⒊ which is not the case for the shifḥah ḥarufah.
⒋ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships in the Torah, [it is the same 
for the woman whether] the male forces [her] or there is acquiescence, whether 
the male acts with intention or not, whether the male is merely aroused or 
consummates intercourse, whether she is awake or asleep, whether the intercourse 
is “normal” or “abnormal,” and she is liable for each act of intercourse,
⒌ which is not the case for the shifḥah ḥarufah.
⒍ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships the minor is treated like the 
adult, to render the adult liable,
⒎ but with respect to the shifḥah, if the male is a minor, both are exempt.
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⒏ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships both receive lashes, but with 
respect to the shifḥah, she receives lashes but the male does not.
⒐ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships both bring a sacrifice, but with 
respect to the shifḥah, the male brings a sacrifice but she does not.
⒑ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships [the sacrifice is] a ḥattat, with 
the shifḥah it is an asham.
⒒ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships [the sacrifice is] a female [she-
goat], with the shifḥah it is a male [ram].
⒓ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships [the male] is liable for each 
[separate] act of intercourse, with the shifḥah [he is liable one ḥattat] for [any] 
number of acts [with the same shifḥah].
⒔ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships in the Torah a Beit Din is liable 
for [an incorrect] decision, which is not the case for the shifḥah ḥarufah.
⒕ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships, an Annointed [=High] Priest 
who made [an incorrect] decision and acted on it is liable, but with respect to 
the shifḥah if he acted even without making [an incorrect] decision he is liable 
for an asham vadai.
⒖ R. Ishmael says: Scripture is speaking of a Canaanite shifḥah married to a 
Canaanite eved;
⒗  Others say in his name: This one [who] is married to a ee man.
⒘  R. Akiva says: From [the words of ] the Torah she is half-slave half-ee. [R. Elazar 
ben Azaria says: She is half-slave half-ee] married to a ee man.
⒙ One who engages in any act of intercourse forbidden by the Torah – [if ] he is 
in a state of unawareness [as to the fact that the act is prohibited] once, and she 
five times, he brings one ḥattat sacrifice and she brings five ḥattat sacrifices; [if ] 
she is in a state of unawareness once and he five times, she brings one ḥattat 
sacrifice and he brings five ḥattat sacrifices.
⒚ [With respect to] all the forbidden relationships, if one is an adult and one a 
minor, the minor is exempt; 
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⒛ if one is awake and the other asleep, the one asleep is exempt; 
2⒈ if one acts inadvertently and one intentionally, the one who acts inadvertently [is 
liable for] a ḥattat, the one acting intentionally [is liable to] excision.
6.4 SIFRA QEDOSHIM PEREQ 5
6.4.1 Overview of the Text
i. Text Witnesses
 The section under consideration is designated in the printed editions as 
 ,(in Assemani 66 (p. 401 in Finklestein’s edition (קדשים פרק ה פר‘ש פר‘קי ב'
 in Vatican 31), covering Lev. 19:20-22 (Weiss 89c). Four main text פרק ג
witnesses have been examined and variants om a number of additional 
MSS used by Finkelstein6 in the partial apparatus in his introduction to 
Assemani 66 are also noted where relevant.
Primary     Secondary  
  Midrash HaGadol = מ    Assemani 66 = א
Midrash Ḥakhamim = ח     Vatican 31 =ר
 Yalkut Shimoni = ש   (Breslau (Zuckerman 108 = ב
   Venice Edition 1445 = ד
Parma De Rossi 139   Tertiary = ג
Rabbenu Hillel = ר“ה   Oxford Neubauer 151 = ה
Rabad = ראב“ד  (London (Margaliot 341 Part II = ל
 The Sia citations in Yalqut Shimoni are questionable as they seem to 
have been taken apart, reassembled and paraphrased. Therefore the variants 
found in Midrash HaGadol, Midrash Ḥakhamim, and Yalqut Shimoni will 
be presented in the apparatus in angled brackets <  > along with the 
readings in the commentators 7.ר׳ הלל ראב״ד, קרבן אהרון, רש״י, הגר״א 
6 Finkelstein, לרבנים המדרש  יורק: בית  ניו  מספר 66,  אססמאני  מנוקד:  רומי  יד  כתב  פי  על  כהנים   תורת 
 Torat Kohanim] It should be noted that not all the sigla are those =] באמריקה, תשי״ז, נ-סג.
used by Finkelstein.
7 Based on Louis Finkelstein, 1989 באמריקה)  לרבנים  המדרש  בית  יורק:  (ניו  רב  דבי   =] ספרא 
Sifra deVei Rav] 1:119, text witnesses of Sia can be divided into four geographical groups, 
--------------------------------------  6.4 SIFRA QEDOSHIM PEREQ 5  --------------------------------------
— 261 —
 Assemani 66 is taken as the base text for the section; this follows the 
opinion of Finkelstein, who maintained that Assemani 66 was overall the 
“best“ manuscript.8 Variants considered relevant to the discussion are listed 
following each unit but some units have no significant variants as these 
generally do not include variations in spelling.9 For ease of reference, the 
section has been divided into nine sections (A-I), based on subject matter. 
The biblical citations are italicized in the translation and indicated with 
quotation marks in the Hebrew, and line numbers have been added. The 
signs {} indicate that a word is only partially readable. 
ii. Structure  
 The passage shows an unusual combination of styles. In its first part 
it shows the conventional form of citing a biblical lemma and deriving 
its interpretation. These consist either of a straightforward derash (word 
X means Y), occasionally with the use of רבוי-מיעוט logic, though with 
no express formulae, or the use of hermeneutical principles to derive a 
rule, particularly הקש and שוה  The end of the passage, however, is .גזרה 
in a non-typical form, consisting in effect of a summary of many of the 
previously derived rules. Unlike the usual midrash form, it contains no 
citations of the biblical text. It is this part that appears to be parallel to, 
and perhaps derived om, baraitot or the Mishnah and Tosea.
which all ultimately relate back to one original version (p. 71): Eastern, including Vatican 
31, and the versions used by the Midrash Hagadol and the Mishneh Torah; North Aican, 
including Assemani 66; Spanish, including the versions used by the ספר מצוות גדול and 
Rabad, and by Maimonides in his Mishnah commentary; and other Western, including 
the printed editions, and the versions used by the Yalqut Shimoni and R. Hillel. 
8 Finkelstein, Sifra deVei Rav 1:⒙
9 Such as כתיב מלא versus כתיב חסר, exchanges between ן-ם, and differences in any vocalization 
and short forms. On the use of a separate apparatus for spelling variants, abbreviations and 
errors, see Tirzah Meacham, ,משנת מסכת נידה עם מבוא, מהדורה ביקורתית עם הערות בנוסח 
העברית, 1989 האוניברסיטה  (ירושלים:  ובראליה  ההלכה  בתולדות  ופרקים  ובעריכה,   =] (בפרשנות 
Meacham, “Mishnat Niddah”] 1:24 Finkelstein has apparently ignored short forms and 
spelling changes in his apparatus.
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6.4.2 Sifra’s Interpretation of Lev. 19:20
6.4.2.A The Age of the Parties
1. ״איש״ פרט לקטן
2. או יכול שני מוציא בן תשע שנים ויום אחד תל לו ״ואיש״
3. ״כי10 ישכב את אשה״ פרט לקטנה
1. Man – except a minor. 
2. Or perhaps I exclude a boy of nine years and a day? It is thus stated And a 
man [thus one includes any male of at least nine years]. 
3. Who lies with a woman – except a minor female.
 This section seems to be restricting the application of the transgression 
to those who are physically mature. The age of nine years plus a day as the 
boundary of sexual capability for the male is found elsewhere in Sia with 
regard to sexual transgressions, using a similar structure as in this case: 
the setting up of a possible exclusion of a male of nine-twelve years (i.e. 
one who is sexually capable but legally not responsible) om a general rule 
with the words יכול ש[א]ני מוציא and then the rejection of this exclusion 
based on some type of inclusion – רבוי oen based on the letter vav, as in 
this case.11 This is found, for instance, in Sia Metzora pereq 7:1 (Weiss 
78c) with respect to the בועל נדה – bo’el niddah (one who has intercourse 
with a menstruant) based on the words ואם שכב ישכב in Lev. 15:24 using 
the doubling of the verb; and in Sia Metzora pereq 6:1 (Weiss 77d) with 
respect to the זב – zav (a male with an abnormal genital discharge) based 
on the vav in the word ואיש in Lev. 15:⒗ A law in mNid. 5:5 similarly 
differentiates between sexual capability and legal responsibility:12
בן תשע שנים ויום אחד...ואם בא על אחת מכל העריות האמורות בתורה, 
מיתות על ידיו, והוא פטור
10 Assamani 66 misquotes the verse which begins with כי instead of אשר. Vatican 31 has the 
correct version and that is what appears as the text quoted above.
11 Midrash HaGadol (MS מ) seems to base the inclusion on the words ישכב  perhaps ,כי 
making the logical assumption that איש is to include any male deemed capable of שכיבה.
12 The Mishnah texts here and below om Tractate Niddah are quoted om Tirzah Meacham, 
“Mishnat Niddah” 2:53
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A boy of nine years plus a day ... if he engages in one of the sexual relationships 
prohibited in the Torah, [the women in this case] are put to death on his 
account, and he is exempt.
 With respect to the female, we may assume that the boundary of sexual 
capability is set at three years plus a day as it is elsewhere in Sia with respect 
to sexual offences. For instance, Sia Metzora pereq 6:7 (Weiss 78a) uses רבוי 
to specifically include a girl of three years plus a day with respect to the offence 
of engaging in one of the sexually prohibited relationships, based on the word 
in Lev. 15:⒙ Again, there is a similar rule in mNid. 5:4:13 ואשה
בת שלש שנים ויום אחד... בא עליה אחד מכל העריות בתורה, 
מתים על ידיה, והיא פטורה. פחות מיכן – כנותן אצבע בעין
A girl of three years plus a day ... if one has intercourse with her in one of the 
sexual relationships prohibited in the Torah, [the men in this case] are put to 
death on her account, and she is exempt. If she is younger than this, it is like 
a finger in the eye [i.e. there is deemed to have been no sexual intercourse].
 Thus both Sia and the Mishnah exclude the minors, קטן and קטנה, 
om liability for punishment in their respective rules. While the Mishnah, 
however, explicitly states that the other party is still liable, this is not 
explicit in the case at hand in Sia. A controversy is apparent on this 
issue among certain Rishonim (Medieval commentators). Maimonides (Hil. 
Issurei Biyah 3:17) held that both parties in such a case were liable to their 
respective punishments:
בן תשע שנים ויום אחד שבא על שפחה חרופה היא לוקה והוא מביא קרבן
A boy of nine years and a day who has intercourse with a shifḥah ḥarufah – she 
is whipped and he brings a sacrifice.
 The anti-Maimonidean commentator Rabad, R. Avraham ben David, 
(12th century, Provence), in contrast, held that neither party in a Lev. 
19:20 transgression was liable to punishment if one was a קטן:
13 Meacham, “Mishnat Niddah” 2:50 
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א“א זה שבוש שלא מצינו קטן בר עונשין וקרבן זה מן העונשין הוא 
והיא כמו כן פטורה דהא מיקשו אהדדי
Avraham said: It [the Sifra text] is an error, as we have not found that a 
minor boy is liable to punishment, and this sacrifice is a punishment. She 
[the minor girl] is similarly exempt, for they are similar to one another.
 The principle expressed here suggests that the punishment of the 
male is dependent on the liability of the female. The Mishneh Torah 
commentator Magid Mishneh supported Maimonides against the existence 
of such a principle:14 
ורבינו סבור שהכל תלוי באשה...ולא אמרו בזמן שהוא אינו מביא 
קרבן היא אינה לוקה
Our Rabbi [Maimonides] was of the opinion that all depended 
on the female ...they did not say that whenever he does not bring 
a sacrifice, she is not whipped.
6.2.4.B The Nature of the Offence
1. ״שכבת זרע״ פרט למערה
[In] a lying of seed – except one who is merely in a state of arousal.
Because Lev. 19:20 specifies the word זרע (zera – semen) this passage is 
interpreted to mean that there must actually be an emission of semen, thus 
excluding the מערה (one who engages in sexual activity but not to the point 
of ejaculation). In contrast, for instance, Sia Metzora pereq 7: 1 (Weiss 78c) 
includes the מערה (me’areh) in the offence of intercourse with a menstruant, 
based on the doubled language ישכב שכב   in Lev. 15:2⒋ What is not אם 
clear here, however, is whether ejaculation without penetration is counted 
as an offence. The Sia commentary is elsewhere aware of the possibility 
of different types of intercourse; on the issue of a male lying with a male in 
14 Such a rule does occur in some legal systems; see, e.g., LH section 129 which provides 
that a male adulterer is not punished by the king if his co-adulterer is not punished by her 
husband.
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Lev. 20:13, for instance, Sia Qedoshim pereq 9:14 (Weiss 92b) states:
”משכבי אשה“ מגיד הכתוב ששתי משכבות באשה
[If a man lies with a man in] the lyings [plural] of a woman – Scripture [by 
the use of the plural] indicates that there are two types of intercourse with 
a woman.
The Tosea passage (tKer. 1:16-18), as noted above (lines 4-5), does 
specifically exclude the situation of כדרכה  (abnormal” intercourse“) לא 
om Lev. 19:20, among other situations not mentioned in Sia. This is 
probably relating to sexual expression without the possibility of conception 
based on the word זרע in the sense of offspring. 
6.2.4.C The Identity of the shifḥah neḥerefet 
  (the “Intermarriage Baraita”)
1. ״והיא שפחה״ יכול בשפחה הכנענית הכתוב מדבר תל׳ לו׳ ״והפדה״ 
2. או ״והפדה״ יכול כולה תל׳ לו׳ ״לא נפדתה״
3. הכייצד בפדויה ובשאינה פדויה ושחיציה שפחה וחיציה בת חורין
4. במאורסת לבן חורים הכתוב מדבר דברי ר׳ עקיבה
5. ר׳ ישמעאל או׳ בשפחה הכנענית הכתוב מדבר המאורסת לבן חורין
6. ר׳ לעזר בן עזריה אומר כל העריות כבר אמורות
7. מישיור אין לנו אילא שחיציה שפחה וחיציה בת חורים
There are several differences in orthography, abbreviations and especially use 
of prepositions in the MSS (and even some errors in tertiary witnesses) which 
will not be brought in the apparatus. Only variants reflecting significant 
differences in meaning will be brought unless there is some issue to be 
discussed.  The sigla for the MSS can be found above on page 260. A word 
underlined in the lemma indicates the underlined witnesses support the 
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reading but have changes in orthography, abbreviations, prepositions, etc.15
בפדויה] = א  פדויה ]= א00 ר ב ג ל ד ה <מ ח>  .3
מאורסת = <ח> המאורסת = ה  במאורסת] = *    .4
הכתוב מדבר במאורסת לבן חורין = ר ג ל ד  הכתוב מדבר המאורסת לבן חורין] = א ב   .5
הכתוב מדבר המאורסת לעבד עברי = ה <ש>  המאורסת לבן חורין הכתוב מדבר = <ח> 
המאורסת לעבד עברי = <ראב״ד> במאורסת לעבד עברי הכת׳ מדבר = א00 <ר״ה> 
משוייר = <מ ח ר“ה> משאר = ד  מישיור] = א ר ב  ושיור = ה   .7
מי שחציה = <מ> שפחה שחציה = ל  את שחציה = ב ה  שחיציה] א ר ג 
זו שחציה = <ראב“ד>
חורין והיא שפחה לחייב על כל שפחה ושפחה = <מ>  חורים] * 
חורין המאורסת לעבד עברי אחרים אומ‘ לא יומתו כי לא חופשה בשפחה כנענית ומאורסת 
לעבד (עברי) כנעני = <ש והגירסא דומה בווייס>
Translation
⒈  And she is a female slave. Is it possible that Scripture is speaking of a Canaanite 
slave? [No, because] it is stated caused to be redeemed.
⒉  Or [another possibility]: does caused to be redeemed mean she is totally redeemed? 
[No, because] it is stated she is not redeemed. 
⒊  How [is this to be interpreted]? Concerning one who is redeemed and not 
redeemed, [that is] of whom half is slave and half is ee,
⒋  [and] concerning one engaged to a ee man Scripture is speaking – according to 
R. Akiva.
⒌  R. Ishmael says: Scripture speaks of a Canaanite female slave, who is engaged to 
a ee man.
⒍  R. Lazar ben Azariah says: All [those who have] forbidden sexual practices have 
already been stated;
15 See Finkelstein, Torat Kohanim p. 50ff for a more complete apparatus.
--------------------------------------  6.4 SIFRA QEDOSHIM PEREQ 5  --------------------------------------
— 267 —
⒎  there is nothing le over except one who is half-slave and half-ee.
 The key point in this Sifra section is the attribution to three different 
sages of a ruling that accepts as a possibility a betrothal between a partial 
slave female and “ee” male. There is also considerable variation in the MSS 
with respect to these lines, as well as a number of difficulties in logic:
⒈  In contradiction to the view of R. Ishmael which is cited further on, 
the Sifra editors state explicitly that the shifḥah neḥerefet could not be a 
Canaanite slave. This is based on the reference to פדיון – redemption in 
Lev. 19:20, and the apparent assumption that Canaanite slaves would 
not be redeemed by anyone. (This is in part confirmed by Lev. chapter 
25, in which the idea of redemption seems to apply only to people 
referred to as אחיך your brother). 
 It is not clear, however, whether this means the shifḥah neḥerefet is a 
Hebrew female (as Ibn Ezra in fact assumed in his commentary to Lev. 
19:20). Based on mQidd. 1:2, the only type of Hebrew female slave 
would be a minor, since the Hebrew amah, according to that section, 
goes ee at the onset of puberty. Yet based on the Sifra section above, 
if the female is a minor, the offence is deemed not to have occurred.16 
In effect, if Sifra presupposes knowledge of Mishnah, it has argued 
itself into an impossibility, since the conditions of Lev. 19:20 would 
never be met. 
⒉ R. Akiva identifies the shifḥah neḥerefet with one who is “half-slave, 
half-ee.” The possible intention, though it is not stated explicitly, 
may have been to refer to one who was originally a Canaanite slave 
but was now half-ee, thus putting her into a different category, and 
resolving the above dilemma. Rashi, at least, assumed that this was the 
case (commentary to Lev. 19:20)
16 The text here may refer to minor girl of less than three years and a day whose intercourse 
in not considered intercourse in mNiddah 2:⒋ Over that age but before majority (the 
appearance of two pubic hairs and reaching the age of twelve years and six months and 
a day) there would be the issue of fines for rape or seduction of a virgin and if she were 
married or betrothed to another man, he would be liable for adultery if she were a Hebrew 
slave. According to Rashi on Deut. 15:12, the court may sell the debtor’s entire family into 
slavery including his wife and minor daughters.
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ובשפחה כנענית חציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין...הכתוב מדבר
Scripture is speaking of...a Canaanite shifḥah who is half-slave half-free.
 R. Akiva’s justification for this status is based on his usual method 
of interpreting each element of the text separately, and thus deriving 
om both parts of the infinitive absolute construction הפדה לא נפדתה 
(in Lev. 19:20) the condition of redemption and non-redemption. The 
opinion of his contemporary R. Elazar ben Azariah, which appears to 
support him, is based on logic: since Scripture, in his opinion, has 
already covered all other forbidden sexual relationships (as in Lev. 
chapters 18 and 20), the only remaining type involves the half-slave 
half-ee woman. 
 This additional support seems unusual, if merely for the reason that, 
as noted by Frankel,17 R. Elazar b. Azariah and R. Akiva did not see 
eye to eye in the matter of דרשה. In particular, R. Elazar seems not 
to have accepted the method of interpreting separately each element 
of an infinitive absolute. This attitude is confirmed in the reaction 
attributed to him in the following baraita in bQidd. 17b, with respect 
to the obligation העניק תעניק in Deut. 15:14, concerning the provision 
of maintenance to persons one has eed: 
ר׳ אלעזר בן עזריה אומר ככתבן נתברך בית בגללו מעניקים לו לא נתברך בית בגללו אין 
מעניקים לו אם כן מה ת״ל ״הענק תעניק״ דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם
R. Elazar ben Azariah says: [Matters are] as they are written. [If ] the 
household was blessed on his [the slave’s] account, he is supported; [if ] it 
was not blessed on his account, he is not supported. Then why does Scripture 
[repeat the verb in the infinitive absolute form and state] הענק תעניק [bestow 
you shall bestow]? The Torah speaks in ordinary language. 
⒊ One may also question on what basis R. Elazar argued that all other 
types of forbidden relationships were already covered in Scripture; that 
is, since these other prohibitions do not explicitly include slaves, it is 
possible that Lev. 19:20 was in fact referring to one who is totally 
17 Zechariah Frankel, דרכי המשנה (Warsaw 1923) 98-9⒐
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a slave, as in the opinion of R. Ishmael. This question apparently 
occurred to R. Hillel, who argued that forbidden relationships with 
slaves had in fact already been covered in Scripture:
ואי אמרת הא איכא שפחה דלא כתיבה בתורה הא כת׳ 
״לא תהיה קדשה מבנות ישראל״ ושפחה קדשה היא
If you were to say that this is a shifḥah who has not [already] been written 
about in the Torah, it is written [Deut. 23:18] There shall not be a qedeshah 
from the daughters of Israel, and a shifḥah is a qedeshah.
 This unusual interpretation of Deut. 23:18 is reminiscent of the 
translation of this verse found in Targum Onkelos, which, in a departure 
om its usual word-for-word rendering of the MT, assumed this verse was 
a condemnation of slave-ee intermarriage: 
לא תהי אתתא מבנת ישראל לגבר עבד ולא יסב גברא מבני ישראל אתתא אמה
There shall be no woman of the daughters of Israel [as wife] to a man [who 
is an] eved, and no man of the sons of Israel shall take a woman [who is an] 
amah.
 On the question of sexual relationships with slaves, Sifra itself seems 
to reflect some disagreement. In Lev. 18:26, in the general conclusion to 
the incest prohibitions, we find the words:
ולא תעשו מכל התועבת האלה האזרח והגר בתוככם
You shall not commit any of these abominations, [neither] the citizen nor 
the stranger who lives among you. 
 Using רבוי logic, Sia Aḥarei Mot pereq 13:18 (Weiss 86c) comments:
גר זה הגר הגר לרבות נשי הגרים בתוככם לרבות נשים ועבדים
Stranger – it is the stranger. The stranger – to include the wives of the strangers. 
Among you – to include women and slaves.18
18 This same midrash on these words to include women and slaves is in Sifra see for example 
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 Such language would imply that slaves were included in the general 
prohibitions against incest. In two sections of Sifra, however, which are 
deemed to be part of the interpolation known as the מכילתא דעריות, the 
opposite opinion is expressed. Regarding the prohibition against one’s 
 ,(daughter-in-law) in Lev. 20:12, Sifra Qedoshim 9: 13 (Weiss 92b) כלה
reflecting an assumption against intermarriage with slaves, states:
אי כלתך אפילו שפחה אפילו נכרית תלמוד לומר אשת בנך היא לא אמרתי 
אלא באשה שיש לה אישות עם בנך יצאו השפחה והנכרית שאין לה אישות עם בנך
If [Scripture prohibits] your daughter-in-law [you might think it includes] 
even a shifḥah or gentile woman. It is thus stated She is the wife of your son 
[Lev. 18:15]; I spoke only of a woman who has wifehood with your son, 
[thus] the shifḥah and gentile woman are excluded, since she has no wifehood 
with your son.
 Similar logic is applied to the prohibition against אחות (one’s sister) in 
Lev. 20:17; the statement at Sifra Qedoshim pereq 10:13 (Weiss 92d-93a) 
is:
אי אחותך אפילו שפחה אפילו נכרית תלמוד לומר בת אשת אביך
If [Scripture prohibits] your sister [you might think it includes] even a shifḥah or 
gentile woman. It is thus stated the daughter of your father’s wife [Lev. 18:11].
 There is further attestation in tannaitic sources that the female slave was 
assumed to be eely available, as in the following passage om tHor. 2:11:
מפני מה הכל קופצין לישא את הגיורת ואין הכל קופצין לישא את המשוחררת
מפני שהגיורת היא היתה בחוקת המשתמרת והשפחה המשוחררת היא היתה בכלל 
המופקרת
Why does everyone jump to marry a female convert, but not to marry a freed 
female slave? Because the female convert was considered observant [i.e. of 
all sexual rules], while the freed shifḥah was considered someone made freely 
available. 
Aḥarei Mot pereq 7:9 (Weiss 83a) concerning Yom Kippur and pereq 12:1 (Weiss 84c) 
concerning the prohibition of eating blood.
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 Thus there is no consistent evidence as to whether incest prohibitions 
“crossed” between slave and non-slave groups. R. Elazar’s point may have 
been that the only way in which such “crossing” between groups could be a 
sexual transgression (ערוה) is if there were some element of eedom about 
the woman in question.
⒋  The attribution to R. Akiva is complicated by the existence of the 
following variants in lines 3-5: 
3. בפדויה ובשאינה פדויה] פדויה ושאינה פדויה  
מאורסת המאורסת  4. במאורסת]   
במאורסת  5. המאורסת]   
 The effect of these variations in or absence of the particles ב and ה, 
as Finkelstein notes,19 is to make it unclear exactly how much of lines 
3-4 are to be attributed to R. Akiva. The reading in the base text 
(Assemani 66) gives the impression that there are two prepositional 
phrases (בפדויה…במאורסת) which are the subject of מדבר  the ,הכתוב 
first describing who the slave woman is, and the second describing to 
whom she is connected and how, and it is only the second which is to 
be attributed to R. Akiva. In contrast, in line 5, in which there are two 
similar types of phrases, the reading המאורסת joins the two elements 
together much more clearly.
  It is likely that the two elements in each case are intended to be 
joined and attributed to each of the respective sages. Some support 
for this may in fact be found in the Yerushalmi version of this citation 
(MS Leiden, to be cited in full further below), in which R. Akiva’s 
position contains the words במאורסת  …  The significance .בשחצייה 
of these variants, though on the surface seemingly trivial, becomes 
apparent when compared with mKer. 5:⒌ There the assumption that 
the two elements in each case were actually said by each sage may be 
questioned, because the second element in each case is missing (that 
is, according to the Mishnah, the sages had nothing to say about the 
slave’s relationship). This issue will be explored further below, when 
19 Finkelstein, Sifra deVei Rav 1:60.
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the various parallels are compared.
⒌ The existence of variants that replace חורין עברי with בן   raises a עבד 
question as to which term is original, and whether the Sifra passage can 
be used as evidence of a trend in favor of slave-ee intermarriage. The 
majority of the primary witnesses attest to בן חורין being the second party 
in the relationship, in the opinion of both R. Akiva and R. Ishmael. 
The term עבד עברי appears in a marginal gloss in the Assemani 66 text, 
regarding the opinion of R. Akiva, and seems to be in a different hand 
than the main text. It also appears in MS ה regarding the opinion of 
R. Ishmael, and in some of the tertiary witnesses. As will be more fully 
discussed below, the idea that the עברי  is the second party was עבד 
likely influenced by the Babylonian Talmud.
6.2.4.D The Creation of a “Half-Slave”
1. (ג) ”והפדה לא נפדתה“ בכסף ובשוה כסף
2. מנ‘ אף בשטר תל‘ לו‘ ”או חפשה לא נתן לה“
3. ולהלן הוא אומר ”וכתב לה“
4. מה ”לה“ אמור להלן בשטר אף כן בשטר
5. (ד) אין לי אילא כסף בחציה ושטר בכולה מנ‘ אף בשטר בחציה
6. תל‘ לו‘ ”או חפשה לא נתן לה“ מה כסף בחציה אף בשטר בחציה
⒈  And she has not been redeemed – with money or a money equivalent. 
⒉  How do we know that even a deed [releases her]? Scripture therefore states: And 
her freedom has not been given to her.
⒊  Below [Deut. 24:1] it says: And he writes her [a deed of divorce]. 
⒋  Just as to her is written below concerning a deed, so to her is written here 
concerning a deed. 
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⒌  I know only that money [can release] half of her, [but] a deed [releases] all of 
her. How do we know that even a deed can release half of her? 
⒍  It is thus stated: And her freedom has not been given her – just as money [can 
release] half of her, so can a deed [release] half of her.
 The question underlying this section is the technical possibility of 
creating half a slave. The section begins by confirming that a slave can be 
released by both money and the equivalent of money (implied in the use of 
the term פדה in Lev. 19:20), and a “deed” (implied in the use of the term 
 .with Deut גזירה שוה The latter association is derived by a .(חפשה לא נתן לה
24:1 concerning divorce, based on the word לה; just as there a woman is 
released om marriage by having a document given to her, so here she 
is released om slavery by having a document given to her. The Malbim 
commentary to the Torah (19th century) explains why the word לה attracts 
attention in Lev. 19:20:
ומ״ש או חופשה לא נתן לה לשון שלא השתמש בו בשום מקום שתמיד יאמר 
״משלח חפשי״ ״לחפשי ישלחנו״...
What [Scripture] wrote, freedom has not been given to her, is language that 
it does not use elsewhere; it will always say sending free, he shall send him free 
[Exod. 21, Deut. 15, Jer. 34]... 
 The section now confirms that half of a slave can be released, by both 
money and a deed. The latter is derived by the logical assumption that both 
methods should have the same effect. A version of this baraita in bGitt. 41b 
makes this relationship clear:
ת״ש ״והפדה״ יכול לכל ת״ל ״לא נפדתה״ אי לא נפדתה יכול לכל ת״ל ״והפדה״ 
הא כיצד פדויה ואינה פדויה בכסף ובשוה כסף ואין לי אלא בכסף בשטר מנין 
ת״ל ״והפדה לא נפדתה או חופשה לא נתן לה״ ולהלן הוא אומר ״וכתב לה ספר כריתית״ 
מה להלן בשטר אף כאן בשטר אין לי אלא חציו בכסף או כולו בשטר חציו בשטר מנין ת״ל 
״והפדה לא נפדתה או חופשה לא נתן לה״ מקיש שטר לכסף מה כסף בין כולו בין חציו אף 
שטר נמי בין כולו בין חציו
Come and hear: redeemed – with respect to all [of her]? [No,] it is stated: 
she had not been redeemed. If she has not been redeemed, does this mean 
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all [of her]? [No,] it is stated redeemed. How can she be redeemed and not 
redeemed? With money and something equivalent to money. I know only 
with money, whence with a deed? [In Lev. 19:20] it states: redeemed she has 
not been redeemed or her freedom given her, and there [Deut. 24:1] it states: 
and he writes her a bill of divorce. Just as there is a deed in that case, there is 
a deed in this case. I know only half [redeemed] with money, and all with a 
deed; whence half with a deed? It is stated: redeemed she has not been redeemed 
or her freedom given her – it compares a deed to money. Just as money [is 
effective] for all or half, so a deed [is effective] for all or half.
 The significance of this Sifra section lies in several points: 
⒈ The term שטר does not seem to be used consistently in rabbinic sources 
with respect to slaves. The שטר in this Sifra section appears to imply a 
 a deed of manumission, particularly given its analogy to the ,גט שחרור
 ,in the Mishnah, however שטר of Deut. 24:⒈ The slave’s ספר כריתות
seems to be a bond or promissory note – that is, something of value 
is given to the master, either by the slave or others: in mQidd. 1:3, 
referring to the שטר by which the Canaanite slave acquires himself, 
and the references in mGitt. 4:4-5 to שטר על דמיו or על חצי דמיו given 
in exchange for a forced manumission. This is to be distinguished 
om the גט שחרור, mentioned periodically throughout Mishnah Gittin, 
which seems to imply something done by the master, whether or not 
in return for value (as in mGitt. 9:3,גופו של גט שחרור: הרי את בן חורין 
 ,The body of a deed of manumission [states]: Behold“ – הרי את לעצמך
you are ee; behold, you belong to yourself ”). The following baraita in 
bQidd. 16a, and its corresponding discussion, confirm that later sages 
also perceived this confusion, and, like Sifra, assumed that the שטר as 
it applied to slaves was a גט שחרור:
תנא וקונה את עצמו בכסף ובשוה כסף ובשטר בשלמא כסף דכתיב מכסף מקנתו 
שוה כסף נמי ישיב גאולתו... אלא האי שטר ה“ד אילימא דכתב ליה שטרא אדמיה 
היינו כסף אלא שיחרור שטר למה לי לימא ליה באפי תרי זיל א“נ באפי בי דינא זיל 
אמר רבא זאת אומרת עבד עברי גופו קנוי והרב שמחל על גרעונו אין גרעונו מחול
It was taught: He [presumably a Hebrew slave, from the context below] 
acquires himself with money, with something equivalent to money, or 
with a deed. Money is reasonable, as it is written [Lev. 25:51, with respect 
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to a Hebrew] with the money of his purchase. Similarly, for something 
equivalent to money , [it is written, ibid.] he shall return [the value of] 
his redemption... But what is the case for this deed? If we say [the slave] 
writes [the master] a note for his value, this is [the same thing as] money. 
Rather, it is a manumission. [But] why a deed – let [the master] tell him, 
“Go out” before two [witnesses], or before the Beit Din. Rava said: This 
means that a Hebrew slave is acquired bodily, and if a master forgives the 
remainder owing on him, the remainder is not forgiven. 
 The three Jewish Targumim also accept the association of חופשה in 
Lev. 19:20 with a deed; Pseudo-Jonathan and Neofiti specifically 
identi this deed as a שחרורה  כתב deed of manumission) or a) שטר 
.שטר document of eedom) while Onkelos simply has) חרותה
⒉ The above baraita confirms another point raised by the Sifra section: 
the גט שחרור was a valid method of manumission. In that case, it must 
be asked why this method is not specifically listed among the types 
of manumission for either the Hebrew or Canaanite slave in mQidd. 
1:2-⒊ The answer may lie in the use of the phrase עצמו את   in קונה 
these mishnayot. This phrase suggests that the types of manumission 
listed in these mishnayot are perceived to be at the instance of the 
slave, rather than that of the master; that is, they are either invoked by 
the slave or others on his behalf (such as through payment of money), 
or operate automatically for the benefit of the slave (such as the passage 
of time or appearance of puberty signs). The deed of manumission, on 
the other hand, based on various sources including the two mentioned 
above, appears to have been at the instance of the master. 
  If this distinction is correct, then we can understand the Sifra 
section as confirming that a half-slave can be created at the instance of 
either the slave or the master: the slave can buy a partial manumission 
(a situation which appears to be consistent with Hellenistic practice, 
to be discussed below), or the master himself can create a situation of 
partial eedom.
⒊  This leads to the final issue: is this Sifra section discussing a slave 
owned by a single master, or by partners? That is, could a single owner 
release half his ownership, or did the half release apply only in a case in 
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which one partner released all of his share? Amoraic discussion reveals 
an assumption that this issue was a matter of dispute, between R. Judah 
[the Patriarch] and others. The following discussion in yGitt. 4:5 46a 
(with respect to releasing a male half-slave) suggests that only R. Judah 
[the Patriarch] accepted that a single owner could ee half his slave:
היאך איפשר חציו עבד וחציו בן חורין תיפתר או כרבי דרבי אומר אדם משחרר חצי עבדו 
או דברי הכל עבד של שני שותפין ועמד אחד מהן ושיחרר חלקו
How is it possible for someone to be half-slave half-free? Explain this either 
according to Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch], as Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] says 
a man may free half his slave, or [according to] the opinion of all, [this is] a 
slave of two partners, and one frees his portion. 
 Certain of the Babylonian Amoraim , however, thought that the issue 
might depend on the type of manumission (bGitt. 41b):
ת“ר המשחרר חצי עבדו רבי אומר קנה וחכ“א לא קנה אמר רבה מחלוקת בשטר דרבי 
סבר והפדה לא נפדתה או חופשה לא נתן לה מקיש שטר לכסף מה כסף בין כולו בין חציו 
אף שטר נמי בין כולו בין חציו ורבנן גמרי לה לה מאשה מה אשה חציה לא אף עבד נמי 
חציו לא אבל בכסף דברי הכל קנה... ורב יוסף אמר מחלוקת בכסף דרבי סבר והפדה לא 
נפדתה פדויה ואינה פדויה ורבנן סברי דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם אבל בשטר דברי הכל 
לא קנה מיתיבי המשחרר חצי עבדו בשטר רבי אומר קנה וחכ“א לא קנה תיובתא דרב 
יוסף תיובתא
The sages taught: If one frees half his slave, Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] 
says [the slave] has acquired [half of himself ], and the sages say he has not 
acquired [half of himself ]. Rabbah said: This is a dispute with respect to a 
deed, as Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] is of the opinion that she has not been 
redeemed or her freedom given her [Lev. 19:20] compares a deed to money; just 
as money [is effective to acquire] all or half [of the slave], so a deed is also 
[effective] for all or half. The sages learn her [in Lev. 19: 20] from her, a wife 
[he shall write her a bill of divorce – Deut. 24:1]; just as one cannot [divorce] 
half a wife [with a bill of divorce], one cannot [free] half a slave [with a deed 
of manumission]. But all agree that money acquires [half ]... Rav Yosef said: 
This is a dispute with respect to money, as Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] is 
of the opinion that [the infinitive absolute] she has not been redeemed [is 
unbundled to mean] she is redeemed and not redeemed, while the sages are 
of the opinion that the Torah speaks in plain language. But all agree that 
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a deed does not acquire [half ]. They object [as it was taught above]: If one 
frees half his slave, Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] says [the slave] has acquired 
[half of himself ], and the sages say he has not acquired [half of himself ]. [Is 
this] a refutation of Rav Yosef? [It is] a refutation.
 The talmudic editor thus confirms that R. Judah the Patriarch would 
accept a partial release by a single owner in any case. 
 The significance of this position may be understood by comparing it 
with with Roman law. Pre-Justinian, not only could a single owner not 
release half his ownership, but a co-owner of a slave could not ee the 
“entire” slave. As Buckland explains:20 
... the owner of half cannot free the other half. Hence the classical jurists held 
that if one of co-owners purported to free the slave, the manumission did not 
take effect. The act was not, however, a mere nullity. If the manumission was 
formal ... the effect was to vest the share of the freeing owner in the other 
owner by accrual.
 Under Justinian, there was pressure in favor of eeing the slave; thus, 
other co-owners were forced to sell their shares to any co-owner who 
wanted to ee the slave (C ⒎⒎⒈1, translated and quoted by Buckland):21 
“If one owner desires to ee inter vivos or by will the others shall sell their 
shares to him or his heres who shall then ee.”
 This difficulty with half-slave status may be understood on examination 
of the Roman concept of manumission. The essence of Roman manumission, 
according to Buckland,22 was not a conveyance of what the master owned 
in the slave back to the slave; it was a cessio in iure of the master’s rights in 
the slave, and the creation of a new status:
[Manumission] is not in strictness transfer of dominium. A man has no 
dominium in himself or his members. Nor is it an alienation of liberty. The 
right received is not that of the master....Manumission is an act emanating 
from the holder of ownership removing the man (by the authority of the 
State, which is present in all formal manumission) from that class... It does 
20 W.W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery 57⒌
21 Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery 57⒎
22 Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery 7⒕
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indeed confer rights and capacities on him, but it is from the notion of 
destroying capacities for rights over him that the conception starts.23 
 Enslavement in this system, in other words, implied that one person 
possessed certain powers over another, and such powers could not be given 
up in half-measures. In the tannaitic system, in contrast, which did accept a 
half-slave status, we might thus infer that enslavement was seen as ownership 
by the master of something ordinarily belonging to the slave, and that this 
“something” could be given back in whole or in part.24 This idea is consistent 
with the language used in the Mishnah regarding manumission: את  קונה 
 you belong to“) הרי את לעצמך ;(he acquires himself,” mQidd. 1:2-3“) עצמו
yourself,” mGitt. 9:3).25 It is also consistent with the mishnaic rule that slaves 
became liable for torts they had committed during their enslavement, aer 
they have become ee (mB.Bat. 8:4); such a rule implies that the slave had 
some sort of legal “essence” which continued to incur liabilities even while it 
was in the possession of another. One did, in other words, have dominium, 
or something like it, in one’s self, which could be conveyed to others. 
 Finally on this point, it may be noted that Maimonides (Hil. Avadim, 
7:1-2) accepted that a single owner could ee half a slave only upon receipt 
of money (the view of the חכמים above, and against the view of both R. 
Judah the Patriarch and Sifra):
גט שחרור צריך שהיה ענינו דבר הכורת בינו לבין אדוניו ולא ישאר לאדון בו זכות...
המשחרר חצי עבדו בשטר לא קנה העבד חציו והרי הוא עבד כשהיה אבל אם שחרר חציו 
בכסף...קנה ונמצא חציו עבד וחציו בן חורין
It is necessary that a deed of manumission be in essence something that cuts 
off [the relationship] between [the slave] and his master, and no right in him 
remains with the master...if one frees half his slave with a deed, the slave does 
not acquire half of himself and is still a slave as he was; but if he frees half of 
23 Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery 437-43⒏
24 The creation of a half-slave status will be examined more fully in the Excursus in ⒍6 of 
this chapter.
25 This wording in mGitt. is similar to that found in certain Mesopotamian manumissions, 
in which the manumitted person was required to serve or support the manumitter until 
the latter’s death; at that point one finds language such as ša ramānīša šī (see, e.g. the 
OB manumission document UAZP 29, line 14). The relationship between half-slavery and 
conditional manumission will be explored more fully in the Excursus in ⒍6 of this chapter.
--------------------------------------  6.4 SIFRA QEDOSHIM PEREQ 5  --------------------------------------
— 279 —
him with money...he acquires [half of himself ] and is half-slave half free.
6.4.2.E The Punishment of the Woman
”בקורת“ מכות מלמד שהיא לוקה  .1
יכול אף הוא ילקה תל לו ”תהיה“  .2
היא לוקה והוא אינו לוקה  .3
⒈ Biqqoret – lashes. This teaches that she is whipped.
⒉ Is it possible that he too is whipped? It is thus stated tihyeh [i.e. the verb is 3 f.s.] 
⒊ [implying] she is whipped and he is not whipped.
 The text here accepts biqqoret as lashes, and confirms that only the 
woman is punished in this way. No derivation is given here, but the various 
Sifra commentators, such as R. Hillel and Rabad, accept the amoraic 
opinion in bKer. 11a, which cites this midrash on tihyeh.
6.4.2.F The Necessity of a Deed of Manumission 
”לא יומתו כי לא חפשה“ הא אם חפשה הרי אילו חייבין מיתה  .1
ר‘ שמעון אמר משום ר‘ עקיבה יכול יהא הכסף גומר בה  .2
תל לו ”לא יומתו כי לא חופשה“ ערה את כל הפרשה ל“כי לא חפשה“  .3
מלמד שאינו גומר בה אילא בשטר  .4
⒈  They shall not die because she has not been freed. Thus if she has been eed, they 
would be liable to death.
⒉  R. Shimon said in the name of R. Akiva: Does money finish with her [manumit 
her]?
⒊  Scripture says: They shall not die because she has not been freed; it intertwines the 
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entire section with the words because she has not been freed. 
⒋  This teaches that he [the master] does not finish with her [i.e. she is not 
manumitted] except by deed.
 The issue in this case appears to be the circumstance in which the 
shifḥah would be ee, so that both parties would be liable to death for 
adultery (assuming the woman is otherwise betrothed). The meanings of 
both גומר and 26ערה in this context are vague, and one might argue that 
they are intended as a play on the same terms which were used earlier 
in the passage in a sexual sense. Despite the fact that an earlier section 
confirmed that either a payment or a deed of manumission can release 
part or all of the slave woman, this section appears to be stating that a 
final manumission can be effected only by a deed of manumission. As the 
Malbim commentary explains, the Sifra passage is reacting to the fact that 
only the term חפש is repeated at the end of v. 20:
וסיים ב״לא חופשה״ לבד ולא אמר ״לא יומתו כי לא נפדתה ולא חופשה״ 
מבואר שפדיון כסף לבדו אינו גומר לעשותה ב״ח
It concludes with she had not been freed only; it did not say: they shall not die 
because she has not been redeemed and has not been freed. It is explained that a 
monetary redemption alone does not make her completely free.
 Further, this Sifra passage contradicts the position in mGitt. 4:5, in 
which the male half-slave and half-ee seems to be released upon writing 
of a bond (that is, a money equivalent). 
⒈ One possibility is that the more stringent formality was applicable 
specifically to the shifḥah neḥerefet to keep her sexually available for the 
maximum possible time without penalty of death.
⒉ An alternative possibility is that the necessity of a deed of manumission 
may have been a later development. From certain amoraic debates in 
 אורעה to intertwine” (Jastrow). The reading“ ערי appears to be the Pi’el 3 m.s. perf. of ערה 26
in the witness ש is the form found in bGitt. 39b (as will be seen below), and appears to 
be the Afel 3 m.s. perf. of ארע “to join” (Jastrow). Even-Shoshan s.v. ב. ערה has the same 
definition for a Hebrew word.
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the Talmudim, it seems that the deed of manumission was thought 
to be a special requirement in certain cases. In such cases, it was clear 
that the master had otherwise severed connection with the slave – 
for instance, declaring him הקדש (sanctified property) or rendering 
him הפקר (abandoned property), or when יאוש (abandoning hope of 
recovery) was deemed to have occurred regarding a stolen or runaway 
slave. The issue was then whether the slave was automatically ee, or 
whether he remained simply a slave without a master until someone 
wrote him a deed of manumission. We may note first a controversy in 
bGitt. 39b on the matter of יאוש, which contains a slightly different 
version of the Sifra section. Here it is acknowledged that the limitation 
to a deed of manumission that is expressed in this midrash would not 
apply in the case of a slave dedicated as sanctified property; in the latter 
case there is in effect someone to accept the redemption money:
אמרו לפני רבי אמר נתייאשתי מפלוני עבדי מהו אמר להם אומר אני אין לו תקנה אלא 
בשטר...והתניא רבי אומר אומר אני אף הוא נותן דמי עצמו ויוצא מפני שהוא כמוכרו לו 
הכי קאמר או בכסף או בשטר והאי פקע ליה כספיה ולאפוקי מהאי תנא דתניא ר‘ שמעון 
אומר משום רבי עקיבא יכול יהא כסף גומר בה כדרך ששטר גומר בה ת“ל והפדה לא 
נפדתה אורעה כל הפרשה כולה ללא חופשה לומר לך שטר גומר בה ואין כסף גומר בה 
It was posed before Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch]: If one said: I have abandoned 
hope [of recovering] a certain slave of mine – what is [the rule]? He said to 
them: I say that [the slave] has no remedy except a deed [of manumission]...
But was it not taught [with respect to a slave who was dedicated as sanctified 
property]: Rabbi [Judah the Patriarch] says: I say that he [the slave] also 
gives his value and goes out [free], because it is as if [the Temple treasurer] 
sells him to himself. Thus he says that either money or a deed [manumits 
a slave], and in this case his money releases him. This is to exclude [this 
situation from the view of ] the following tanna, as it was taught: R. Shimon 
says in the name of R. Akiva: Could it be that money finishes with her in the 
way a deed finishes with her? It is stated [in the doubled infinitive absolute 
form]: redeemed she has not been redeemed. The entire passage is joined to 
because she has not been freed, to tell you that a deed finishes with her and 
money does not finish with her.
⒊  Finally, it may be noted that Maimonides (Hil. Avadim, 7:6) again 
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appears to have ignored this Sifra section:
שפחה חרופה אם רצה לשחרר חציה הנשאר ותעשה אשת איש גמורה הרי זה משוחרר בין 
בכסף בין בשטר שאף הכסף גומר שחרורה
[With respect to] a shifḥah ḥarufah – if one wants to free the half of her 
that remains [enslaved], and she will be made a “complete” wife, he can 
manumit her with either money or a deed, because even money completes 
her manumission.
 It is possible that Maimonides had a different text of Sifra; it will 
be noted that the witness מ, which Finkelstein assigns to the same 
geographical group, is missing the citation of R. Shimon. In that case, 
however, we might also expect the same lacuna in MS Vat. 3⒈ A more 
likely explanation of Maimonides’ view (which then influenced מ) is the 
fact that in bGitt. 39b there is an Amoraic dispute about whether the view 
of R. Shimon was correct:
אמר רמי בר חמא א״ר נחמן הלכה כר׳ שמעון 
ור׳ יוסף בר חמא א״ר יוחנן אין הלכה כר׳ שמעון
Rami bar Ḥama said in the name of Rav Naḥman: The halakhah is according 
to R. Shimon. Rav Yosef bar Ḥama said in the name of R. Yoḥanan: The 
halakhah is not according to R. Shimon.
 The Talmud then goes on to cite a case which appears to support R. 
Shimon. Rav Naḥman had disallowed a manumission in which a dying 
master had given his slave woman his own cap to effect an acquisition of 
herself. The Talmud concludes, however, that R. Shimon’s dictum was 
irrelevant to the case: 
מאן דחזא סבר משום דהלכה כר׳ שמעון ולא היא אלא משום דהוה ליה כליו של מקנה
One who saw [this] thought [the reason for Rav Naḥman’s decision was] that 
the halakhah is according to R. Shimon. But this is not so; it was because [the 
master] owned the items [used] for the purchase [i.e. the woman was in effect 
handing him back his own property, and thus there was no redemption].
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6.4.2.G The Punishment of the Male
1.  ”והביא את אשמו ליי וג“
2.  נא‘ כן ”איל אשם“ ונא‘ להלן ”איל אשם“
3.  מה ”איל אשם“ אמור להלן בכסף שקלים אף כן בכסף שקלים
⒈  And he shall bring his guilt offering to God, etc.
⒉  A guilt offering ram is said here, and a guilt offering ram is said below [Lev. 5:15, 
according to the various Sifra commentators].
⒊  As a guilt offering ram is said below to be in silver [i.e. money is given to purchase 
the sacrifice, rather than the individual actually bringing the sacrificial animal], 
so here too it is in silver.
 Using another verse as a parallel, it is derived that the asham sacrifice 
here was also to be paid in money.27 The גזירה שוה analogy on the word 
 is based, according to the Malbim, on the fact that this word is אשם
superfluous in Lev. 19:21: 
שהיל״ל ״והביא את אשמו״ וכו׳ ״איל״
...it should have said and he shall bring his asham sacrifice etc. – a ram
 This is brought out more clearly in the fuller quotes in ד and ר; the 
more focused wording in ש (Yalkut Shimoni), on the other hand, seems 
to base the גזירה שוה on the phrase איל אשם. 
6.4.2.H Further Specification of the Nature of the Offence
”וכפר עליו הכהן באיל האשם לפני יי על חטאתו אשר חטא“  .1
מלמד שהוא מביא אחת על ביאות הרבה  .2
”ונסלח לו מחטאתו אשר חטא“ לעשות את המיזיד כשוגג  .3
27 As Noth also argued (see chapter 3, section ⒊2), though on other grounds.
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⒈  And the priest will atone for him with the guilt offering ram before God on the sin 
which he sinned.
⒉ This teaches that he brings one [sacrifice] for many acts of intercourse.
⒊ And he shall forgive him for the sin which he sinned – to render the one who acts 
intentionally like the one who acts inadvertently.
 Both of the rules in this Sifra section are also found in the Mishnah: 
⒈  mKer. 1:2 sets out a general rule regarding those acts which require 
a punishment of excision (these are listed in mKer. 1:1, including 
various types of sexual transgressions). The rule requires a difference 
in punishment according to the mental state of the offender:
על אלו חיבים על זדונם כרת ועל שגגתם חטאת ועל לא הודע שלהן אשם תלוי
On [the following types of offences] they are liable for excision if they acted 
intentionally, and for a sin offering if they acted in error, and for a conditional 
guilt offering if they were not uncertain [that they had sinned]...
 mKer. 2:2, however, provides a contrasting rule for the shifḥah neḥerefet 
offence:
...וארבעה מביאין על הזדון כשגגה...הבא על השפחה...
... and four [types of sinners] bring [the same type of sacrifice] whether they 
acted intentionally or in error... [including] the one who has intercourse with 
the shifḥah [neḥerefet]...
⒉  Mishnah Ker. 2:3 provides a further special rule regarding the shifḥah 
neḥerefet, in the case in which one commits many acts of the same 
nature (presumably with the same shifḥah):
חמשה מביאין קרבן אחד על עברות הרבה...הבא על השפחה ביאות הרבה...
Five persons bring one sacrifice for many transgressions... [including] one 
who has intercourse with a shifḥah [neḥerefet] many times...
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 As explained by the Malbim commentary, Sifra supports these rules 
based on the apparently superfluous wording in Lev. 19:22:
מ״ש על חטאתו אשר חטא מיותר וכפול פי׳ חז״ל שמכפר באיל האשם הא׳ על כל מה 
שחטא...וכפל שנית...לעשות את המזיד כשוגג
What [Scripture] stated on his sin that he sinned is superfluous and repetitive. 
The sages’ interpretation is that he is forgiven with the ram of the asham 
that is stated with respect to everything he has sinned...and it is repeated...to 
render the one who acts intentionally like the one who acts in error.
 A parallel citation to Sifra appears in bKer. 9a; here, however, the last 
phrase is “corrected” to its more logical order:
ונסלח לו מחטאתו אשר חטא לעשות מזיד כשוגג והא קרא כי כתיב במזיד כתיב אלא 
אימא לעשות שוגג כמזיד
...and the sin that he committed will be forgiven him [Lev. 19:22] – to render the 
one who transgresses intentionally like the one who transgresses in error. But 
Scripture writes of one who transgresses intentionally. Say rather: to render the 
one who transgresses in error like the one who transgresses intentionally. 
 There also appears to be an issue as to whether the offence described in 
Lev. 19:20 concerns the מזיד (intentional sinner) or the שוגג (inadvertent 
sinner). Rashi states (bKer. 9a, ד“ה ונסלח): 
והא עיקר קרא במזיד כתיב דכתיב בקורת תהיה והיינו מלקות ואין מלקות אלא במזיד
The object of Scripture is written with respect to the מזיד, because it is 
written there will be a biqqoret, and this is lashes, and lashes apply only to 
the מזיד.
 The Malbim commentary, however, concludes:
...שעיקר הקרבן על השוגג...ובזה נכונה גם גי׳ הספר׳ ״לעשות המזיד כשוגג״ 
...the object of the sacrifice is on the שוגג... and in this respect the version in 
Sifra “to make the מזיד like the שוגג” is also correct.
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6.4.2.I The Summary Section
1. (ט) כל העריות לא עשה בהם את המערה כגומר
2. והשפחה עשה בה את המערה כגומר.
3. (י) כל העריות לא עשה בהן את הקטן כגדול
4. והשפחה עשה בה את הקטנה כגדולה.
5. (יא) כל העריות אחד האיש ואחד האשה שוין במכות ובקורבן
6. והשפחה היא לוקה והוא אינו לוקה הוא מביא קרבן והיא אינה מביאה קרבן
7. כל העריות בחטאת והשפחה באשם
8. כל העריות בנקבה ושפחה בזכר
9. כל העריות חייב על כל ביאה וביאה והשפחה לא חייב אילא אחת על ביאות הרבה.
10. כל העריות לא עשה בהם את המיזיד כשוגג והשפחה עשה בה את המי{זיד כ}שוגג
Variants
עשה = ר ב ד <מ ש ר“ה וייס> לא עשה] = א   .1
ושפחה = ד ובשפחה = ר <מ>   והשפחה] = א ב   .2
לא עשה = ר ב ד <מ ש וייס>  עשה] = א 
∩ = ב כל-כקטנה]*    3-4
עשה = ר ב <מ ר״ה ראב״ד>  לא עשה] = א ד <וייס>   .3
עשה] = א ד  ושפחה = ד  ובשפחה = ר <מ>  והשפחה] = א   .4
חסר = ד <וייס> בה את] = *  לא עשה = ר ב <מ ר״ה ראב״ד וייס> 
ובשפחה = ר ב ד <מ>  והשפחה] = א   .6
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ושפחה חרופה] = ד <וייס>  והשפחה] = *   .7
אינו] = ד  לא] = *  ובשפחה = ר ב ד <מ>  והשפחה] = א   .9
והשפחה] = א  מזיד = ד  המיזיד] = *  חסר = ד  את] *   .10
ושפחה = ד  ובשפחה = ר ב <מ> 
Translation
⒈  Concerning all the forbidden relationships, [Scripture] has not made the one who 
is merely aroused like the one who completes intercourse,
⒉  while concerning the slave, it has made the one who is merely aroused like the 
one who completes intercourse.
⒊  Concerning all the forbidden relationships, [Scripture] has not made the minor 
male like the adult male,
⒋  while concerning the slave, it has made the minor female like the adult female.
⒌  Concerning all the forbidden relationships, both the man and woman are equal 
with respect to lashes and sacrifice,
⒍  [while concerning] the slave, she is whipped and he is not whipped, he brings a 
sacrifice and she does not bring a sacrifice.
⒎  All the forbidden relationships [require] a ḥattat (sin offering), [while] the slave 
[requires] an asham (guilt offering). 
⒏  All the forbidden relationships [require] a female [sacrifice, while] the slave 
[requires] a male [sacrifice].
⒐  Concerning all the forbidden relationships, one is liable for each and every act 
of intercourse, while concerning the slave, one is liable only once for many acts 
of intercourse.
⒑  Concerning all the forbidden relationships, [Scripture] has not made the one who 
acts intentionally like the one who acts in error, while concerning the slave, it has 
made the one who acts intentionally like the one who acts in error.
---------------  Chapter 6. RABBINIC INTERPRETATIONS OF LEVITICUS 19:20-22   --------------
— 288 —
 From a stylistic point of view, these lines are in effect a continuation 
of the idea of R. Elazar that Lev. 19:20 constitutes the one remaining 
 they list the ways in which this forbidden relationship differs om ;ערוה
all others, by summarizing all the points which have just been proved 
in the first part of the section. Yet, as noted above, the summary form 
without biblical citations is not characteristic of this halakhic midrash, a 
feature that is rendered more significant by the fact that this summary 
section has parallels in the Mishnah and Tosea. Further, there are a 
number of elements in the Sifra summary that explicitly contradict the 
midrashic derivations in the first part of the section:
⒈ The wording in lines 1 and 2 of this section is clearly reversed with 
respect to the midrashic derivation in section ⒜ above: with respect 
to the shifḥah, the גומר is not like the מערה. Thus the wording in the 
remaining witnesses (which reverse the order of the עשה – לא עשה ) 
seems to be correct; yet as the lectio difficilior, the reading in Assemani 
66 might be considered original.
 It is also possible that the reading in Assemani 66 was a deliberate 
scribal change. In the following passage in bKer. 11ab, it appears that 
the Amoraim had before them a simple statement to the effect that the 
 with no specification as to whether ,מערה is considered equal to the גומר
this referred to the shifḥah neḥerefet or all arayot. Rav Sheshet manages 
to argue both cases. With respect to the slave, he considers additional 
elements regarding the nature of the act (elements that are present in 
Tosea), and argues in essence that the גומר is exempt, like the מערה, if 
his גמירה occurs with respect to something which is not a שכבת זרע:
תני תנא קמיה דרב ששת עשו גומר כמערה מתכוין כשאין מתכוין כדרכה כשלא כדרכה 
ניעור כישן...א“ל...הכי קתני עשו גומר שלא כדרכה בשפחה חרופה דלא מיחייבי כמערה 
כדרכה דשכבת זרע כתיב מתכוין שלא כדרכה בשפחה דפטורין כאינו מתכוין דשכבת 
זרע כתיב ניעור שלא כדרכה בשפחה דפטורין כישן מ“ט דשכבת זרע כתיב נמצא מתכוין 
והמערה בשפחה כשאין מתכוין בכל עריות ישן כדרכה כישן דעריות נמצא ניעור שלא 
כדרכה בשפחה כישן דכל עריות
A tanna repeated before Rav Sheshet: They rendered one who completes 
his act like one who is merely aroused, one who acted intentionally like one 
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who acted unintentionally, ‘normal’ intercourse like ‘abnormal’ intercourse, 
the one who was awake like the one who was asleep... He said to him... This 
is what is taught: They rendered one who completed ‘abnormal’ intercourse 
with a shifḥah ḥarufah, who is not liable, like one who is merely aroused 
during ‘normal’ intercourse, as it is written in a lying of seed [i.e. a completed 
act of ejaculation during vaginal intercourse]; [they rendered] one who 
committed an intentional act of ‘abnormal’ intercourse with a shifḥah, who 
is exempt, like one who did not act intentionally, as it is written ‘in a lying 
of seed’; [they rendered] one who is awake while engaging in ‘abnormal’ 
intercourse with a shifḥah, who is exempt, like one who is asleep. What is the 
reason? It is written: in a lying of seed. Thus it was found that one who acts 
intentionally and one is merely aroused with respect to a shifḥah is like one 
who acts unintentionally with respect to other prohibited sexual relations; 
one who is asleep during ‘normal’ intercourse [with a shifḥah] is like one who 
is asleep with respect to other prohibited sexual relations; it was found that 
one who is awake during ‘abnormal’ intercourse with a shifḥah is like one who 
is asleep with respect to other prohibited sexual relations.
 It is thus possible that Assemani 66 was corrected to reflect the passage 
but it is also possible that the reading in Assemani 66 was the reading 
before the editors of the Babylonian Talmud.
⒉  Lines 3 and 4 again seem to be a mistake in Assemani 66; here, however, 
the wording in ד also follows Assemani 6⒍ Possibly attempting to 
reconcile these differences in the witnesses, the Sia commentator 
Qorban Aharon was able to propose a logical interpretation for both 
this reading and the reverse, and thus to see them as paraphrases of the 
same idea. For כל העריות עשה והשפחה לא עשה (the reading in ר and מ) 
he explained:
צריכין אנו לפרש אותה על זה האופן כל העריות עשה בהם הקטן לחייב פה החוטא בו 
כגדול שכמו שהבא על הגדולה חייב כך הבא על הקטנה חייב... ובשפחה חרופה לא עשה 
הקטנה כגדולה אלא דהבא על הגדולה חייב ואם בא על קטנה דהיא פטור אף הוא פטור
We must interpret it in this manner: for all the transgressions the minor is 
made like the adult, to render liable the one who sins with him, so that just 
as one who has [wrongful] intercourse with an adult female is liable, so one 
who has [wrongful] intercourse with a minor female is liable...but with the 
shifḥah ḥarufah the minor female is not like the adult female; rather, one who 
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has intercourse with an adult [shifḥah] is liable, but if he has intercourse with 
a minor, who is exempt, he is also exempt.
 For the opposite wording the explanation is as follows:
ואם נרצה לקיים גרסת הספרי׳ דגרסי׳ כל העריות לא עשה והשפחה עשה... כלומר שלא 
תלה עונש הגדול בקטן... אבל בעריות [צ״ל בשפחה] עשה הקטנה כגדול, שהשוה את 
הגדול לקטן ופטר הגדול אם בא על הקטנה
If we want to give effect to the version where we read “for all the 
transgressions it does not render [the minor like the adult] and for the 
shifḥah it does render [the minor like the adult]”...that is to say, [generally] 
the punishment of the adult is not dependent on [the punishment of ] 
the minor...but for all the transgressions [sic; probably shifḥah], the minor 
female is like [i.e. has the same effect on] the adult male, as the adult male 
is made equal to the minor male and is exempt if he has intercourse with 
a minor [shifḥah].
 In other words, both readings are saying the same thing om a different 
angle. The second explanation is somewhat weak, in that, as Weiss notes, 
we would have expected the end phrase to be עשה את הגדול כקטנה. We may 
therefore posit that the reading in ר and also found in Midrash HaGadol 
 is original; this is supported by the fact that the parallel baraita in (מ)
Tosea has the same structure.
6.5 ASSESSING THE PARALLEL TEXTS
As we have noted, both Mishnah and Tosea contain parallel texts 
to that in Sifra, though not in the same order as Sifra. Of particular 
interest is the part of the citation outlining the views of the sages 
concerning the identity and relationship of the shifḥah neḥerefet, as both 
Sifra and Tosea give evidence of support to intermarriage, in complete 
contradiction to the Mishnah. There are further appearances of this 
particular intermarriage section in each of the Talmudim, again with 
a certain amount of variability. The question thus arises as to which 
version, particularly of the intermarriage section, is original (or, perhaps, 
“more” original).
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 I propose that the version in Tosea is the “most” original, in effect by 
default:
1) Sifra contains internal contradictions, evidence of amendment according 
to the Bavli, and an unusual summary section that does not appear to 
be original to it;
2) Mishnah is streamlined to conform with its other slave rulings.
While this argument does not preclude changes having been made to the 
Tosea text over time (as is evident om variants in the Tosea MSS 
that are quoted by Zuckermandel), it will be argued that the versions in 
the Mishnah and Sia have been based on a text most similar to Tosea; 
in some cases these versions have been deliberately edited, and in other 
cases they show changes which are consistent with the streamlining which 
occurs during a period of oral transmission.
6.5.1 General Considerations Between Mishnah and Tosefta
It might be argued on the one hand that the Tosea passage shows the 
characteristics expected of it, particularly if one accepts the contention 
of those (such as Frankel and Neusner) who argue that the Tosea is a 
commentary, or form of Talmud, upon the Mishnah:
a) It adds details which appear to explain or extend the application of the 
Mishnah’s rules, and this would include details concerning the status 
of the shifḥah as married to a slave or ee man; 
b) It follows the structure of the Mishnah exactly. This structure consists 
of three parts:
i.  a list of the differences between the shifḥah and כל העריות (“differences” 
pericope)
ii.  a discussion of the identity of the shifḥah (“intermarriage” pericope)
iii.  a list of common principles which apply to העריות  ”summary“) כל 
pericope).
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 I shall argue, however, that in this case it is more logical to treat the 
Mishnah pericope as commentary on the material found in Tosea. In 
other words, the Mishnah’s editor had before him (in writing or orally) a 
block of material similar to that in the Tosea (though not necessarily the 
version in the current Tosea), including a list of the differences between 
the שפחה and העריות  He then summarized this material into certain .כל 
basic principles. This contention is based on two main arguments:
⒈ The three pericopes of the citation bear only a loose relationship to one 
another; in other words, there is no particular reason why they should 
be connected to chapter 2 of mKer. in this particular order. They do fit 
generally within the context of the first two chapters of mKer., which 
consist of groupings of offences which share similar characteristics. We 
might, however, have expected the definition of the shifḥah to have been 
added aer mKer. 2:2, which has the first mention of the shifḥah; and 
we might have expected general principles concerning עריות to have been 
part of mKer. 1:1, which contains a list of עריות. It may be argued, in 
other words, that the three pericopes have been lied as a whole om 
somewhere else and tacked on to the end of chapter 2, because there 
happens to have been a previous mention in this chapter of the shifḥah.
  In contrast, this kind of loose arrangement of material on a similar 
subject matter is consistent with the style of Tosea, where the jumping 
om subject to subject would cause no particular concern.
 Consistent with the assumption that this citation was originally a loose 
collection of materials which had circulated independently, and was at 
some point brought together in a Tosea-like collection, is the fact 
that the “intermarriage” pericope and the “summary” pericope appear 
as separate items in Sia, and the “intermarriage” pericope appears as 
a separate item (with variations) in each Talmud.
⒉ The Mishnah citation shows signs of editing. In particular, conclusions 
are drawn which go beyond a mere list of cases. Examples of such 
conclusions are:
A. The phrase לא שווה להם לא בעונש ולא בקרבן. That is, this is one 
general difference between the שפחה and כל העריות, and the text 
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then goes on to give examples of such differences: the type of 
sacrifice, and the fact that with respect to the שפחה the male and 
female are treated separately.
B. The phrase החמיר בשפחה, which is stated to be the effect of making 
the כשוגג  the intentional [sinner] like the inadvertent – מזיד 
[sinner]. (The precise nature of the חומרה – stringency is unclear; 
it may be om the point of view of the shifḥah, in that she is 
punished regardless of the intention of the male). 
  Further, the last section in the Mishnah, starting אחד העריות   כל 
 with] all the [other] forbidden relationships, if one] – גדול ואחד קטן
is an adult and one is a minor, needs a context to be fully understood. 
In particular, it is not clear whether the Mishnah is still dealing with 
differences between the shifḥah and כל העריות, or whether it has moved 
to a new subject. From the Tosea, it is clear that the latter is the case; 
we are now dealing with a baraita on העריות  with no interest in ,כל 
the shifḥah, and are listing rules regarding different protagonists (man-
woman, minor-adult, asleep-awake etc.). The Mishnah has thus merely 
abstracted some of these rules.
  The BT also understood that this part of the Mishnah required a 
context. The editors, however, chose to see this part of the Mishnah 
as a continuation of the list of differences between the shifḥah and כל 
:(and interpreted the Mishnah accordingly (bKer. 11a העריות
והכא חייב קטן א״ר יהודה הכי קתני כל עריות אחד גדול ואחד קטן קטן פטור וגדול חייב 
והכא גדול נמי פטור מ״ט דהא מקשין אהדדי...
Is a minor male liable with [respect to a shifḥah]? Rav Judah said: This is 
what is taught: For all the transgressions, if one is a minor and one is an 
adult, the minor is exempt and the adult liable, but here the adult is also 
exempt. What is the reason? They are made comparable to each other... 
(In effect, this conclusion sounds similar to the wording found in the 
Assemani 66 text concerning the קטן, as discussed in section b):
כל העריות לא עשה בהן את הקטן כגדול, והשפחה עשה בה את הקטנה כגדולה
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[Concerning] all the forbidden relationships, [Scripture] has not made the 
male minor like the adult male, while [concerning] the slave, it has made the 
minor female like the adult female.
6.5.2 General Considerations between Sifra and Tosefta
It is reasonably clear that the “summary” pericope is the same baraita in 
both Sifra and Tosea, based on the resemblance in both subject matter 
and structure. As noted above, however, its overall structure is unusual 
to the midrashic form. Further, the version of the baraita in Sia shows 
certain signs which are consistent with an independent baraita having been 
modified to serve the needs of the midrashic context:
⒈  The Sifra version lacks the introductory question or context-setting 
terminology found in Tosea (אלו דברין שבין שפחה… – These are the 
[different] matters between the shifhah…).
⒉ The Sifra version appears to have streamlined many of the additional 
details found in Tosea, and possibly subsumed several cases under one 
general rule ( for instance, the מערה may include the לא מתכוון and the 
 The effect of this streamlining is to make the Sifra version .(לא כדרכה
of the differences pericope relate more closely to the biblical text, as is 
consistent with the midrashic form.
⒊  Further to the last point, the Sifra version follows the order of the 
biblical proof texts somewhat more closely than Tosea:
 Biblical phrase & proof Sifra   Tosefta 
 מזיד|שוגג⒌   גומר ⒉   ואיש-קטן ⒈ 
גומר ⒉    קטן ⒈   זרע-גומר ⒉ 
 קטן⒈   לוקה-קרבן⒊   בקרת-לוקה ⒊ 
     3a. 3  אשם-חטאתa. אשם-חטאת
     3b. 3  זכר-נקבהb. זכר-נקבה
 לוקה-קרבן⒊   ביאות הרבה ⒋  אשר חטא-ביאות הרבה⒋ 
  ביאות הרבה⒋   מזיד|שוגג⒌  אשר חטא-מזיד|שוגג ⒌ 
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(As noted in section h above, the ד witness of Sifra also reversed the order of 
2 and 1, possibly to make it even more consistent with the biblical text.)
6.5.3 The “Intermarriage” Pericope 
We have noted that this pericope in the Sifra section (section c) associates 
the biblical term נחרפת with מאורסת; the parallel Tosefa passage (lines 
15-17) similarly uses the term נשואה. The parallel Mishnah passage (lines 
9-13), in contrast, though comparable in other respects, leaves out any 
mention of a slave-ee betrothal or marriage. The versions of this pericope 
found in the two Talmudim add further variations. Bavli Ker. 11a provides 
for a betrothal between two slaves, one Canaanite and one Hebrew:
א1. ת“ר והפדה יכול כולה ת“ל לא נפדתה
ב1. יכול לא נפדתה ת“ל והפדה
2. הא כיצד פדויה ואינה פדויה חציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין ומאורסת לעבד עברי דברי ר“ע
3. ר״י אומר בשפחה כנענית הכתוב מדבר ומאורסת לעבד עברי א“כ מה ת“ל והפדה לא 
    נפדתה דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם
4. ר‘ אלעזר בן עזריה אומר כל עריות מפורשות לנו משוייר לנו חציה שפחה וחציה בת
    חורין ומאורסת לעבד עברי
5. אחרים אומרים לא יומתו כי לא חופשה בשפחה כנענית הכתוב מדבר ומאורסת לעבד עברי
Significant Variants 
MSS: Munich 95 (מ), Florence II-I-7 (F), London – BL Add. 25717(402) 
(L), Vatican 120 (V120), Vatican 119 (ו). The text quoted above is the Vilna 
edition which serves as the base text in the apparatus below.
מניין יכולה כולה = ו   F V120 = [יכול כולה     L = ‘שנ ת״ר] = *  א1. 
L = לא לא נפדתה יכול לא כולה = מ 
V120 = אי לא נפדתה יכול כולה יכול לא נפדתה] יכול כולה = L מ  ב1. 
יכול מקצתה = F ו  
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ומחורפת = F ו  L V120 ומאורסת] = מ  .2
L = חסר רבי ישמעאל…לעבד עברי] = *   .3
V120 בלשון = מ ו   F L = [4. כלשון
בעבד עברי = מ בשפחה כנענית] = *     .5
Translation
⒈  The sages taught: …redeemed [Lev. 19:20] – does this mean all of her? Scripture 
[also] says: She is not redeemed [ibid.] – does this mean she is not redeemed? [But] 
Scripture says …redeemed [ibid.]. 
⒉  How can she be redeemed and not redeemed? She is half-slave and half-ee and 
betrothed to a Hebrew slave – these are the words of R. Akiva.
⒊  R. Ishmael says: The Bible speaks of a female slave who is Canaanite, and is 
betrothed to a Hebrew slave. Then why [in his view] does Scripture say redeemed 
she is not redeemed? The Bible speaks in ordinary language.
⒋  R. Elazar b. Azariah says: All the forbidden relationships are set out explicitly for 
us; there remains to us only the woman who is half-slave, half-ee and betrothed 
to a Hebrew slave.
⒌  Others say: They shall not die because she was not free [ibid.] – the Bible speaks of 
a female slave who is Canaanite, and betrothed to a Hebrew slave.
 Yerushalmi Qidd. 1:1 59a, in contrast, attributes a slave-ee betrothal 
to R. Akiva, and a betrothal between two slaves to R. Ishmael. The 
discussion takes place aer a question is posed as to how a woman 
who is half-slave half-ee would “acquire herself ” – that is, can she be 
divorced, like a wife, or does she follow the usual rules with respect to the 
manumission of slaves? 
מהו שתקנה עצמה במיתת רבה ובהשלים שש  .6
מה צריכה ליה כרבי עקיבה דרבי עקיבה אמר בשחצייה שפחה וחצייה בת חורין   .7
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במאורסת לבן חורין הכתוב מדבר  
ברם כרבי ישמעאל צריכה ליה דרבי ישמעאל אמ‘ שפחה כנענית הנשואה לעבד עברי הכתוב   .8
מדבר
אם נישואי תורה הן אם אדניו יתן לו אשה  .9
לא צורכה דלא מהו שתקנה עצמה במיתת רבה ובהשלים שש וכמאן דאמר אין עבד עברי עובד   .10
את היורש
Variant (MS Leiden)
דר׳ ישמעאל אומר שפחה כנענית  דרבי ישמעאל…מדבר] ∩ = ל   .8
הנשואי לעבד עברי הכתוב מדבר = ל ̊ ̊
The homeotoleuton in ל is filled in by another hand.
Translation 
⒍  Can she [the shifḥah neḥerefet] acquire herself on the death of her master, or upon 
serving six years [like a Hebrew slave]?
⒎  Why is this [issue] necessary? [Not for] R. Akiva, as R. Akiva said the Bible 
speaks of a woman half-slave half-ee betrothed to a ee man [and therefore 
presumably can be divorced]. 
⒏  It is necessary, however, for R. Ishmael, as R. Ishmael said the Bible speaks [of ] 
a Canaanite shifḥah married to a Hebrew eved.
⒐  Is this not a marriage according to the Torah law [i.e. Exod. 21:4]: If his master 
gives him a wife….
⒑  No, the question is still necessary, can she acquire herself on the death of her 
master, or upon serving six years, according to one who stated that a Hebrew 
slave does not serve the heir [i.e. even if this is a “real” marriage, the Hebrew male 
might go ee on the death of the master, but it is not clear that his Canaanite 
wife would as well].
 The differences among the sources (using the base texts in each 
case, except where otherwise noted) may be summarized as follows; for 
each source the first element (the identity of the shifḥah) and the second 
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element (the relationship) of the opinion attributed to each sage are 
listed:
 Mishnah Tosefta Sifra Bavli Yerushalmi
R. Akiva       
1st element חציה-חציה same same same same 
2nd element  — —  מאורסת מאורסת מאורסת נשואה 
לבן חורין לע״ע לבן חורין לבן חורין  
R. Ishmael       
1st element כנענית כנענית כנענית כנענית שפחה 
2nd element  — —  נשואה מאורסת מאורסת נשואה 
ל׳ע״ע לע"ע לבן חורין לעבד כנע’  
28
    (בשם ר“י)   אחרים
1st element  כנענית  כנענית 
2nd element  מאורסת  נשואה 
לעבד כנעני  לבן חורין  
R. (E)lazar  (כ“י וויען)    
1st element חציה-חציה same same same  — — 
2nd element  — —  מאורסת - — —  נשואה
לע״ע  לבן חורין  
 Certain general observations may be made:
⒈  All sources seem consistent in identiing the slave as either a half-slave/
half-ee (ר“ע, ר“א) or a Canaanite (ר“י, ר“מ). (The identification as an עבד 
.(in Bavli MS Munich 95 is likely a mistake עברי
⒉  The type of relationship is also reasonably consistent among the sages 
in the various sources: in the Mishnah it is absent, in Tosea it is 
 Yerushalmi in) ארוסין and in Sifra, Bavli and Yerushalmi it is ,נשואין
one instance has נשואה, however, it must be noted that in MS Leiden, 
28 As Finkelstein notes (Finkelstein, Sifra deVei Rav 1:54) אחרים may be מאיר  as he is ,ר‘ 
described in bHorayot 13b:
…לרבי מאיר אחרים ולר‘ נתן יש אומרים   
 …R. Meir has [the opinion of ] others and R. Natan has [the opinion of ] others say.
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the only witness available, this citation is written in the margin in a 
different hand).
⒊  It is the object of the relationship which shows the most variability; 
however, it may be argued that the עבד עברי is prominent only in the 
Bavli. There are also hints in the Bavli (bKer. 11a) that its editors were 
aware there was another version of the baraita with בן חורין:
לר׳ ישמעאל בשלמא והפדה לא נפדתה כדקתני דברה תורה כלשון בני אדם 
אלא דקתני מאורסת לעבד עברי מנלן דכתיב כי לא חופשה מכלל דהוא חופש...
With respect to R. Ishmael [who according to the Bavli maintains that the 
shifḥah neḥerefet is a Canaanite woman betrothed to a Hebrew slave], his 
opinion is reasonable with respect to [his non-deconstruction] of redeemed 
she has not been redeemed [Lev. 19:20], as he states: The Torah speaks in the 
language of humans. But as to what he states, ’betrothed to a Hebrew slave,’ 
where do we derive this? As it is written [ibid.]: she has not been freed – this 
implies that he was freed...[emphasis added]
 In other words, there is an attempt to assimilate an eved ivri to ee 
man. Finkelstein, among others, assumes29 that this is because:
אין משפטו של ע״ע שונה מזה של בן חורין. הוא בן חורין שנמסר לזמן קצוב לעבודה
The law regarding a Hebrew slave does not differ from that of a free man. He 
is a free man who is given over to work for a fixed period.
 This seems, however, to be stretching the point. The commentators do 
not seem to address this point.
 The question therefore arises as to whether Tosea and Sifra simply 
reflect a slipshod approach to terminology, or whether they in fact reflect 
different attitudes to slave-ee marriages. Finkelstein assumed that the 
differences in terminology might be explained by assuming that the different 
terms reflected different marriage customs.30 Noting the discussion of the 
29 Finkelstein, Sifra deVei Rav 1:5⒍
30 Finkelstein, Sifra deVei Rav 1:60-6⒈
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term ḥarufah in bQidd. 6a quoted above,31 he argued:
בוודאי יש קשר בין השימוש במלה חרופה ביהודה ומנהג בני יהודה להתיר יחוד קודם 
החופה (יבמות ד׳י׳)...אם כן המלה נחרפת פירושה כמו שאמרו בירושלמי, כתושה... 
בתוספתא השתמשו במלה נשואה מפני שארוסה בגליל אין פירושה מותרת לבעילה 
ומיוחדת לאישות...
Undoubtedly there is a connection between the use of the word ḥarufah 
in Judah and the custom in Judah to permit private meeting [between an 
engaged man and woman] before the ḥupah ceremony (mYev. 4:10)…if so, 
the meaning of the word neḥerefet is as stated in the Yerushalmi, “crushed” 
[i.e. a reference to sexual intercourse]… in Tosefta the word nesu’ah was used 
because in the Galilee the meaning of arusah would not have encompassed 
permission for intercourse and designated for wifehood...
 While such an explanation might explain the difference in terminology 
between Sia and Tosea, it does not, however, resolve the conflict with 
the Mishnah,32 and another solution must be looked for beyond a simple 
difference in terminology. Having proposed the possibility that mKer. 
2:4-6 has in general been edited om a previous, Tosea-like source, we 
may now explore the possibility that the intermarriage pericope in the 
Mishnah has also been edited, to reflect the general mishnaic attitude 
against slave-ee intermarriage. 
 Though there is in fact no direct prohibition of “intermarriage” between 
slave and ee in the Mishnah, such a prohibition can be inferred om a 
number of provisions:
⒈  MGitt. 4:5, (which has a parallel in mEduyot 1:13), which addresses 
קורין 31 ביהודה  שכן  מקודשת,  חרופתי  האומר  דתניא:  שמע,  תא  מהו?  חרופתי  להו:   איבעיא 
...לארוסה חרופה
 It was asked of them [the sages]: What is ḥarufati ? Come [and] hear: the 
one who says ḥarufati is betrothed since in Judah they call a betrothed woman 
ḥarufah…
32 Another possibility is that a situation of אירוסין was seen by the editors of Sia as a 
compromise between the two positions in Mishnah and Tosea: less than full marriage, 
but a way of fitting certain de facto relationships, such as those between slaves and ee, 
or the situation of the concubine, into a more normalized system. This solution, however, 
would imply that the editors of Sifra were aware of both positions in Mishnah and Tosea 
and deliberately took a position between them. 
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the problem of the male who is half-slave, half-ee. Being partially a 
slave, he is forbidden to marry a ee woman; being partially ee, he is 
forbidden to marry a slave woman: 
מי שחציו עבד וחציו בן חורין עובד את רבו יום אחד ואת עצמו יום אחד דברי בית הלל 
אמרו להם בית שמאי תקנתם את רבו ואת עצמו לא תקנתם לשא שפחה אי אפשר שכבר 
חציו בן חורין בת חורין אי אפשר שכבד חציו עבד יבטל והלא לא נברא העולם אלא לפריה 
ורביה שנאמר לא תהו בראה לשבת יצרה אלא מפני תקון העולם כופין את רבו ועושה אותו 
בן חורין וכותב שטר על חצי דמיו וחזרו בית הלל להורות כדברי בית שמאי
One who is half-slave and half-free works one day for his master and one day 
for himself – the words of Beit Hillel. Beit Shammai said to them: You have 
set in order his master[‘s position] but not his [the slave’s]; he cannot marry 
a shifḥah because he is already half-free, and he cannot marry a free woman 
since he is already half-slave. Shall he be exempt [from marriage]? Was the 
world not created for propagating, as it is said [Isa. 45:18]: [God] did not 
create [the earth as] a wasteland, He formed it to be dwelt in? 33 Rather, for the 
sake of worldly order we pressure his master and he frees him, and he [the 
slave] writes a note for half his value. Beit Hillel reversed themselves to teach 
according to the words of Beit Shammai. 
⒉  The closest formulation to direct prohibition of “intermarriage” refers 
to a full female slave and the prohibition is to be inferred om the last 
element of mQidd. 3:12, which, as noted in the Introduction, denies 
her qiddushin: 
And whoever has no qiddushin with this or any man, the child follows her 
[status]. What child is this? The child of a shifḥah or gentile woman.
 The following points support the idea that the Mishnah version of 
the shifḥah neḥerefet passage in mKer. was edited to support this anti-
intermarriage stance:
⒈  In the commentary on section ⒞ of the Sifra passage above, a question 
33 There is evidence that females were deemed not to be subject to the commandment “to be 
uitful and multiply”; see, e.g. Tosafot, bB.Bat. 13a, שנאמר ה”ד, which repeats the maxim: 
 That the woman is not commanded concerning being uitful) דאיתתא לא מפקדא אפריה ורביה
and multiplying).
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was raised as to whether the sages actually said all that was attributed to 
them – in particular, whether both R. Ishmael and R. Akiva identified 
the shifḥah, and then specified to whom she was related and how. It 
was further noted that there is a discrepancy between Mishnah and 
Tosea: both these elements are present in Tosea (and Sifra), whereas 
only the first is present in the Mishnah. In other words, if we were to 
accept the position that Tosea is a commentary on the Mishnah, the 
Tosea editor has added words which imply that the Sages ignored the 
position of both Houses (as reflected in mGitt. 4:5) that נשואין was 
impossible for slaves and half-slaves.
  It is more logical to argue the opposite case: the Mishnah editor, in 
citing a version of the intermarriage pericope similar to that in Tosea, 
deleted any reference to the second element, so as to make the views 
of the Sages consistent with mGitt. 4:⒌ This situation would imply 
that, despite the references to the views of the Houses in mGitt. 4:5, 
the idea attributed to them that נשואין were unavailable to a slave or 
half-slave was actually a later development. With respect to mGitt. 
4:5 being a later development, it is interesting to note that Tosea 
appears to contain no material corresponding to mGitt. 4:4-5, or the 
corresponding mEduyot 1:13; that is, there is no material regarding the 
hypothecated slave or the general legal status of the half-slave half-ee. 
This is, of course, an argument om silence; this silence, however, is 
also consistent with the mishnayot having been added aer Tosea’s 
compilation, whenever this compilation took place.
  It must also be questioned whether R. Elazar’s view was part of the 
original intermarriage pericope in either Mishnah or Tosea, as this 
attribution does not appear in all witnesses – for instance, the Mishnah 
contained in MS Munich, and the witness which served as the base 
text for Zuckermandel’s Kereitot. The most likely explanation for the 
omission, however, is an error based on homeoteleuton, with respect to 
the words בן חורין.
⒉  The degree of variation in the Mishnah text at this point may also be 
noted, since it makes interpretation difficult – in particular, אי זו היא 
versus זו היא, and the fact that the word ודאי is masculine in all but the 
Maimonides text. In MS Munich, the effect of the variant readings is 
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to make an anonymous tanna answer R. Ishmael’s question איזוהי שפחה 
with וודאי כל העריות מפורשות. 
⒊  There is also the discrepancy, noted above, between the view of R. 
Elazar ben Azaria expressed in this Mishnah and his usual attitude 
toward R. Akiva. It may be noted that the editors of the Bavli also 
seem aware of this discrepancy, and reconcile it by providing him with 
another biblical interpretation (bKer. 11a):
ר׳ אלעזר בן עזריה היינו ר״ע לר׳ ישמעאל קאמר לדידי בעלמא כוותיך סבירא ליה 
דדברה תורה כלשון בני אדם והכא שאני מכדי כתיב ליה קרא כי לא חופשה, 
והפדה לא נפדתה ל״ל ש״מ להכי אתא לחציה שפחה וחציה בת חורין
R. Elazar ben Azariah – is this [not like the opinion of ] R. Akiva? [One 
could suppose that in this case] he said to R. Ishmael: Generally it is like 
your opinion; he holds that the Torah speaks in human [i.e. plain] language. 
But here it is different; when Scripture writes because she has not been freed, 
why do I [also] need she has not been redeemed? Derive from this that [that 
phrase] came [to teach about] one who is half-slave, half-free.
⒋  We may note also that R. Ishmael’s identification of the shifḥah in 
the Mishnah version of this pericope describes her as a שפחה וודיי, as 
opposed to a שפחה כנענית. The meaning of the term וודיי is not clear – 
that is, whether it is intended as the equivalent of the latter term, or as 
the opposite of 34,ספק seemingly in contrast to R. Akiva’s identification 
of the shifḥah as חציה שפחה חציה בת חורין. In any event, the impression 
is that this is a deliberate editorial change in the Mishnah, given that 
Tosea and Sia agree on the reading שפחה כנענית. 
⒌  In summary, it is possible that a version similar to that represented in 
Tosea was the basis upon which the mishnaic editor took his outline, 
edited to fit within the general principles of the Mishnah. The earlier 
form of the intermarriage pericope had the sages expressing the view that 
כנענית were possible for both the נישואין  and the half-slave; this שפחה 
point of view had changed by the time of the redaction of the Mishnah. 
34 See n. 4 supra. 
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6.5.4 The Priority of the Tosefta Passage
The following sequence of events may be proposed as consistent with 
the evidence: Tosea represents the earliest version of the intermarriage 
pericope, which was later assimilated into a larger unit. This earlier 
intermarriage pericope attests to the possibility of intermarriage between 
slaves and ee persons. As changes in the law occurred (possibly under 
Roman influence), the baraita was assimilated into the Mishnah in edited 
form according to its general system of prohibiting qiddushin to slaves. 
Some schools, however, allowed a compromise situation, that of ארוסין, 
which is reflected in Sifra and the Talmudim. The change to עבד עברי in 
the Bavli represents an attempt to reconcile the earlier baraitot with the 
Mishnah, according to the tradition that the 35עברי  is the only one עבד 
permitted to a שפחה כנענית under Exod. 21:⒋
6.5.5 Conclusion
The mishnaic rules state, at least indirectly, a prohibition against 
intermarriage between slave and ee. This is seen in mQidd. 3:12, 
which denies the ability of the shifḥah to form qiddushin, and mGitt. 4:5, 
which attests to the inability of the male who is “half-slave, half-ee” 
to form qiddushin. Other tannaitic sources, however, do make reference 
to intermarriage between female slaves and ee males. This is seen, for 
instance, in a passage found in tKer. 1:16-18 and Sifra Qedoshim pereq 5, 
which are parallel to mKer. 2:4b-⒍ These passages discuss the law of the 
shifḥah neḥerefet in Lev. 19:20-2⒉ The Mishnah passage refers to various 
opinions as to the identity of the shifḥah neḥerefet, as either half-slave, 
half-ee (R. Akiva) or a “real” slave (R. Ishmael). The Tosea and Sifra 
passages contain expanded versions of these opinions; Tosea refers to a 
half-slave, half-ee female married (נשואה) to a ee man, or a Canaanite 
female slave married to either a ee man or Canaanite eved, while the 
Sifra passage refers to a half-slave, half-ee female betrothed (מאורסת) 
to a ee man, or a Canaanite female slave betrothed to a ee man. These 
35 As reflected, e,g. in the Mekhilta de R’ Ishmael, Neziqin, parshah 2 (ed. Jacob Lauterbach, 
Mekilta de-Rabbi Ishmael [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1976]), ⒑
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differences, it is argued, are significant, and reflect the existence of rabbinic 
opinions that did not prohibit intermarriage between slave and ee. It has 
also been argued, contrary to traditional opinion, that the tosean version 
of the passage, rather than the mishnaic version, is the original (or “more” 
original). Foreign influence was suggested as one possibility to explain the 
change of opinion reflected in the Mishnah.
 The Sifra passage, however, also discusses manumission methods, and 
in particular the method for creating someone who is “half-slave, half-ee.” 
It was noted that this concept seems to be contrary to theories of slave 
ownership that formed part of Roman law; such a contradiction would, of 
course, complicate any question of foreign influence. 
 A more likely explanation of the variations, which are so complex as 
to be rendered as ineffectual, is that these simply reflect the complexity 
of tannaitic thought and its myriad exegetical methods. I wish to examine 
in depth the question of a half-slave half-ee status, in an attempt to 
ascertain whether this was a convenient construct or an actual status. 
6.6 EXCURSUS: THE EXISTENCE OF 
A HALF-SLAVE, HALF-FREE STATUS 
As we have noted in ⒍⒌3 the necessity of correcting the impediment to 
marriage for a male who is half-slave half-ee (mGitt. 4:5) is one of the few 
indirect references in the Mishnah to a prohibition against intermarriage 
between slave and ee. We have also noted that in the Roman legal system, 
contrary to the discussions in Sifra, the creation of a half-slave half-ee 
status was a legal impossibility. The question arises as to whether this status 
was simply a theoretical construct within the rabbinic legal system.36 
36 The fondness of the mishnaic editor⒮ for classifications and for discussing the theoretical 
boundaries between classes has been noted by Judith Romney Wegner (Wegner, Chattel 
or Person 7). She argues that the Mishnah shares the “Hellenistic dislike of the excluded 
middle”; to avoid creating hybrid categories for items that cannot be easily classified (such 
as the koy of mBikk. 2:8), the Mishnah will describe them as “like X” in some respects 
and “not like X” in others. As a further example of a situation that appears to be such 
theorizing, we may note mGitt. 8:2; if a husband has thrown his wife her bill of divorce 
so that it lands halfway between the two of them, she is described as מגרשת ואינה מגרשת 
(divorced and not divorced). Likely this did not describe an actual status, particularly as 
the situation could be easily remedied.
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 In support of a contention that such a situation of partial eedom 
actually existed, we may note briefly that something resembling such a 
“half ” status is found in various slave systems, and seems to arise in various 
ways:
a)  One of several partners eeing his share in a slave, as suggested in 
the Sifra section above. Biezunska-Malowist cites examples among the 
Greco-Roman papyri in Egypt of ownership of partial shares in slaves. 
She notes that partial manumission was viable in these legal systems, 
contrary to the situation in Roman law.37 
b)  Someone who was viewed as a slave with respect to one person but ee 
with respect to another. We may note, for instance, the situation set 
out in mGitt. 4:4, the mishnah (perhaps not coincidentally) preceding 
that discussing the situation of the half-slave; here a debtor has pledged 
a slave as security to a creditor, and the debtor has eed the slave while 
he is still pledged:38
 ...עבד שעשאו רבו אפותיקי לאחרים ושחררו שורת הדין אין העבד חייב כלום 
אלא מפני תקון העולם כופין את רבו ועושה אותו בן חורין וכותב שטר על דמיו...
A slave whose master makes him a hypothec to others and frees him – the 
strict law is that the slave owes nothing, but for the sake of social order we 
put pressure on his master, and he frees him, and he writes him a note for 
his value... 
 The interpretation of this passage is quite difficult (in particular, 
the precise kind of security implied by “hypothec,” whether it is the 
creditor who is the “master” being pressured to ee the slave, and who 
37 Biezunska-Malowist, L’esclavage 123, n. ⒈ She cites, among others, the case of a woman 
receiving rights to a half-share in a number of slaves whom her brother had eed. She 
speculates (ibid. 129) that where several slaves were co-owned among several people, there 
might have been a tendency to maintain the legal co-ownership, even if the slaves were 
in fact divided up among the various owners, both to minimize the tax paid by each co-
owner, and to spread the risk of loss.
38 One assumes, first, that the slave has remained in the debtor’s possession, and second, that 
there is no concept of differentiated ownership, in which a creditor might ensure that his 
rights had priority. 
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is to write the note); for our purposes, however, we may conclude that 
the issue is whether the pledged but eed person still remains a slave 
with respect to the creditor.
c)  A slave allowed to purchase his manumission over time, so that he gains 
his eedom by degrees. Such is one of the situations considered by 
Westermann to underlie an edict dating to the Second Temple period 
and applicable to Syria-Phoenicia.39 The precise function of the edict 
is unclear,40 but seems to require the registration (for tax purposes) 
of various types of holdings, such as cattle and slaves. Of interest for 
our purposes is an unusual reference in this edict to σωματα λαικα 
ελευθερα. This term, as Westermann notes, implies “enslaved persons 
who are ee”; one of the purposes of the edict, in his opinion, was 
to ee those persons who were not considered legally complete slaves, 
because, among other possibilities, they had been partially manumitted.41 
He suggests further, based on literary similarities, that the author of the 
Letter of Aristeas, in which there is a reference to an alleged eeing 
of Hebrew slaves by Ptolemy II, may have used a document resembling 
this edict as a model for the eeing of those wrongfully enslaved.42 
d)  Conditional manumission, in which the slave is eed if he or she agrees 
to continue to provide some service to the master until some future 
point. Scholars studying the various ways of providing for the elderly 
in the ancient Near East note (among other methods) an arrangement 
made with a slave to serve the master in return for manumission upon 
the master’s death.43 In certain cases this arrangement might include the 
39 The edict is the Rainer Papyrus (PER) Inv. 24, 552, dated by William L. Westermann, 
“Enslaved Persons Who are Free,” American Journal of Philology 59 (1938) 2 to the 3rd 
century BCE during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphus. 
40 Westermann, “Enslaved Persons,” 7, argued in contrast to earlier opinion that this was not 
in itself a fiscal edict, but presumed an earlier edict requiring registration of “slaves”; as too 
many people had avoided registration on the assumption that their human holdings were 
not slaves, this edict was an inquiry into status.
41 “Enslaved Persons,” 1, ⒕ For a somewhat more recent example of manumission by 
installments, see the discussion of the Cuban institution of coortación in Herbert S. Klein, 
Slavery in the Americas. A Comparative Study of Virginia and Cuba (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1967) 196-200.
42 Westermann, “Enslaved Persons” 19-⒛
43 See, e.g., the sources cited in Marten Stol and Sven Vleeming, The Care of the Elderly in 
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provision of a mate for the slave (whether another slave, or a ee person), 
with both partners undertaking the responsibility of caring for the 
master; in some cases such an arrangement might also have been a way 
to provide for a daughter with “limited prospects.”44 In certain of these 
cases the verb palāḫu might be used to describe the obligation of the 
slave or couple. Variations on this type of palāḫu arrangement involving 
slaves are found in documents of different eras, including NA redemption 
agreements, in which a person redeemed om slavery is called on to 
repay his redeemer through service,45 and NB/LB širkūtu documents, 
in which a slave is dedicated to a god on the condition that he continue 
to serve his master in some capacity.46 The slave’s eedom in such cases 
may be described as tenuous or ambiguous, taking effect immediately yet 
dependent on the future fulfillment of a condition that might not occur. 
The situation has been described as reminiscent of the Greek institution 
of παραμονη, and creating a situation of “halbfreiheit.”47 
the Ancient Near East. Studies in the History and Culture of the Ancient Near East 14 
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1998) 51-53 (Neo-Sumerian), 83-84 (Old Babylonian), 183-184 (Neo-
Babylonian). A similar example om Nuzi can be found in Aapeli Saarisalo, “New Kirkuk 
Documents Relating to Slaves,” Studia Orientalia 3 (1934) 13, in which an adopted male 
slave is to serve the adopter (ipallaḫšu).
44 Stol and Vleeming, Care of the Elderly 83, 19⒊
45 See, e.g. SAAS V, 16, BM 103206, lines 11-12, in which it appears that two men have 
redeemed their brother om slavery, and he is to repay them by serving them:
 kūm KU`.BABBAR 3 MU.AN.NA.MEŠ
 [x IT]U.MEŠ-ni ipallahšunu
 for the silver [probably interest], 3 years
 x months he shall serve them.
46 See, e.g. Yale Babylonian Texts [= YBT] Vol. VII 17, lines 8b-14, cited in Raymond 
Dougherty, The Shirkûtu of Babylonian Deities. YOS Researches 5/2 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press. Reprinted New York: AMS Press, 1923) 40-4⒈ In this instance a husband 
PN1 and wife PN2 dedicate their slave PN3 to Ishtar “for the preservation of their lives” 
(ana balāṭ napšatīšunu), though retaining him in lifelong service; Dougherty suggests this 
is possibly the first stage of a manumission: 
 ūmū mala    During the days that
 PN1 u     PN1 and
 PN2 balṭunū   PN2 are living,
 PN3 ipallaḫšunūtu   PN3 shall serve them.
 ina ūmu ina šīmat ittallkū  On the day they go to their fate,
 PN3 šimki    PN3 a sirku(?)
 ša Ištar iššû   of Ishtar shall be.
47 Paul Koschaker, Über einige griechische Rechtsurkunden aus den östlichen Randgebieten des 
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  Such an arrangement may in fact be hinted at in biblical references 
to the עבד עולם in Exod. 21:5-6 and Deut. 15:17, despite the suggestion 
of permanent servitude implicit in this phrase.48 In support of this 
interpretation of the biblical term we may note, first, that the two 
non-pentateuchal instances of עבד עולם also hint at a relationship of 
a client-patron nature. In 1Sam. 27:12, Akhish refers to David as his 
eved olam; in Job. 40:28, there is an interesting apposition of eved olam 
with ברית, as part of a description of the power of Leviathan:
היכרת ברית עמך תקחנו לעבד עולם
Will he make a covenant with you, will you take him as an eved olam?
 Second, we may note that the Onkelos Targum to Exod. 21:6 and 
Deut. 15:17 has לעלם פלח   a slave who serves/works forever,” as“) עבד 
opposed to the biblical “a slave forever”).49 This Targum generally uses 
 in all its range of meanings, including עבד to translate the Hebrew פלח
“to work” and “to worship,” as well as for other situations of slave’s labour, 
including the idea of the Hebrew רדה , as in Lev. 25:4⒊ It can, however, 
also bear the meaning of “to serve.”50 We may note that PLḤ is used 
in a variety of post-biblical agreements, oen as part of a list of mutual 
obligations undertaken by the parties to the agreement.51 Most relevant for 
Hellenismus (Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1931) 7⒋
48 We may note that the ritual described, particularly in the Exod. passage in which the 
slave is brought אל האלהים, is reminiscent of the slave’s dedication to a god in the širkūtu 
arrangement cited in Dougherty, The Shirkûtu of Babylonian Deities supra n. 3⒐
49 Targum Neofiti has עבד משתעבד לעלם – a slave who is enslaved permanently, and in Deut. 
 a slave enslaved forever, while TY in Exod. 21:6 reflects the — עבד משעבד עוד לעולם 15:17
rule in mQidd. 1:2, by limiting this slave’s term to the Jubilee: עבד פלח עד יובלא – a slave 
works/serves until the Jubilee.  
50 See, e.g. Dalman, s.v. פלח, who gives dienen as one of the meanings for both the Hebrew 
and Aramaic forms. 
51 The terms אפלח and פלחה are found in certain marriage contracts of the geonic 
period. Mordechai Friedman, Jewish Marriage in Palestine. A Cairo Genizah Study 
(Tel  Aviv:  Jewish Theological Seminary of America, 1980) 1:172 notes that אפלח 
appears as one of the husband’s obligations in non-Palestinian style ketubbot, as in 
the following instance : 
…ואנא אפלח ואיזון ואיסובר ואפרנס ואכלכל ומיקר…
 And I will serve, feed, support, sustain, maintain
---------------  Chapter 6. RABBINIC INTERPRETATIONS OF LEVITICUS 19:20-22   --------------
— 310 —
our purposes is a conditional manumission document om Elephantine. 
In this document (Porten and Yardeni, B.⒊6), one Meshullam ees his 
amah Tapamet and her daughter; Tapamet had previously married the man 
Anani. Though in line 4 of the document the release om slavery seems to 
take place as of Meshullam’s death (Porten and Yardeni in fact characterize 
the document as a “Testamentary Manumission”), lines 8-12 suggest that 
the release takes place immediately, on the condition that the two women 
continue to PLḤ Meshullam and then his son:
...ואנתי שביקה מן טלא לסמשא ויהישמע ברתכי וגבר אחרן לא שליט עליכי 
ועל יהישמע ברתכי ואנתי שביקה לאלהא ואמרת תפמת ויהישמע ברתה אנחן 
יפלחנך זי יסבל בר וברה לאבוהי בחייך ועד מותך נסבל לזכור ברך...
...[Meshullam states:] You are let go from the shade to the sun, and your 
daughter Yehoyishma, and no other man has authority over you and over 
Yehoyishma your daughter, and you are let go to God. And Tapamet said, 
and her daughter: We will PLḤ you as a son or daughter supports its 
father, in your lifetime and until your death, [and then ] we will support 
your son Zakur...
 (Friedman Vol II. p. 62, line 9)
 A similar set of obligations appears in the formulary of R. Hai Gaon :
…[ואנא] במימרא דשמיא אפלח ואוקיר ואיזון ואפרנס ואכלכל ואכבי יתיכ[י]…
 And I in the name of heaven shall serve and honor and maintain and support 
and sustain and clothe you
(Assaf, 1st document, p. 13)
 :appears as one of the wife’s obligations in Palestinian-style ketubbot פלחה  
וקב[ל]ת דתהוי מוקרה ומיקרה ומשמשה ו[פלחה קמיה]…
 And she undertook to honor, esteem, attend and [serve him]‥
(Friedman Vol. II. p. 39, line 11)
 Falk (in Ze’ev Falk, “Mutual Obligations in the Ketubah,” JJS 8 [1957] 217) would 
translate these forms of PLḤ as meaning “to cherish,” arguing that, with respect to the 
husband’s אפלח, this was a “moral” obligation, added relatively late to supplement the legal 
obligations. Friedman, on the contrary, takes both forms of PLḤ in these contracts to 
refer to “service.” Whatever the precise nuance, we may argue that as in the conditional 
manumissions PLḤ suggests an obligation undertaken within a mutual set of benefits.
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 Such conditional status changes were recognized as creating difficulties 
regarding the precise situation of the person subject to the condition. The 
Mishnah speaks of the circumstances under which a bill of divorce (52(גט 
can be given conditionally, and questions the status of the woman in such 
a case (mGitt. 7:3-4):
זה גטך אם מתי זה גטך אם מתי מחלי זה זה גטך מאחר מיתה לא אמר כלום 
מהיום אם מתי מעכשיו אם מתי הרי זה גט...מה היא באותן הימים רבי יהודה אומר 
כאשת איש לכל דבריה רבי יוסי אומר מגרשת ואינה מגרשת
[If one gives a bill of divorce conditionally, such as] ‘This is your get if I die’ 
[or] ‘this is your get if I die of this disease’ – [this is like saying] ‘this is your 
get after [my] death – he has said nothing. [If he says, ‘This is your get] from 
today, if I die’ [or] ‘from now, if I die’ – this is a [valid] get... What [status] 
is she during this time? R. Yehudah says she is like a married woman in all 
respects; R. Yosi says she is divorced and not divorced.
 The Mishnah thus confirms that a conditional change of status must 
be effective immediately, even if the condition does not materialize until 
the future; we note also that there is a question as to the woman’s precise 
status during this time, with R. Yosi’s “divorced/not divorced” suggesting 
something like the “half-slave/half-ee” situation. 
 The difficulty inherent in these future conditions is again discussed 
in the formulary of Rav Yehudah Barzilai with respect to a conditional 
manumission. The specific concern is a situation in which a slave is eed on 
condition he serve the master until the master’s death; if the slave happens 
to die before the master, the condition is not fulfilled, and the status of 
any marriage contracted in the meantime, and that of any children, are in 
doubt. A number of ingenious proposals are made to avoid this difficulty, 
including the following:53 
...וכן תקנתי שיכתו׳ לו שטר שחרור שלם ויאמר לו הרי זה שחרור ע״מ שתכתו׳ לי עליך 
שטר מוחזק שתמשני כל ימי חיי בכך וכך נמצא זה שחרור תלוי בכתיבה ולא בשימוש 
מאלתר... הרי הוא מותר בבת ישראל...
52 Aside om its name, this document bears other similarities to a deed of manumission (גט 
such as its operative wording. See, e.g., mGitt. 1:4, 9:⒊ ,(שחרור
53 Halberstam, Book of Documents 127 (document of conditional slave). 
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...thus I have established that he [the master] write him a complete deed of 
manumission, and say to him, ‘Here is a manumission, on the condition that 
you write for my benefit a secure deed that you will serve me all my life [by 
doing] this and that.’ The manumission is thus conditional on the writing 
[of the deed of service] forthwith and not on the service [itself ]...then he is 
permitted to an Israelite woman...
 In this way the slave does not have to wait until the master’s death to 
marry, and fulfillment of the condition is easier to assess.
 In summary, it is possible that the concept of “half-slavery” was 
associated with practical situations – conditional manumission or partial 
manumission among them. Yet, as the Sifra section discussed above 
indicates, there was a difference of opinion concerning how a partial 
manumission could be effected. It seems that again we are dealing with a 
concept that is incapable of application. 
----------------------------------------------  7.1 THE DILEMMA   ----------------------------------------------
— 313 —
7.1 THE DILEMMA 
The biblical narratives regarding Hagar, Bilhah and Zilpah, the slave-wives 
of Abraham and Jacob who bear children on behalf of Sarah, Rachel, and 
Leah, closely reflect the “surrogacy” contracts that are found in various 
eras and locations in the ancient Near East.1 These arrangements generally 
involved a slave woman provided to the husband by the wife, or bought 
by the couple, who was to bear children on behalf of the wife. Apparently 
typical of such arrangements was the rather ambiguous status of the 
“surrogate,” as is attested, for instance, in an OB contract (CT VIII 22b, 
UAZP 77) that refers to the purchase of a girl by a male, PN3, and female, 
PN4 (presumably husband and wife):
PN1 mārat PN2 itti PN2 abīša PN3 u PN4 išāmūši
ana PN3 aššat ana PN4 amat
ūm PN1 ana PN4 bēltīša ul bēltī attī iqtabu ugallabši ana kaspim inaddišši
PN1 is the daughter of PN2; from her father, PN2, PN3 and PN4 have 
bought her.
To PN3 [husband] she is (in the status of ) a wife, to PN 4[wife] she is (in 
the status of ) a slave.
On the day that PN1 says to PN4 her mistress: “You are not my mistress,” 
she (may) shave her and sell her.
1 For discussions of these contracts, see, e.g., A. K. Grayson and J. van Seters, “The Childless 
Wife in Assyria” (NA documents); Westbrook, Old Babylonian Marriage Law chap. 6, esp. 
106 (OB documents); and Tikva Frymer-Kensky, “Patriarchal Family Relationships and 
Near Eastern Law,” Biblical Archeologist 44 (1981): 209-14 (OB documents).
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 The biblical accounts of Bilhah and Zilpah also reflect this ambiguity, 
as we will see below. Further, their status and the status of their offspring 
present an interesting dilemma with respect to the matrilineal principle. 
Under mishnaic law (mQidd. 3:12) these women would be deemed incapable 
of qiddushin, and their four offspring (Dan, Naali, Gad and Asher) would 
legally be slaves. We have noted the inconsistency in reaction to slave status 
in various legal sources. I suggest that postbiblical narratives of Bilhah 
and Zilpah in so-called literary sources—such as found in apocrypha, 
Targumim, aggadic midrash, and within some of the legal sources—show 
the same sort of inconsistency in their reactions to the status of these 
women. Thus, for instance, discomfort with the women’s slave origins is 
explicitly revealed in the Bavli and Targum references, as well as in certain 
later midrashim associated with the school of R. Moshe haDarshan; other 
references, however, seem indifferent to the question of their slave status. 
These competing traditions suggest that the mishnaic disapproval of slave-
ee intermarriage, and the consequent effects on a child’s status, did not 
constitute a unanimous, linear tradition.
7.2 BIBLICAL REFERENCES TO BILHAH AND ZILPAH
The biblical passages regarding the origins of these two “slave-wives” reveal 
them as women of apparently dubious ancestry and limited deeds; they are 
described simply as shefaḥot belonging to Lavan and given in turn to his 
daughters Rachel and Leah when each married Jacob (Gen. 29:24, 29). 
As a result of an apparent competition between the two daughters to bear 
children, each daughter donates her shifḥah to Jacob, in a repetition of 
Sarah’s donation of her shifḥah Hagar to Abraham (Gen. 16:2ff ). Bilhah 
gives birth to sons Dan and Naphtali, and Zilpah to sons Gad and Asher. A 
review of the relevant passages in Gen. 30:3-13 indicates the terseness of the 
narrative, which is careful to keep the two women marginal to the action:
ותאמר הנה אמתי בלהה בא אליה ותלד על ברכי ואבנה גם אנכי ממנה.
ותתן לו את בלהה שפחתה לאשה ויבא אליה יעקב.
ותהר בלהה ותלד ליעקב בן.
ותאמר רחל דנני אלהים וגם שמע בקלי ויתן לי בן על כן קראה שמו דן.
ותהר עוד ותלד בלהה שפחת רחל בן שני ליעקב...ותקרא שמו נפתלי.
ותרא לאה כי עמדה מלדת ותקח את זלפה שפחתה ותתן אתה ליעקב לאשה.
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ותלד זלפה שפחת לאה ליעקב בן...ותקרא את שמו גד.
ותלד זלפה שפחת לאה בן שני ליעקב...ותקרא את שמו אשר.
[Rachel said]: Here is my amah Bilhah; lie with her, and she shall give birth 
on my knees, and I will be built up from her. She gave him [Jacob] Bilhah 
her shifḥah as a wife, and Jacob lay with her. Bilhah conceived and bore Jacob 
a son. Rachel said: God has judged me, and also heard my voice and gave 
me a son; therefore she called his name Dan. [Bilhah] conceived again, and 
Bilhah the shifḥah of Rachel bore a second son to Jacob...and she [Rachel] 
called his name Naftali. Leah saw that she had left off giving birth; she took 
Zilpah her shifḥah and gave her to Jacob as a wife. Zilpah the shifḥah of Leah 
bore Jacob a son...and she [Leah] called his name Gad. Zilpah the shifḥah of 
Leah bore Jacob a second son...and [Leah] called his name Asher.
 Like Hagar, the women are variously described as amah, shifḥah, and 
ishah. Unlike Hagar, however, these two shefaḥot have no period of rebellion 
or speech of their own.2 They are little more than surrogate wombs, 
deliberately dissociated om the biological fact of motherhood: Rachel says 
(Gen. 30:3), “I will be built/have children through [Bilhah]” (the Hebrew 
 ;((build) בנה son/child), and) בן can be taken as a play on the words אבנה
it is Rachel and Leah who actually name the children borne by the other 
women. The inherent ambiguity of the surrogate is further reflected in the 
fact that some of the biblical chronologies do emphasize Bilhah and Zilpah 
as the mothers—for instance, Gen. 33:2 (Jacob’s meeting with Esau, albeit 
in a position of greater danger which may indicate lesser status), Gen. 
35:25-6 (a listing of the sons of Jacob), and Gen. 46:18, 25 (describing the 
migration to Egypt). Yet in Ruth 4:11, it is only Rachel and Leah who are 
said to have “built the house of Israel” (אשר בנו שתיהן את בית ישראל).
 Further, though the Genesis 30 passage quoted above clearly describes 
Bilhah and Zilpah as “wives” of Jacob, this description is not maintained 
consistently. Genesis 32:23, for instance, expressly distinguishes between 
the two groups of women:
2 Bilhah in one instance is also called a pilegesh (Gen. 35:22). As I suggest in chapter 1, a) 
the word pilegesh should be translated as “consort” rather than “concubine,” and does not 
indicate a particular legal status; b) the word pilegesh may have been added to the account 
of the Bilhah-Reuven incident in Gen. 35:22, so as to avoid any suggestion that Bilhah 
was Jacob’s wife and thus that Reuven was guilty of incest; thus even within the biblical 
text itself there may have been an uncertainty regarding her status.
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...ויקח את שתי נשיו ואת שתי שפחתיו ואת אחד עשר ילדיו...
...and he [Jacob] took his two wives and his two shefaḥot and his eleven sons...
Genesis 35:25 and 26 similarly refer to Bilhah and Zilpah as the shefaḥot 
of Rachel and Leah respectively, while 46:18 and 25 refer to Zilpah and 
Bilhah as being given by Lavan to Leah and Rachel. Further, Bilhah and 
Zilpah and their children are clearly placed closest to the danger at Jacob’s 
meeting with Esau (Gen. 33:1, 2, 6). Yet despite these indications of their 
subordinate rank, it is only Bilhah who is explicitly mentioned by name as 
a wife of Jacob in the genealogies of Chronicles (1Chr. 7:13).
 This “scheme” of surrogate and diverse motherhood may reflect, as has 
been suggested by scholars,3 an “awareness of unequal degrees of kinship” 
among the founding groups of Israel; yet there is nothing in the Bible 
to suggest that any of the tribes was regarded as of lower status than the 
rest. Genesis 37, recounting the situation leading up to Joseph’s abduction 
by his brothers, may suggest some ill-feeling on the part of the sons of 
Bilhah and Zilpah, whose דבה רעה (evil talk), was reported by Joseph to 
his father Jacob (v. 2).4 Yet their mothers are still referred to in this verse 
as the nashim (wives), of Joseph’s father.5
3 See, e.g., John Bright, A History of Israel (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1959), 142-4⒊
4 Such ill-feeling was read into this story by the author of the apocryphal story “Joseph 
and Aseneth” (C. Burchard, “Joseph and Aseneth,” in The Old Testament Pseudepigrapha 
[ed. J.H. Charlesworth; New York: Doubleday, 1985], 177-247). The story describes a 
plot against Joseph by the Pharaoh’s son, who attempts to enlist the aid of the sons of 
the “handmaids” (24:2):
 And his servants said to him into the ear, saying, “Behold, the sons of Bilhah 
and the sons of Zilpah, Leah’s and Rachel’s maidservants, Jacob’s wives, are 
hostile to Joseph and Aseneth and envy them….”
 The story continues at vv. 7-9: 
 And Pharaoh’s son lied to them [the sons] and said, “… I heard Joseph your 
brother saying I will blot them out om the earth and all their offspring lest they 
share the inheritance with us, because they are children of maidservants….”
5 We may note also that in 1Chr. 2:1-2, the order of the sons is different om the order of 
their births in Gen. 29ff and the order of the lists in chaps. 35 and 4⒍ In chap. 35 all of 
Leah’s sons are listed first, followed by Rachel’s sons and then the “surrogate” sons Dan, 
Naphtali, Gad, and Asher of Bilhah and Zilpah, while in chap. 46 all of Leah’s sons are 
followed by Zilpah’s sons and then Rachel’s and Bilhah’s sons. 
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7.3 EARLY POSTBIBLICAL REFERENCES
An examination of the terms used to describe Bilhah and Zilpah in early 
literature reveals two distinct trends. Most of the Targumim translate amah 
and shifḥah in reference to Bilhah and Zilpah with the usual אמתא and 
ishah with אתתא; the LXX similarly has παιδίσκη and γυνή. Another trend 
is evident, however, which implies that the women were some sort of 
subordinates, rather than outright slaves. This indicates, it seems to me, a 
sensitivity to the problems that would be created by mQidd. 3:⒓
 First, we may note that Josephus, as well as three of the Targumim, 
are careful to avoid the suggestion that Jacob had married “slaves.” In Ant. 
1:303, Josephus states that the women were not “slaves” (δοῦλαι) but rather 
ύποτεταγμεναι, “subordinates” (Liddell / Scott). Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 
adds explicitly that Bilhah and Zilpah were “eed” before Rachel and Leah 
gave them to Jacob: 
ושחררת ליה ית בלהה אמתה ומסרה ליה לאנתו ועל לוותה יעקב 
וחמת לאה ארום קמת מלמילד ושחררת ית זלפה ויהבת יתה ליעקב לאנתו
And [Rachel] freed her handmaid Bilhah for him and gave her for wifehood, 
and Jacob went in unto her. (TY to Gen. 30:3)
And Leah saw that she had ceased to bear children and she freed Zilpah her 
handmaid and gave her to Jacob for wifehood. (TY to Gen. 30:9)
 There is as well an interesting pattern of translation in Onkelos, which 
I would argue is also an attempt to suggest that Bilhah and Zilpah were 
“subordinates,” and thus to get away om any suggestion of slavery. Like 
the other Targumim, Targum Onkelos generally uses אמתא to translate 
 [In Gen. 37:2, they are simply referred to as “his (Joseph’s) father’s wives,” but Joseph 
brings to his father Jacob “bad reports of them.” According to Targum Pseudo-Jonathan 
the sons of the slave wives are accused of eating the limbs of living animals, a serious 
transgression of the dietary laws. Targum Neofiti uses a root signiing “character, nature” 
intimating that the sons of the slave wives were inherently evil. According to Ber. Rab. 
(Theodor-Albeck) 84:2, Joseph brings reports om his brothers of them eating the limbs 
of living animals, casting their eyes on the women of the land, scorning them and referring 
to them as “sons of the slave women, slaves.” Martin McNamara brings the relevant 
bibliography for this reading in Targum Neofiti 1: Genesis (Collegeville, Minn.: Liturgical 
Press, 1992), 171 n. ⒊ TM]
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shifḥah and amah; in addition, it uses the term לחנה as a translation for the 
Hebrew pilegesh. In five instances, however, לחנה is also used by Onkelos to 
translate amah or shifḥah. These instances (Gen. 31:33; 32:23; 33:1, 2, 6) 
exhibit a particular pattern: ⒤ they relate only to Bilhah and Zilpah, (ii) 
they are used only aer these women have been taken as wives by Jacob, 
and (iii) they are used only when the text describes them in relation either 
to Jacob or to his camp, and not in relation to Rachel and Leah. This 
pattern, which is also followed in Neofiti and Pseudo-Jonathan, suggests 
that Targum Onkelos is deliberately departing om its usual word-for-word 
translation in order to emphasize that the women, though likely subordinate 
to the other wives, were not slaves in their relationship to Jacob.
 ,in Onkelos as a Cognate of the Akkadian laḫḫi/anatu לחנה 7.3.1
“Female Subordinate”
The forms of לחנה found in the Targumim are generally assumed to mean 
“concubine;”6 Dalman (s.v. לחינתא  argued that there were two (לחינה, 
forms, לחינה, meaning Magd (maid) and לחינתא, meaning both Magd and 
Kebsweib (concubine). Despite this oen-found association with concubines 
(or maidservants), S. Kaufman7 in fact accepts לחנה as a loanword om the 
Akkadian laḫḫi/anatu, a female “official at the queen’s court” (CAD) or 
simply eine Angestellte (female employee) (AHW).8 Kaufman contends that 
Onkelos misunderstood לחנה as “concubine” and hence incorrectly applied 
it to translate the Hebrew pilegesh. Yet the argument is circular, as there is 
nothing to suggest that Onkelos understood either pilegesh or the Bilhah-
6 Sokoloff and Jastrow give “concubine” as the translation; Mandelkern similarly has 
pellex. Even-Shoshan notes that the word has entered Hebrew as equivalent to pilegesh, 
based on the following statement in Exod. Rab. 40:4, a point regarding the offspring 
of Bilhah and Zilpah:
אמר ר‘ חנינא בן פזי אין לך גדול משבט יהודה ואין לך ירוד משבט דן שהיה מן הלחנות
 R. Ḥanina ben Pazi said: There is no tribe greater than Judah, and no tribe lower 
than Dan, which was [descended] om the leḥeinot.
 (A similar quote appears in Midrash Tanḥuma pereq Ki Tissa siman 13; there, however, the 
word shefaḥot is used).
7 Kaufman, Akkadian Influences, 6⒍
8 The masculine form laḫḫinu is given in AHW as ein Angestellter in Tempeln usw (temple 
employee).
-------------------------------   7.3 EARLY POSTBIBLICAL REFERENCES  -------------------------------
— 319 —
Zilpah verses as implying a concubinage relationship; the deliberate pattern 
of translation in Onkelos suggests a more subtle understanding, and the 
idea of an “official” though subordinate status would fit well with the status 
of Bilhah and Zilpah.
 Further, there are several instances of masculine and feminine forms 
of LḤN in Imperial Aramaic sources in which the translation “concubine” 
is doubtful.9 While there is no scholarly agreement on the meaning of the 
term in these sources, we may argue that “subordinate” would provide a 
suitable translation in at least two of the instances:
a) The biblical book of Daniel (5:2, 3, 23) has a version of the root LḤN 
among the list of those involved in the desecration of the Temple vessels 
at the feast of Belshatzar: 
(5:2) ...וישתון בהון מלכא ורברבנוהי שגלתה ולחנתה 
(5:3)...ואשתיו בהון מלכא ורברבנוהי שגלתה ולחנתה
(5:23)...ואנתה ורברבניך שגלתך ולחנתך חמרא שתין בהון 
The לחנתה of these verses is assumed by various scholars, as well as most 
English translations, to mean “concubines,” as the KJV translation makes 
clear:
(5:2)...that the king, and his princes, his wives, and his concubines could 
drink from them 
(5:3)...and the king, and his princes, his wives, and his concubines drank 
from them 
(5:23)...you and your princes, your wives, and your concubines drank wine 
from them 
 This association of לחנה with some sort of sexual partner seems to have 
begun with the LXX translation of these verses; yet it is to be noted that 
in this translation it is the term שגלתה that is translated by παλλακαι, 
“concubines” (Liddell/Scott),10 while לחנתה is translated as παρακοιτοι, 
9 There is also an instance of LḤN in the Canaanite Keret Epic (Driver, Canaanite Myths 
and Legends (Old Testament Studies 3; Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1956), K III iv 13: 
 lḥn s[…]md[…] tsm ‘mly [h]ry. This is translated by Driver as “the wench Harray shall 
obey.”
10 B. Landsberger, “Akkadisch-Hebräische Wortgleichungen,” Supplements to VT 16 
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“female bedfellows” or simply “wives” (ibid.). Among those who accept the 
meaning here as “concubine,” there is no agreement as to the derivation, 
though there are various attempts to associate the term with an idea of 
lasciviousness.11 A further difficulty with this translation is that it does 
not suit the various other Imperial Aramaic instances of the root LḤN, as 
will be discussed below. 
b) Elephantine contract om the archive of Anani son of Azariah: Anani 
and his wife Tapamet, who was apparently married to him while still 
the amah of another man,12 are parties to several contracts. Anani is 
identified in each of these contracts as a לחן (det. form לחנא); in one 
contract only his wife is identified as a 13:לחנה
...אמר ענני בר עזריה לחן זי יהו ונשין
תפמת אנתתה לחנה זי יהו אלהא שכן יב ברתא...
(1967): 196, argued that the term שגלתה is derived om the Akkadian ša ekalli, 
translating the Sumerian formula MI.ŠÀ.É.GAL.MEŠ; this term has the range of 
meanings “queens,” “harem,” “personnel surrounding the queen” (CAD). In Deut. 
28:30, however, the verbal form ישגלנה is replaced in the public Torah reading by 
 in Isa. 13:16, Jer. 3:2 שכב There is also a replacement of this root by the root .ישכבנה
and Zech. 14:2, where the reference is rape or fornication as it was considered too 
vulgar. In Ps. 45:10 and Neḥ. 2:6 the meaning appears to be “consort” and there is no 
replacement. 
11 Several argue that the word is cognate with Arabic root ערווה) לח‘נ nakedness) according 
to Even-Shoshan, ריח רע (bad smell) according to anonymous sources quoted by Kohut, or, 
metaphorically, “obscene” (B. Davidson, Analytical Hebrew and Chaldee Lexicon [London: 
Bagster, 1970], 423). Landsberger, “Akkadisch-Hebräische,” 204, took the term in Daniel 
as “prostitutes,” supposedly reflecting the Bible’s dim view of women. Others, however, 
took the root as חנן, and thus related to חננא, used in Onkelos for חנון in Exod. 22:26 (I. 
Kosovsky, Concordance to Targum Onkelos [in Hebrew] (Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 
1986), or לחן, used in Pseudo-Jonathan for חן in Exod. 12:36 (E. G. Clarke, Targum 
Pseudo-Jonathan of the Pentateuch: Text and Concordance [Hoboken: Ktav, 1984]). Still 
others see a cognate in the Arabic נגון) לחנ tune) and thus assume some relation to court 
singers (the explanation preferred by Kohut).
12 Porten and Yardeni, Aramaic Documents, 2:B.⒊⒊, records a marriage between Anani and 
Ta[pa]met, who is also described as אמתך with respect to one Meshullam; B.⒊⒍ records 
the manumission of Ta[pa]met by Meshullam. Porten and Yardeni (ibid., 73) describe 
the latter document as a “testamentary manumission,” to take effect only at Meshullarn’s 
death; as has been discussed in chapter 6, however, this document may be an example of 
conditional manumission.
13 Porten and Yardeni, Aramaic Documents, B.⒊12, lines 1-⒉ 
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...Anani son of Azariah, laḥan of YHV, and the woman Tapamet his wife, 
leḥana [or leḥeina] of YHV, the God [who] resides at Yeb the fortress, said...
 Some scholars assume that both Anani and Tapamet were temple 
singers, or “cantors.”14 It seems om the document, however, that they 
are not associated with the temple, but rather with the Deity YHV; Porten 
and Yardeni thus identi them as “servitors of YHW.”15 The term may 
thus be describing an occupation, an attendant of this Deity; but it is 
also possible that it is identiing the “proper law” of the parties—that 
is, the law applicable to such “YHV-ians.”16 The term may thus be an 
ethnic identifier, similar to other terms of nationality found in the witness 
descriptions in these documents.17
c)  Notation on the back of a Behistun agment:
 The profession of a certain Azaria appears to be described. Some would 
identi this person as the father of Anani above:
עזריה לחנא נגרא תנ...
זכרן על עז[ר]יה לחנא זי...
14 C. C.Torrey, “More Elephantine Papyri,” JNES 13 (1954): 149-53, at 151; B. 
Couroyer, “LHN: Chantre?” VT 5 (1955): 86, who notes a cognate Arabic term and 
suggests a comparison to contemporaneous Egyptian temple practice.
15 Porten and Yardeni, Aramaic Documents, 9⒍ One may note that according to Serge 
Sauneron, The Priests of Ancient Egypt (trans. Ann Morrissett; New York: Grove, 1968), 
60, it was customary to refer to Egyptian cult personnel at a particular temple as “servants 
of the god.” If לחן   is describing a specific function within the Jewish temple at Yeb, a 
further issue is raised concerning the position of Ta[pa]met: was her title לחנה simply an 
honorific based on her husband’s position, like the נביאה of Isa. 8:3 (E. G. Kraeling, The 
Brooklyn Museum Aramaic Papyri [New York: Arno Press, 1969], 145; contra, Couroyer, 
“LHN,” 85), or did Ta[pa]met herself have a specific function within the temple?
16 The existence of the “proper law” of a contract—that is, the rules of a specific legal 
system that are to be used in interpreting that contract—is an issue familiar in modern 
occurrences in which the parties to the contract (or other aspects of the contract ) “belong 
to” different jurisdictions. Z. Falk, “Mutual Obligations in the Ketubah,” JJS 8 (1957): 
215-17, has suggested that such concerns are also evident in ancient documents; the use 
of the phrase כדת משה וישראל (according to the law of Moses and Israel), for instance, is 
intended to speci the appropriate legal system for interpreting a marriage contract.
17 While the usual description of a witness in these documents is PN1 bar PN2, there are 
certain instances of ethnic identifiers, with or without a father’s name. See, e.g., Porten and 
Yardeni, Aramaic Documents, B.⒉2, line 19 (הדדנורי בבליא); B.⒊5, line 24 (מתרסה מגשיא 
.(אתרפרן בר ניסי מדי) and B.⒊6, lines 16-47 ;(תת מגשיא
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Azaria, maker of wooden bowls
Memorandum concerning Azaria, leḥana who…
(Cowley, Aramaic Papyri 63 lines 9 and 12)
 This לחן is taken as a “maker of wooden bowls,”18 based on the 
Akkadian laḫannu, “bowl,” and the association with נגרא, “carpenter” 
(Jastrow). Otherwise, there is nothing in the context that gives any 
clue as to the meaning.
d) There may be a fourth instance in an Aḥiqar papyrus om Elephantine, 
apparently concerning the discipline of underlings:
מחאה לעלים כא[יה] לחנת אף לכל עבדיך אל[פנא] איש זי
קנה עבד פר[יץ ו]אמה גנבה ...
A blow for a slave, re[buke] for a maid, and for all thy servants [dis]cipline. 
A man who buys a li[centious] slave or a thievish maid
(Cowley, Aramaic Papyri lines 83-84)
 Since the ל of לחנת might be a preposition, Cowley considered the noun 
to be חנת; Kraeling, however, considered this form to be a “haplological 
ellipsis” of 19לחנת.  is translated by some as “maidservant”20 or ללחנת 
“slave-girl.”21 Yet the word appears to be paired with עלים (young men), 
and not עבדים (slaves), so that the general sense may be young male and 
female underlings; in this case the form may be plural, with the expected 
.le off ה
 Given that some idea of “subordinates” or “attendants” seems appropriate 
for the instances of LḤN in the Elephantine and Aḥiqar documents, we 
might also posit a similar meaning for the term in Daniel, and translate 
the lists as “nobles, consorts, and (female) attendants.”
18 Driver, Canaanite Myths and Legends, 5⒐
19 Cowley, Aramaic Papyri, 234; Kraeling, Brooklyn Museum 14⒋
20 For instance, Kraeling, Brooklyn Museum, 144; Koehler and Baumgartner, Hebrew and 
Aramaic Lexicon, 1090.
21 Lindenberger, “Ahiqar,” 49⒏
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 An issue is then raised as to whether these various attestations are 
related both to each other and to terms used in the Targumim, and further, 
whether Dalman is correct in arguing for two forms of the word. We would 
argue that all the forms above, with the possible exception of Cowley 63, 
are consistent with the expected Imperial Aramaic forms22 of a feminine 
noun לח[י]נה and a masculine noun לחן :
   feminine   masculine  
singular 
abs   לחנה Ananiah archive לחן Ananiah archive
cstr   לחנת Aḥiqar(?)  לחן -
det   לחנתא Targumim  לחנא Behistun agment
plural 
abs   לחנן Targumim  לחנין -
cstr   לחני   - לחנת -
det   לחנתא Targumim,   לחניא -
    Aḥiqar(?)
Suffix (3ms) לחנתה Daniel   לחניה -
 Dalman’s distinction may be based solely on context, if he assumed 
that the Targum form must equal “concubine” but believed that this 
meaning would be inappropriate in other instances. There are also several 
instances in which the Targumim do use the form לחינתא to translate an 
apparently absolute form in the Hebrew text, thus giving the impression 
that it actually is a separate absolute form; Targum Onkelos to Gen. 36:12, 
for instance, has לחינתא לאליפז for the Hebrew ותמנע היתה] לאליפז פילגש]  
(Timna was a pilegesh of Eliphaz), and the Targum to 2Sam. 3:7 has ולשאול 
 Saul had a pilegesh named) ולשאול פלגש ושמה רצפה for the Hebrew לחינתא
Ritzpah). Rather than this being a separate absolute form, however, it may 
simply be an appropriate use of the Aramaic definite form, in which a 
definite article might be assumed as in English23 (“Timnah was the pilegesh 
of Eliphaz”), or a case in which the definite form in Aramaic does not 
necessarily retain its definite meaning.24
22 See F. Rosenthal, A Grammar of Biblical Aramaic (Weisbaden: O. Harrasowitz, 1968), 23, 2⒍
23 Rosenthal, Grammar of Biblical Aramaic, 2⒋
24 W. B. Stevenson, Grammar of Jewish Palestinian Aramaic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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 It may thus be postulated that either the masculine laḫḫinu first entered 
Aramaic as לחן, om which developed the feminine form לחנה, or the 
laḫḫi/annatu form entered and then underwent a “backformation” to לחנה 
(the Akkadian feminine final “t” being subject to Aramaic morphological 
rules25).
 It may then be further proposed that לחנה as understood by Onkelos 
meant some sort of subordinate or underling and was used in connection 
with Bilhah and Zilpah to avoid a suggestion that they were slaves. That 
this choice of words was deliberate is confirmed by the existence of the 
same pattern in Neofiti26 and Pseudo-Jonathan, particularly as the latter 
otherwise uses פלקה rather than לחנה to translate the biblical pilegesh.27 
7.3.2 The Relationship between Targum Onkelos and Josephus 
The influence of Onkelos on other Targumim has been noted by scholars.28 
What is also curious in this instance is the choice by both Onkelos and 
Josephus to render the women as “subordinates.” It is difficult to say 
whether there is any interrelationship between these two sources. It must 
be noted, however, that Onkelos departs om its usual word for word 
rendering in another instance involving slave marriages and appears to cite 
a rabbinic law that was also known to Josephus. Deut. 23:18 reads:
לא תהיה קדשה מבנות ישראל ולא יהיה קדש מבני ישראל.
1962), 2⒊
25 Kaufman, Akkadian Influences, 14⒌
26 There is one exception; as noted in chapter one, Neofiti to Gen. 35:22 does not translate 
the Hebrew פילגש אביו but has a marginal note with פלגש אבוי. In the Yemenite tradition, 
in which the reader recites Targum Onkelos with the Torah reading, this section is 
skipped in the Targum in accordance with mMeg. 4:⒑
27 Pseudo-Jonathan also uses לחנה for the barren amahot of Avimelekh in Gen. 20:⒘ It is 
thus not completely clear whether this Targum understood the Aramaic term in the same 
way as did Onkelos.
28 See, e.g., Abraham Tal, “Ms. Neophyti I: The Palestinian Targum to the Pentateuch,” 
Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 31-43, with respect to the influence of the vocabulary 
of Targum Onkelos on Targum Neofiti. On p. 41, he mentions specifically the use of 
the term לחינא in Neofiti as an example of this phenomenon. This phenomenon seems 
confirmed (at least in this instance) given that Neofiti follows the pattern of use of this 
term in Onkelos with respect to Bilhah and Zilpah.
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There shall not be a qedeshah from female Israelites, and there shall not be a 
qadesh from male Israelites.
The precise meaning of qadesh/qedeshah is unclear, and it is usually translated 
as a male or female prostitute. As noted in chapter six, Targum Onkelos 
renders the verse:
לא תהי אתתא מבנת ישראל לגבר עבד ולא יסב גברא מבני ישראל איתא אמה 
An Israelite female shall not be a wife to a male slave, and an Israelite male 
shall not marry a female slave.29
Josephus at Antiquities 4:8:23 has:
...nor let free men marry slaves, although their affections should strongly 
bias any of them so to do; for it is decent, and for the dignity of the persons 
themselves, to govern those their affections. And further, no one ought to 
marry a harlot, whose matrimonial oblations, arising from the prostitution 
of her body, God will not receive...30
29 Ellinson, Nissuin, 66, notes that later rabbinic opinion was divided as to the source of this 
opinion: Maimonides (Hil. Issurei Biyah 12:11, 13; 15:4) argued it was rabbinic, while 
Rashi (bQidd. 69a s.v. או דיעבד קאמר) argued it was biblical.
30 Philo, faced with the same need to explain the slave wives of Abraham and Jacob, is 
equivocal on the question of intermarriage between slave and ee. In his allegorical 
explanation of the difference between the “wife” and the “handmaid,” the latter represents 
the “lower instruction given by the lower branches of school lore” (On Mating with the 
Preliminary Studies, 14, trans. F. H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker). Yet Philo recommends 
espousing both the wife and the handmaid (ibid., 24):
 …anyone whose mind is set on enduring to the end the weary contest in which 
virtue is the prize, who practises continually for that end, and is unflagging in 
self-discipline, will take to him two lawful wives and as handmaids to them two 
concubines.
In another passage Philo in effect equates certain handmaids with wives:
 There were women born beyond the Euphrates, in the extreme parts of Babylonia, 
who were handmaids and were given as dowry to the ladies of the house at their 
marriage. But when they were thought worthy to pass on to the wise man’s bed, the 
first consequence was that they passed on om mere concubinage to the name and 
position of wedded wives, and were treated no longer as handmaids, but as almost 
equal in rank to their mistresses, who indeed, incredible as it seems, promoted them 
to the same dignity as themselves. (On the Virtues, 223, trans. F. H. Colson)
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7.4 BILHAH AND ZILPAH AS “MATRIARCHS”
We have noted the inconsistency in the biblical text with respect to the 
“wifely” status of Bilhah and Zilpah.31 A further issue that arises in the 
postbiblical traditions is the question of “matriarch status.” In modern, 
western tradition the title אמהות (Matriarchs), is reserved for four of the 
Genesis women: Sarah, Rebecca, Leah, and Rachel.32 The origin of the 
word אמהות (which is simply a plural of אם (mother)) as an honorific is 
difficult to determine, but we may trace the term at least as far back as 
the extracanonical Tractate Semaḥot, chap. 1, halakhot 13-⒕ These rules 
follow a list of mourning customs, in which it is stated that the usual 
mourning customs are not to be observed on the death of one’s slaves; 
rather, one treats such deaths like the loss of an animal. An exception, 
however, was made for certain slaves, including the man named Tevi who 
belonged to Rabban Gamliel,33 who is described here as kasher. The text 
continues with a further exception made for the slaves of Rabban Gamliel 
and then adds a general statement regarding the use of honorifics:
אין קורין לעבדים ולשפחות אבא פלוני ואמא פלונית 
של בית רבן גמליאל היו קורין לאבא טבי ולאימא טביתא. 
אין קורין לאבות אבינו אלא לשלשה האבות ולא לאימהות אמנו אלא לארבעה האימהות
31 Not surprisingly, this inconsistency continues in the postbiblical tradition. Gen. Rab. 66:4 
(Rom), for instance, refers explicitly to Jacob’s “four wives: Leah and Rachel, Zilpah and 
Bilhah,” while the version in Theodor-Albeck has: “that Jacob took four.”
32 This theme of four matriarchs is familiar especially in the liturgy. We may cite as two 
familiar examples the reain in אחד מי יודע, found in the Passover Haggadah:
ארבע מי יודע? ארבע אני יודע. ארבע אמהות…
 Who knows four? I know four. Four are the matriarchs… 
and the Yizkor prayer in Tiqun Meir: 
…תהא נפשה [נפשו] צרורה בצרור החיים עם נשמות אברהם יצחק ויעקב שרה רבקה רחל   
ולאה…
 …Let his/her soul be bound in the bond of life with the souls of Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob, Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah…
33 There are various references in the rabbinic literature to Tevi and Tevita, the unusual slaves 
of Rabban Gamliel; see, e.g., mSukkah 2:⒈ For a justification of this vocalization of the 
name, see Harry Fox, “Critical Edition of Mishnah Tractate Succah,” 2:41-42, who argues 
that these names are likely Aramaic rather than Greek.
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(13) We do not call male and female slaves “Father so-and-so” or “Mother 
so-and-so.” Those of the house of Rabban Gamliel [however] were called 
Father Tevi and Mother Tevita.
(14) We do not use the term “our fathers” except for the three patriarchs, or 
the term “our mothers” except for the four matriarchs.
 These rules are also stated in a baraita reported in bBer. 16b, again 
within the context of mourning customs with respect to slaves. MBer. 2:7 
refers to the exception made for Tevi, here too described as kasher. The 
Gemara then appears to “add” the further rules concerning honorifics, and 
to explain some apparent contradictions raised by them:
ת“ר אין קורין אבות אלא לשלשה ואין קורין אמהות אלא לארבע אבות 
מאי טעמא אילימא משום דלא ידעינן אי מראובן קא אתינן אי משמעון 
קא אתינן אי הכי אמהות נמי לא ידעינן אי מרחל קא אתינן אי מלאה קא
אתינן אלא עד הכא חשיבי טפי לא חשיבי תניא אידך עבדים ושפחות אין 
קורין אותם אבא פלוני ואמא פלונית ושל ר“ג היו קורים אותם אבא פלוני 
ואמא פלונית מעשה לסתור משום דחשיבי
Our Sages taught [in a baraita]: We call only three men “patriarchs” [Abraham, 
Isaac and Jacob, according to Rashi, and this is the accepted tradition] and 
only four women “matriarchs” [i.e., Sarah, Rebecca, Leah, and Rachel]. 
Patriarchs: what is the reason [for instance, why not include Jacob’s sons]? If 
you say it is because we do not know [from which son we are descended, i.e.,] 
whether we come from [the tribe of ] Reuven or Shimon [etc.], the same is 
true for the [last two matriarchs]—we do not know whether we come from 
[the tribe of ] Rachel or Leah. Rather, [the reason] is because up to [Jacob] 
they are worthy of consideration, and the rest are not.
It was further taught: We do not call male and female slaves “Father so-and-
so” or “Mother so-and-so.” Those of Rabban Gamliel [however] were called 
“Father so-and-so” and “Mother so-and-so.” [Does this] fact [not] contradict 
[the above rule]? [No], because they were worthy of consideration.
 The terms אמא and אמהות (matriarch[s]) and their masculine counterparts 
 ,patriarch[s]) are clearly considered here to be honorifics) אבות and אבא
reserved to a limited few; as Rashi explains, the terms are equivalent to 
calling someone מר or מרת (“sir” or “madam”). From the context (that 
is, the first discussion regarding matriarchs and patriarchs is immediately 
followed by a prohibition against using similar honorifics for slaves), it may 
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be assumed that it was the slave origins of Bilhah and Zilpah that came to 
exclude them om entitlement to the term “matriarch.” This connection is 
in fact made explicit in a post-tannaitic, anonymous exegesis found in Num. 
Rab., a work attributed to R. Moshe haDarshan of Narbonne (11th century 
C.E.). The exegesis is based on Numbers 7, specifically the list of animals 
brought by the tribal leaders for a peace offering at the consecration of the 
Tabernacle altar (two oxen, five rams, five he-goats, and five yearling lambs, 
repeated for each leader in vv. 17, 23, 29, 35, 41, 47, 53, 59, 65, 71, 77, 83). 
The midrash at 14:11 (ed. Rom) provides: 
ולזבח השלמים בקר שנים כנגד יצחק ורבקה שהיו תמימים ובני מלכים. 
אילים חמשה עתודים חמשה כבשים בני שנה חמשה למה היו ג‘ מינים
אילים ועתודים וכבשים כנגד יעקב לאה ורחל למה היו של חמשה
חמשה חמשה לפי שחשבונם עולה ט“ו כנגד יעקב ולאה ורחל וי“ב 
שבטים והאמהות לפי שקראו האמהות שפחות לכך לא נכנסו לחשבון
For the peace offering: two oxen—corresponding to Isaac and Rebecca, who 
were pious and children of kings; five rams, five he-goats, five yearling lambs—
Why were there three kinds, rams, he-goats, and sheep? Corresponding to 
Jacob, Leah, and Rachel. Why were there five of each? Because this sums 
up to fifteen, corresponding to Jacob and Leah and Rachel and the twelve 
tribes. And the two amahot [here as the plural of amah, “handmaid, i.e. 
Bilhah and Zilpah]? Since they were called shefaḥot, they did not enter into 
the calculation. 
Despite this apparently straightforward tradition, however, there is evidence 
that this “matriarchal quartet” was not fixed until relatively late. Song of 
Songs Zuta 1:15 (Buber, p. 16)34 contains a midrash on the name Qiryat 
Arba that states:
...שנקברו שם ארבע אמהות חוה שרה רבקה ולאה
...since there were buried there four matriarchs: Eve, Sarah, Rebecca, and 
Leah
34 This work is dated by some to the 10th century C.E. (H. L. Strack and G. Stemberger, 
Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, 347).
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More particularly, there are several earlier-redacted midrashim that refer to 
six matriarchs, explicitly including Bilhah and Zilpah as אמהות. One such 
midrash in Pesiqta de Rav Kahana (ca. 5th century C.E.) is another exegesis 
based on Numbers 7 and the consecration of the desert Tabernacle; in this 
case it is a parable on the number six, reflecting the six carts brought by 
the tribal leaders (v. 3):
ויביאו את קרבנם לפני ה‘ שש עגלות וגו‘ – כנגד ששת ימי בראשית. 
שש כנגד שש ערכי המשנה. שש כנגד שש האימהות. ואלו הן, שרה רבקה רחל ולאה בלהה 
וזלפה
And [the leaders] brought their offering before the Lord: six carts ... [Six] for 
the six days of creation, six for the orders of the Mishnah, six for the six 
matriarchs. And these are: Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel and Leah, Bilhah, Zilpah. 
(ed. D. Mandelbaum, pisqa 1:7)
Variations of this “six” parable are also found in later midrashim. An 
expanded version found in Esth. Rab. to 1:2 (ca. 6th century C.E.) is based 
on the six steps of King Solomon’s throne (2 Chr 9:18). The midrash at 
1:12 (ed. Rom) provides:
ר‘ הושעיא רבה אומר שהיה עשוי כטירכי מרכבו של מי שאמר והיה העולם הקב“ה וכה“א 
שש מעלות לכסא שש כנגד ששה רקיעים ולא שבעה הן אמר ר‘ אבון הן דמלכא שארי 
טיטיון שש כנגד ארצות ארץ אדמה ארקא גיא ציה נשיה תבל וכתיב והוא ישפוט תבל 
בצדק שש כנגד ששה סדרי משנה זרעים מועד נשים נזיקין קדשים וטהרות שש כנגד 
ששת ימי בראשית שש כנגד שש אמהות שרה רבקה רחל ולאה בלהה זלפה
R. Hoshaya Rabba says that it [the throne] was made like the chariot35 of the 
One who declared and the world came into being—the Holy One, Blessed 
Be He. He would say thus: six steps to the throne [2 Chr 9:18]—six for the 
six levels of heaven. Are there not seven? R. Abun said: The one in which 
the King rests is imperial domain36 [i.e., off-limits]. Six for the six [levels 
of ] earth:37 eretz, adamah, arqa, gai, tziah, neshiah, tevel. And it is written 
35 According to Jastrow (s.v. כטירכי מרכבתו ,(טירכי is a tautography for כמרכבתו.
36 According to Jastrow (s.v. טיטיון ,(טיטיון is a corruption of טמיקון, the form found in Song 
of Songs Rabbah (infra), and both are related to ταμιαχος, tamiacus, “imperial domains.” 
37 There are actually seven levels listed. Shimon Dunsky, Midrash Rabba to Song of Songs 
(Jerusalem: Dvir, 1980), 193 n. 3 notes a midrash in VaYiqra Rab. (Margoliot) 29:11 on 
the phrase “In the seventh month” in Lev. 23:24, in which a listing of the levels of heaven 
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[Ps. 98:9]: He will rule tevel justly. Six for the six orders of the Mishnah: 
Zeraim, Moed, Nashim, Neziqin, Qodashim, and Taharot. Six for the six days 
of creation. Six for the six matriarchs: Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel and Leah, 
Bilhah, Zilpah.
Song of Songs Rab. to 6:4 (ca. 6th century C.E.), again based on Num. 
7:3, also contains this expanded version. The midrash at 6:4 (ed. Rom) 
provides:
ד“א יפה את רעיתי כתרצה כשאת רוצה כד את בעייה לית את צריכה בעייה מכלום 
מילף מכלום מי אמר להם להביא עגלות ובקר לטעון המשכן לא מהן ובהן הביאו אותן 
הה“ד ויביאו את קרבנם לפני ה‘ שש עגלות צב כנגד ששה רקיעים ולא שבעה הם 
א“ר אבון הן דמלכא שרי טמיקון שש כנגד שש ארצות ארץ ארקא אדמה גיא ציה נשיה 
תבל וכתיב ישפוט תבל בצדק ו‘ כנגד ו‘ ערכי משנה שש כנגד ששת ימי בראשית 
ו‘ כנגד ו‘ אמהות שרה רבקה רחל לאה זלפה בלהה
Another matter: You are beautiful, my beloved, like Tirzah [6:4]. When you 
desire [a word play on tirzah]: when you want [something], you need not ask 
from anyone or learn from anyone. Who told them [the princes] to bring 
carts and cattle for the requirement of the Tabernacle? Did they not bring 
them of their own accord? As it is said: And [the leaders] brought their offering 
before the Lord: six covered wagons—for the six heavens. Are there not seven? 
R. Abun said: The one in which the King rests is imperial domain [i.e., 
off-limits]. Six for the six [levels of ] earth: eretz, arqa, adamah, gai, tziah, 
neshiah, tevel. And it is written [Ps. 98:9]: He will rule tevel justly. Six for the 
six orders of the Mishnah; six for the six days of creation; six for the six 
matriarchs: Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel, Leah, Zilpah, Bilhah.
and earth is in fact based on the number seven:
בחדש השביעי לעולם שביעי חביב למעלה שביעית חביבה וילון רקיע שחקים זבול מעון מכון   
ערבות סולו לרוכב בערבות ביה שמו בארצות שביעית חביבה ארץ אדמה ארקא גיה צייה נשייה 
תבל והוא ישפוט תבל בצדק…
 In the seventh month—The seventh is always beloved. The seventh above 
is beloved: vilon, raqi’a, shehaqim, zevul, ma’on, makhon, aravot [=the seven 
different heavens]; Extol the One who rides upon the heavens [=aravot] in His name 
Yah [Ps. 68:5]; in the lands seventh is beloved: eretz, adama, arqa, gai, tziyya, 
neshiyya, tevel [=the seven types of land]; And He shall judge tevel righteously [Ps. 
96:13]…
 The midrash continues with other examples of sevenths: Enoch, Moses, David, Asa, and 
the seventh sabbatical. This makes it likely that the listing in the Esth. Rab. midrash is 
based on this (or a similar) “seven” parable. 
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 We may note a further reference to six matriarchs in an expanded 
commentary in Targum Pseudo-Jonathan to Exod. 14:21, concerning the 
parting of the sea:
וארכין משה ית ידיה על ימא בחוטרא רבא ויקירא דאיתברי מן שירויא וביה חקיק 
ומפרש שמא רבא ויקירא ועישרתי אתוותא די מהא ית מצראי ותלת אבהת עלמא ושית 
אימהתא ותריסר שיבטוי דיעקב ומן יד דבר ה‘ ית ימא ברוח קידומא תקיף כל לילייא ושוי 
ית ימא נגיבא ואתבזעו מיא לתריסר בזיען כל קבל תריסר שיבטוי דיעקב
And Moses stretched his hand over the sea with the great and precious 
staff that was created from the beginning, and in which was engraved and 
specified the great and precious Name, and the ten signs that dispersed the 
Egyptians, and the three fathers of the world, and the six mothers, and the 
twelve tribes of Jacob; and immediately God moved the sea with a powerful 
east wind all the night, and made the sea like dry land, and the water was 
split into twelve parts alongside the twelve tribes of Jacob. 
 A final example om Gen. Rab. (ca. 5th century C.E.) is interesting in 
that it attributes the relevant opinion to R. Meir, a tanna who preceded the 
Mishnah redaction. The passage records a dialogue between R. Meir and a 
Samaritan on an apparent contradiction between a pentateuchal statement 
and one in a prophetic book, which was not included in the Samaritan 
biblical tradition Gen. Rab.(Rom) 70:7:
ר‘ יהושע דסכנין בשם ר‘ לוי אמר כותי אחד שאל את ר‘ מאיר אמר לו אין אתם אומרין 
יעקב אמתי דכתיב תתן אמת ליעקב אמר לו הין א“ל ולא כך אמר וכל אשר תתן לי עשר 
אעשרנו לך א“ל הין אמר לו הפריש שבטו של לוי אחד מעשרה למה לא הפריש א‘ מי‘ 
לשנים שבטין אחרים אמר לו וכי י“ב הן והלא י“ד הן אפרים ומנשה כראובן ושמעון יהיו 
לי א“ל כ“ש אוסיפתא מיא אוסיף קמחא אמר לו אין את מודה לי שהם ארבע אמהות א“ל 
הין אמר לו צא מהם ד‘ בכורות לד‘ אמהות הבכור קודש ואין קודש מוציא קודש אמר לו 
אשריך ואשרי אומתך שאת שרוי בתוכה
R. Yehoshua of Sakhnin said in the name of R. Levi: A Samaritan asked a 
question of R. Meir. He said [to R. Meir]: Do you not say, “Jacob is my 
truth,” as it is written: You will show truth to Jacob [Micah 7:20]? [R. Meir] 
replied: Yes. He said [to R. Meir]: And did Jacob not say, And of all that 
You give me I will give a tenth to you [i.e., a tithe; Gen. 28:22]? [R. Meir] 
replied: Yes. He said [to R. Meir]: [Jacob] separated the tribe of Levi [for 
divine work. But a tithe of twelve tribes should be 1.2 tribes, whereas this 
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tithing of Levi represents only] one out of ten [tribes]; why did he not [also] 
separate one-tenth of the other two tribes? [R. Meir] replied: [You say] there 
are 12 [tribes]. But are there not 14, [as Jacob said]: Ephraim and Menasheh 
[Joseph’s sons] are like Reuven and Shimon to me [Gen. 48:5]? He said [to R. 
Meir]: All the more so! More water, more flour [i.e., you have strengthened 
my point; there should have been 14 tribes dedicated]. [R. Meir] said to 
him: Would you not agree there were four matriarchs? He said [to R. Meir]: 
Yes. [R. Meir] said to him: Remove from [the calculation] the four firstborn 
sons of the four matriarchs: the firstborn is holy, and a holy object does 
not have a [further] holy object taken from it [i.e., the tithe calculated as 1/
(14-4); 1 of 10 tribes is thus correct]. He replied: Happy are you and happy 
is the nation in which you exist.
 From the context, it is to be understood that the four matriarchs om 
whom four first born sons have descended must refer to Jacob’s wives, 
including Bilhah and Zilpah.
 We might have concluded, based only on the baraita in Berakhot and 
the later midrash of R. Moshe haDarshan, that the tradition of exclusion 
of Bilhah and Zilpah is relatively late. The precise dating of Semaḥot, 
however, puts this conclusion in doubt. Strack/Stemberger assert that this 
tractate might date om as early as the third century.38 The priority of 
Semaḥot to tractate Berakhot seems also to be suggested by the awkward 
language of halakhah 1:14, thus rendering it the lectio difficilior; this seems 
to be in effect the opinion in the commentary Naḥalat Ya’aqov:
הלשון בהלכה זאת אינו מדוקדק אבל בגמרא דברכות גרסי‘ הכי אין קורין אבות אלא 
לשלשה דהיינו אברהם יצחק ויעקב ואין קורין אמהות אלא לארבע שרה רבקה רחל ולאה 
עכ“ל וכן ראויה להיות הכא
The language in this halakhah [14] is not precise, but in the Gemara of 
Berakhot we read: “We call only three men patriarchs”—that is, Abraham, 
Isaac, and Jacob—”and we call only four women matriarchs”—Sarah, 
Rebecca, Rachel, and Leah. Until here is its language, and it seems suitable 
in this instance [as well].
 If the halakhot of Semaḥot, and thus the attitude of exclusion toward Bilhah 
38 Strack and Stemberger, Talmud and Midrash, 24⒐
--------------------------   7.5 THE GENEALOGY OF BILHAH AND ZILPAH  --------------------------
— 333 —
and Zilpah, are dated early, it seems that rival opinions toward the women had 
co-existed. It can be argued that the midrash in Num. Rab. 14:11 was in fact 
intended as a deliberate contrast to the earlier parable based on Numbers 7, 
with the express purpose of excluding Bilhah and Zilpah. The numbers are 
manipulated to arrive at fieen, not usually a particularly significant figure,39 
and the exegesis is also compelled to ignore Sarah and Abraham. 
7.5 THE GENEALOGY OF BILHAH AND ZILPAH
Finally, we may note two major traditions concerning the origins of 
Bilhah and Zilpah. As we will see below, such origin tales are unusual 
for women, let alone slave women. Both of these traditions provide the 
women with a paternal link to Abraham, one through Lavan40 and one 
through an extrabiblical figure, possibly named Aḥiyot or Aḥoti. It has 
been suggested that the rabbinic sages were concerned to provide all twelve 
tribes with Abrahamic connections through their mothers as well as their 
father Jacob,41 yet we must still question the unusual existence of not 
one, but two genealogies for these slave women. I propose that the Lavan 
version was an explicit attempt to explain away the slave origins; the Aḥiyot 
version reflects the same kind of emphasis on inclusion and kinship and 
indifference to slave-ee intermarriage that we have noted with respect to 
Exod. 21:4-⒒
 The Lavan tradition is discernible in brief references in various 
midrashim and Targumim. The Aḥiyot tradition, in contrast, is part of a 
detailed “genealogical” record concerning Bilhah. This genealogy is found 
39 See, however, mSukkah 5:4, which does refer to the number 15 in connection with the 
Temple:
חמש עשרה מעלות היורדות מעזרת ישראל לעזרת נשים כנגד חמשה עשר שיר המעלות   
שבתהילים
 Fieen steps going down om the Israelites’ [i.e., men’s] area to the women’s 
area, corresponding to fieen “Step Songs” in the Psalms [120:34].
40 Lavan was the grandson of Naḥor, Abraham’s brother (see, e.g., Gen. 24:15, 24, 29), 
but in Gen. 29:5 he is called “Lavan son of Nahor.” The classical Jewish commentator 
Nachmanides claims that Naḥor was more important than his son Betuel and that this is 
why Lavan was called his son. Rabbenu Baḥya consider this a case of grandchildren being 
the same as children. 
41 Louis Ginzberg, The Legends of the Jews (7 vols.; Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 
1938), 5:295 n. 16⒎
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in a Qumran agment in Hebrew as well as within a larger apocryphal 
document in Greek, known as the Testament of Naphtali (one of Bilhah’s 
sons, according to the biblical record);42 of particular interest for our 
purposes, in addition to the genealogical data “added” to the biblical record 
for these apparently marginal biblical women, is a “naming speech”43 for 
Bilhah. As well, there is a partial repetition of some of the elements of 
both the Lavan and the Aḥiyot traditions in the late midrashic work 
Bereshit Rabbati, again attributed to the school of R. Moshe haDarshan. 
The existence of two genealogical traditions, one apparently sectarian in 
origin and the other of a more “mainstream” background, is not in itself 
surprising. As will be noted in a brief review of these sources, however, the 
lines of transmission are not straightforward.
7.5.1 The Aḥiyot Tradition
The Hebrew version of the Bilhah genealogy is found in Qumran agment 
4Q215, dated between 30 B.C.E. and 20 C.E.:44
עם אחיות אבי בלהה א[חי*]ה דבורה אשר הניקה את רב[קה  .1
וילך בשבי וישלח לבן ויפרקהו ויתן לו את חנה אחת מאמהותי [ותלד*]   .2
ראישונה את זלפה ויתן את שמה זלפה בשם העיר אשר נשבה אל[יה  .3
ותהר ותלד את בלהה אמי ותקרא חנה את שמה בלהה כי כאשר נולדה [היתה*]   .4
מתבהלת לינוק ותואמר מה מתבהלת היאה בתי ותקרא עוד בלהה [  .5
 [...] .6
42 The Hebrew version of a Testament of Naphtali found in mediaeval MSS (such as that 
set out in R. H. Charles, The Greek Versions of the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs 
[Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960] Appendix II), does not contain any genealogical 
information.
43 This term will be explained below.
44 The Hebrew text is taken om the reconstruction by Michael Stone, “Testament 
of Naphtali,” in Qumran Cave 4, XVII, Parabiblical Texts, Part 3, (DJD 22; Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1996b), 73-82, at 78-79, 804; further reconstruction (marked *) is by Prof. H. 
Fox. Prior treatments of this agment are listed on p. 73 of the Stone article.
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7.  וכאשר בא יעקוב אבי אל לבן בורח מלפני עישיו אחיהו וכאשר [מת*]
אבי בלהה אמי וינהג לבן את חנה אם אמי ואת שתי בנותיה [ויתן אחת]   .8
[ללאה*] ואחת לרחל וכאשר היתה רחל לוא ילדה בנים [  .9
[ יעקו]ב אבי ונתון לו את בלהה אמי ותלד את דן אח[י   .10
[ ]תי אח ש ל לש[  .11
⒈ with Aḥiyot the father of Bilhah [brother of ] Deborah who nursed Reb[ecca
⒉ and he went into captivity and Lavan sent and redeemed him and gave him 
Ḥanah, one of [his] amahot [and she gave birth to]
⒊  Zilpah first and he gave her name (as) Zilpah aer the name of the city [to] which 
he was taken captive
⒋ and she conceived and gave birth to Bilhah my mother, and Ḥanah called her 
name Bilhah because when she was born [she was]
⒌  in a hurry to nurse, and she said: How she45 hurries, she is my daughter, and again 
called her Bilhah[…]
⒍ [….] 
⒎ And when Jacob my father came to Lavan fleeing om Esau his brother and when 
[he died]
⒏ the father of Bilhah my mother—Lavan led away Ḥanah my mother’s mother and 
her two daughters [and he gave one]
⒐ [to Leah] and one to Rachel, and when Rachel was not son-bearing46 […]
⒑ to Jaco]b my father, and gave47 him Bilhah my mother, and she gave birth to Dan 
[my] brother[…]
⒒ [… 
See, e.g., Tov, Textual Criticism, 108-⒐ .היא is Qumranic orthography for היאה 45
46 Stone takes ילדה here as the participle יולדה following a perfect of היתה.
47 Stone takes נתון as an infinitive absolute.
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 The Greek Testament of Naphtali, whose terminus ad quem is given as 
the third century C.E.,48 contains genealogical data similar to that in the 
Qumran agment. Chapter 1:6-12 reads:
I was born from Bilhah,
and because Rachel dealt craftily and gave Bilhah to Jacob in place of herself, 
and she bore me on Rachel’s knees,
therefore I was called Naphtali.
And Rachel loved me because I was born upon her knees;
and as I was tender in appearance, she used to kiss me, saying: May I see a 
brother of yours from my own womb like you. Therefore also Joseph was like 
me in all things, 
according to the prayers of Rachel.
And my mother is Bilhah,
the daughter of Rotheus, a brother of Deborah, Rebecca’s nurse 
who was born on the same day as Rachel.
And Rotheus was of the family of Abraham,
a Chaldean, god-fearing, freeborn and noble.
And after having been taken captive he was bought by Laban, and he gave 
him Aina his servant to wife
who bore him a daughter
and she called her name Zilpah,
after the name of the village where he had been taken captive. Next she bore 
Bilhah, saying:
My daughter is eager for what is new;
for immediately after she was born she was eager to suck.
 The midrashic work Bereishit Rabbati, in its commentary to Gen. 29:24, 
contains elements of both the Aḥiyot tradition and the Lavan tradition:49
ויתן לבן [לה] את זלפה [שפחתו] וכי שפחותיו היו, אלא בנימוס הארץ בנותיו של אדם 
מפגלשיו נקראו שפחות. ואית דאמר אבי בלהה וזלפה אחיה של דבורה מינקת רבקה היה 
ואחותי היה שמו, וטרם שנשא אשה נשבה שלח לבן ופדאו ונתן לו שפחתו לאשה וילדה לו 
בת וקרא שמה זלפה על שם העיר שנשבה לשם, ילדה עוד בת וקרא שמה בלהה, כשנולדה 
היתה מתבהלת לינק, אמר מה בהולה בתי. וכאשר הלך יעקב אצל לבן מת אחותי אביהן 
48 The English translation is om H. W. Hollander and M. de Jonge, The Testaments of 
the Twelve Patriarchs: A Commentary (Leiden: Brill, 1985) 297-9⒏
49 The Hebrew text is om the edition of C. Albeck, Midrash Bereshit Rabbati [in Hebrew] 
(Jerusalem: Meqitse Nirdamim), 1⒚
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ולקח לבן לחוה שפחתו ולשתי בנותיה ונתן זלפה הגדולה ללאה בתו הגדולה לה לשפחה, 
ובלהה הקטנה לרחל בתו הקטנה. 
And Lavan gave [to her, to Leah his shifḥah] Zilpah [Gen. 29:24]. Were they 
his shefaḥot? Rather, by the law of the land the daughters of a man by his 
pilagshim were called shefaḥot. And there are those who say that the father 
of Bilhah and Zilpah was the brother of Deborah, Rebecca’s nurse, whose 
name was Aḥoti. Before he married, he was taken captive, and Lavan sent 
and redeemed him and gave him his shifḥah as a wife, and she gave birth to a 
daughter to him, and he called her Zilpah, after the name of the city to which 
he was taken captive. She gave birth to another daughter, and he called her 
Bilhah, since when she was born she hurried to nurse, and he said: How my 
daughter hurries. When Jacob was at Lavan’s, Aḥoti their father died, and 
Lavan took his shifḥah Ḥavah [could be read Ḥanah, according to Albeck] 
and her two daughters, and gave Zilpah the elder to his elder daughter Leah 
as a shifḥah, and Bilhah the younger to his younger daughter Rachel.
 These documents have been of particular interest to scholars who 
wish to trace the transmission of non-rabbinic works om the Second 
Temple period, particularly works now known om the apocryphal and 
pseudepigraphic collections, to mediaeval Jewish literature. It is useful to 
list in table form the various elements of this genealogy; in this way, those 
elements not present in the biblical text are highlighted, as well as the 
variations in each source upon which scholars have relied to establish their 
theories of transmission:
 MT 4QTNaph Greek Ber. Rabbati
Relationship of 
Bilhah/Zilpah none sisters sisters sisters
Elder sister n/a Zilpah Zilpah Zilpah
Father’s name none אחיות/Aḥiyot Rotheus אחותי/Aḥoti
Father’s relationship
to Abraham n/a not explicit explicit not explicit
Redemption 
terminology n/a פרק bought פדה
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 MT 4QTNaph Greek Ber. Rabbati
mother’s name none חנה Aina חוה-חנה
mother’s status n/a one of the  maidservant shifḥah of 
  amahot (παιδισκην) Lavan  
  of Lavan of Lavan
   
aunt’s name none דבורה Deborah דבורה
“Zilpah” origin none city to which  city in which  city to which
  father taken father captive father taken
“Bilhah” origin none  – play on    – play on
מתבהלת  מתבהלת  
   – eagerness  eagerness  – eagerness
  to suck to suck to suck
Giving of Bilhah and  explicit explicit absent explicit
Zilpah to Rachel 
and Leah
 Prior to the availability of the Qumran agment, scholars had focused 
on the evident structural similarities between the Greek Testament and Ber. 
Rabbati. Himmelfarb, for instance, concluded that the degree of similarity 
between the Greek Testament (and certain other apocryphal units) and Ber. 
Rabbati is such that a literary relationship has to be assumed; she suggests 
that differences between the sources might simply be revisions by R. Moshe 
to conform to contemporary Jewish practice.50 Addressing the issue of the 
channel of transmission between these sources, Himmelfarb suggested that 
R. Moshe may have had access to a Byzantine Italian Christian version or 
the Greek Testament, probably translated into Hebrew.51 The publication 
of the Qumran agment allowed a reconsideration of the relationship 
between the sources. Stone considered it unlikely that the Greek Testament 
was an intermediary in the transmission of this source, given the details 
50 Martha Himmelfarb, “R. Moses the Preacher and the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs,” 
AJS Review 9 (1984): 55-78, at 62, 6⒊
51 Himmelfarb, “R. Moses the Preacher,” 73-7⒋
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shared between the Qumran agment and Ber. Rabbati, as against the Greek 
document:52 the difference in both the father’s53 and mother’s names in Greek, 
the use of “in which” instead of “to which” in the Zilpah story, the fact that 
the Greek contains an explicit reference to the relationship with Abraham but 
lacks any reference to the two women being given as maidservants, and most 
particularly, the fact that the Bilhah wordplay works only in Hebrew and 
thus could not have originated in the Greek. Stone posits a Second Temple 
“original Naphtali” om which both the Hebrew sources drew.54
7.5.1.A The Naming Speech
Pardes has explained the naming speech as a literary genre found 
throughout the Bible, among other sources, in which someone, usually 
a woman, provides a name for a child, oen developing the name om 
a play on words. The naming speech, in her opinion, is usually reserved 
for significant people; it “accentuates the importance of a given birth.”55 
The naming speech format found in both the Hebrew and Greek formats 
can thus be considered significant, raising an issue as to why the birth 
of Bilhah was emphasized. Further, one may question why the naming 
traditions for the two “slave wives” are not equivalent: that of Zilpah is a 
simple appropriation of a place name.
 One proposal, as suggested by Stone, is that the emphasis on Bilhah’s 
genealogy is actually intended to accentuate the prominence of her 
descendants. Stone notes in particular the mention of Tobit as a descendant 
of the tribe of Naphtali (1:1). Given the apparent emphasis in this book on 
reclaiming Tobit as a “good” Israelite, in contrast to his apostate ancestors 
(e.g. 1:3-5), one might posit the origins of both the Bilhah lineage and 
52 Michael Stone, “The Genealogy of Bilhah,” DSD 3 (1996a): 20-36, at 28-3⒉
53 In contrast to Stone’s view of the Greek name Rotheus as anomalous, Albeck suggests in 
his notes to the Ber. Rabbati passage (p. 119) that it is possible to read the Hebrew in that 
passage as Aroti and not Aḥoti, that is, as a Hebraicized Rotheus with an extra aleph; it 
would then be the name Aḥiyot in the Qumran agment that is anomalous.
54 Stone, “Genealogy of Bilhah,” 3⒊
55 Ilana Pardes, Countertraditions in the Bible: A Feminist Approach (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1992), 40-43, 15⒊ The narrative in Gen. 29:32-30:24, for instance, 
in which Leah and Rachel name their own sons as well as those of Bilhah and Zilpah, 
contains a series of such speeches.
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the book of Tobit in a sectarian group anxious to affirm their respectable 
lineage. Against the sectarian idea, however, is the fact, noted above, that 
the Bilhah lineage seems already to have been emphasized in the biblical 
text itself, as she is the only one of Jacob’s four wives mentioned by name 
in the genealogies of 1Chr. 7:⒔ There are also various traditions linking 
Bilhah closely to Joseph, suggesting that she in fact raised him aer the 
death of his mother (Gen. Rab. [Rom] 84:11), and that her death was 
precipitated by the news that he had supposedly perished (Jub. 34:15).
There is also the possibility that naming speeches, or at least naming 
word plays, were more common than is reflected in written sources. Philo, 
for instance, gives explanations for the names Bilhah and Zilpah, as he does 
for certain other names:56 
Moses has given us the names of these two handmaidens, calling them Zilpah 
and Bilhah. Zilpah by interpretation is “a walking mouth,” which signifies 
the power of expressing thought in language and directing the course of 
an exposition, while Bilhah is “swallowing,” the first and most necessary 
support of mortal animals.
 These explanations occur within the context of Philo’s allegorical 
interpretation of the relationships between the patriarchs and their wives 
and handmaids. What is interesting, however, is that the explanations 
appear to be Hebrew/Aramaic, rather than Greek, word-plays: “a mouth 
going forth” is probably זיל, the imperative of the Aramaic אזל (go), plus 
 ע-ה swallow), with) בלע mouth); while “a swallowing” is possibly om) ,פה
exchange. This suggests that Philo had access to some Hebrew/Aramaic 
traditions regarding biblical names.
7.5.1.B Channels of Transmission
Despite the various similarities among the texts, there are still several issues 
that suggest that the lines of transmission were not straightforward.
a) We may agree that, at the very least, the naming speech of Bilhah 
likely had a Hebrew original, given the nature of the wordplay. With 
56 On Mating with the Preliminary Studies, 30, trans. F.H. Colson and G. H. Whitaker. In this 
work Philo also gives explanations for, among others, the names Sarah, Rachel and Ephraim.
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respect to the other elements, however, there is no compelling reason 
to accept a Hebrew over a Greek original. Moreover, even if we posit 
an “original Naphtali” in Hebrew (and the positing of such an original 
still gets us no further in explaining the channel of transmission to the 
midrashic source), we must still explain why the three sources differ 
among themselves with respect to the identity of Bilhah’s name-giver, 
and why the Greek source would have changed the identity of Zilpah’s 
name-giver, as summarized below:
 MT 4QTNaph Greek Ber. Rabbati
name-giver to Zilpah n/a father mother father
name-giver to Bilhah n/a mother mother father
b)  Another point of difference among the versions is that the connection to
Abraham is not explicit in either of the Hebrew versions of this 
genealogy. Stone suggests, however, that such a relationship may be 
derived om the use of the term paraq to describe Lavan’s redemption 
of Aḥoti, arguing that this term is unusual in the Qumran texts,57 
though it is found in Lam. 5:8, where it is used with respect to a slave. 
Lavan’s motive for this action may thus have been the obligation in 
Lev. 25:47-50 to redeem a relative taken into slavery; hence there is a 
suggestion that Lavan and Aḥoti were related and thus of Abrahamic 
stock. There is, however, another tradition which connected Deborah, 
the sister of Aḥoti according to the Hebrew genealogies, with Naḥor, 
Abraham’s brother,58 a possibility of which the Hebrew versions may 
also have been aware.
57 Stone, “Testament of Naphtali,” 8⒈ An Aramaic form of paraq is found as part of a 
required condition in the marriage contract that a husband is obligated to redeem his wife 
if she is taken captive (mKet. 4:8): אם תשתבאי אפרקניך. The Akkadian term pirqu is found 
at Nuzi (interestingly, the AHW suggests this is actually a metathesis of the root PQR).
58 There is another tradition that may identi Deborah as a great-niece of Abraham. The 
midrash Sefer ha-Yashar (Dan), p. 114, mentions a Deborah as the daughter of Utz, the 
son of Abraham’s brother Naḥor: ויהיו בני עוץ בכור נחור אביחרף וגדין ומילום ודבורה אחותם 
(And the children of Utz, the firstborn of Naḥor: Aviḥeref and Gadin and Milon and their 
sister Deborah). This genealogy, however, is not mentioned in the Bible, and it is not clear 
om the context whether this is the same Deborah who was Rebecca’s nurse. The midrash 
itself is dated relatively late, anywhere om the 11th to the 16th century C.E. (see the 
summary in Strack and Stemberger, Talmud and Midrash, 359).
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c) Though the Qumran agment mentions the disposition of Bilhah and 
Zilpah, it does not specifically describe them as shefaḥot, as does Ber. 
Rabbati (this may, however, be due to the agmentary nature of the 
material).
d) The three sources agree that Zilpah was the elder sister. Rashi, however, 
explicitly states the opposite. At Gen. 30:10 he cites a midrashic source 
(found at Gen. Rab. 71:9) that detected something unusual in the 
wording used in Genesis 30 to describe Zilpah’s giving birth to Gad 
and Asher. In both verses 10 and 12 the phrase used is “And Zilpah 
the handmaid of Leah gave birth”:
בכולם כתיב ותהר וכאן ותלד אלא בחורה היתה ולא היתה ניכרת בעיבורה
With all [the other women in this chapter—Leah, Bilhah and Rachel] —it 
is written: and she conceived [and gave birth], and here just she gave birth—she 
was a young girl, and her pregnancy did not show.
 From this unusual idea, it followed that Zilpah was younger and that 
this was the reason she was given to Leah:
...וכדי לרמות יעקב נתנה לבן ללאה שלא יבין שמכניסין לו את לאה שכך מנהג ליתן 
שפחה הגדולה לגדולה וקטנה לקטנה
In order to trick Jacob, Lavan gave [Zilpah] to Leah, so that he would not 
know that they were giving him Leah. This was the custom, to give the older 
shifḥah to the older woman and the younger to the younger.
 This reversal is also suggested, though not explicitly, in the 11th 
century Midrash Aggadah, a source also attributed to the school of R. 
Moshe haDarshan:
והיתה קטנה והיתה ראויה לרחל ונתנה ללאה ברמאותו כדי להראות ליעקב שזו שפחת 
רחל
And she [Zilpah] was small, and suited to Rachel; and she was given to 
Leah as part of his [Lavan’s] deception, to show Jacob that this was Rachel’s 
shifḥah.
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 It is difficult to explain the existence of this contradiction in two 
sources apparently belonging to the school of R. Moshe haDarshan. 
Further, though Rashi was familiar with and quoted some of the work of 
this school, it is difficult to tell om his comments in this case whether 
he was unaware of all or part of the Aḥoti tradition, or whether he was 
deliberately choosing to ignore it.
7.5.2 The Lavan Tradition
Bereishit Rabbati, unlike the two versions of the Testament, gives a tradition 
naming Lavan as the father of Bilhah and Zilpah, thus making them half-
sisters to Leah and Rachel. The earliest attestation of this tradition seems 
to be in Gen. Rab. 74:14 (redacted 5th century C.E.), in a midrash in the 
name of the third generation amora R. Reuven. This midrash is based on 
Gen. 31:50, in which Lavan exacts om Jacob an oath aer the latter has 
fled om Lavan’s household with his wives and children: If you torment 
my daughters or take other wives over them… God is the witness between me 
and you. [emphasis added] If Lavan meant here to protect his daughters 
Leah and Rachel om being supplanted by further wives, surely he was 
aware that Jacob had already been given “other wives”—Bilhah and Zilpah. 
According to the midrash, the solution was obvious:
א“ר ראובן כולהון בנותיו היו
Rabbi Reuven said: All of them [that is, Leah, Rachel, Bilhah, and Zilpah] 
were [Lavan’s] daughters.
 Targum Pseudo-Jonathan (redacted 7-8th cent. C.E.)59 on Gen. 29:24 
was a similar wording for Bilhah in Gen. 29:29 adds to this identification 
that the mother of each woman was a “concubine”:
ויהב לבן ליה ית זלפה ברתיה דילידת ליה פילקתיה ומסרה ללאה ברתיה לאמהו
And Lavan gave her60 Zilpah, his daughter borne to him by his concubine, 
and gave her to Leah as her amah.
59 Despite its late redaction date, the Targum likely contains earlier material.
60 The Clarke Targum has ליה, but presumably this is an error for לה.
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 This notion of the mother as a “concubine” seems also to be recognized 
in the following midrash in Pirqei de R. Eliezer (8-9th century), pereq 37, 
which posits the idea that the daughters of a pilegesh are called shefaḥot (the 
midrash repeated in the later Ber. Rabbati):
לקח לבן את שתי שפחותיו ונתנן לשתי בנותיו. וכי שפחותיו היו והלא בנותיו היו, 
אלא ללמדך שבנותיו של אדם מפלגשו נקראו שפחות שנאמר ויתן וגו‘ בלהה שפחתו
Lavan took his two shefaḥot and gave them to his two daughters. Were they 
his shefaḥot? Were they not his daughters? This teaches you that the daughters 
of a man from his pilegesh are called his shefaḥot,61 as it is said: And he gave, 
etc., Bilhah his shifḥah....
7.6 CONCLUSION
A review of various references to Bilhah and Zilpah suggests that there 
were competing traditions regarding them om an early period; already in 
the biblical text there is evident uncertainty as to their precise status. In 
postbiblical sources we find two traditions regarding their genealogy, both 
of which were possibly familiar to the editor of Jubilees. Early midrashim 
accept the women as matriarchs. Targum Onkelos and TY “correct” their 
status by referring to them as “subordinates” or by claiming they were eed 
(a tradition also reflected in Josephus); the Bavli (and the Tractate Semaḥot), 
as well as certain later midrashim, reject them as matriarchs, apparently 
because of their slave origins. It is thus primarily the “mainstream” sources 
that are conditioned by the same sensitivity to slave-ee intermarriage that 
is reflected in the Mishnah.
61 Betsy Halpern-Amaru, “Bilhah and Naphtali in Jubilees: A Note on 4QNaphtali,” DSD 
6 (1999): 1-10, at 5-6, notes that, contrary to the biblical text, in which Zilpah is always 
called a shifḥah, in Jubilees she is called an ‘amato, the Ge’ez equivalent of amah. She 
suggests that this change indicates that the author of Jubilees may have been aware of 
(and rejected) the idea that Zilpah was the daughter of a concubine. This would imply 
that the tradition that daughters of concubines were called shefaḥot was known relatively 
early. It is possible, however, that the Jubilees author is simply using ‘amato as a generic 
term for female slave, much as אמתא is used in Aramaic.
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The terms shifḥah and amah were used in the Bible as synonyms, where the 
use reflects differences in ethnic origin or source. These female slaves were 
dependents, but some slave terminology was used for non-slave situations 
where the reference was to an aide, steward, assistant, consort, or other 
faithful dependent. The same woman could be both wife and slave, and 
there is material evidence of a wife-like status for some amahot. Great effort 
was made to place these women in some kind of family or kinship structure, 
most likely where marriage was allowed. There is no evidence that the 
primary use of the shifḥah and amah was exploitation either as a concubine 
or breeder, although both uses were made. Their sexual use was carefully 
regulated. The epigraphic evidence concerning amah suggests that the term 
was used in pre- and postexilic Israel for a woman of relatively high social 
status, as demonstrated by the fact that the term for “wife,” ishah, is also 
applied to women who are elsewhere referred to as shifḥah and amah. 
 Hezser’s functional analysis of rabbinic and Roman law regarding 
slaves is an in-depth synchronic analysis of postbiblical slavery. My study 
continues such a study as an individual diachronic analysis of a particular 
aspect of slavery, namely sex right, and analyzes its evolution om the 
ancient Near East to the Greco-Roman context. 
 In contradistinction, Flesher focuses on the genealogical distinctions 
between Israelite debt-servants who are temporarily indentured and will 
return to Israelite society proper and the non-Israelite slaves who are 
permanent slaves or whose masters may release them to become part of 
Israelite society. The primary system in the Mishnah according to Flesher 
defines slavery in terms of male Israelite householders’ control over the 
slaves regardless of their ethnicity. Sometimes the slave is categorized as 
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property, sometimes as dependent household member (like, for example, 
women and minors) and sometimes as citizen. Flesher presents the system 
as gender neutral. He considers the shifḥah and amah of Exod. 21:7-
11 and Lev. 19:20 as concubines rather than slaves, while the amah of 
Deuteronomy is the female counterpart of eved. In his view, as opposed to 
mine, the Mishnah's primary system of slavery considers slave women more 
like slaves than women with the added attribute of sexual use. 
 I have argued that the different halves of the matrilineal principle in 
mYev. 7:5 and mQidd. 3:12 cannot be explained by householder control. 
Moreover, Flesher's ethnic and primary slave systems are not complementary 
with respect to female slaves. In the non-ethnic system there are provisions 
for the shifḥah who gives birth and in the ethnic system the female Hebrew 
slave must be released before puberty — neither of which can be explained 
by householder control. Flesher's underlying systemic approach assumes 
that the Mishnah is a homogeneous code. I have argued that the Mishnah 
is a collection of specific rules, but not a complete codification in the 
modern sense. Urbach and others have demonstrated layers in the Mishnah 
and divergent opinions, making it unlikely that the Mishnah represents a 
consistent worldview. I treat the inconsistencies in the Mishnah as reflective 
of different schools’ traditions, which can be compared and contrasted to 
provisions in other canonical texts, particularly the Tosea and midreshei 
halakha. I have found that these represent a multiplicity of quite distinct 
and oen contradictory halakhic positions. 
 Methodologically, biblical law, like Mesopotamian law collections, 
may be considered "internormative" — rules sharing certain moral, 
ethical, and religious norms, civil and economic regulations, or political 
goals, rather than statute law in the modern sense. My definition is an 
anthropological definition of law as a complex phenomenon rather than 
a discrete set of rules.
 Furthermore, I have used diachronic philological examination (words 
and terms in a variety of contexts) and comparison of terms and provisions of 
other legal systems to uncover a history of concepts. Comparison, especially 
of Hebrew and Akkadian terms, assumed that nuances of meaning in one 
language may suggest similar nuances in the other. I have made use of 
comparison with "functionally equivalent" acts and remedies om other 
legal systems as a basic method of comparative law. Although this is largely 
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subjective, it has proven to be quite uitful. In my opinion the strength 
of the method is that linkage between particular legal systems need not be 
demonstrated before arguing for functional equivalence.
 I have thus made use of a multi-factor model of halakhic development 
of the type proposed by B. Jackson. This allows for both historical causes 
and inherent logical development in the analysis of any legal decision. 
The halakhic construction of "female slave" status was neither consistent 
nor linear, and historical causes offer only a partial explanation of the 
dominance of certain principles. Hence, I have focused on the different 
reasoning methods used by sages in the same general time ame. P. 
Heger’s pluralistic model attributes to each decisionmaker logical and 
environmental influences which are in a certain degree of tension with 
the deep belief in the immutability of the Torah. This allows, in my 
opinion, for a nuanced view of halakhic development. Positivist models 
such as Neusner’s or Flesher's assume or demand consistency throughout 
the legal canon, a proposition which denies the multiplicity of rabbinic 
positions so obviously a part of Jewish legal discourse. I have argued that 
legal concepts change over time. The issue of the authority of a sage must 
then be investigated historically and not merely dogmatically to uncover 
the motives of an authority and various influences on it. Inconsistencies 
in various rabbinic texts are significant, and even if the texts are firmly 
established philologically on the basis of their variant readings in the extant 
manuscripts, the texts once established may remain internally inconsistent 
— demonstrating a variety of conflicting positions.
 There is no universal agreement of scholars on an appropriate model. The 
evolutionary approaches used hitherto tend to obscure the specific differences 
that relate to females. Thus, I have argued that the use of functional 
equivalence may serve as a "corrective" in this respect, since it allows scholars 
to compare how such problems were addressed in different sources.
 Various approaches have been put forth by scholars concerning the 
three sets of biblical slave legislation (Exod. 21:2-11 — eved ivri, amah; 
Lev. 25:39-46 — aḥ; Deut. 15:12-18 — eved ivri, amah). Mendelson filled 
in the gaps of Hebrew slave legislation on the basis of Mesopotamian 
parallels. Westbrook argued for a common, fairly static law in the entire 
Near East for 1500 years, which allowed cross-referencing between Bible 
and cuneiform law collections. Nonetheless, it is difficult to assume that 
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the law remained static even for hundreds, much less thousands, of years 
in the Near East given contact between different civilizations, either by 
peaceful means such as trade or violent ones involving warfare, conquests, 
and equent dislocation or relocation. This synchronous approach of 
Westbrook and Mendelson fails to posit the mechanism responsible for the 
widespread dissemination of "common law." J. J. Finkelstein rejects the a 
priori assumption of a common law in the Near East, but he acknowledges 
the closeness of cases and language. There was perhaps a scribal connection 
between Eastern and Western Semites, though not necessarily a "common 
law" in the ancient Near East. Heger, Finkelstein, and others have argued 
that biblical legislation faced the same problems as other legal systems did 
but developed solutions in accordance with its own unique theology.
 I argue that reproductive capacity makes comparison of the female 
slave to the ishah, wife, more relevant than comparison to male slaves. 
Sexual access, sex right, and its consequences depend on where a woman 
is on the dependence continuum evident in the Israelite household, with 
the legitimate wife bound by laws of adultery in the strict sense at one 
extreme end. Sex right may be used as a marker to show how female 
slaves were differentiated om wives and other women in Jewish law. Legal 
marriage and the resultant status of the offspring created class differences 
while adultery laws protected a man’s sex right to a particular woman. 
Differential legal provisions concerning sexual activity result in at least 
some legal recognition of what is otherwise status inequality. Legal status 
is assigned by a legal system and therefore is constructed; it is not an 
inherent condition.
 As such, it was proposed that an essential factor in defining “female slave” 
is the notion of sex right – that is, the regulation of sexual access to such 
females. This study has looked at two facets of sex right in connection with 
slaves: the notion that a female slave has no qiddushin, with the correlative 
idea that her offspring will also be slaves (the matrilineal principle), and the 
question of whether one can commit adultery with a female slave.
 It was shown that the biblical notion of “female slave” placed her on 
a continuum with wives. Such women could marry (in fact, the provision 
of Exod. 21:7-11 may be a species of a fitting-out-for-marriage contract), 
and their children would not necessarily be slaves (though they might be 
inferior with respect to inheritance). Adultery with the female slave of Lev. 
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19:20-21 seems to consist of a kind of treason or betrayal.
 In contrast, mishnaic law provides for a clearly articulated matrilineal 
principle, though it was noted that there were likely a number of different 
views of slave marriage extant postbiblically, as reflected in other tannaitic 
works. As to adultery with the female slave of Lev. 19:20-21, it was noted 
that a variety of exegeses reflected in tannaitic material led to a plethora of 
conflicting definitions of this crime, with the result that the crime, though 
vaguely resembling transgression of an incest prohibition, ended up as 
virtually unenforceable, for want of a clear definition of the protagonists. 
Far om the slave-wife continuum reflected in the biblical texts, the 
postbiblical material studied reflected distancing with a far more complete 
separation between slave and family.
 The development in slave definition om Bible, where a slave woman 
was dependent and placed in the family continuum and her reproductive 
capacity would be utilized, forms a sharp contrast with the Mishnah, where 
she is marginalized and sexual relations with her are either prohibited or 
without legal consequence. Biblical slaves were part of the dependence 
continuum, while in the tannaitic period concepts like ben/bat ḥorin (ee 
person) and meshuḥrar/meshuḥreret (eed slave) apparently are far closer to 
Greek and Roman legal categories.
 In short, there is a leap (at least in these elements) in the definition of 
female slave between biblical and postbiblical texts. Why did this occur? 
As for the multitude of definitions of Lev. 19:20, this may at first blush 
be explained simply by the pluralism extant in the tannaitic era. Each sage 
has his own view of the crime contemplated in Lev. 19:20, and each view 
is supported by the sage’s particular form of exegesis – some show influence 
of foreign (i.e., Greco-Roman) law, particularly with respect to notions of 
“property,” while others seem to be reacting more to important different 
referents in the biblical text. In general, postbiblical contact with Greco-
Roman law, with its precise distinctions between property and person, 
overcame the biblical idea of a dependence continuum. The resulting 
conditions, such as "half-slave, half-ee," became too tenuous to be put 
into practice, another example of the marginalization of the slave class.
 I have argued that there is no conclusive evidence of a prohibition of 
legal marriage for female slaves, nor is there automatic inheritance of slave 
status in the Bible. The asymmetry in the rulings depending on which parent 
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is a slave demonstrates for S. Cohen that there was no unified matrilineal 
principle in Mishnah. In contradistinction, I argue that the variety of 
opinions concerning inheritance of slave status in postbiblical literature gives 
no firm basis for arguing a linear development of the matrilineal principle in 
Jewish law. Rather, the evidence is consistent with the difference between 
dependence and marginalization in biblical and postbiblical texts. In the case 
of the shifḥah neḥerefet, the unee status of the woman seems to preclude 
the possibility of adultery. In what seems to be a conflict between sex 
right and some idea of property rights, the case was resolved according 
to property rights. In nearly all slave systems, there is a conflict between 
slave as person and slaves as property, yielding inconsistent treatment of 
slaves. In Exod. 21:20 a kind of talion is given to the slave killed by his 
master—"he shall surely be avenged"—and in Exod. 21:26-27 slaves iǌured 
by the master are manumitted. This seems to indicate that they were not 
considered solely as property. The shifḥah neḥerefet may be understood as an 
upset of the dependence continuum. For the slave it is a crime of trespass 
and for the wife a crime of adultery. Adultery constitutes treason against the 
husband. Although the slave was not formally married, this sexual crime is 
nevertheless considered to be a trespass.
 The matrilineal principle as it developed in postbiblical Judaism consists 
of two elements: restriction on "legal" marriage and the interdependence 
of the child's status with its mother's status. As opposed to what appears 
to be the case in the Bible, legal marriage was oen not available to female 
slaves. The status of slave women is not changed by intercourse, that is, 
they do not become legal "wives" and therefore their children remain slaves. 
Jewish-gentile and ee-slave sexual connections do not yield marriage. In 
mQidd. 3:12 if the woman is a gentile her child is a gentile; if she is a slave, 
her child is a slave regardless of the nationality of the father. If the mother 
is an Israelite and the father is a slave or gentile, the offspring is a mamzer 
according to mYev. 7:⒌
 The matrilineal principle and its development in mishnaic law, at least 
with respect to slaves, I believe is due more to foreign influence and the 
demands of the Greco-Roman administrative system on householders to 
keep detailed lists of household elements, probably for purposes of taxation. 
In particular, I suggest that tax law would account for this change om the 
previous biblical model. It is in the Ptolemaic era that I think we first notice 
--------------------------------------------------  CONCLUSION  --------------------------------------------------
— 351 —
the taxation of slaves as commodities. This system should be contrasted with 
the taxation of transactions involving slaves, in which the slave would be 
defined as such by the parties to a sale or a general poll or head tax. Under 
these new conditions a slave, like other household members, would be taxed 
according to the definitions of slavery by an administrative ruling. That is, 
this increase in commodity taxation would likely necessitate the greater 
existence of a poll or census with a clearly defined notion of slavery. There 
likely would be considerable pressure to adopt such formal definitions.1 
 Assuming for the moment that these conclusions have some plausibility, 
should they have any effect on halakhah in modern times? The construct 
of slaves and slavery is supported by certain legal, political, economic, and 
social definitions, only some of which have relevance in the Western world. 
I return in particular to the halakhic possibility of acquiring a female slave 
described at the beginning of the Introduction. One proposed solution for 
"curing" the offspring of a mamzer would be for him to purchase a non-
Jewish woman as a slave. The offspring would be slaves who could then 
be eed without carrying the status of mamzer; the woman could then 
be eed as well with manumission constituting conversion to Judaism. 
This raises the question as to whether legal actions which are to a large 
extent symbolic should be permitted despite their abeyance and in this case 
repugnant nature in the modern world. 
 Many of us today would view contemporaneous reliance on such an 
antiquarian model as this as a morally dangerous position. Under a positivist 
characterization of Jewish law, such as that proposed by Englard and 
1 Certain general observations on the need to maintain extensive lists to justi commodity 
taxation may be made:
 In ancient Athens it was considered irreconcilable with a person’s dignity to impose a 
tax on one’s person, income, or capital; therefore there were generally direct taxes only 
on metics and indirect taxes and liturgies; eisphora was an extraordinary direct tax for 
extraordinary demands such as war (Thomsen, p. 11).
 In Roman Egypt, there were poll taxes on persons already om Ptolemy IV Philopater 
(Wallace, p. 96); for this purpose, slaves, sons, and eedmen followed their master 
(Wallace, 119). Documentation was required to show the relationship of all persons to 
an owner (Wallace, 102). Exact information was also important with respect to capitation 
taxes imposed by Romans (Wallace, 96), om which people fled (Wallace, 97, 136; and 
possibly Luke 2:1-4 which was either a tax or census registration possibly for taxation 
purposes). Given the nature of this increased administrative attention, detailed rules were 
required for commodity transactions.
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Roth,2 such a position is legally acceptable if pronounced by a recognized 
authority. Both scholars, as noted above, would seem to exclude factors in 
the historical development of a particular halakhah om consideration by 
any poseq (legal decisor), and this would appear to render irrelevant any 
data that show that particular rules were time– and circumstance-specific. 
From the texts studied above it is evident that sex right is an outmoded 
model inextricably linked to female status. Such a connection, through 
such axioms as shinnui ha-itim (changing times),3 might now be easily 
ruptured by a poseq. Yet this type of connection also reflects a flawed view 
of positivism, in my opinion, even if one concedes that this is the correct 
model with which to assess modern halakhah. It is a static view that would 
preclude the formation of new norms based directly on the Torah. It puts 
the strongest emphasis on the continuity of precedent (Englard) or the 
existence of so-called systemic principles (Roth), over recognition of the 
significance of differences in decisions and principles that have always 
been a feature of the halakhic system. It fails to acknowledge the fact 
that the decision makers’ values and circumstances inevitably influence 
their acceptance of particular trends of Torah interpretation. Even using 
a positivist model, there is room for a dynamic viewpoint, under which 
new norms can be derived om the Torah (law) and there can be open 
acceptance of differing interpretations, rather than a static viewpoint under 
which all norms have already been derived. Hence we would argue for a 
new dynamic model based on a continuum in which we see sex rewarded or 
sex punished depending on our contemporaneous interpretations of good 
and evil.  A static model is, in my opinion, a dying model.
2 Englard, “Research in Jewish Law,” 36; J. Roth, “An Halakhic Perspective on an Historical 
Foundation,” Judaism 133 (1985):, 62-67, at 6⒊ Roth argues that the historical sources of 
a norm are legally significant only if a) they remain the sole justification for the norm, and 
b) they are judged to be inaccurate or inapplicable. While b) would seem to give a wide 
allowance for the introduction of historical data, a) gives a wide allowance for the positing 
of a variety of justifications for any particular norm. Under the latter, Roth rejects the 
relevance of historical data regarding the matrilineal principle (p. 67). 
3 See explanations of this term in Roth, “An Halakhic Perspective,” 251, 254, 28⒌
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